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Introduction
Renger E. de Bruin, Cornelis van der Haven, Lotte Jensen and  
David Onnekink
On Friday the 29th of this month January [1712], at ten o’clock in the 
morning, the Congres or assembly of the plenipotentiaries was opened, 
with the sound of trumpets.1
Thus the peace congress in Utrecht that would end twelve years of global 
warfare and would alter the map of Europe for the foreseeable future was 
ceremoniously opened. Spectators witnessed the ostentatious arrival of the 
ambassadors, such as the bishop of Bristol and the earl of Strafford for 
the queen of England, and the abbot of Polignac and marshall d’Huxelles 
for the king of France, who arrived by coach and were led into the building by 
a chamberlain of the congress. The performance was witnessed by ‘the conflu-
ence of countless people’ who had gathered on the square in front of city hall 
and observed the arrival of the bishop of Bristol and his equipage, who was 
‘very splendourous’, with a long magnificent robe carried by two pages.2 These 
were ‘dressed in white linen, with light green velvet covers, with silver embroi-
deries and with red plumes on their hats; the footmen in purple linen, with 
light green covers and with golden collars’.3
The theatrical setting of the congress underscores its performative nature, a 
play in several acts in which the actors, the diplomats, had set roles. The perfor-
mances of peace are the subject of this volume which focuses in particular on 
the Peace of Utrecht of 1713, a milestone in European history. It concluded the 
* The editors wish to thank the following institutions for their financial support of the 2013 
conference and the publication of this volume: The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific 
Research NWO (specifically Lotte Jensen’s VIDI-project ‘The role of war and propaganda litera-
ture in the shaping of an early modern Dutch identity, 1648–1815’ and the Internationalisation 
project ‘Rethinking the Peace of Utrecht’), Utrecht University, the Dutch-Belgian Society for 
Eighteenth Century Studies, the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the 
Peace of Utrecht Foundation.
1    Europische Mercurius, behelzende de voornaamste zaken van staat en oorlog, voorgevallen in 
alle de koningryken en heerschappyen van Europe 23 (1712), I, 84.
2    Europische Mercurius 23 (1712), I, 84, 85.
3    E. Harskamp, ‘Journael of daegelijxe annotatie vant gene ontrend de vredehandel tot Utrecht 
de heeren, daer toe den 16 december 1711 van stadswege gecommitteert, is voorgekomen,’ 
Berigten van het Historisch Genootschap te Utrecht 3:2 (1851): 213–220, appendix.
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extensive wars that had swept through Europe as well as the overseas colonies 
and heralded an exceptionally long period of peace for early modern times 
in Western Europe that lasted until the outbreak of the War of the Austrian 
Succession in 1740.
The Peace of Utrecht ended the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713), 
pitching the Grand Alliance against France in a struggle for domination of 
the continent. The prize was the throne of Spain, vacant since the death in 
1700 of the childless last Habsburg king Carlos II. When plans for partition 
came to naught, France and Habsburg became embroiled in a major struggle 
for the inheritance, in which England and the Dutch Republic allied with the 
Emperor but Spain supported the French claimant. Battlefields were scat-
tered over several locations in Western Europe: on the Iberian peninsula, the 
Spanish Netherlands, Northern Italy and on the German side of the Rhine. On 
a far smaller scale, fighting took place in the American colonies and on the 
world’s oceans. Despite Allied victories near Blenheim (1704), Ramillies (1706), 
Turin (1706), Oudenaarde (1708) and Malplaquet (1709), France remained 
undefeated. A series of peace negotiations led by the Dutch and the French, 
which commenced in 1705, ultimately failed in 1710. Renewed secret negotia-
tions between France and the English Tory ministry which came into power in 
1710, eventually led to the Peace of Utrecht which was settled in April 1713. The 
Peace of Utrecht acknowledged the French claimant, now Philip V, as king of 
Spain, but also allotted dispensation to the Habsburg claimant in Italy (Naples, 
Sardinia and Milan) and the Spanish Netherlands. The French lost possessions 
in Canada to the English, who also took Gibraltar and Minorca and wrested the 
asiento (the monopoly on slave trade to the Spanish Empire) from the French. 
The Dutch received a military Barrier in the Southern Netherlands. The peace 
treaties continued in Baden, Rastatt and Madrid in 1714 and 1715 completed the 
process.
The wars between France and the Grand Alliance changed the nature and 
scale of European warfare. Armies grew dramatically in a process described 
as a military revolution. The Dutch had an army of over 100,000 men, but the 
French army peaked at 420,000 troops in its heyday.4 Battles were also fought 
on a larger scale. In the Battle of Blenheim, for instance, some 120,000 troops 
were involved and the casualties numbered tens of thousands.5 According to 
4    John A. Lynn, Giant of the grand siècle the French Army, 1610–1715 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 32; David Onnekink and Renger de Bruin, De Vrede van Utrecht 
(Hilversum: Verloren, 2013), 34.
5    J.W. Wijn, Het Staatsche Leger. Deel VIII: Het tijdperk van de Spaanse Successieoorlog, 1702–1715. 
Volume 1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), 471–479.
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Jeremy Black, the period between 1660 and 1710 witnessed an important step in 
this process, in which scale and organization were tied up with the growth of 
state administration.6 This inevitably also changed the impact on society, most 
notably through heavier taxation.7
The Peace of Utrecht embodies several intriguing contradictions. While it 
brought about a prolonged period of peace in Europe, it also inaugurated the 
age of aggressive ‘balance of power’ politics. Although the Peace was main-
tained for several years, conflict resulting from disputed articles arose as early 
as 1716 when Spain went to war over Sicily and Sardinia. However the great 
powers intervened in order to restore the Utrecht settlement. That settlement 
collapsed with the War of the Austrian Succession in 1740. Moreover, the Peace 
of Utrecht restructured overseas commerce and arguably accelerated Anglo-
French rivalry in the colonies, that reached a climax in 1756 with the start of 
the Seven Years War.
The long years of conflict paradoxically forged a growing sense of ‘Europe’ 
as an international society, and artistic depictions of the Treaty of Utrecht 
highlighted both the European character of the Peace as well as the proto-
patriotic sentiments that it stirred. At the same time, as the conclusion of a 
period in which international religious rivalry once again flared up, the Peace 
of Utrecht itself witnessed a striking lack of attention to religious matters. 
Although Protestant plenipotentiaries submitted a declaration of support for 
suppressed religious minorities on 11 April 1713, the day of the conclusion of 
Peace, the actual treaties all but ignored religious matters.8
While the public was generally averse to war, it did not neglect to celebrate 
its war heroes. Prince Eugene of Savoy and the Duke of Marlborough became 
celebrities. The impact of war also interacted with the growing news indus-
try. In the Dutch Republic, for instance, political pamphlets already circulated 
during the Dutch Revolt, but the genre really took off in the early seventeenth 
century, peaking in 1672 with a total of at least one million copies.9 In England, 
6    Jeremy Black, A military revolution? Military change and European society, 1550–1800 
(Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1991).
7    E.g. Wantje Fritschy, ‘The Poor, the Rich, and the Taxes in Heinsius’ Times,’ in Anthonie 
Heinsius and the Dutch Republic 1688–1720. Politics, War, and Finance, ed. J.A.F. de Jongste and 
A.J. Veenendaal (The Hague: Institute of Netherlands History, 2002), 242–258.
8    James W. Gerard, The peace of Utrecht a historical review of the great treaty of 1713–14, and of the 
principal events of the war of the Spanish succession (New York/London: G.P. Putnam, 1885), 
299.
9    Roeland Harms, Pamfletten en publieke opinie. Massamedia in de zeventiende eeuw 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 25; Michel Reinders, Gedrukte chaos. 
Populisme en moord in het Rampjaar 1672 (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Balans, 2010), 14.
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the newspaper really took off on the eve of the Civil War in 1641 and reached a 
steady plateau around the time of the War of the Spanish Succession. The first 
daily newspaper appeared during the War of the Spanish Succession, and the 
early eighteenth century heralded a time in which ‘the newspaper became an 
established factor in British politics’.10
Although decision-making about war and peace was almost exclusively 
the domain of princes and ministers, the people’s insatiable hunger for mili-
tary news stimulated governments to publicly justify war policy. The booming 
media informed the general public about the peace negotiations and facili-
tated public reflection on the diplomatic process.11 The public performance 
of peace became more important even though, at the same time, many forms 
of diplomatic communication and rituals remained invisible to the people at 
large. This also stimulated public debate, which famously peaked in England in 
1711 with the influential The conduct of the allies by Jonathan Swift, sponsored 
by Tory politician Robert Harley. It was a scathing criticism of the war which 
facilitated the ministerial shuffle that ultimately led to peace negotiations. 
In this debate female authors also played their role, for instance Delarivier 
Manley, whose satirical anti-Whig 1709 The New Atalantis was likewise sup-
ported by Harley. In general, women’s publication’s in England really took off 
on the eve of the Civil War and reached a peak around the time of the start of 
the War of the Spanish Succession.12
In short, the Peace of Utrecht confronts us with changing concepts of inter-
national relations as well as with new public practices of ‘performing’ diplo-
macy in eighteenth-century Europe. This volume rethinks the Peace of Utrecht 
by exploring the nexus between culture and politics. For too long, cultural and 
political historians have studied early modern international relations in iso-
lation. By studying the political as well as the cultural aspects of this peace 
(and its concomitant paradoxes) from a broader perspective, this volume aims 
to shed new light on the relation between diplomacy and performative cul-
ture in the public sphere.13 Peace-making was a core business of early modern 
10    Joad Raymond, The invention of the newspaper. English newsbooks 1641–1649 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991), 15.
11    Cf. Jeremy D. Popkin, ‘New perspectives on the early modern European press,’ in News 
and politics in early modern Europe (1500–1800), ed. Joop W. Koopmans ed. (Leuven/Paris/
Dudley: Peeters, 2005).
12    Joad Raymond, ‘Development of the book trade in Britain,’ in The Oxford History of 
Popular Print Culture Vol. I, ed. Joad Raymond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 64.
13    Cf. J. Watkins, ‘Toward a new diplomatic history of medieval and early modern Europe,’ 
Journal of Medieval and early Modern Studies 38.1 (2008), 1–14; Maurits Ebben & Louis 
Siciking, ‘Nieuwe diplomatieke geschiedenis van de premoderne tijd. Een inleiding,’ 
Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis 127 (2014): 541–552.
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diplomatic activity. It was a performative act, both in a cultural (the perfor-
mance of peace celebrations) as well as diplomatic sense (the ceremonial 
nature of negotiations). Moreover, as Berber Bevernage has pointed out, peace 
treaties utilize ‘highly performative language of peace treaties’ in an ‘attempt 
to create a rupture between the “then” and the “now”.’14 The conclusion of 
peace itself is a significant performative act.
This volume looks at the wider aspects of performativity connected to the 
Peace of Utrecht in an attempt not only to rethink the nature and significance 
of events of 1713 themselves but also to establish how diplomatic historians, 
cultural historians and literary scholars can benefit from each other’s insights. 
It also builds on a long tradition of interpretations of the Peace of Utrecht 
itself, a settlement that was regarded as important as well as politically con-
troversial from its inception. For the historians who chronicled the Peace of 
Utrecht around 1713, it became a crucible of ideological strife until deep into 
the eighteenth century.15 Towards the end of the eighteenth century, how-
ever, the historiographers fell rather silent on the peace, although it figured 
in most historical overviews (often in a negative light). Full coverage of the 
peace by modern scholarship had to wait until the late nineteenth century, 
the golden age of the historiography of foreign policy, with monographs on 
the peace by Ottocar von Weber (1881) and James W. Gerard (1885).16 Another 
important milestone was the 1995 encyclopedic The Treaties of the War of the 
Spanish Succession—An Historical and Critical Dictionary, edited by Linda and 
14    Berber Bevernage, History, Memory, and State-Sponsored Violence: Time and Justice (New 
York: Routledge, 2012), 82.
15    Jonathan Swift started working on his history of the peace in 1712, but the work was never 
published because of its perceived partisan bias. Partisan bias was also obvious in Henry 
St John’s Defense of the Treaty of Utrecht, and Robert Walpole’s 1712 as A Short History of 
the Parliament which Approved of the infamous Peace of Utrecht, a book that was repub-
lished in 1763 at the time of the Peace of Paris. The Huguenot Casimir Freschot published 
his extensive The compleat history of the Treaty of Utrecht and also that of . . . the Treaties 
of Baden and Rastatt in 1716, mainly consisting of the publication of treaties and resolu-
tions. Likewise, the magisterial Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire du XVIII siècle by the Swiss 
Guillaume de Lamberty, a fourteen-volume series on the War of the Spanish Succession pub-
lished from the 1720s onward contained a massive collection of primary sources.
16    Ottocar von Weber, Der Friede von Utrecht (Gotha: Perthes 1891); W.J. Gerard, The Peace of 
Utrecht. Historical review of the great treaty of 1713–1714, and of the principal events of the 
War of the Spanish Succession (New York/Londen: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1885). A small study 
in Dutch was written by the Utrecht schoolmaster Willem Bannier in 1913, De vrede van 
Utrecht, 11 april 1713: rede, uitgesproken voor de leerlingen van het Stedelijk Gymnasium te 
Utrecht op 11 april 1913 (Utrecht: Utrechtsch Stedelijk Gymnasium, 1914).
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Marsha Frey.17 Except for such scattered publications, the peace itself has been 
all but neglected in modern historiography despite the landmark status that is 
given to the Peace of Utrecht in some overviews of the history of international 
relations. Some historians argue that where the Peace of Westphalia failed to 
achieve stability in Europe, the Peace of Utrecht ‘superseded Westphalia’ in 
creating a functional alliance system.18 At the same time, whereas Westphalia 
has received iconic status amongst international relations scholars, Utrecht 
is all but ignored in international relations textbooks or downgraded as only 
one of many early modern treaties.19 War has always been more attractive to 
scholars than peace, but according to John Gittings the study of peace deserves 
more attention.20 Recently, peace studies have been flourishing, including 
those directed at the early modern age, witness for instance the research 
project ‘Europäische Friedensverträge der Vormoderne online’, hosted by the 
Leibniz-Institut für Europäische Geschichte (IEG).21
In most of the studies mentioned above the emphasis is on high poli-
tics. The most recent volume of essays, edited by Heinz Duchhardt, is more 
inclusive of the visual and literary responses to the Peaces of Utrecht, Rastatt 
and Baden but is at heart a study of diplomacy and international relations.22 
From another angle, art historians have studied the artistic representation of 
peace in the early modern age.23 This volume aspires to approach the Peace 
of Utrecht from an interdiscplinary (literary cultural, and diplomatic) perspec-
tive, by considering it as a performative event.
17    The Treaties of the War of the Spanish Succession—An Historical and Critical Dictionary, 
ed. Linda Frey and Marsha Frey (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1995).
18    D.J, Sturdy, Fractured Europe 1600–1721 (Oxford/Malden: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2002), 
75.
19    Typical is Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches by Robert 
Jackson and Georg Sørensen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013 (fifth edition)). There 
is a lengthy discussion on Westphalia, but Utrecht is not mentioned in the book at all.
20    John Gittings, The Glorious Art of Peace: From the Iliad to Iraq (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012).
21    ‘Europäische Friedensverträge der Vormoderne online,’ Leibnitz Institut für Europäische 
Geschichte, http://www.ieg-friedensvertraege.de, accessed 26 June 2014.
22    Utrecht Rastatt Baden 1712–1714: Ein europäisches Friedenswerk am Ende des Zeitalters 
Ludwigs XIV, ed. Heinz Duchhardt and Martin Espenhorst (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2013); Cf. Pax Perpetua. Neuere Forschungen zum Frieden in der Frühen Neuzeit, 
ed. Inken Schmidt-Voges et al. (Berlin: Oldenburg Verlag, 2010).
23    E.g. Liesbeth M. Helmus, ‘Allegories of peace: Nijmegen, Ryswick and Utrecht-Rastatt,’ in 
Peace Was Made Here. The Treaties of Utrecht, Rastatt and Baden 1713–1714, ed. Renger de 
Bruin and Maarten Brinkman (Michael Imhof Verlag: Petersberg, 2013), 87–97.
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 Performance
The concept of ‘performance’ covers a wide range of scholarly fields, from phi-
losophy, anthropology, linguistics, theatre studies, to political discourses and 
international relations. It certainly is a challenging concept since its borders 
are so porous that the phenomenon is difficult to describe.24 For the present 
volume, both the political interpretations of this paradigm as well as its defini-
tion in the field of theatre studies seem to be particularly relevant. It has, how-
ever, been linguistic speech-act theory which laid the foundation for current 
approaches to performative acts, not only in the field of ‘performance studies’ 
as such, but also in relation to various other fields, like political science, literary 
studies, anthropology and theatre history. The work of J.L. Austin had a large 
influence on scholars who study the performativity of language, based on the 
idea that saying something is already a form of acting, which means that pro-
nouncing words in public can be seen as the performance of an action.25
The official announcement of a peace treaty, one of the core elements of 
early modern peace celebrations, could be seen very well as a ‘speech act’ in 
Austin’s terms. Recently signed treaties were ‘performed’ in different ways and 
before they were seen as a ‘peace’, these treaties had to be officially announced 
in a public space (read out loud). Only when a peace was thus proclaimed could 
one say that it was ‘performed’, which means: publicly considered as ‘real’ and 
existing. Both its public character as well as its timeliness are central to the 
idea of a ‘peace performance’, confirming in time and by way of public speech 
what has just been written down and signed. These official announcements 
were made in front of the public, often from the steps or balcony of official 
buildings, like town halls.26 The treaty between France and the Dutch Republic 
for instance was announced in The Hague on 13 April 1713 by a special mes-
senger, the secretary of the States General, who handed over an official copy of 
the treaty to the official representatives of that political body, after which the 
peace was made public in the streets by shouts and sounds of trumpets.27
24    Marvin Carlson, Performance: a critical introduction (New York, London: Routledge, 2004), 
205–206; Performing memory in art and popular culture, ed. Liedeke Plate and Anne 
Margriet Smelik (New York, London: Routledge, 2013), 6–7.
25    Erika Fischer-Lichte, Ästhetik des Performativen (Frankfurt a/Main: Suhrkamp, 2004), 31ff; 
Performing memory, ed. Plate and Smelik, 7–8.
26    E.M.L. van der Maas, ‘De Vrede verbeeld. Zeventiende-eeuwse vredes in de prentkunst,’ 
in: 1648. Vrede van Munster. Feit en verbeelding, ed. Jacques Dane (Zwolle: Waanders, 1998), 
192–193.
27    See the report in: Europische Mercurius (1713), I, 219.
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The verb ‘to perform’ has of course much wider connotations and refers 
more generally to how acts are carried out and become meaningful in practice. 
Performance is a popular term in modern handbooks on management and 
governance as was the instructive vocabulary of ‘manière’ or ‘l’art de’ in seven-
teenth- and eighteenth-century professional handbooks, like instructions for 
diplomats. The performance of a peace then refers to diplomatic practice, the 
daily business of the negotiations and the work that had to be done behind 
the scenes in order to ‘perform’ a peace, i.e. to mediate between representatives 
of powers in order to solve an armed conflict. This conceptualized diplomatic 
‘work’ of early modern diplomats refers to a broad range of ways to perform 
a peace. For the diplomats who gathered in Utrecht, all aspects of their per-
formance as diplomats became important during the negotiations. As Linda 
and Marsha Frey write in the first chapter, the performative repertoire of eigh-
teenth-century diplomats was extensive, and ‘intrigues, manoeuvres, negotia-
tions, quarrels and social activities, sometimes including sexual liaisons’ were 
all part of their role in the performative culture of international diplomacy.
The concept of performance is strongly connected with the public relevance 
of the performed act and the public attention caught by its ‘showy’ character. 
Acts are performances as soon as they are carried out before the eye of an audi-
ence. Jon Mckenzie highlights the interactional nature of performances and 
their ‘challenge of efficacy’, i.e. their ambition to address and affect an audi-
ence.28 Here the ‘theatrical’ aspect of performances (including their political 
appearance) is becoming important. The bodily co-presence of actors and an 
audience is the essence of theatrical praxis, which constitutes a performance. 
The idea that a performance always is an event that occurs between actors 
and their audience is central to the concept of performance in modern theatre 
studies. A public act is seen as a performance as soon as there is an audience 
that is expected to act like a group of co-performers, who contribute to the per-
formance by their physical presence, their observation and their responses.29
Thus, the notion of performance is inherently linked to ‘agency’, as the per-
formance is acted out by different groups of people.30 In the case of ‘Utrecht’, 
different professional agencies—like publicists, theatre makers, diplomats, 
poets and courtiers—were involved in the performance of ideas, concepts 
28    Jon Mckenzie, Perform or Else: From Discipline to Performance (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2001), 30–31.
29    See Fischer-Lichte, Ästhetik des Performativen, 47, who refers to the work of Max Hermann 
from the 1920s.
30    Cf. Performing Memory, ed. Plate and Smelik, 3–4.
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and memories in front of an audience. When we consider the peace perfor-
mances of early modern diplomats, the most striking thing seems to be, how-
ever, that the negotiations itself were not public at all. The most successful 
negotiations were conducted informally and behind closed doors, but at the 
same time the performance of peace remained a highly formalized and ritual-
ized event. Increasingly, diplomats themselves realized the potential of public 
performances, whereas princes celebrated peace with feasts and imagery. They 
realized the representative potential of this public attention and initiated big 
(semi)public theatrical events as the public frame of their negotiations (like 
fireworks, masquerades and theatre performances). ‘Utrecht’ therefore con-
fronts us with intriguing tensions between public manifestations of peace and 
performances that remained invisible to the public, as, for example, the chap-
ter by Lucien Bély shows. Both visible and invisible performances, however, 
could be seen as acts of identity formation as well. In this volume we will be 
confronted with the performances of identities in different fields: ranging from 
European and local identities, gendered identities, cultural identities as well as 
professional identities (diplomats, courtiers).
The mediated peace performances of the early eighteenth century not 
only made visible and ‘experienceable’ what otherwise would remain hidden 
behind closed doors (the negotiations), they opened up a much wider field 
of topics and issues for public reflection. It is for this reason that this book 
will deal with the ways in which theatrical and textual reflections on war and 
peace transformed issues of distanced international politics and negotiations 
into topics of public discussion and critical reflection. The performance of 
‘Utrecht’ therefore widely exceeds the borders of the Dutch town. The peace 
performances discussed in this book cover a wide range of reflections related 
to the peace: its appearances in different mediated forms within the public 
sphere, the ‘performance’ of diplomats, as well as theatrical performance itself 
as an instrument to imagine and perform peace.
The notion that diplomats ‘performed’ peace in front of a larger audi-
ence is obvious in the arrival of the British ambassador the Earl of Lexington 
in Madrid in September 1712 for consultation. He entered the city in a royal 
coach; ‘uncountable was the confluence of the general public’ to see the mag-
nificent spectacle, which was repeated the next day when he rode to the Buen 
Retiro Park to speak with King Philip V.31 In Utrecht tourist guides circulated 
in which the names of the ambassadors, their residences as well as the colours 
of the costumes of their retinue were described, and the Utrecht residents 
31    Europische Mercurius 23 (1712), II, 247.
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could witness these diplomatic parties touring the city in an almost theatrical 
outfit.32 The most successful ambassador in showing off to the local popula-
tion was undoubtedly the Portuguese ambassador Tarouca, who threw a mag-
nificent ball in honour of the birth of the crown prince,33 but also treated 
the locals to a rare sight by organizing a sleigh-ride party in winter on one 
of the Utrecht canals, an engraving of which in the Utrecht archives still 
32    Nicolaas Chevalier, Lyste der Namen ende Qualiteiten van hare excellentien de heeren 
pleniptotentiarissen envoyees, ende publique ministers, dewelke sig bevinden op het congres, 
over de Generale Vrede, t’Utrecht. Beneffens haare Edelens Wapens, Woonplaatsen, ende 
Livryen . . . (Utrecht, 1712).
33    Kornee van der Haven, Eveline Koolhaas-Grosfeld, ‘Maskerade en Ontmaskering,’ De 
Achttiende Eeuw 41:1 (2009): 5–7.
Figure 0.1 A ball in honour of the birth of the crown prince of Portgual (19 October 1712), 
organized by the count of Tarouca on 27 February 1713 in Utrecht. Engraving by 
Nicolas Chevalier from Relation des fêtes, que le Comte de Tarouca a données 
(Utrecht: N. Chevalier, 1714).  
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captures the moment.34 The conclusion of the peace and the celebrations also 
led to a spectacular performance. When on 14 June 1713 the States General orga-
nized fireworks in the Hofvijver in The Hague, the general populace enjoyed 
the spectacle from the shore, together with ‘all the foreign ministers’, invited 
by the States General ‘to be treated and see the artful fireworks from the House 
of Prince Maurice’.35
The theatrical setting in which peace was performed was also of great inter-
est to spectators. John Leake, a traveler who witnessed one of the meetings of 
the ambassadors in February 1712, wrote: ‘The 23rd there was to be a general 
assembly at the stadthouse of the ministers of the several Allies, as well as 
of those of France. We could not slip this opportunity of gratifying our curi-
osity, and therefore, about ten in the morning, we placed ourselves as conve-
niently as we could to observe the cavalcade’. He realized the historical value 
of the occasion and was thrilled to ‘view the politic faces of these arbitrators of 
the fate of Europe’. The location itself, however, was less than impressive. The 
rooms in city hall ‘have nothing of the fineness of magnificence about them, 
but are as dark and melancholy as the transactions within them have hitherto 
been.’36
 Commemoration
As such, the Peace of Utrecht staged a number of performative events, but 
it is also interesting to briefly analyse its afterlife. Soon after 1713 interesting 
discrepancies arose between the different national framings of remembering 
‘Utrecht’. In Great Britain for instance, the Treaty of Utrecht was considered 
as the starting point of a period of political and cultural prosperity, whereas 
in the Dutch Republic the treaty was seen as a turning point in the process of 
political and moral decline. Also in the German countries people thought 
of the peace as the bringer of both exuberant wealth along with general pas-
sivity, spoil and ‘French effeminacy’. Such vices were associated in art and lit-
erature with French court culture, placed in opposition to ‘native’ simplicity, 
diligence and bravery. The fear of political hegemony of Louis XIV went hand 
in hand with the fear of cultural supremacy of France in Europe.
34    Het Utrechts Archief, Utrecht, cat. 32384.
35    Europische Mercurius 24 (1713), I, 309. See also the contribution by Willem Frijhoff in this 
volume.
36    John Leake, quoted in Kees van Strien, Touring the Low Countries: accounts of British 
travelers, 1660–1720 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1998).
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There were few commemorations. In 1738 the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
the peace was celebrated in the Dutch Republic with the issuing of a remark-
able Game of the Goose, with the Silver Jubilee of the Peace of Utrecht (‘Het 
Jubeljaar van de Vrede’) as the final square to win the stake. The other sixty-
nine squares symbolized events in Dutch history from the Revolt against Spain 
in the sixteenth century onwards.37 After 1738 silence reigned around the 
Treaty of Utrecht. Performances of Handel’s Utrecht Te Deum, mainly in Britain, 
were the exceptions. The year of the first centennial, 1813, was not exactly the 
right time for peace memorials. Even after Napoleon’s catastrophic march to 
Russia, prospects for a near end to his rule did not look good in the spring of 
1813. In 1886 the Peace of Utrecht was performed by students in Utrecht in a 
‘ maskerade’, a popular event apparently as it was repeated in 1890 and 1923.38 
1913 did not inspire any national commemorations either, but in 1964 the 250th 
anniversary of the Peace of Rastatt of 1714 was modestly remembered with an 
exhibition, a publication and a medal.39
All this changed dramatically with the tercentenary, the occasion of a grand 
scale commemoration in three peace cities: Utrecht, Rastatt and Baden, an 
initiative comparable to the commemoration of the Peace of Westphalia in 
Münster and Osnabrück in 1998. However, the Utrecht initiative was, from the 
start, more focused on political issues like slavery and racism. In the activities, 
both in the plans for the commemoration year and in the long period before, 
the emphasis was strongly on contemporary art, theatre, film and music.40 
On the other hand, a yearly concert around the Utrecht Te Deum by Handel 
in Utrecht Cathedral paid attention to the music from the times of the peace 
treaty. In the four peace cities in Europe (Utrecht, Baden, Rastatt and Madrid) 
the treaties were commemorated in celebrations which were each distinctive 
in their mix of historical and current concerns, national and international 
focus and cultural and political issues, either tightly or loosely connected to 
the events in 1713–1715. One might wonder at this spectacular rediscovery, or 
rather, reinvention, of the Peace of Utrecht in recent years. As Jane O. Newman 
writes in chapter 13 to this volume, it remains to be seen how the peace cel-
ebrations of 2013 will be remembered in the future.
37    Peace Was Made Here, ed. De Bruin and Brinkman, 184–185.
38    David Onnekink and Renger de Bruin, De vrede van Utrecht (Hilversum: Verloren, 2013), 
102–103.
39    1714. Friede von Rastatt, Ausstellung im Schloss Rastatt vom 11. Juli bis 18. August 1964 (Rastatt: 
Stadtverwaltung, 1964).
40    For an overview of the activities see: 9 jaar Stichting Vrede van Utrecht 2005–2013, ed. Lieke 
Hoitink and Petra Orthel (Utrecht: Stichting Vrede van Utrecht, 2014).
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 Stages of Performance
Performances of Peace investigates how peace was mediated, represented and 
‘made’ in the build-up to the negotiations, during the last years of the War 
of the Spanish Succession and during the Utrecht negotiations (1711–13). By 
studying these peace performances, it aims to shed new light on the relation-
ship between diplomacy and performative culture in the public sphere. It will 
do so by focusing on four different ‘stages’ where the Utrecht peace perfor-
mances took place: the ‘diplomatic’ (I), ‘publicity’ (II), ‘theatrical’ (III) and 
‘commemorative’ (IV) stage. The ‘diplomatic stage’ looks into relationship 
between diplomacy and cultural practices and discourse. The ‘publicity stage’ 
deals with the public debate, as it emerged in newspapers, periodicals, histo-
riographical works, occasional poetry and plays. The ‘theatrical stage’ discusses 
different kinds of theatrical performances during the Spanish Succession War 
and the 1713 peace celebrations, such as fireworks, theatre plays, musical per-
formances and peepshows. Entertaining spectacles like these made the world 
and experiences of diplomats and militaries accessible to larger groups of peo-
ple. The ‘commemorative stage’ discusses the manner in which later genera-
tions reflected on and historically constructed the peace. In all parts special 
attention is paid to issues of ‘agency’ and ‘identity’: who were performing these 
acts, and which (local, national or European) identities were constructed in 
this way?
The first part of this volume is dedicated to the ‘diplomatic stage’. European-
wide coalitions necessitated the formulation or revision of ‘grand strategies’, 
which now increasingly came to span the continent as well as overseas terri-
tories. But the concepts related to the conduct of foreign policy also changed, 
for instance with the emergence of the ‘balance of power’ principle.41 The 
increasing sophistication of diplomatic interaction is exhibited in the hand-
books of Abraham de Wicquefort in the 1673 and François de Callières in 1716 
as well as in the diplomatic academy established by Torcy in 1712. The pro-
cess of transforming dynastic conglomerates into nation-states,42 albeit capri-
cious and far from straightforward, changed the nature of foreign politics and 
diplomacy. Increasing public pressure (itself the result of a coming of age of 
‘public opinion’)43 on governments to justify or even alter the direction of 
41    Evan Luard, The Balance of Power: the System of International Relations, 1648–1815 
(St. Martin’s Press: Basingstoke, 1992).
42    But see Lucien Bély, La societé des princes: xvie–xviiie siecle (Fayard: Paris, 1999).
43    The lapse of the 1694 Licensing Act in England was considered a landmark by Jürgen 
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category 
of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, Polity, 1989), 58.
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Figure 0.2 The Peace of Utrecht. Engraving by Anna Folkema. From: Roeland van Leuve, 
Mengelwerken (Amsterdam: J. Verheyden, 1723). 
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foreign policy, partly the result of the steep rise of the cost of war due to rapidly 
expanding armies,44 added a new layer to the complex system of international 
relations. Increasingly also nationalist sentiments, national stereotypes and 
the depiction of foreign enemies in the evolution of a national culture chal-
lenged the dynastic princes’ claim to the people’s loyalty, partly as a result of 
the long wars between states.45 At the same time, the steep rise of colonial 
imports and commercial wars heightened the awareness of the global dimen-
sion of conflict and fostered cosmopolitism. International relations in the 
eighteenth century differed from those in the seventeenth century.46 With new 
concepts there also emerged new languages of international relations to come 
to terms with changes, such as the emergence of the term ‘balance of power’, 
a term that could be seen as a description of the situation but also shaped the 
social reality itself. The power of language in international relations, especially 
with regard to peace treaties such as that of Utrecht, was important.
Frey and Frey (chapter 1) present a panoramic overview of eighteenth-
century diplomats acting on their stage. The diplomats’ ‘intrigues, maneuvers, 
negotiations, quarrels and social activities, sometimes including sexual liai-
sons, were part of the public performance of peace.’ They show how diplomats 
were trained to perform on the ‘theatre of the world’ and how they interacted 
successfully by being part of a community with a shared language and prac-
tices. Minute attention was paid to the rules of conversation as well as dress 
and ceremony. The era of the Peace of Utrecht is pertinent, since it saw the 
emergence of the notion of the professional diplomat in which training was 
taken to a higher level and practices were encoded in handbooks.
The chapter by Lucien Bély shows how the performance of diplomats did 
not always take place on a ‘stage’ but often behind it, invisible to the spectators. 
This was the case with the Peace of Utrecht, in which the most material aspects 
of the treaty were negotiated in secret between French and English negotiators 
rather than in Utrecht between the plenipotentiaries in official meetings. Bély 
focuses in particular on the role played by the commercial interests, merchants 
lobbying for trade advantages in the West Indies in a process largely hidden 
44    According to Jeremy Black, a military revolution took place between 1660 and 1710 driven 
by the expansion of armies: A Military Revolution: Military Change and European Society, 
1550–1800 (Basingstoke: St. Martin’s Press, 1997).
45    Cf. Tony Claydon, Europe and the Making of England, 1660–1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007).
46    Cf. Heinz Duchhardt, Balance of Power und Pentarchie: Internationale Beziehungen 1700–
1785 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1992).
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from the eyes of the general public. The diplomats integrated such demands, 
often secret projects proposed by merchants or companies in the negotiations. 
The article also makes clear the significance of the global scale of the ramifica-
tions of the Utrecht negotiations.
The theme of identity is explored by Phil McCluskey (chapter 3), who analy-
ses the shifts in identity and loyalty of the subjects of the duke of Savoy in 
the duchies of Savoy and Piedmont on the eve of the Peace of Utrecht. These 
territories were divided by the Alps, and the loyalty of the Savoyard people in 
particular was tested when French troops occupied Savoy during the War of 
the Spanish Succession. Did the change of a dynastic ruler lead to large-scale 
resistance or did the population remain indifferent? To what extent did shared 
culture and language between the occupied people and conqueror affect the 
sense of loyalty to the new regime? And how did Victor Amadeus appeal to 
the Savoyards in order to retain their loyalty? McCluskey disentangles the com-
plex and multilevel patterns of identities and loyalties of the Savoyard people, 
concluding that the duke’s strategy, a combination of threat and appeal to 
‘national sentiment’, proved extremely successful.
Identity is also the subject of chapter 4 by David Onnekink, focusing on the 
abortive negotiations for peace between the Dutch and the French in 1709 and 
1710, on the eve of the Peace of Utrecht. The focus is on identities and how 
they tie in with foreign policy discourses. More specifically, Onnekink analyses 
Universal Monarchy discourse in popular sources in which France is portrayed 
as warlike, arrogant and unreliable. The article shows how this discourse also 
pervaded official policy sources and diplomatic correspondence, thus suggest-
ing that identity discourses rather than rational argument influenced the out-
come of the negotiations in 1710.
The public reflection on the Peace of Utrecht in literary, historiographical 
and journalistic texts is the topic of the second part of this book, highlighting 
‘the publicity stage’. The general public’s craving for news during the War of the 
Spanish Succession and the negotiations in Utrecht was met by a large stream 
of publications, including newspapers, periodicals, treatises, poems and plays. 
By means of these media all sorts of political and moral ideals were propa-
gated, but informing and entertaining the audience was just as important. 
This is illustrated by Suzan van Dijk and Henriette Goldwyn in their analysis 
of Madame du Noyer’s coverage of the peace negotiations in her periodical 
Quintessence des nouvellle historiques, critiques, politiques, morales et galantes 
(chapter 5). In this periodical, which has been largely overlooked in the histo-
riography of the Utrecht celebrations, informing the public was just as impor-
tant as offering entertainment. The mixture of facts and fictional epistolary 
elements, which were embedded in a literary tradition, typify Du Noyer’s 
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writing. Her reporting techniques differed from the more traditional accounts 
in the sense that she emphasized a female perspective, albeit ironically.
Du Noyer’s entertaining writing style is rather different from that found in 
the Histoire du Congrès et de la Paix d’Utrecht [. . .], the authoritative history 
of the Utrecht peace congress, which in appeared anonymously in 1716. Heinz 
Duchhardt (chapter 6) argues that this influential book was written by an eye- 
witness of the Utrecht negotiations and that the French historian Casimir 
Freschot, who lived in Utrecht, is the most likely candidate. His account is far 
from objective but filled with animosity against the French, the English and 
the Pope. The author for instance fulminates against the British strategies con-
ducted in the years before the actual signing of the Peace Treaty, especially the 
monarchical pursuits of Queen Anne and the games played behind the back of 
the allies, which would disadvantage the Dutch Republic.
While in the above mentioned publications attention was paid to all partici-
pants in the negotiations, many other contemporary texts focused exclusively 
on the national impact of the peace celebrations. The internal debates on 
the British ‘stage’ are the topic of chapters 7 (Samia Al-Shayban) and 8 (Clare 
Jackson) while chapter 9 focuses on the Dutch Republic (Lotte Jensen). The 
British nation was deeply divided over the peace negotiations: Queen Anne 
and her adherents were in favour of the conclusion of the peace while the Whig 
Cabinet preferred a continuation of the fight. The political struggle between 
the Tories and the Whigs was visualized in Joseph Addison’s tragedy Cato. This 
play, which tells the story of Cato’s struggle for liberty against Caesar’s tyranny, 
was written in 1712 and first performed on 14 April 1713. It has been subject to 
many- often contradictory- interpretations. Al-Shabayn argues that reading the 
play against the background of the Treaty of Utrecht offers new insights: it is 
not Cato but Caesar who, as a proponent of peace, offers a role model for con-
temporary politics. Although Addison had earlier sided with the Whigs, it is in 
fact Queen Anne’s policy that is supported on stage.
This is also the case in Jonathan Swift’s contribution to the debate, The 
Conduct of Allies (1711) and his lesser-known History of the Four Last Years of 
the Queen (written in 1712–13, first published in 1745). Swift took a firm stand 
in the internal political struggles and whole-heartedly supported Queen Anne. 
His motives, however, seem to have been influenced by personal circumstances 
as well: he was trying to secure an appointment as Historiographer-Royal, but 
his attempts hopelessly failed. Addison’s and Swift’s publications show that the 
performance of peace was filled with internal political struggles, but the Swift 
case also calls attention to questions related to the mediation of knowledge 
about the negotiations for a more general reading public As Jackson shows 
in her chapter, Swift’s claim to possess particular knowledge of the political 
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negotiations and maneuvering that underpinned the Treaty of Utrecht was 
asserted in his capacity as a polemical propagandist who remained in London 
whilst the diplomatic negotiations took place abroad. The fact that he was not 
involved in the negotiations or the diplomatic world itself thus enabled him to 
frame his own position as an independent journalist and opinion-maker.
Jensen focuses on the popular reactions to the peace treaty in relation to 
the rise of national and European thought. Jensen’s chapter shows that it is in 
the field of literature that identities are first and most effectively formulated 
because literature often works with discursive patterns of self-identification, 
convincing images and commonplaces. Mainly focused on national arena, 
like the internal political struggles of republicanism versus Orangism, these 
reactions explore different concepts of Dutchness as well as different roles 
of the Dutch Republic on the international stage. Only a few writers, such as 
the Mennonite Adriaan Spinniker, however, propagated true European peace. 
More often, the national perspective was shaped in dialogue with the regional 
and European levels. Some singled out the Dutch Republic as the best part of 
Europe and emphasized the laudable contribution of their nation to the peace 
negotiations whilst others highlighted the benefits of the peace for Europe as a 
whole. Both regional and national as well as European ‘imagined communities’ 
take shape in the sources discussed by Jensen, based on national feelings, but 
also on religious or cultural identities.
Part three, the theatrical stage, deals with peace celebrations and other 
public events related to the War of the Spanish Succession. Fireworks 
and public festivities were mainly used as an instrument of top-down com-
munication, while travelling peepshows and theatre plays at fairs or in public 
theatre houses were commercial initiatives with a more popular character. 
In both cases, the audience got the opportunity to participate in the distant 
worlds of war and diplomacy. Although the most successful peace negotia-
tions were conducted informally and behind closed doors, rulers and politi-
cians recognized the representative potential of public attention and arranged 
large-scale (semi-)public ceremonial and theatrical events to create a public 
framework for their negotiations. As scholars like Jeroen Duindam have shown, 
‘diplomatic ceremony’ was of crucial importance in the nexus between court 
life and diplomacy.47
In chapter 10, Cornelis van der Haven investigates the role of war plays and 
military peepshows during the War of the Spanish Succession and the Utrecht 
peace negotiations. In the Amsterdam theatre house several plays were 
47    Jeroen Duindam, Vienna and Versailles. The Courts of Europe’s Dynastic Rivals, 1550–1780 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 181–184.
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performed, which depicted battlefield scenes, whereas a highly allegorical 
piece by Enoch Krook, entitled Staatkunde (‘Politics’), performed in 1713, made 
the ‘theatre of diplomacy’ accessible to a larger audience. It enabled the audi-
ence to reflect on the political and tactical skills that were important in the 
world of diplomats as well as on the political principles of balance of power 
and the rules of international diplomacy. Travelling peepshows were another 
medium which enabled a larger audience to get an impression of the military 
world. By looking through a glass they got a private, nearly intimate impres-
sion of the military scenery. Media like these were paradoxical in nature: on 
the one hand, they brought the experience of war and diplomacy closer to the 
public; on the other hand, they kept the realities of war and diplomacy at a 
greater distance in order for the viewer to enjoy that distanced reality and the 
spectacles related to it.
While the above-mentioned performances were primarily popular, there 
was also a wide range of celebrations with a more top-down character. The 
institutional political use of public ceremonies is central to the chapters by 
Aaron Olivas and Julie Farguson, who respectively describe public celebrations 
connected to Philip V of Spain and Queen Anne of Great Britain. In chapter 11, 
Olivas shows how the Spanish king availed himself of political propaganda in 
the colonies. During the Spanish Succession War, many public performances 
were organized to celebrate important events in the personal life of the king, 
such as his marriage to María Luisa of Savoy, her pregnancies, and the birth 
of their sons. These spectacles served both political and diplomatic goals: the 
public’s moral and financial support was crucial for the king’s ability to wage 
war, and people were urged to donate to the crown. Furthermore, the trans-
imperial bonds with the French crown were reinforced by the use of these 
ceremonies.
A similar, instrumental use can be witnessed in the public thanksgiving 
held at St Paul’s Cathedral in London on 7 July 1713, as shown by Farguson 
(chapter 12). The festivities consisted of a grand procession, a musical perfor-
mance, and fireworks. Farguson demonstrates how this celebration fits in the 
history of public thanksgivings and argues that Queen Anne used this ceremo-
nial form as a political instrument. She was promoted as a symbol of national 
and religious unity to counteract the political factionalism of the era. Music 
played an important role in proclaiming the benefits of peace in national terms: 
Handel’s Te Deum enforced the message of peaceful and religious harmony. 
Farguson’s account of these monarchical celebrations demonstrate that per-
formances of peace were mainly framed in national terms: just as in the case of 
the Dutch fireworks and Spanish celebrations overseas, the performances were 
utilized by the political rulers to propagate their own political agenda.
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This instrumental use of ceremonies, however, was not restricted to court 
life. In the case of the Dutch Republic, where court life was almost absent in 
the first half of the eighteenth century, ceremonial celebrations served as vehi-
cles to pass on political and moral messages as we can see in the chapter by 
Willem Frijhoff, who discusses the fireworks held in The Hague from anthro-
pological, social and political perspectives. He points to the richness of this 
medium in terms of conveying clear moral and political messages in support 
of the diplomatic negotiations of the States General and the States of Holland; 
these messages reached a wider audience through engravings and broad-
sheets, which were reproduced many times. The most striking observation is 
that the patriotic and moral symbolism remained totally inward-turned and 
concentrated on a celebration of the Dutch Republic itself and the structures 
of the state. There were no references to European alliances or cosmopolitan 
ideals. According to Frijhoff, this suggests that the Dutch authorities realized 
that their leading European role belonged to the past.
In all cases, these public performances—ranging from fireworks to military 
peepshows—reveal the growing public interest in war and peace-making. 
Rulers and politicians recognized the importance of creating a public frame-
work, while playwrights and entertainers reacted to the need of the general 
public to be informed about what happened in the rather distant diplomatic 
and military spheres.
In the final part on ‘the commemorative stage’, the focus is on contempo-
rary reflections upon the Peace of Utrecht through the metaphor of a ‘memory 
theatre’. As Jane O. Newman explains, this is a mental exercise in which one 
can summon images and memories of the past as if they were performed 
on stage. The question this final part tries to answer specifically is how such 
a memory theatre was constructed in the commemorations of the Peace of 
Utrecht in 2013.
In chapter 14 Jane O. Newman reflects on the articles and central concern of 
this volume by musing on the connection between diplomacy, performativity 
and commemoration. She does so by using her own research on the commem-
oration of the Peace of Westphalia in 1948 as an example. As she points out, 
this book is a performance itself—a memory theatre providing insight into the 
ways the Peace of Utrecht was remembered by historical scholars in the year 
2013.
In the closing chapter Renger de Bruin explores the various ways in which 
museums in Germany, Spain, Switzerland and The Netherlands recreated 
a peace which, contrary to the Peace of Westphalia, was all but forgotten. 
In a way, the peace had to be reinvented for a modern audience, in which spe-
cific national and local concerns also played their part. In Utrecht, for instance, 
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the local museum focused on a historical recreation of the Peace, but most 
celebrations had a more cultural character and celebrated ‘peace’ as a notion 
rather than a historical event. In Baden commemoration had a similar contem-
porary flavour, whereas Rastatt focused on the historical context. As De Bruin 
shows, in these four cities, like four different ‘stages’, the Peace of Utrecht was 
performed as a European event, echoing both the historical peace of 1713 as 
well as the practical organization sponsored by the European Union.
Together these chapters thus form a four-pronged structure in which the 
four separate stages are presented to the reader, who becomes a spectator indi-
rectly of these performances of the Peace of Utrecht. Accordingly, this volume 
not only sheds new light on the peace itself but also on our own early twenty-
first-century conditions and concerns in relation to the performance of peace 
and to what ‘Utrecht’ means to us today.

part 1
The Diplomatic Stage
∵
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CHAPTER 1
The Olive and the Horse: The Eighteenth-Century 
Culture of Diplomacy
Linda Frey and Marsha Frey
The diplomats who gathered in the picturesque town of Utrecht to end the 
wars fought in Europe as well as overseas acted on a public parquet. Their 
intrigues, maneuvers, negotiations, quarrels, and social activities, sometimes 
including sexual liaisons, were part of the public performance of peace. These 
representatives could not but be conscious of their role in this performative 
culture and be adept at its manipulation. The sociability of this international 
elite so integral to the ancien régime facilitated the deliberations. In the eigh-
teenth century those who served abroad, whom Napoleon would later deri-
sively dub ‘the brilliant butterflies of the panniers age,’1 belonged to a distinctive 
community, according to the astute and knowledgeable envoy of Louis XIV, 
François de Callières (1645–1717).2 Just as the states of Europe were part ‘d’une 
même République,’3 so diplomats were part of a narrow elite; they shared simi-
lar sentiments, norms and values, were bound by personal and family alliances, 
and understood the implicit ‘code’ ‘rooted in ceremonial forms and gestures.’4 
That assessment was shared at the end of the eighteenth century by Victor-
François, duc de Broglie (1718–1804) who compared this group to ‘un grand 
ordre de chevalerie’. To belong to this ‘milieu élégant et raffiné’ one needed to 
1    Napoleon’s Letters to Marie Louise, ed. Charles de La Roncière (New York: Farrar & Rinehart 
Inc., 1935), 15 July, 1813, 169.
2    François de Callières, On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes, trans. A.F. Whyte 
(Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1963), 113.
3    Callières, On the Manner of Negiotating with Princes, 11.
4    Hamish Scott, ‘Diplomatic Culture in Old Regime Europe,’ in Cultures of Power in Europe 
during the Long Eighteenth Century, ed. Hamish Scott and Brendan Simms (Cambridge: 
University Press, 2007), 58–85: 60, 77; Lucien Bély, ‘Méthodes et perspectives dans l’étude des 
négociations internationales à l’époque moderne,’ Frankreich im europäischen Staatensystem 
der Frühen Zeit, ed. Rainer Babel (Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 1995), 219–233: 223 and 
Claire Béchu, ‘Les Ambassadeurs français au xviiie siècle: Formation et carrière,’ L’Invention 
de la diplomatie, Moyen Âge- temps modernes, ed. Lucien Bély and Isabelle Richefort (Paris: 
Presses universitaires de France, 1998), 331–346: 345.
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be ‘de la famille.’5 Antoine Pecquet ( 1700–1762)6 who served as premier commis 
of foreign affairs from 1725 to 1740—said much the same. Foreign representa-
tives abroad formed ‘une espèce de société indépendante,’ bound together by a 
‘une communauté de priviléges’.7 By the outbreak of the Revolution a ‘distinct 
diplomatic culture’ that was both ‘cohesive’ and ‘homogeneous’ existed8 and 
unified the diplomatic world.9
 Men of War and of Peace
The individuals who belonged to this ‘distinctive community’ came from the 
same social class, the nobility—and more often than not the upper ranks, and 
dominated the diplomatic corps, especially the ranks of ambassador and min-
ister plenipotentiary, which inevitably came to be permeated with a ‘noble 
ethos.’10 A prosopographical study of 450 diplomatic agents between 1697 
and 1715 underscores the critical importance of birth. These negotiators were 
from either the noblesse de l’épée (the nobles of the sword), the noblesse de 
la robe, or the clergy. For certain families diplomatic service became a tradi-
tion. For example, Jean d’Estrées, abbé de Saint Claude, succeeded his uncle, 
César, cardinal d’Estrées as ambassador of France at Madrid just as Jean Louis 
d’Usson, marquis de Bonnac followed his uncle, François d’Usson, marquis de 
Bonrepaus at the United Provinces.11 Yet another prosopographical study of 
French diplomats who held the rank of minister plenipotentiary or ambassa-
dor between 1715 and 1791 shows that of the 179, 120 (67%) had also served 
in the military.12 In France by 1789 nobles held 35 of the 39 diplomatic posts; 
5     Quoted in Jacques Henri-Robert, Dictionnaire des diplomates de Napoleon, histoire et 
dictionnaire du corps consulaire et imperial (Paris: Henri Veyrier, 1990), 13.
6     François Michaud, Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne (Michaud: Paris, 1854), 
reprint (Graz: Akademische Druck u. Verlagsanstalt, 1967) 32: 341. See also Béchu, ‘Les 
Ambassadeurs français au xviiie siècle,’ 335.
7     Antoine Pecquet, De l’Art de négocier avec les souverains (The Hague: Jean van Duren, 
1738), 104.
8     Scott, ‘Diplomatic Culture,’ 59. See also Hamish Scott, The Birth of a Great Power System, 
1740–1815 (Harlow, England, 2006), 4–5.
9    Lucien Bély, Espions et ambassadeurs au temps de Louis XIV (Paris: Fayard, 1990), 748.
10    Scott, ‘Diplomatic Culture,’ 72.
11    Bély, ‘Méthodes et perspectives,’ 222.
12    Béchu, ‘Les Ambassadeurs français,’ 333. See also Simon Surreaux, Les Maréchaux de 
France des Lumières: histoire et dictionnaire dans la société d’Ancien Régime (Paris: Spm, 
2013).
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the other four, such as Danzig, were minor postings.13 Because many of the 
diplomats also belonged to the noblesse de l’épée and had attained the rank 
of general officer, a close relationship between the army and the diplomatic 
corps existed. Both Lucien Bély’s and Claire Béchu’s analyses demonstrate that 
diplomats were selected in large part from the military.14 That linkage is also 
seen during the War of the Spanish Succession. In the case of Great Britain, 
Henry Snyder has pointed out that all the major diplomatic posts (The Hague, 
Brussels, Lisbon, Vienna, Berlin, Hanover and Spain) at one time during that 
conflict were held by military officers, many with close ties to Marlborough.15 
That link underscores the primacy of birth in the diplomatic corps of the Old 
Regime for only those of the highest social status were selected to represent the 
king, particularly at the rank of ambassador. Marlborough, who was accredited 
to several courts and shuffled among others, showed his prowess in both mili-
tary and diplomatic tactics. The comte de Tallard had the distinction of nego-
tiating the Partition Treaties of 1698 and 1700 designed to avoid war and, after 
they were shattered, of fighting in the ensuing conflict and earning a marshal’s 
baton. Captured at the battle of Blenheim as a prisoner of war, he intrigued 
with his many friends in England, helped bring down the Whigs, and was sub-
sequently released without ransom, perhaps as a gesture of gratitude.16 João 
Gomes da Silva, count of Tarouca, fought before he negotiated as first pleni-
potentiary of Portugal at Utrecht. The famous cavalry commander Reinhart 
Vincent, Freiherr von Hompesch often engaged in both military and diplo-
matic skirmishes.17 The Swiss, François-Louis de Pesmes, often called Saint-
Saphorin, both a general and a diplomat, assisted the Dutch, the Habsburgs, 
the Prussians, the Swiss, and finally the British. With less happy consequences, 
Raimond-Balthazar Phélypeaux de Verger had served as envoy extraordinary 
before being promoted to lieutenant general. Dispatched on an almost impos-
sible mission, anticipating the intentions of the duke of Savoy, Phélypeaux 
13    Melvin Edelstein, ‘La Noblesse et le monopole des fonctions publiques en 1789,’ Annales 
historiques de la Révolution française 54 (1982): 440–443, 441.
14    Bély, ‘Méthodes et perspectives,’ 222 and Béchu, ‘Les Ambassadeurs français,’ 333.
15    Henry L. Snyder, ‘The British Diplomatic Service during the Godolphin Ministry,’ in 
Studies in Diplomatic History, ed. Ragnhild Hatton and M.S. Anderson (North Haven, Ct: 
Archon Books, 1970), 47–68: 60, 63.
16    Ronald S. Love, ‘Camille, comte de Tallard, marquis de la Beaume-D’Hostun, Baron 
d’Arlanc,’ in The Treaties of the War of the Spanish Succession: An Historical and Critical 
Dictionary, ed. Linda Frey and Marsha Frey (Westport, Ct: Greenwood Press, 1995), 
433–434.
17    Augustus J. Veenendaal, Jr. ‘Reinhart Vincent, Freiherr von Hompesch,’ in The Treaties of 
the War of the Spanish Succession: An Historical and Critical Dictionary, ed. Frey and Frey, 
209–210.
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was ordered to act as field marshal except when he was acting as ambassador. 
It did not go well. Phélypeaux’s difficult personality only alienated the duke 
who took him hostage and declared war against France.18 A less well known 
example, János Erdődi, Gróf Pálffy, the commander in chief of the imperial 
armies in Hungary, built up personal contacts that expedited his negotiations 
of the peace of Szatmár.19 In all of the above cases and doubtless in many 
others the Old Regime saw no contradiction in selecting ambassadors to con-
clude the peace from men of war. As one contemporary noted: ‘La carrière 
politique n’a jamais été regardée comme une discontinuation de la carrière 
militaire.’20 That same nexus between soldiers and diplomats, albeit with dif-
ferent personnel, would recur later in the Revolution and under Napoleon. 
Whether they offered the olive, peace, or brought the horse, war, they shared 
a code of conduct that dictated dress, language, and etiquette. As Bély has 
argued, this ‘social and cultural coherence’ facilitated international discussions 
by making possible a common language and creating certain expectations.21
 The Issue of Training
The demands of the developing international system in an age of endemic 
warfare forced many to realize the importance of diplomacy and to consider 
more formal training for the men sent abroad. The impetus to establish such a 
school was echoed in the earlier attempts of Philip II and of the papacy in the 
Pontifical Academy of 1701 and later of Frederick II.22 The best-known attempt, 
Torcy’s short-lived Académie politique, had been founded in 1712.23 It is not 
18    Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, ‘Raimond-Balthazar Phélypeaux de Verger,’ in The Treaties of 
the War of the Spanish Succession: An Historical and Critical Dictionary, ed. Frey and Frey, 
352–353.
19    Peter F. Sugar, ‘János Erd Erdödi, Gróf Pálffy,’ in The Treaties of the War of the Spanish 
Succession: An Historical and Critical Dictionary, ed. Frey and Frey, 328–329.
20    Béchu, ‘Les Ambassadeurs français,’ 333.
21    Bély, Espions et ambassadeurs, 289.
22    Karl Schweizer, ‘François de Callières and the marquis de Torcy’s ‘Political Academy’: New 
Evidence,’ Canadian Journal of History 46: 3 (2011): 619–625, 619.
23    For the short-lived academy founded by Torcy see Guy Thuillier, La première École 
d’administration: L’Académie politique de Louis XIV (Paris: Librairie Droz, 1996). See also 
John Rule with Ben Trotter, Diplomacy and Administration under Louis XIV: Colbert de 
Torcy and the Department of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1689–1715, forthcom-
ing; Maurice Keens-Soper, ‘The French Political Academy 1712: A School for Ambassadors,’ 
European Studies Review 2 (1972): 323–355; Klaits, ‘Men of Letters’, 577–597.
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surprising that Torcy turned to an experienced diplomat, Callières, who had 
championed the idea of a professional diplomatic corps.24 Later in the cen-
tury the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs did send some promising individu-
als to the diplomatic school at Strasbourg, founded by Jean Daniel Schoepflin 
(1694–1771)25 and subsequently directed by his pupil, Christophe Guillaume 
Koch (1737–1813), a professor of law, who presided over the diplomatic com-
mittee prior to the fall of the monarchy. Many diplomats who would serve 
the revolutionary governments, however briefly, attended Strasbourg, such as 
Bourgoing, Ségur, Bombelles, Custine, Bacher, and Talleyrand, as well as their 
counterparts from other countries, such as Clemens Wenzel Lothar, Prince 
Metternich (Holy Roman Empire); Maximilian Josef, Freiherr von Montgelas 
(Bavaria); and Morton Frederick Eden, Baron Henley (Great Britain). There 
they studied international law, statistics, and history and forged bonds that 
would persist in their later lives.26
 Diplomatic Manuals
Although many of these attempts were short lived, there were manuals to guide 
those who sought to serve as diplomats. For many Callières’ now classic work, 
On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes, written in 1716, epitomized the ide-
als of the diplomacy of the old regime. These norms were widely shared and 
can be seen as well in the works of one of his contemporaries, Louis Rousseau 
de Chamoy (1645?–1711).27 In Callières’ view rulers should appoint men who 
were both prepared and able for a state’s fate often depended on the envoy. In 
particular ‘men of birth and breeding’ and wealth were best able to represent 
France because their rank would entitle them to respect. Those of good birth, 
he assumed, would also have certain ‘qualities’ necessary for success. The suc-
cessful envoy was suave, personally agreeable, able to adapt to different cul-
tures and to appreciate the positive features of the country where he was sent. 
24    Schweizer, ‘François de Callières’, 622.
25    Michaud, Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne 38: 407–409.
26    Jürgen Voss, ‘Christophe Guillaume Koch (1737–1813): Homme politique et historiographe 
contemporain de la Révolution,’ History of European Ideas 13:5 (1991): 531–543: 531–532. 
See also Jean Richtereau, Le Rôle politique du professor Koch (Strasbourg: Imprimerie 
Alsacienne, 1936) and Michaud, Biographie, 22: 84–86.
27    Louis Rousseau de Chamoy, L’Idée du parfait ambassadeur (Paris: A. Pedone, 1912). 
Chamoy’s work was written in 1697 and reflected his extensive diplomatic experience. He 
served the king abroad as secretary, chargé d’affaires, resident, envoy, and plenipotentiary.
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He was also affable, had excellent manners, and was courteous ‘in little things.’ 
Because the envoy represented his ruler he must have an unshakeable dignity. 
In brief, rulers should avoid sending the least gifted and rely on the ablest. 
Callières approvingly cited the remark of the grand duke of Tuscany who, 
although admitting that Tuscany had ‘fools,’ was careful ‘not to export them.’28
Some two decades later in 1737, Antoine Pecquet, an admirer of Callières, 
echoed his views. Pecquet too disputed the idea that all men could be excellent 
negotiators. Rather the prince should select ‘l’homme du monde’ who could 
excel in what he termed ‘le théâtre du monde.’29 For him, as for Callières, a 
successful envoy had to possess certain essential characteristics. For envoys of 
the first rank, that is, ambassadors, individuals had to be of great birth or great 
achievement. Those of lesser distinction could be chosen for the lower ranks. 
The envoy’s ability to excel in a foreign society helped to ensure ultimate suc-
cess. The first duty of the envoy was to project not only ‘politesse’ but good will. 
To do that he must respect the laws and customs of the country and follow 
court ceremonial.30
The views of those within the diplomatic establishment were eerily similar 
almost a hundred years later. William Eden, Lord Auckland (1744–1814), who 
had served as British ambassador to Spain and the United Provinces and spe-
cial envoy to France, echoed Callières’ advice and urged those going abroad to 
be well acquainted not only with their own country and its colonies but also 
with all the states of Europe, their sovereigns and ministers. The envoy should, 
moreover, be fluent in French, able to write well in English (if employed by the 
British), and well versed in the etiquette of courts, the law of nations and exist-
ing disputes.31 Still those who proffered the olive branch of peace, including 
those who rode the horse of war, shared a code of conduct that dictated dress, 
language, and etiquette.
 Ceremony and Etiquette
They would not have recognized these issues as ones of mere style, for such 
customs validated the ancien régime and reinforced the aristocratic code. 
28    De Chamoy, L’Idée du parfait ambassadeur, 56–57, 40–46, 49, 124–127, 24, 21–22, 59, 142.
29    Pecquet, De l’Art de négocier, x, xii, xxvi–xli.
30    Pecquet, De l’Art de négocier, 106–107, 2, 5, 10–13, 24–30, 32–37, 38–42, 46, 44–46, 50, 70, 
49–51, xv, 57, 110, 58–59.
31    William Eden, first baron Auckland, The Journal and Correspondence of William, Lord 
Auckland (London: Richard Bentley, 1862), 3: 329–330, 20 February 1796.
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The minutely regulated ceremonies were part of what Duindam calls ‘the pub-
lic presentation of power.’32 Historians have come to recognize that ‘symbolics 
of power’ [were] not mere incidental ephemera.’33 For Louis XIV etiquette was 
an instrument of power: ‘Those people are gravely mistaken who imagine that 
all this is mere ceremony.’34 Those at the court became sensitized to ‘the status 
and importance that should be attributed to a person in society on the basis of 
his bearing, speech, manner or appearance.’35 The nobility were caught in ‘the 
vicious circle of enforced ostentation,’ ‘imprisoned by their own ceremonial 
and etiquette,’36 like an insect imprisoned in amber. This ‘incessant competi-
tion’ meant that ‘everyone was running on the spot.’37 To ‘keep one’s place in 
the intense competition,’ one had to cultivate the appropriate gestures, move 
in the rigidly mandated way, wear the right fabrics, choose the correct shoes. 
As Elias noted, ‘Even smiling is shaped by court custom.’38 A satire dating from 
the reign of Henry IV has one courtier explain to another the minutiae of dress 
(high heels, gilded spurs), what to say, when to laugh, how to move the head, 
when to fling your arms, when to shift from one foot to another, etc.39 A diplo-
mat who was, nonetheless, not part of the courtly elite, Callières condemned 
the ‘vain ceremonies,’ which he equated with a ‘play’ in which the courtiers 
32    Jeroen Duindam, Vienna and Versailles: The Courts of Europe’s Dynastic Rivals, 1550–1780, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 181. See also Ute Daniel, ‘Überlegungen 
zum höfischen Fest der Barockzeit,’ Niedersächisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte 
72 (2000): 45–66; Benjamin Marschke, ‘Von dem am Königl. Preussischen Hofe abge-
schafften Ceremoniel’: Monarchical Representation and Ceremony in Frederick William 
I’s Prussia,’ in Orthodoxies and Diversity in Early Modern Germany, ed. by Randolph C. 
Head and Daniel Christensen, 227–252 (Boston: Brill Publishers, 2007); Miloš Vec, 
Zeremonial-Wissenschaft im Fürstenstaat: Studien zur juristischen und politischen Theorie 
absolutischer Herrschaftsrepräsentation (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998) 
and Barbara von Stollberg-Rilinger, ‘Zeremoniell, Ritual, Symbol: Neue Forschungen zur 
symbolischen Kommunikation im Spätmittelater und Früher Neuzeit,’ Zeitschrift für his-
torische Forschung 27 (2000): 389–405.
33    David Cannadine, ‘Introduction: Divine Rites of Kings,’ in Rituals of Royalty: Power and 
Ceremonial in Traditional Societies, ed. David Cannadine and Simon Price, (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1987), 3.
34    Norbert Elias, The Court Society, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Pantheon, 1983), 
117–118.
35    Elias, The Court Society, 55.
36    Elias, The Court Society, 71, 207.
37    Elias, The Court Society, 207–208.
38    Elias, The Court Society, 232.
39    Quoted in Elias, The Court Society, 231.
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were ‘comedians.’40 Later in the century François Gabriel, Comte de Bray 
(1765–1832), who was sent as French representative to the Diet of Ratisbon and 
who resigned in August 1792, found the etiquette a ‘labyrinth,’ such that one 
cannot find one’s way after one enters: the number of steps to advance or to 
retreat, the number of bows was counted and predetermined. When to put on 
one’s hat and when to remove it was stipulated. ‘All this is almost as difficult 
to study as one of the most important rules of [the French mathematician] 
Bezout.’41 The magnificent clothing, the pompous ceremonial, the march that 
lasted two and half hours combined with visits, ceremonies, fêtes, and dinners 
made him deplore the time lost. This is ‘an abominable business,’ he lamented, 
‘with such ‘oppressive vanities.’ He deplored the five-hour ceremonial, the 
reception line that lasted three and a half hours, the ‘fatiguing luxury.’ In short, 
he found this way of life ‘miserable.’42
The absolutist and authoritarian ancien régime encoded hierarchy in a rep-
resentational system, by which is meant, according to Blanning, ‘the making 
present of authority by dress, ritual, painting, architecture, theatrical perfor-
mance or any other form of display.’43 As members of the ‘distinctive diplo-
matic culture’ that evolved in the long eighteenth century, they were part of an 
‘independent society,’ so termed by an official of the foreign ministry, Antoine 
Pecquet in 1737.44 Drawn from an aristocratic elite, these individuals shared 
certain assumptions because ‘diplomacy itself assumed many of the character-
istics of the aristocratic-courtly and cosmopolitan culture of the period.’45 Not 
incidentally, court and embassy reinforced the ceremonial of each.
In the ancien régime, states manipulated etiquette to advance social status, 
just as the aristocracy did. Not surprisingly, such discussions dominated dip-
lomatic manuals and legal treatises. The classic work The Law of Nations; or, 
Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations 
and Sovereigns by Emerich de Vattel first appeared in 1758. That well-known 
jurist noted that ‘at present kings claim superiority of rank over republics.’46 
40    François de Callières, Letters (1694–1700) of François de Callières to the Marquise d’Huxelles, 
ed. Laurence Pope and William Brooks (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2004), 228.
41    Comte F.-G. de Bray, Mémoires du comte de Bray (Paris: Plon Nourrit et Cie., 1911), 103.
42    Bray, Mémoires du comte de Bray, 109, 111, 120.
43    T.C.W. Blanning, ‘Frederick the Great and German Culture,’ in Royal and Republican 
Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe, ed. Robert Oresko, G.C. Gibbs and H.M. Scott 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1997), 527–550: 529–530.
44    Scott, ‘Diplomatic Culture,’ 59–60.
45    Scott, ‘Diplomatic Culture,’ 62
46    Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the 
Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns (Philadelphia: T. and J.W. Johnson and Co., 
1863), 149.
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The jurist Georg Friedrich Martens, whose treatise appeared in French in 
1789, included an extensive section on precedence and not incidentally 
appended advice on how to avoid the disputes which bedeviled early modern 
diplomacy.47
As the historian Jeremy Black pointed out, diplomats used ceremonial 
and protocol ‘as a means of asserting and defending status and interests. It 
was perfect for a competitive world that wished to have an alternative to 
conflict.’48 Diplomats were ordered to engage in a kind of ‘ceremonial brink-
manship as they sought to defend and enhance the prestige of their masters.’49 
Precedence was so vigorously contested because it reflected a state’s power, 
what the comte de Broglie called, the ‘interest of regard.’50 The courtiers were 
so obsessed with rank and with deportment because such maneuvering was 
‘a zero-sum game: the gains of one entailed the other’s losses.’51 Probably no 
one played that game as well as the French. Jean Baptiste Colbert, marquis de 
Torcy, the secretary of foreign affairs under Louis XIV, an adept practitioner of 
the art, noted that these ‘trifles of etiquette’ signaled the importance of a coun-
try, affirmed its power, and helped to establish its grandeur. When the king of 
Denmark announced that he would in the future receive the French envoys 
as Louis received his, that is, seated and covered, Louis XIV refused to accept 
this change. Torcy underscored that to accept an inferior ranking or even to 
consent under the ‘pretext of politeness or equality and the suppression of all 
prerogatives’ would be to ‘recognize and admit the decline of the country.’52
These ‘subtle games of ceremonial’ undergirded what Lucien Bély dubs the 
‘société des princes.’53 In that ‘collective construction’ ceremony served not only 
as a ‘political instrument in the relations between European states, but also as 
a mark of solidarity in the society of princes.’54 The sovereigns, in Bély’s words, 
made up a rather ‘singular’ family whose relations were ritualized to such an 
47    George Friedrich Martens, Summary of the Law of Nations (Philadelphia: Thomas 
Bradford, 1795), 136–144. The French edition of 1789 Précis du droit des gens modernes de 
l’Europe was a revision of an earlier work in Latin.
48    Jeremy Black, British Diplomats and diplomacy, 1688–1800 (Exeter: University of Exeter 
Press, 2001), 97.
49    Duindam, Vienna and Versailles, 184.
50    Scott, The Birth of a Great Power System, 124.
51    Scott, The Birth of a Great Power System, 124.
52    Jean Baptiste Colbert, Journal inédit de Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Torcy, ed. Frederic 
Masson (Paris: Plon Nourrit, 1884), xiii–xiv.
53    Lucien Bély, La Société des princes: XVIe–XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Fayard, 1999), 406, 396.
54    Lucien Bély, ‘Souveraineté et souverains: la question du cérémonial dans les relations 
internationales à l’époque moderne,’ Annuaire-bulletin de la Société de l’histoire de France 
130 (1993): 27–43, 43 and 28.
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extent that even war did not hamper or impede ‘une politesse internationale.’55 
‘La société polie,’ that very strict code of manners, had evolved at the court 
society. That ‘universe of usage’56 both underscored and reinforced the pres-
tige of the upper classes.
 Aristocratic Code
The aristocratic code mandated what the age called ‘honest dissimulation,’ 
which meant ‘that whatever you felt or thought, you must behave accord-
ing to the rules of politeness’ and you must do so seemingly without effort, 
with what Castiglione, the quintessential courtier, called grace or ‘sprezza-
tura [nonchalance.]’57 This theme of repression (and suppression) of emo-
tions was epitomized at Versailles. ‘The practice of honest dissimulation,’ as 
Snyder has argued, ‘was dialectically linked to the Old Regime culture of dis-
play and observation.’58 The aristocratic injunction mandated that a gentle-
man only walks, never runs and that he enters a room langsam und feierlich, 
in a slow and solemn manner. Diplomats mastered phatic communication, 
that is, ‘greetings, phrases, and gestures employed to convey general sociabil-
ity rather than to transmit specific meaning.’59 Diplomats understood only too 
well what Raymond Cohen has pointed out, that the ‘threshold moments’ of 
greeting and parting ‘define the nature of the social relationship between the 
participants.’60 Under the carapace of the international system lurked what 
Blanning has dubbed ‘the culture of power’ and what Shakespeare called ‘dis-
sembling courtesy.’61 Blanning notes that Louis XIV’s authority was ‘as much 
a cultural as a military or diplomatic construct.’62 A critical American at the 
Court of St. James, John Adams, lamented that ‘There are a train of ceremonies 
55    Bély, ‘Souveraineté et souverains,’ 28, 35. See also Daniel, ‘Überlegungen zum höfischen 
Fest der Barockzeit,’ 45–66 and Stollberg-Rilinger, ‘Zeremoniell, Ritual, Symbol,’ 389–405.
56    Bély, La Société des princes, 10.
57    Edward Muir, Ritual in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 120.
58    Jon R. Snyder, Dissimulation and the Culture of Secrecy in Early Modern Europe (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2009), 47.
59    Muir, Ritual in Early Modern Europe, 125.
60    Raymond Cohen, Theatre of Power: The Art of Diplomatic Signalling (New York: Longman, 
1987), 90–91.
61    Shakespeare, Cymbelline, I, I, 84 quoted in Dissimulation and the Culture of Secrecy, 33.
62    T.C.W. Blanning, The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture: Old Regime Europe 1660–
1789 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 5.
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yet to go through . . . It is thus the essence of things is lost in ceremony in every 
country of Europe. We must submit to what we cannot alter. Patience is the 
only remedy.’63
 Role of Language
Language buttressed the court society. It was not accidental that the diplomat 
Callières (1645–1717) who wrote the seminal tract On the Manner of Negotiating 
with Princes also composed two works on civility: Des mots à la mode et des 
nouvelles façons de parler (1692) and De la science du monde et des connais-
sances utiles à la conduite de la vie (1717). In the first essay this quintessential 
insider describes the court vocabulary as a ‘strange jargon’64 and in another as 
‘a certain kind of singular language which one uses at certain times and among 
certain persons.’65 Diplomats who operated in an international arena were 
more steeped in that usage than most inside the court society. To a man like 
Talleyrand, who straddled both worlds, the language of the court suffered from 
an ‘excess of words which impoverished it.’ The ‘polite’ language of monarchi-
cal France, he complained, was pauperized by its vices. Its ‘ancient obsequi-
ous forms’ reflected the ‘ruinous luxury’ of the court. ‘In this paradoxical logic, 
abundance became misery, the multiplication of periphrases, the circumlocu-
tion, and other superfluities added to the destitution.’66
 Importance of Dress
Dress like language reflected and reinforced the aristocratic society and the 
hierarchical code. What Daniel Roche has termed the ancien régime’s elaborate 
‘culture of appearances’ ‘had provided an established set of assumptions about 
the legibility of identity and status through varieties of dress’ and mandated 
63    Quoted in Ideas and Diplomacy: Readings in the Intellectual Tradition of American Foreign 
Policy, ed. Norman A. Graebner (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 36.
64    Des mots à la mode et des nouvelles façons de parler, quoted in Daniel Gordon, Citizens 
without Sovereignty Equality and Sociability in French thought, 1670–1789 (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 105.
65    See François de Callières, Du bel esprit (Amsterdam: Pierre Brunel, 1695), 16.
66    Philippe Roger ‘Le Débat sur la ‘langue révolutionnaire,’ in La Carmagnole des muses: 
l’homme de lettres et l’artiste dans la Révolution (Paris: Armand Colin, 1988), 177–178.
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displays of magnificence.67 This lexicon of words, gestures, symbols, and garb 
was consciously adopted. The deployment of symbols, the utterance of spe-
cific phrases coupled with certain intonations, and the wearing of a distinctive 
dress were visible manifestations of the diplomatic culture and of the interna-
tional system. In the words of Burke, ‘no citizen of Europe could be altogether 
an exile in any part of it.’68
 Significance of Congresses
For Bély the congress of peace ‘the incarnation of possible international 
accord, brought a message of peace for the world.’69 For him the congress was 
‘a symbolic image of international sociability.’70 Indeed festivities dominated 
the agenda at Baden with its balls, fêtes, plays, and musical performances, not 
to mention multi-course banquets. It was no accident that one of the French 
representatives, Charles-François, comte de Vintimille du Luc, brought actors, 
musicians, and ballerinas along with chefs and forty pages. Indeed that con-
gress could share with the later congress at Vienna the appellation ‘the danc-
ing congress.’71 Such sociability buttressed the social ties and underscored the 
‘relative cultural and social homogeneity of the negotiators’ that served as the 
backdrop of all international encounters.72 That homogeneity ‘reaffirmed by 
the social practices of diplomacy’, facilitated political discussion and rein-
forced cosmopolitanism.73 The similitude of gestures, words and attitudes 
eased communication.74 In this theatre of Europe certain rituals honed by 
usage and by tradition limited war.75 What undergirded the international order 
was an aristocratic sociability that would be lost later in the revolutionary era.
67    Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances: Representations of Dress in Revolutionary 
France (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 232.
68    Edmund Burke quoted in Gerald W. Chapman, Edmund Burke: The Practical Imagination 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967), 185–186.
69    Bély, Espions et ambassadeurs, 374.
70    Bély, Espions et ambassadeurs, 374–375.
71    Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, ‘Baden,’ in The Treaties of the War of the Spanish Succession, 
ed. Frey and Frey, 26.
72    Bély, Espions et ambassadeurs, 374.
73    Bély, Espions et ambassadeurs, 374.
74    Bély, Espions et ambassadeurs, 402.
75    Bély, Espions et ambassadeurs, 377.
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That system with its implicit ideological underpinnings enmeshed diplo-
mats in that ‘ghostly perpetuum mobile’: the etiquette, the ceremonial, and the 
language of court society.76 Burke saw in this sublimation of emotions a cer-
tain ‘elegance of mind and manners.’77 Such things as manners were not insig-
nificant; Burke argued that they were more important than laws. ‘Manners are 
what vex or soothe, corrupt or purify, exalt or debase, barbarize or refine us, by 
a constant, steady, uniform, insensible operation, like that of the air we breathe 
in. They give their whole form and colour to our lives.’78 ‘Taste and elegance’ 
Burke argued, ‘though they are reckoned only among the smaller and second-
ary morals, yet are of no mean importance in the regulation of life.’79 As was 
language. Diplomats mastered the usage of the ancien régime, ‘these linguistic 
weapons of a bygone worldliness.’80
The language and ceremonial reinforced certain expectations of behaviour. 
Diplomatic practice and ritual set the terms of engagement and conditioned, 
when it did not determine, the procedure at Utrecht. Both the public face of 
the congress and the private negotiations were grounded in the assumptions 
of a shared diplomatic code. Within the public framework of the congress, the 
ceremony and ritual flaunting of the trappings of power as seen, for example, 
in the gazettes, fireworks, songs, prints, poetry, and coins, underscored both 
the majesty of the various states and the emergence of a cosmopolitan Europe. 
Shared conventions on language, dress, etiquette, and ritual reaffirmed the 
international nature of that society. The informal contacts and the sociability 
expedited the give and take so integral to the old diplomacy and facilitated 
agreements in the ancien régime. It was, in the words of Scott, a ‘concessive 
world . . . conducted by ambassadors who were members of the same inter-
national society.’81 Europeans’ assumption of a common diplomatic culture 
helped make possible an international order. In the eighteenth century Burke 
and others thought of Europe as ‘a commonwealth . . . virtually one great state.’ 
76    Norbert Elias, The Court Society, translated by Edmund Jephcott (New York: Pantheon, 
1983), 86–87.
77    Edmund Burke, The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, vol. 9, ed. William B. Todd 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 114, ‘Fourth Letter on a Regicide Peace.’
78    Edmund Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace,’ in The Works (London: Bell, 1893), 5: 208.
79    Edmund Burke, ‘A Letter to a Member of the National Assembly in Answer to Some 
Objection to his book on French Affairs,’ in Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke 
(London: Bohn, 1855), 2: 537.
80    Sarah Maza, Private Lives and Public Affairs: The Causes Célèbres of Prerevolutionary France 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 307.
81    Scott, ‘Diplomatic Culture,’ 83.
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For him ‘correspondence in laws, customs, manners, and habits of life’ had 
more force than treaties. ‘They are obligations written in the heart . . . .’82 The 
Treaty of Rastatt provides the most telling example. The negotiations between 
the duc de Villars, one of the most outstanding generals of Louis XIV, and Prince 
Eugene of Savoy, arguably the foremost commander in Europe who served 
the Habsburgs, were expedited by their mutual respect and their friendship. 
Earlier in their careers they had fought together in the Ottoman campaigns. 
82    Edmund Burke quoted in Gerald W. Chapman, Edmund Burke. The Practical Imagination 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967), 185–186.
Figure 1.1 Medal in silver to Commemorate the Treaty of Rastatt, 1714. Design by Martin 
Brunner (1659–1725). 
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At Rastatt, they dined and played cards. The medal issued by the French to 
commemorate that peace showed two thunderbolts of battle giving Europe 
peace: Olim duo fulmina belli, nunc instrumenta quietis (once two thunderbolts 
of war, now instruments of peace.)83 Two who had successfully mounted the 
horses of war extended the olive branch of peace.
83    Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, ‘Treaty of Rastatt,’ in The Treaties of the War of the Spanish 
Succession, ed. Frey and Frey, 373–375.
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CHAPTER 2
Behind the Stage: The Global Dimension of the 
Negotiations
Lucien Bély
Study of the diplomatic correspondence before the Peace of Utrecht reveals 
that commercial and colonial interests became very important at that time. 
The question of the Indies, that is, of Spanish America, may be counted as 
one the causes of the War of the Spanish Succession. So European diplomats 
had to understand and discuss such matters, but most of the negotiators, 
gentlemen or clergymen, were unfamiliar with these issues. Merchants could 
intervene in the discussions as experts and sometimes as negotiators as did, 
for instance, the French merchant and diplomat Nicolas Mesnager, deputy of 
Rouen for the council of commerce. Such interventions often formed the most 
secret part of the negotiations.
We can note a dialectical phenomenon. The merchants wanted to discover 
new markets, and the European economies needed them in a time of general 
crisis. On the other hand, governments and diplomats integrated those views 
into their demands and tried to imagine new ways to intervene throughout the 
world and to open new roads for commerce.
Of course, the dynastic situation was the main affair in the War of the 
Spanish Succession. The House of Bourbon was seeking a new relationship 
between the Court of Versailles and the Court of Madrid that would create 
a real union between them. The young Philip V, Louis XIV’s grand-son, was 
expected to follow the king of France’s political line. On the other side, the 
allies—Great Britain, the United Provinces and the emperor—could not 
accept this new European organization with such a huge aggregation of 
crowns in the hands of one family. This super-power would pose a threat to 
the stability of all of Europe. The war’s military operations were the main 
concern of the European princes: they were waiting for the result of their 
strategic choices. For thirteen years, the battles dominated European history. 
But some other interests, particularly commercial ones, soon became factors 
in the negotiations among allies or between enemies as the hidden part of 
the conflict.
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 The Negotiations between France and Spain
One of the key issues in international relations of the time involved the par-
ticipation of foreigners in Spanish-American trade, despite Spain’s colonial 
monopoly. European merchants brought to Spain the products needed for this 
trade, but the trade remained in Spanish hands, was controlled by Spanish 
officers and protected by the Spanish fleet. A 1686 investigation by the French 
consul Patoulet showed the place of each country in the trade of Cadiz: France 
ranked first; Genoa, the United Provinces, England, Hamburg, and the Spanish 
Netherlands each had a good share while Spain provided only 6% of the 
goods.1
We know that the arrival of precious metals also had important conse-
quences for European economies. The study, in particular, of the place of 
precious metals and of metallic coinage in the development of Europe has 
been controversial for historians and perhaps for economists. The ‘crisis’ of 
the seventeenth century was described by Earl J. Hamilton,2 reinterpreted by 
P. Chaunu3 and discussed by Michel Morineau.4 During the War of the Spanish 
Succession, Mesnager wrote that New World treasure was almost the sole 
source of the wealth of Europe.5 And in 1710, he wrote: ‘Spanish America has 
1    The foreigners themselves were present in the Spanish ports, as the Flemish in Cadiz: Jan 
Everaert, De internationale en koloniale Handel der Vlaamse Firma’s te Cadiz (1670–1700) 
(Bruges: De Tempel, 1973); or the Irish present in the Canary Islands: Agustin Guimerá Ravina 
and José Miguel Delgado Barrado, ‘Proyectismo camario y comercio americano: un plan de 
compañía privilegiada (1753),’ El Comercio en el Antiguo Régimen, ed. Manuel Lobo Cabrera 
and Vicente Suárez Grimón (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria: Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran 
Canaria, 1994), 151–162.
2    Earl J. Hamilton, American Treasure and Price Revolution in Spain (1501–1650) (Cambridge 
(Mass.): Octagon Books, 1934); idem, War and Prices in Spain (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard 
University Press, 1947).
3    Huguette and Pierre Chaunu, Séville et l’Atlantique (1504–1650). Partie statistique (Paris: 
Editions de l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 1957–1958); Pierre Chaunu, Séville 
et l’Atlantique (1504–1650). Partie interprétative (Paris: Editions de l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes 
en Sciences Sociales, 1959–1960).
4    Michel Morineau, Incroyables gazettes et fabuleux métaux (Paris: Maison des sciences de 
l’homme, 1985).
5    Lucien Bély, Espions et ambassadeurs au temps de Louis XIV (Paris: Fayard, 1990), 576–595, 
here 582: ‘Réflexions sur les moyens qui peuvent aider à déterminer les Hollandais à la paix,’ 
Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Correspondance politique Hollande 214, fol. 
105–107. See also: Lucien Bély, L’Art de la paix en Europe. Naissance de la diplomatie moderne, 
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the largest sources of gold and silver in the world [. . .] everyone wants to have 
his own share.’
For English and Dutch merchants, as well as for their governments, the main 
danger with a French prince as king of Spain was the benefits that the French 
economy could reap, especially through direct access to the wealth of Spanish 
America. An ‘asiento’ or contract was signed between the Spanish adminis-
tration and the French Company of the Asiento or of Guinea for providing 
slaves to the Spanish colonies. France in exchange would ensure the protec-
tion of the Spanish convoys. The main strategic choice of the war was thus 
whether to maintain the links between Spain and America when abandoning 
the European dominions of the Spanish king. Obviously, during the long war, 
the arrival of American metal was a breath of oxygen for the Bourbon camp.6
In the talks between the two countries the French ambassador Michel 
Amelot7 established a harmony between the French king’s influence and 
the Spanish government. Daubenton, representing Pontchartrain and the 
Department of the Navy, had to defend French commercial interests. This 
‘agent général’ had to gather information from the various French consuls 
in Spain.8 Nicolas Mesnager also came, as an expert, to hold talks with the 
Spanish authorities. However, in spite of French attempts to gain advantage, 
the Spanish administration, through very tough negotiations, maintained the 
uniqueness of the system and defended its independence.9
In a first negotiation, from December 1704 to May 1706, in Spain, Mesnager 
obtained a new organization of trade: only ‘foreign allies to Spain’ could send 
goods to America. But merchants did not wait for the result of the political 
XVIe–XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007). For the next quote, see Bély, 
Espions, p. 587.
6    Guy Rowlands, ‘The Economics of War. Tax, trade and credit in pursuit of an acceptable 
peace,’ Peace was made here. The Treaties of Utrecht, Rastatt and Baden, 1713–1714, ed. Renger 
de Bruin and Maarten Brinkman (Petersberg: Michael Imhof Verlag, 2013), 34–41. See also 
Guy Rowlands, The financial decline of a great power. War, influence, and money in Louis XIV ’s 
France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
7    For this ambassador, see Guillaume Hanotin’s PhD thesis ‘Au service de deux rois: 
l’ambassadeur Amelot de Gournay et l’union des couronnes,’ Université Paris-Sorbonne, 3 
December 2011. See also: L. Bély, ‘La présence et l’action des ambassadeurs de France dans 
le gouvernement de Philippe V d’Espagne: conduite de la guerre et négociation de la paix,’ 
L’Espagne et ses guerres, ed. Annie Molinié and Alexandra Merle (Paris: PU Paris-Sorbonne, 
2004), 183–201.
8    This important, new function is the subject of current research by Sylvain Lloret.
9    E.W. Dahlgren, Les relations commerciales et maritimes entre la France et les côtes de l’Océan 
Pacifique, I, Le commerce de la mer du Sud jusqu’à la paix d’Utrecht (Paris: La Découvrance, 
1909).
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negotiations. The importance of Malouins in the South Sea trade is obvious: 
they broke through the monopoly in the Spanish Empire but essentially chose 
to smuggle in goods to get around the control of Cadiz.10 The question posed 
by André Lespagnol is whether they wanted to participate in the American 
trade or share the American treasure. Saint-Malo traders discovered that direct 
trade in the South Seas (South Pacific) was technically possible and financially 
rewarding. In 1703 traders embarked on this adventure without considering 
the risk it posed to Franco-Spanish relations. The French General Controller of 
Finances gave them support in 1705, even if he concealed it behind passports 
granted for voyages of discovery. So, the possibility of a French presence in 
American ports was established.11
Coming from Europe or leaving Peru, French sailors chose to stop near 
Concepcion: they settled in Talcahuano, a safe anchorage, well sheltered from 
the winds. This settlement became the main logistical base for French trade 
in the South Seas. They even built semi-permanent houses, with dormitories, 
where sailors could recover their health.12 The French also benefited from the 
protection of the colonial authorities, the Uztariz. Concepcion was finally a 
privileged locale for gathering information on the market conditions and on 
the changes in the politico-military situation. This French experience became 
a model: illegal or quasi-illegal trade combined with local settlement. This 
informal presence of European merchants seemed a pragmatic way to respect 
the Spanish organization while finding new markets in America. The Dutch 
and the English would try to obtain the same privileges in the negotiations.
England managed to secure more solid advantages from the War of the 
Spanish Succession in Portugal, imposing the commercial treaty negotiated 
by John Methuen.13 The rural Portuguese economy was now linked with the 
manufacturing English one while gold found in Brazil boosted this Anglo-
Portuguese trade and fortified the financial situation of London.14
10    André Lespagnol, Messieurs de Saint-Malo. Une élite négociante au temps de Louis XIV 
(Saint-Malo: PU Rennes, 1990).
11    Worse, from 1712, Saint-Malo boats went to Cadiz to top up their cargo.
12    Due to longer and longer stays of the boats and to desertion, there arose a form of settle-
ment of some French natives. A commissioner noted in 1714 that in Concepcion French 
officers had built houses as if they had to spend their entire life there. These Frenchmen 
behaved as ‘in a conquered country’, said the same observer, who deplored the excesses of 
youth. Frictions or quarrels broke out with the Spanish people settled in the area.
13    José Luís Cardoso, Isabel Cluny, Fernando Dores Costa et al., O Tratado de Methuen (1703): 
diplomacia, guerra, política e economia (Lisbon: Livros horizonte, impr., 2003).
14    Mesnager also assumed that the maritime powers had obtained assurances from the com-
petitor of Philip V, Archduke Charles, giving them advantages in the Spanish-American 
trade in case of an allied victory. See about Charles of Austria, the Emperor Charles VI: 
44 Bély
The need for information also formed part of the negotiations between 
France and Spain. The manuscript of Jean de Monségur, about Mexico or New 
Spain, reveals that the French government, especially the State Secretary of 
the Navy, Jérôme de Pontchartrain, tried to glean accurate information on the 
American market. This traveller-informer appears as a ‘soldier-diplomat-spy,’ 
in the words of Jean-Paul Duviols.15
According to his report, Spain allied and perhaps united with France, could 
provide the West Indies with all the goods consumed there and can do all 
the business with America. In fact, it was not so easy. Monségur described in 
detail the trade of New Spain. He showed how French ships from Saint-Malo, 
Martinique and other parts of France came to America. They took advantage of 
the fact that Mexico lacked many things at that time. The monopoly was also 
bypassed by trade carried out by Spaniards sailing from port to port: he men-
tions Havana, Maracaibo, Caracas and Cumaná. The French traveller described 
the system: French vessels arrived, especially from Saint-Malo and Martinique, 
richly loaded. They could not unload if they did not dispose of their goods at 
low prices to the Spanish officers who prevented them from freely selling their 
cargo to merchants. This is the lesson of the French presence: if individuals 
had no opportunities to buy from French hands, a large part of the profit (from 
30% to 40 or even 50%) went to the viceroy and his ministers. Monségur even 
points out the introduction of goods from England and Holland. He accumu-
lated the most accurate data and numerical evaluations to identify the pos-
sibilities of trade in America. For example, he listed the main goods required 
in Mexico as iron, steel, white wax, fruit, silks, lace, woollen goods, groceries, 
papers, cards, hats, haberdashery and medicinal drugs.
Finally, the dynastic affair seemed increasingly immaterial, or at least less 
important, once the military operations had destroyed the Spanish Empire in 
Europe. Outside Spain, only Sicilia had remained in Philip V’s hands. Barcelona 
and a large part of the Spanish peninsula were occupied by the Archduke 
Charles of Austria, son of emperor Leopold I and brother of Emperor Joseph I. 
So, the war aims of the House of Austria were nearly fulfilled. The commercial 
aspect of the war remained, however, the main concern for London and The 
Hague.
Virginia Sanz, Entre Austrias y Borbones: el archiduque Carlos y la monarquía de España 
(Madrid: Sigilo, 1993); Virginia Léon, Carlos VI: el emperador que no pudo ser rey de España 
(Madrid: Aguilar, 2003).
15    Mémoires du Mexique: le manuscrit de Jean de Monségur, 1707–1709, ed. Jean-Paul Duviols 
(Paris: Chandeigne, 2002).
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French diplomacy therefore chose to place the negotiations with its enemies 
on the same commercial terms. First with the Dutch who remained intransi-
gent, then with the English who jumped at the opportunity. These negotia-
tions required the use of specialists such as Mesnager who was instructed to 
put in order and form proposals on topics that diplomats usually had little 
mastery of.
The first secret negotiations between France and its enemies had begun in 
the United Provinces.16 This country appeared in the seventeenth century as a 
key financial and commercial centre and a place of relative religious tolerance. 
Negotiators sent by France could easily disguise the purpose of their travels. 
The French minister of foreign affairs went himself to The Hague to negoti-
ate with Heinsius. Despite such favourable conditions, the French negotiations 
with the United Provinces reached an impasse. The Dutch government was not 
seduced by French commercial proposals and remained faithful to the Great 
Alliance.
 The Negotiations between France and England
During the year 1711, negotiations became possible between France and 
England after the change of government in London and the military defeats of 
Brihuega and Villaviciosa in Spain. Matthew Prior, a poet and also a former sec-
retary of the English embassy in Paris, arrived in France: he gave a precise and 
lively report of his negotiations with the marquis de Torcy, the French Secretary 
of State for foreign affairs. About commercial affairs, he quoted the words of 
Torcy: ‘ “Monsieur Prior, dit-il, vous avez été dans le commerce, reflechissez un 
peu sur ce memoire”; so beginning at “Pour la Great Britain plus particulière-
ment”, he said that we asked no less than to be master of the Mediterranean 
and Spain, to possess ourselves of all the Indies, and to take away from France 
all that appartains to that crown in America.’17 The discussion was about four 
places in America. Prior answered that Spain would have ‘little reason to fear 
from [English] settlements, which were to secure [English traders] from pirates 
and robbers, particularly in the South sea,’ who were, according to Prior, ‘most 
Englishmen, and some French, particularly Dunkirkers’. France, a ‘generous 
16    Johanna Geertruida Stork-Penning, Het Grote Werk. Vredesonderhandelingen gedurende 
de Spaanse Successie-oorlog, 1705–1710 (Groningen: J.B. Wolters, 1958).
17    Report on the manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland, preserved at Welbeck Abbey, 
vol. V (London: printed for Her Majesty’s stationery office, 1899), ‘Prior’s Negotiations in 
France,’ 35.
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nation,’ hated them as much as England did, and Spaniards would be happy 
to be protected ‘from the violence of these buccaneers’. Torcy considered that 
such a settlement was impossible: it was ‘a constant rule of Spain, not to let 
in any other nation amongst them in America’. Later, in his Mémoires, Torcy 
would recall Prior’s words: ‘Il coûtera peu au roi catholique de les [the four 
places] accorder à l’une et à l’autre nation dans la grande étendue des terres 
soumises à la monarchie d’Espagne, depuis la Californie jusqu’au détroit de 
Magellan.’18
Then Torcy underlined another ‘impossibilité’ about ‘la terre neuve’: ‘. . . it is 
the nursery of our seamen, our fishers are obliged as yours are, to take young 
men to perform that voyage [. . .] and for fish we have more need of it than 
you, for we are indispensably obliged to consume it ourselves, while you for 
the greatest part propose to yourselves only the profit of selling it to others.’19 
Prior knew that ‘some temperament might be found in the negotiation upon 
this head’. He answered only that all Hudson’s Bay was English, and, as a proof, 
he indicated ‘that the names of all the banks and towns even in the French 
maps have always been and are now English’. For Newfoundland, the phrase 
‘terre neuve’ came from the English name: a very interesting way to defend 
the priority of the settlement by maps. The idea of a ‘temperament’ referred 
to a solution already found regarding fisheries: it would be the right of French 
fisher men to prepare cod on the ‘French shore’. Torcy met Prior on the follow-
ing day. The king of France had asked ‘those persons who are most versed in the 
mercantile affairs to consider of and report their opinion upon the proposals’.
On the 27th of July, the meeting took place at nine in the evening in the gar-
dens of Fontainebleau; the abbot Gaultier was with the two negotiators. Torcy 
evoked the Dutch gazettes which expressed surprise in the Netherlands about 
the South Sea Company. The French secretary of State said that French mer-
chants were also very anxious about the South Sea Company. Prior replied that 
French traders could make ‘what bargain they could with Spain’. The French 
minister swore by his ‘foi d’honnête homme’ that France was not on a better 
footing than it had been in the time of Charles II and that the Spaniards were 
most jealous of the French since a prince of the house of Bourbon was on the 
throne. This was the lesson of the Franco-Spanish negotiations.
In July 1711, Daniel Defoe sent Harley papers about a settlement in America. 
He wrote that some of those schemes had been approved by William III at the 
beginning of the war. The kingdom of Chile was suitable for an English colony, 
18    Mémoires du marquis de Torcy, Collection des mémoires relatifs à l’histoire de France, ed. ? 
A. Petitot and Monmerqué, 2-LVIII (Paris: Foucault, 1828), 30–31.
19    Ibid., 36.
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especially in the town of Valdivia. This paper underlined that many natives 
were ‘hating the Spaniards and willing to receive any nation that are likely to 
deliver them from the slavery they are under to the cruel and tyrannic tem-
per of the said Spaniards’.20 Then came an interesting anthropological remark: 
‘These natives are a foundation of commerce, because they go clothed and 
would generally clothe themselves if they could obtain manufactures.’ This 
colony could produce rice, cocoa and wine, and in the north, sugar and spices. 
Another settlement could be made between the Rio de la Plata and the straits 
of Magellan. Land connections could link this colony to Chile.
 The Negotiations between England and the United Provinces
To understand the reaction of the Dutch, we can rely upon the letters sent by 
John Drummond, a banker, to Harley; this interesting commercial figure has 
been studied by Ragnhild Hatton.21 I want to consider the passages of his cor-
respondence concerning world commerce.
John Drummond had conversations with the Dutch Grand Pensionary 
Heinsius, and he could enumerate the new conditions for a peace. It seemed 
difficult to drive Philip V out of Spain, but the trade with the Spanish West 
Indies must be secured as formerly through Spain, and France was to have no 
greater privileges there than other nations.
As we have seen, the South Sea Company impressed public opinion in 
France as well as in the United Provinces. Drummond wrote that a South Sea 
Company was also proposed by the Dutch ‘to be exerted by way of subscription’ 
and that was kept ‘very secret’. According to Drummond, ‘a part of the project 
is formed in Surinam, on which this Company is to act’. Some details arrived 
on 14 July. Amsterdam encouraged the secret project to establish a settlement 
on the continent of the Spanish West Indies. That city would control the finan-
cial arrangements. They demanded only six men-of-war, twelve or fifteen hun-
dred land men ‘and six hundred slaves, ready at Surinam, to be taken aboard 
there’. They required also three hundred craftsmen (bricklayers, carpenters 
and smiths) and artillery for a fort. The location of the place remained secret: 
20    Report on the manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland, preserved at Welbeck Abbey 
(London, printed for Her Majesty’s stationery office, V–VI, 1899), 59, Daniel Defoe to the 
Earl of Oxford.
21    Ragnhild Hatton, ‘John Drummond in the War of the Spanish Succession. Merchant 
turned Diplomatic Agent,’ Studies in Diplomatic History, ed. R. Hatton and M.S. Anderson 
(London: Longmans, 1970), 69–96.
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‘The place they design is said to be in the kingdom of Mexico, but as well is yet 
kept extremely secret, you may be sure that part will be discovered last.’22 So, 
the Dutch wanted to have a South Sea Company too. Here we note the work-
ings of a European process of imitation through the circulation of ideas and of 
projects. Those proposed Dutch settlements could evoke the French presence 
on the South Pacific coast. Because the Spanish empire seemed weaker, it is 
possible to imagine local or regional settlements which could be accepted by 
Madrid. Torcy was right to underline the resistance of the whole Spanish orga-
nization against such projects. Such enterprises involved slaves—six hundred 
here: they were useful instruments in those projects and were now present in 
the representation of America and of European ambitions.
All the pamphlet campaign, beginning with Swift’s Conduct of the Allies, was 
meant to demonstrate that the British effort during the war was stronger than 
any other,23 and so it must be rewarded by some economic advantages in the 
world. Nothing was negotiated to reinforce the power of the country. Only trad-
ing facilities were necessary to satisfy the ambitions of the people in the British 
Islands. Such demands were in line with the political equilibrium obtained 
through the revolution of 1688, the government following the impulse of the 
political nation. They also revealed the new ambitions of the Tory faction: to 
avoid a continental military engagement, to discard the moneyed interest and 
to protect the landed interest and reinforce the world empire.
The opening of the Utrecht Congress in 1712 was supposed to transform 
the secret discussions into public negotiations, giving lustre to the search 
for peace by attracting in Utrecht about eighty negotiators and a crowd of 
onlookers. They were actors on the stage24 as princes were on the theatre 
of Europe, according to a common metaphor of that time. The social activity 
gave them opportunities for meeting their counterparts, and their conversa-
tions were transcribed in dispatches from the negotiators, as if Congress had 
given them a new dignity and political weight. Thus, a congress exacerbates 
a specific sociability based on a common diplomatic culture. A congress 
22    Report on the manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland, 28, John Drummond to the 
Earl of Oxford, 14 July 1711.
23    Douglas Coombs, The Conduct of the Dutch, British opinion and the Dutch alliance during 
the War of the Spanish succession (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1958).
24    Lucien Bély, ‘Utrecht, un théâtre pour la paix,’ in Les Pays-Bas et la France des guerres de 
religion à la création de la République batave, ed. W. Frijhoff and O. Moorman van Kappen 
(Nijmegen: Gerard Noodt Instituut, 1993), 53–76, reprinted in L’Art de la paix en Europe, 
503–524.
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belonged also to a certain form of communication. Even if they were some-
times considered as formalities, as an empty reality, such diplomatic assem-
blies accompanied a geopolitical reorganization and helped proclaim a new 
stability through an agreement between the belligerents. Behind the stage, 
there was also a world of spies, informers, journalists and chroniclers, of travel-
lers and aristocrats, of writers, comedians and adventurers. They were all inter-
ested in this diplomatic assembly that seemed the great tribunal of political 
affairs in Europe. They were creating an international public opinion.25
In fact, formal negotiations soon gave way to direct talks between London, 
Versailles, Madrid and Turin. However, from 1712, the general congress in 
Utrecht covered many negotiations, especially between the allies, the United 
Provinces and Great Britain. A new treaty was prepared for the Barrier, and it 
was not as favourable as the previous one.
John Drummond had discussions with Dutch statesmen and asked Harley 
to procure or at least to do his utmost to obtain for the Dutch or for their West 
India Company the ‘asiento of negroes’ for the northern parts of the Spanish 
West Indies, namely for Carthagena and Portobello, since everybody was con-
vinced that the English company would supply the whole South Sea coast of 
America. Dutch opinion needed ‘some douceur of that nature’26 to accept the 
British gains. In the same letter, John Drummond described the way in which 
the mercantile interests could impress the diplomatic congress: ‘The deputies 
of the West India Company went to Utrecht last Saturday, and from thence to 
the Hague with the States Plenipotentiaries, and by what I can learn, Porto 
Rico, a small and almost uninhabited island on the north coast of America, for 
the security of the Curacao trade, and the furnishing of negroes to the north 
side of the Spanish West Indies, is what they are resolved to insist on, and that 
they are to come as an equivalent to what they suppose you have obtained for 
your South Sea Company . . .’27 The deputies of the Dutch company came to 
press the diplomatic delegations hard. Four days later, John Drummond wrote 
to Harley after two long conferences with Heinsius: ‘. . . he is for making the 
peace jointly with England, but assures me that your Lordship must help him, 
both as to the barrier treaty and some condescension in the negro trade in 
favour of the Dutch West India Company, for it is impossible for him to satisfy 
men’s minds here till he can obtain something by which he can show them 
25    Lucien Bély, ‘Peut-on parler d’une opinion publique internationale à l’époque moderne ?,’ 
L’Opinion publique en Europe (1600–1800) (Paris: PU Paris-Sorbonne, 2011), 161–181.
26    Report, op. cit., 158, John Drummond to the Earl of Oxford, 15 April 1712.
27    Report, op. cit., 159, John Drummond to the Earl of Oxford, 15 April 1712.
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that England has not been working altogether a separate interest.’28 We must 
remember that war was going on in America. In 1711, Duguay-Trouin had taken 
Rio de Janeiro. In 1712, Cassard managed to ransack Capo Verde, Montserrat 
and Antigua, and later Surinam and Curacao.
France also had new ambitions, especially for Louisiana. John Drummond 
wrote: ‘This new patent of the French King’s to Mons. Crossat [Crozat] for 
the trade of New Mexico; of which Renard has sent your Lordship a copy, 
gives muche jealousy and I am extremely out in my weak politics if this be 
well timed of the French Court to give out such a patent now.’29 Those lettres 
patentes presented, through the 14th article, the new importance of the slave 
trade: ‘Si pour les cultures et plantations que ledit Crozat voudra faire faire, il 
juge à propos d’avoir des nègres audit pays de la Louisiane, il pourra envoyer 
un vaisseau tous les ans, les traiter directement à la côte de Guinée, en pre-
nant par lui permission de la Compagnie de Guinée de le faire, il pourra ven-
dre ces nègres aux habitants de la colonie de la Louisiane, et faisons défense 
à toute compagnie et autre personne que ce soit, sous quelque prétexte que 
ce puisse être, d’en introduire ni d’en faire commerce dans ledit pays, et dudit 
sieur Crozat d’en porter ailleurs.’30 The diplomatic negotiations showed how 
world geography could be used in political discussions and how commercial 
projects are defined and prepared: an alliance of pragmatism and imagination 
nourished by the culture of the time.
The end of a long war brought good news. For the populations it meant 
the end of difficult times: fiscal pressure, military mobilization, ideological 
struggle, political tensions. There were great celebrations with fireworks to 
express the public rejoicing. Nevertheless, the peace treaties appeared finally 
as a failure for most of the countries involved in the war. The Dutch found no 
reward for their efforts. English opinion was mobilized against the commercial 
treaty,31 and Parliament rejected it. For George I, who became king in 1714, the 
agreement with France was shameful, and the negotiators had to defend them-
selves or to escape to the continent. For France, the loss of a part of Canada 
and of Newfoundland had heavy consequences. Spain had lost its European 
Empire and must struggle to neutralize English ambitions in America. The 
emperor would not renounce his claim to Spain. Perhaps, only the duke of 
28    Ibidem, 162, John Drummond to the Earl of Oxford, 19 April 1712.
29    Ibidem, p. 236, John Drummond to the Earl of Oxford, 25 October 1712.
30    Lettres patentes du roi, Fontainebleau, 15 septembre 1712, source Gallica.bnf.fr.
31    Eric Schnakenbourg, ‘Les interactions entre commerce et diplomatie au début du XVIIIe 
siècle: l’exemple du traité de commerce franco-anglais de 1713,’ Histoire, Economie et 
Société 3 (2004): 349–365.
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Savoy, now king of Sicily, and the king of Prussia could be satisfied with the 
new geopolitical order.
The advantages obtained by the British government were probably chimeri-
cal dreams, as were those usually created by the Spanish-American trade. The 
‘navio de permiso’ had little importance: it actually meant the consolidation of 
trade routes in the margin of the Carrera de Indias.32 The contract for the slave 
trade led to a financial collapse of the South Sea Company in England.33
Two facts remained, nonetheless: English smuggling in the Spanish empire 
expanded, resulting in permanent tensions of which the War of Jenkins’ Ear 
was the clearest evidence. The second basic fact was the decisive economic 
importance of the slave trade. Mesnager had recognized the importance of 
this trade for the coasts of Senegal, and trade could be carried out from the 
Guinean coast to the Cape of Good Hope to the profit of the State. While sell-
ing goods of little value, it was possible to buy gold, ivory, wax, gum and leather, 
and he added: ‘Ce commerce nous fournit encore des nègres que l’on trans-
porte à Cayenne, Saint-Domingue et aux îles sans lesquels on ne pourrait les 
cultiver.’34 The attribution of the asiento to a British company did not prevent 
the Atlantic French ports from taking advantage of this human trade. And the 
whole European economy benefited from the products supplied by the colo-
nial islands and redistributed throughout Europe.
Agreements in conjunction with the Peace of Utrecht also revealed the his-
torical evolution of trafficking. However, the planned activity of companies or 
chartered privileges were never fully implemented; they did not realize their 
contract or project.35 Consequently only the liberalization and privatization of 
the slave trade led to the prosperity of the eighteenth century. Again, freedom 
from state control was favourable to slave trafficking and also to worldwide 
trade.
In any case, diplomatic discourse, an expression of political power, recog-
nized the incalculable benefit of trafficking. Diplomacy succeeded in organiz-
ing a new agreement between Spain and English merchants who replaced the 
French ones. The political culture of the time was now aware of the mercantile 
32    Antonio García-Baquero González, La Carrera de Indias. Histoire du commerce hispano-
américain (XVIe–XVIIIe siècles), transl. B. Bennassar, (Paris: Desjonquères, 1997).
33    Helen J. Paul, The South Sea Bubble. An Economic History of its Origins and Consequences 
(London: Routledge, 2011).
34    Archives du Ministère des affaires étrangères (Paris-La Courneuve), Mémoires et docu-
ments France 2018 ‘Mémoire du sieur Mesnager,’ fol. 11–115, December 1703, see Bély, 
Espions, 577–578.
35    Serge Daget, La Traite des Noirs, (Rennes: Ouest-France Université, 1990).
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interests and of the importance of the slave trade,36 which generated a circuit 
invisible to the European populations, allowing them to forget about the bar-
baric aspects of this trade.
The treaties of Utrecht, Rastatt and Baden brought an end to the war 
and the negotiations in 1713–1714. The new political map of Europe was 
approved. The congress showed that all the countries involved in the war would 
accept this new order. It would open a new era of peace, and peaceful dis-
course would replace ideological mobilization. On the stage, many diplomats 
played their part and defended the interests of their masters. A general discus-
sion was possible in this diplomatic framework. Some issues were not dealt 
with: the future of French Protestant refugees, the case of the Catalans, who 
were treated by Philip V as enemies and rebels,37 the future of the Jacobites 
and of the Stuart prince expelled from France, the problem of the Hungarian 
prince Rákóczi, now incognito in Paris.38
The conduct of the English government, especially Bolingbroke’s dramatur-
gical sense, placed England at the centre of European affairs. British diplomacy 
created a new balance of power on the continent. The commercial affairs and 
the global dimensions of the war were the basis of this peace but had been 
discussed quite discreetly. The shameful commerce of slaves had remained 
behind the stage. Why? Because of Christian remorse? Perhaps. Or because 
such affairs did not belong to the sphere of official diplomacy. So, diplomats 
succeeded in hiding this part of the negotiations which were considered as 
private business. Commercial affairs were, however, one of the foundations, 
too often neglected, of the Peace of Utrecht.
36    Henri Sée and L. Vignols, ‘L’envers de la diplomatie officielle de 1715 à 1730,’ Revue belge de 
philologie et d’histoire 5:2–3 (1926), 471–491.
37    Joaquim Albareda, La Guerra de successió i l’onze de setembre (Barcelona: Editorial 
Empúries, 2000); idem, Felipe V y el triunfo del absolutismo. Cataluña en un conflicto europeo 
(1700–1714) (Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, 2002); idem, El ‘cas dels Catalans’. La con-
ducta dels aliats arran de la guerra de successió (1705–1742) (Barcelona: Fundació Noguera, 
2005); idem, La Guerra de Sucesión en España (1700–1714) (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 
2010).
38    Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, Societies in upheaval. Insurrections in France, Hungary, and 
Spain in the early eighteenth century (New York, London: Greenwood Press, 1987).
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CHAPTER 3
‘Enemies of their patrie’? Savoyard Identity and the 
Dilemmas of War, 1690–1713
Phil McCluskey
If Utrecht was a Peace with no obvious winners, one man stood apart as having 
achieved a spectacular success. By the time the negotiations were concluded, 
Victor Amadeus II, duke of Savoy (1675–1730) could pride himself on having 
wholly achieved his war aims: he had aggrandised both his territorial base and 
his dynasty, and had acquired the royal title of king of Sicily into the bargain. 
The House of Savoy’s rise through the ranks of European powers has been ably 
examined elsewhere.1 By siding with the anti-French coalitions in the Nine 
Years’ War and the War of the Spanish Succession, the duke kept the pressure 
on France’s vulnerable south-eastern frontier, draining French resources away 
from other theatres. The concessions he managed to win in 1713 reflect the 
importance of this contribution to the allied war effort. But what is less clear is 
how Victor Amadeus’ audacious diplomatic gambles affected his relationship 
with his states, particularly Savoy, which lay to the west of the Alps. From the 
beginning of his personal rule in the 1680s, the duke had forged a new, more 
authoritarian, relationship with his Savoyard subjects. If the strains of this 
situation were already beginning to show in 1690, the ensuing years of French 
military occupation that ended in 1713 would only complicate matters further. 
An investigation of the attitudes of the people of Savoy, along with those of the 
rival Bourbon and Sabaudian authorities, therefore offers a unique perspective 
on the state of political allegiance at that time.
The duchy of Savoy formed the oldest part of the transalpine composite 
state belonging to the House of Savoy. Its dukes had, for most of the seven-
teenth century, enjoyed close relations with France, and the duchy’s economy, 
1    R. Oresko, ‘The House of Savoy in search for a royal crown in the seventeenth century’ in 
Royal and republican sovereignty in early modern Europe: essays in memory of Ragnhild 
Hatton, ed. R. Oresko et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); C. Storrs, War, 
diplomacy and the rise of Savoy, 1690–1720 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); 
G. Symcox, Victor Amadeus II: absolutism in the Savoyard state, 1675–1730 (London: University 
of California Press, 1983).
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nobility and church were closely linked with the neighbouring French prov-
inces. But all this was to change as, from the 1680s, the young Victor Amadeus II 
became increasingly frustrated by Louis XIV’s vice-like grip over his states and 
sought an opportunity to free himself. The Franco-Sabaudian alliance came to 
an abrupt end in 1690, leading to a French invasion of Victor Amadeus’ states 
and the loss of Savoy, which remained under occupation until peace was con-
cluded in 1696. The French occupied the duchy a second time from 1703–1713, 
after Victor Amadeus again broke his alliance with Louis XIV and joined the 
allied powers during the War of the Spanish Succession.
Very little has been written about the reactions of occupied populations to 
foreign rule during the early modern period. By contrast, for the Revolutionary 
era there have been several important studies, such as T.W. Blanning’s work 
on the French occupations of the Rhineland.2 Other studies of more recent 
occupations have focused on the face-to-face interaction between occupier 
and occupied, at the levels of both lived experience and symbolic representa-
tion.3 These works have highlighted the importance of attempting to recon-
struct attitudes in order to understand the way occupations progressed. Yet 
historians of the ancien régime have largely failed to adapt to these method-
ological developments.4 This is due in part to a paucity of source material 
 relating to the largely illiterate non-elite sections of society at this time; and 
where sources do exist, they are often totally impressionistic. It is therefore 
difficult to be exact about the distribution of popular allegiances. But equally, 
there has also been a widely held perception among historians of the limited 
role of ordinary people in determining policy. More recent scholarship has 
demonstrated that in fact popular views were important in times of war when 
the ability to mobilise resources and win public support was of great conse-
quence.5 Low-level violence and confrontation can therefore reveal much 
about policy formulation on the part of both the French occupiers and also of 
the usurped duke.
2    See T.C.W. Blanning, Reform and revolution in Mainz, 1743–1803 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1974); K.H. Wegert, German radicals confront the common people: revolution-
ary politics and popular politics, 1789–1849 (Mainz: Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 1992).
3    J. Hantraye, Les Cosaques aux Champs-Elysées: L’Occupation de la France après la Chute de 
Napoléon (Paris: Belin, 2005).
4    For a more detailed discussion of the historiography of early modern military occupations 
see P. McCluskey, Absolute Monarchy on the Frontiers: Louis XIV’s Military Occupations of 
Lorraine and Savoy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 1–7.
5    J. Black, European International Relations, 1648–1815 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002).
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This chapter investigates what Savoy’s experience can reveal about identity 
and dynastic loyalty in the years leading up to the Peace of Utrecht. It was 
traditionally assumed that for non-elite groups in ancien régime Europe, alle-
giance to any particular ruler remained largely superficial until the advent of 
nationalism in the late eighteenth century. More recent work has highlighted 
the continued importance of personal and dynastic connections in defin-
ing identities, particularly in societies like Savoy’s that were still permeated 
by feudalism. Furthermore, changes in the legal status of military occupation 
meant that the legitimacy of both the conqueror and the usurped ruler were 
far from clear. The aim of this chapter is therefore to provide an examination 
of the reactions of non-elite Savoyards to French conquest and an account of 
the subsequent level of co-operation between the occupied populations 
and the French regime. Once this has been established, it will suggest which 
factors motivated people in this period to choose one ruler over another. In 
doing so it will reflect on what defined the identity of Savoyards, given the 
duchy’s position as a ‘frontier’ territory between the French and Italian cultural 
spheres. This study will cast new light on the values and priorities of non-elite 
groups in European society at the turn of the eighteenth century.
 Savoyard Reactions to Conquest
The French conquests of Savoy in 1690 and 1703 were achieved with remark-
able facility: on both occasions the towns capitulated quickly, and the duchy 
(with the exception of the fortress of Montmélian) was occupied in matter 
of weeks. Even by the standards of that time, when populations tended to be 
fairly passive in the immediate aftermath of conquest, such rapid turnover was 
unusual.6 The French certainly perceived this lack of resistance as a sign of the 
Savoyards’ willingness to embrace Louis XIV as their new ruler. In 1690, when 
the three estates of Savoy swore allegiance to Louis—as they were required to 
do by the French army—they asked that the king, ‘not treat them as newly con-
quered enemies, but as good subjects’.7 The same happened the second time 
around in 1703: the intendant of the neighbouring Franche-Comté wrote that 
the Savoyards would not resist the French, ‘as they desire so strongly to give 
6    The Savoyards had also been docile during the previous French conquest in 1630: J. Humbert, 
Une grande entreprise oubliée: Les Français en Savoie sous Louis XIII (Paris: Hachette, 1960), 
245–247.
7    Vincennes, S[ervice] H[istorique de la] D[éfense, Fonds de l’Armée de] T[erre], A1 1010, 43, 
Bonnat to Louvois, 20 August 1690.
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themselves to the king’.8 Following the fall of Chambéry, the French military 
commander the maréchal de Tessé wrote that the townspeople seemed ‘quite 
happy’ with the arrival of the French army, and as he put it to the king, ‘nothing 
is easier, sire, than to enter a town when they open up the gates for us’.9
While it is necessary to exercise some scepticism towards these French 
reports, there does appear to have been a level of popular support for the 
French presence. Even the Savoyard sources talk of a groundswell of popular 
joy at the French army’s arrival: the bishop of Geneva/Annecy was informed 
by one of his relatives in Chambéry that, ‘people here sing nothing but Vive 
France!’.10 In 1703, the disposition of the common people was similar: as the 
French commander in Grenoble wrote, there was little to fear from Savoyard 
incursions into the Dauphiné, because ‘all Savoyards [. . .] wish to be subjects 
of His Majesty’.11 A French priest resident in Savoy went further, ‘the people 
and nobility of Savoy have such little affection for His Highness [the duke 
of Savoy] . . . and the conquest will be even easier than during the last war’.12 
Moreover, several Savoyards were sending their effects into France for safe-
keeping, ‘proclaiming loudly that they wish to belong to the king of France 
and from the moment the troops arrive, they will give themselves to him with 
pleasure’.13
This initial level of support is even clearer if we compare the attitude of 
the people of Savoy with those of other territories conquered by the French 
during this period such as Lorraine, Roussillon or the Franche-Comté. In 
several of these, resistance manifested itself in the provision of intelligence 
to France’s enemies, joining the enemy army, or emigration.14 More passive 
resistance could entail the non-payment of taxes, smuggling, or discrimina-
tion against French people who lived locally.15 In parts of the Franche-Comté, 
following the French conquest of 1674, many local residents initially refused 
8     SHDT A1 1701, 70, Ferrand to Chamillart, 10 November 1703.
9     SHDT A1 1690, 177, Tessé to Louis XIV, 16 November 1703.
10    Chambéry, A[rchives] D[épartementales de] S[avoie] 2B 81, Jean d’Arenthon d’Alex to 
Denis d’Alex, 15 August 1690.
11    SHDT A1 1702, 166, Berulle to Chamillart, 7 October 1703.
12    SHDT A1 1702, 192, Bronod to Chamillart, 20 October 1703.
13    SHDT A1 1702, 175, Berulle to Chamillart, 12 October 1703.
14    On Roussillon, for example, see D. Stewart, Assimilation and acculturation in seventeenth-
century Europe: Roussillon and France, 1659–1715 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing 
Group, 1997), 113.
15    Stewart, Assimilation and acculturation, 122; B. Grosperrin, L’Influence française et le senti-
ment national français en Franche-Comté de la conquête à la Révolution (1674–1789) (Paris: 
Les Belles Lettres, 1967), 43–44.
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to speak to French soldiers or administrators, and innkeepers took down their 
signs so they would not have to serve French people.16 Similarly, the popula-
tion of Lorraine registered its distaste for the French presence there following 
the conquest of 1670 in a variety of ways.17 Much of this hostility was due to 
lingering memories of the horrors of previous French occupations: during the 
Thirty Years’ War, Lorraine and the Franche-Comté both suffered economic 
and demographic catastrophes.18
Why should it be that Savoy was more inclined to welcome the French? In a 
long-term sense, perceptions were conditioned by the pre-existing economic 
and cultural links between the people of Savoy and their French neighbours, 
particularly in the Dauphiné. Seasonal migration between Savoy and the 
neighbouring French provinces had long been encouraged, although definitive 
emigration was viewed by the duke as a withdrawal of obedience and could be 
severely punished with confiscation of property or death. In spite of this, many 
families left in the first half of the seventeenth century due to poverty, crossing 
into the Franche-Comté or the Dauphiné, strengthening the kinship networks 
diffused over the political frontier.19 Most Savoyards therefore had no reason 
to consider the French as ‘the Other’. Nor had they had much contact with the 
French army, and even the long French occupation of the sixteenth century 
(Savoy was occupied from 1530 to 1561) does not appear to have weighed very 
heavily on the duchy: demographic records show population growth during 
the period up to 1561 of as much as fifty per cent.20
Their pro-French inclinations can also be explained by the strained rela-
tionship that existed between the people of Savoy and their duke, Victor 
Amadeus. Jean-Marie Moeglin has argued that, well into the early modern 
period, princely dynasties formed the central reference point for the affirma-
tion of regional or ‘national’ identity.21 The dynasty was linked to a country and 
its people through a commonly held belief in Providence or divine grace (the 
ruler being chosen by God); it also personified the ancient notion of a body of 
rights and privileges which engendered feelings of belonging to a community.22 
16    French responses were often severe and created further bitterness: in Arbois, the French 
ordered the demolition of the town’s fortifications as punishment. Ibid., 43.
17    McCluskey, Absolute Monarchy, 105–106, 199–200.
18    McCluskey, Absolute Monarchy, 19; Grosperrin, L’Influence française, 12–13.
19    McCluskey, Absolute Monarchy, 259.
20    R. Devos, ‘Un siècle en mutation’ in Histoire de la Savoie, ed. P. Guichonnet (Toulouse: 
Privat, 1973) 232–233.
21    J.-M. Moeglin, ‘Nations et nationalisme du Moyen Age à l’Epoque Moderne,’ Revue 
Historique 123 (1999): 537–553.
22    Moeglin, ‘Nations et nationalisme,’ 543.
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In Savoy, however, the dynastic link had become weakened. The late seven-
teenth century saw a growing sense of alienation between Savoyards and an 
increasingly distant Piedmontese court based over the Alps in Turin. From the 
1680s, Victor Amadeus had struck at Savoy’s rights and privileges, beginning a 
confrontation that would continue throughout his reign. Though inspired by a 
drive towards fiscal efficiency, the duke and his agents were met with increas-
ing resentment and obstructionism on the part of Savoy’s institutions. That 
many of the duke’s agents were Piedmontese only compounded the problem: 
many Savoyards detested the Piedmontese23 and had little sense of common 
identity with them despite their shared sovereign.
To the French authorities in the region, this sense of alienation was clearly 
evident. The intendant of the Dauphiné, Etienne-Jean Bouchu reported in 
1703 that on a recent trip through Savoy he had noticed a great discontent-
ment at the harshness of the Sabaudian authorities and above all at the mul-
tiplicity and excess of taxes.24 In addition, Cardinal Le Camus (the bishop of 
Grenoble, whose diocese covered part of Savoy) wrote that the duke’s governor 
of Chambéry, the marquis de Salles, was despised by the people because of 
his heavy-handed manner: shortly after the outbreak of war he had demanded 
three thousand bags of grain from the conseil de ville, whereupon a syndic 
informed him that they did not have the money or credit to provide such a 
quantity, and that it would be a great source of pleasure for them if he could 
find it the governor then threatened to throw the syndic out of the window!25
Despite de Salles’s apparent harshness, the Sabaudian authorities also 
offered strong incentives to join the duke’s service: in October 1703, Victor 
Amadeus offered exemption from the taille and capitation for the duration of 
the war and three years after to all men who enrolled in his service.26 Given 
these incentives, it is telling that only thirty or so bourgeois volunteered to join 
de Salles at this time.27 And the passivity of the population meant that they 
posed no threat to the relatively small French force which took Chambéry: 
as Tessé noted, de Salles had posted ordonnances exhorting people to ‘smash 
everything to smithereens,’ something they could do quite easily given that in 
23    See McCluskey, Absolute monarchy, 134.
24    SHDT A1 1690, 50, Bouchu to Chamillart, 4 November 1703. Bouchu had left the army of 
Italy at the end of August and passed through Savoy on his return route to Grenoble.
25    SHDT A1 1690, 168, [unknown] to Le Camus, 29 October 1703.
26    Paris, A[rchives] des A[ffaires] E[trangères], C[orrespondance] P[olitique], Sard[aigne] 
112, fol. 358, ‘Edict de S.A.R.,’ 4 October 1703.
27    SHDT A1 1690, 168, [unknown] to Le Camus, 29 October 1703.
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Chambéry there were eighteen thousand people who could ‘take by the throat’ 
the small number of French troops stationed there.28
A further explanation for the distinct lack of hostility toward the French is 
that, on a day-to-day level, the French occupations of Savoy did not entail very 
much visible change. People were eager to see continuity, above all in terms 
of commerce and their livelihoods. When the French arrived in Chambéry 
in August 1690 the musket-makers of the town told the French commander 
they would be happy to work for the French if they were paid the same rate 
of fifteen florins per month as the duke had paid them.29 There was also an 
essential continuity with the previous regime as the duchy’s judicial and finan-
cial apparatus remained in place, and on an administrative level an intendant 
appointed by Turin was simply replaced by an official (known as a commissaire 
ordonnateur) appointed by Versailles. The remit of early modern provincial 
administration was still sufficiently superficial that a change of sovereign did 
not significantly affect the way the duchy was administered.
It is significant, however, that there was a markedly different tone to the 
welcome accorded to the French the second time around. The aftermath of 
the conquest of 1703 was characterised by a muted caution: after their arrival 
in Chambéry in 1703, the French intendant observed that the population 
was more reserved than previously.30 This caution was largely due to fear of 
retribution from Victor Amadeus. Following the return of Savoy in 1696, the 
duke had appointed one of his closest aides, Giovanni Battista Gropello, as 
intendant-général of Savoy. Gropello’s task was to reassert the duke’s author-
ity over the duchy, after it had co-operated with the French with a conspicu-
ous lack of resistance. With this in mind, a special tribunal was established 
in 1696, headed by Gropello, to judge those Savoyards who had collaborated 
with the French. The tribunal sat for three years and had an ugly character as 
it depended on denunciations; the church hierarchy was instrumental in this 
process, getting the faithful to come forward with information under pain of 
ecclesiastical censure.
The importance of the role of Victor Amadeus in shaping the attitudes 
of the population is further highlighted by a brief comparison with the experi-
ence of the county Nice, another of the duke’s territories occupied by France 
twice during this period. Shortly before the second conquest, the Prince of 
Monaco wrote that he believed that the people of Nice would prefer to be 
28    SHDT A1 1690, 199, Tessé to Louis XIV, 1 December 1703.
29    SHDT A1 1010 nos. 50 & 61, Saint-Ruth to Louvois, 22 & 30 Aug. 1690. St Ruth offered them 
the same and ordered three hundred muskets per month.
30    SHDT A1 1690, 71, Bouchu to Chamillart, 16 November 1703.
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subjects of Louis XIV, the duke having always treated them harshly.31 Similarly, 
in 1706, the French commissaire Paratte wrote to Chamillart, ‘It seems the peo-
ple will voluntarily submit to obedience, and I recognise that the most part 
wish with all their heart to stay there forever’.32 As in Savoy, however, there was, 
a strong feeling of caution amongst the population of Nice after the second 
conquest: the French commander noted in 1705 that the people of Nice wished 
to be forced to return to their homes, ‘in order to appear more attached to their 
natural prince’.33
 Savoyard Society and the Experience of Occupation
The contrast between Savoyard reactions to the first and second French con-
quests reveals how attitudes were far from fixed. They evolved, reflecting the 
changing dynamics of the occupations and the larger conflicts they were a 
part of. On a basic level, people’s attitudes towards the occupying regime were 
coloured by the deepening financial hardships that accompanied war. The 
consequences of conquest weighed much more heavily on the humble, and 
any favourable aspects of regime change did not concern them. The majority 
of Savoyards survived on a subsistence basis, and any initial enthusiasm for the 
French presence waned as the realities of war sank in. For them, survival took 
precedence over the choice between two remote dynasties. This reaction also 
reflects the priorities of French occupation policy during this period: the hall-
mark of the French approach was to mollify the elites as far as possible, while 
placing the burdens on the common people.
What resistance emerged was therefore partly based on the unwillingness—
or more likely inability—of communities to carry the disproportionately 
heavy burdens placed upon them. The level of the taille and other contribu-
tions on the towns almost doubled for peasants during this period, in addition 
to which many had to provide the ustensile (heating, bedding, salt and cooking 
materials) for quartered troops or work in the corvées for transport or forti-
fication work.34 If the comings and goings of soldiers through Savoy caused 
problems for the inhabitants, the lodging of soldiers was no less problematic.35 
31    SHDT A1 1767, 294, prince de Monaco to Chamillart, 30 March 1704.
32    SHDT A1 1973, 113, Paratte to Chamillart, 16 February 1706.
33    SHDT A1 1874, 101, Usson to Chamillart, 27 May 1705.
34    McCluskey, Absolute monarchy, 94–100.
35    Complaints of the townspeople of Chambéry at the disorders and inconvenience caused 
by the billeting can be found in the Archives Municipales de Chambéry: see e.g. BB 124, 
fol. 70, 10 December 1703.
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One resident of Annecy recorded in his diary in May 1691 that French troops 
had ‘taken everything’ and had ‘ruined the country’.36 Profiting from fear, offi-
cers extorted ‘gratifications’ to contain their soldiers, but disorders contin-
ued. Requisitions by the French were incessant, compounding bad harvests 
and leading to famine.37 As the French intendant wrote in autumn 1693, the 
Savoyards were accustomed to a harsh life, but since 1690, the majority of them 
in the mountainous provinces of the Tarentaise and the Maurienne had to 
live off ground shells and nuts into which the better-off people mixed a small 
amount of oats or barley.38
People could also make their choices based on personal or recounted expe-
rience of the occupying regime, in particular on the role of the French soldiers 
or officials they had to engage with. The correspondence of the war minister 
contains many instances of low-level violence between French soldiers and 
local inhabitants.39 To take one notorious example: on 24 August 1705, a lawyer 
named Vibert, together with his wife and four small children were staying in 
their country house outside of Chambéry. At around seven in the evening a 
dozen French soldiers attacked the unsuspecting family, breaking down the 
door with their muskets, shouting, ‘tue, tue, point de quartier!’; Vibert begged 
them for mercy on behalf of his pregnant wife and children, whereupon the 
soldiers seized him by the neck and stabbed him to death. They then ran-
sacked the house and set fire to it. The enormity of this crime frightened the 
entire duchy, prompting a direct intervention from the French war minister 
that the criminals be brought to ‘prompt and vigorous justice’.40
Such encounters undoubtedly tarnished the reputation of the French mili-
tary amongst the Savoyard people. Yet in many cases, the French soldiers were 
not committing wanton violence but acting on behalf of local inhabitants 
who had an axe to grind with their neighbours. Much as in modern occupa-
tions, the presence of occupying forces led to the rivalries and factions within 
36    J. Nicolas, La Savoie au 18e siècle: Noblesse et bourgeoisie (2 vols., Paris: La Fontaine de Siloé, 
1978), I, 555.
37    Nicolas, La Savoie au 18e siècle, I, 155.
38    A.M. Boislisle, Correspondance des contrôleurs généraux des finances avec les intendants 
des provinces, 1683–1715 (3 vols., Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1874–1897), I, 338, 1235, 
Bouchu to Barbezieux, 26 September 1693.
39    In December 1706, for example, a French lieutenant named publicly beat the lawyer 
Charles Perrin and another inhabitant of Chambéry who came to his aid. SHDT A1 1968, 
518, Chamillart to Vallière, 19 December 1706;, 558, Declaration by Perrin and Nicod, 
26 December 1706. In November 1707 a group of French soldiers murdered an inhabitant 
of Puiset in the Maurienne named Lavanas: SHDT A1 2102, 6, Angervilliers to Chamillart, 
6 January 1708.
40    SHDT A1 1862, 249, The Widow Vibert to Chamillart, 2 September 1705.
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society becoming exacerbated, often resulting in violence and murder. A little 
less than a year after the murder of Vibert, another French soldier was con-
demned to five years on the galleys for assassinating one of the most famous 
lawyers in Chambéry in his home as he slept. During the trial it emerged that 
the soldier had been paid to carry out the murder by a Savoyard theology stu-
dent, who evidently had a vendetta against the lawyer. Such actions were not 
uncommon: the head of the Savoyard judiciary wrote to the French war min-
ister that, ‘things have gotten to such a point that every day the inhabitants of 
this town menace each other over the smallest quarrels, threatening to avenge 
themselves with the help of the [French] soldiers that they have at their beck 
and call.’41
A bizarre series of events in 1706 demonstrates further how local officials and 
military officers could set the tone of the occupation, and also how the fabric 
of society could be strained by foreign occupation as well as the fear of repri-
sals once it was over. That summer, the military governor in Savoy, the marquis 
de Vallière, was obliged to arrest the comte de Limandre, an Auvergnat captain 
in the king’s dragoons. Limandre was a charismatic fantasist who had man-
aged to persuade many Savoyards that he was the son of Louis XIV. As such, 
he made people speak to him on bended knee; people presented petitions to 
him on a daily basis, handing over their money on the promise that he would 
direct their concerns to the king in person. Learning this, Chamillart ordered 
Limandre to be imprisoned for the duration of the war, and stipulated that he 
was to be denied verbal and written communication, as he was considered ‘the 
greatest writer in the world.’42
Shortly afterwards, as if to prove this accolade was well deserved, a remon-
strance found its way to Versailles, addressed from ‘The People of Savoy to His 
Most Christian Majesty.’43 Claiming to be writing in the name of the ‘nobil-
ity, bourgeois and Third Estate of Savoy’, the author (probably Limandre) 
recounted the deplorable state to which the people of Savoy had been reduced 
by excessive impositions. But the real point was a character assassination of 
Vallière: all Savoy wished to be delivered from ‘his rages, his threats, his bizarre 
temperament, his severity and his excessive rigour which he exercises indiffer-
ently to everyone’.44
Limandre’s rivalry with Vallière evidently took on a wider significance, 
reflecting divisions in Savoyard society, which were exacerbated by the 
occupation. A Chambérienne by the name of d’Avril Pellissier claimed that, 
41    SHDT A1 1968, 339, Tencin to Chamillart, 6 August 1706.
42    SHDT A1 1968, 349, Chamillart to Vallière, 9 August 1706.
43    SHDT A1 1968, 390bis, ‘Lettre sans nom,’ August 1706.
44    SHDT A1 1968, 390bis, ‘Lettre sans nom,’ August 1706.
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because she regularly passed on whatever seditious information she heard to 
Vallière, her enemies in Chambéry used Limandre to torment her, ‘sparing nei-
ther my honour nor my reputation’. Pellissier herself had incurred the wrath 
of Limandre because she had prevented him from seducing a girl and then 
denounced him to the girl’s family. He subsequently paid a visit to Pellissier to 
insult her and inform her that she was widely hated in Chambéry for passing on 
information to the French governor. He added that she deserved to be stoned, 
and that when the duke of Savoy returned she would get her just deserts.45
This case not only reflects the strains brought about by foreign occupa-
tion but also an awareness that the occupation was temporary. It was clear, 
particularly during the second occupation, that Louis XIV had little intention 
of retaining Savoy in the long term. The legitimacy of the French presence in 
Savoy was based solely on the right of conquest; the French government never 
invoked history or dynastic right to legitimise their presence in Savoy as they 
did in provinces they wished to annex permanently.46 This distinction was 
clear in the official language used: after the conquest of Savoy in 1703, the peo-
ple were informed that, ‘His Majesty wishes to treat his new Savoyard subjects 
just as well as his natural subjects.’47 It was also reflected in the administrative 
structures put in place: there was no intendant for Savoy, only a subdélégué 
of the intendant of the Dauphiné. Savoy served for Louis XIV, as it had for his 
father and Cardinal Richelieu, as a defensive buffer, a zone to quarter the army, 
and a bargaining chip in peace negotiations.48
 The Role of Victor Amadeus
Attitudes were perhaps affected most of all by the actions of the rightful ruler 
of the occupied territory and his agents. Victor Amadeus proved particularly 
adept at stirring up fear among the Savoyard people to dissuade them from 
collaborating with the French. The duke’s tactics were varied and inventive. In 
1691 his government in Turin began sending letters to the saltpetre contractors 
of Savoy, menacing them for having worked for the French authorities. In order 
45    SHDT A1 1968, 401, d’Avril Pellissier to Chamillart, 30 August 1706. Limandre reported later 
that year that Pellissier had been forced to leave Chambéry for being too close to Vallière. 
SHDT A1 1968, 584, Limandre to Chamillart, December 1706.
46    P. McCluskey, ‘From Regime Change to Réunion: Louis XIV’s Quest for Legitimacy in 
Lorraine, 1670–97,’ English Historical Review 126 (2011): 1386–1407.
47    ADS A 24, ‘Ordre,’ Bouchu, 8 December 1703.
48    McCluskey, Absolute monarchy, 55–56. On the 1630s see Humbert, Les Français en Savoie, 
221–222.
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to protect them, the French commissaire ordonnateur imprisoned them, with 
their foreknowledge, for the sake of appearances.49 In 1705 the duke attempted 
unsuccessfully to incite an uprising in his favour in Savoy based on the notion 
that the Savoyards ‘desire nothing more than to escape from the oppression in 
which they have found themselves since the invasion of the country’.50 To fol-
low up on this, he sent his sergeants disguised as peasants into Savoyard com-
munities to surreptitiously raise troops by repeating the amnesty for deserters 
and promising payment due to all those who had been taken prisoner and 
subsequently escaped.51 The French later learnt that this tactic was extremely 
successful, and that many recruits had joined Victor Amadeus in Piedmont.52
In response, the occupying regime was limited in what they could do. Theirs 
was essentially a defensive, reactive approach. Some felt that the continuation 
of commerce with Piedmont would only strengthen the attachment between 
the Savoyard people and their duke,53 reflecting the link between economic 
activity and allegiance. In 1692 and again in 1707 they tried closing the border 
with Piedmont, but on both occasions they ultimately realised that this was 
futile given the geography of the region. The French also had to balance the 
need to support commerce (which ultimately paid for the army, through taxes) 
with the restrictions on the flow of goods and people. They were also eager to 
encourage soldiers from the army of Victor Amadeus to return to Savoy so that 
they could be enlisted into French service. But the duke took measures to pre-
vent this, spreading word through his emissaries that the French would arrest 
and execute any man who crossed the Alps from Italy into Savoy or Geneva.54
During the second occupation Victor Amadeus’ tactic of issuing threats 
coupled with incentives became louder and more frequent. In 1706, as the 
tide of the war turned decisively against France, he issued a declaration offer-
ing amnesty for all deserters joining his service, and renewed the promise of 
privileges and exemptions. But those subjects who took the side of France or 
‘favoured’ France in its levies would be ‘regarded and treated as enemies of 
49    SHDT A1 1239, 91, Bonval to Barbezieux, 21 August 1691.
50    AAE CP Sard. 115, 123, ‘Copy of the commission of M. the duke of Savoy to incite an upris-
ing in his favour in Savoy,’ 8 December 1705.
51    SHDT A1 1994, fol. 438, Leguerchois to Chamillart, 22 January 1707.
52    SHDT A1 2099, 50, Leguerchois to Chamillart, 13 May 1708; A1 2170, 232, Voysin to Medavy, 
6 April 1709. Many of these passed into Piedmont under the pretext of commerce. SHDT 
A1 2175, 106, Ponnat to Voysin, 25 March 1709.
53    SHDT A1 1079, 187, Bouchu to Barbezieux, 2 March 1692.
54    SHDT A1 1972, 284, Chamillart to Angervilliers, 12 October 1706; A1 2038, 125, Chamillart to 
Leguerchois, 12 February 1707;, 147, Leguerchois to Chamillart, 22 February 1707.
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their patrie, traitors, and rebels against their legitimate sovereign.’55 Victor 
Amadeus’ propaganda was therefore not wholly negative and threatening in 
tone: in one notice distributed by his agents in the towns and villages across 
Savoy, addressed ‘A la belle jeunesse Savoyarde’, the duke repeated this combi-
nation of promises and threats to the people of Savoy with the same emotive 
language: they were to make the journey to the frontier to join their ‘great and 
Legitimate Sovereign,’ ‘a journey so advantageous to your own interests as well 
as those of the whole Nation Savoyarde.’56
Such language would certainly have appealed to the Savoyards’ sense of 
identity, and it is this very slippery concept of identity which is crucial in 
explaining the behaviour of an occupied people in any era.57 Nation at this 
time referred to a closed community, one defined by common origins. In 1694, 
the first dictionary of the Academie Française defined nation as ‘the inhabit-
ants of a common country, who live under the same laws and use the same 
language’.58 Patrie also denoted a closed community: citizens belonged to a 
patrie—that is, the land of their fathers—by birth and owed allegiance to it. 
In most contemporary understandings of the term, however, this would have 
excluded ‘Others’ who happened to share the same sovereign, such as the 
Piedmontese. Victor Amadeus’ appeal to a broader ‘pan-Sabaudian’ interpreta-
tion of nation or patrie was therefore an astute move by a ruler living in an age 
before the emergence of a modern sense of nationalism defined by language 
and a distinct ‘national’ culture.
What Victor Amadeus was doing was in some ways novel, but it also mir-
rored broader trends. Historians of France have argued that the decades around 
1700 were crucial for the development of the concepts of nation and patrie and 
that these terms were taking on new meanings.59 Both referred to France, but 
nation also signified group of people sharing certain binding qualities. Patrie, 
on the other hand, was increasingly used in the sense of a territory command-
ing a person’s emotional attachment and ultimate political loyalty.60 As is well 
known, the political and cultural significance of these concepts increased over 
55    SHDT A1 1968, 168, Vallière to Chamillart, 16 April 1706;, 169, ‘Déclaration par S.A.R.’ 
[undated].
56    SHDT A1 1968, 509, Vallière to Chamillart, 17 December 1706; A1 2175, 21, ‘A la belle jeunesse 
Savoyarde,’ 1 March 1709.
57    See F. Bédarida, ‘Vichy et la crise de la conscience française’ in Le régime de Vichy et les 
Français, ed. J.-P. Azéma & F. Bédarida (Paris: Fayard, 1992), 79.
58    D.A. Bell, The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680–1800 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, MA, 2001), 5–6.
59    Bell, The Cult of the Nation, 7.
60    Bell, The Cult of the Nation, 7.
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eighteenth century.61 The first decade of the eighteenth century was, however, 
an important stage in the development of these ideas. That this was a period 
dominated by war is no coincidence; by the end of the decade, even the Sun 
King felt it expedient to address the people of France directly, appealing for 
a renewed devotion to the nation, and zeal for the patrie. Louis XIV’s famous 
plea for public support in June 1709 came after the collapse of The Hague nego-
tiations; in it, the king invoked the rhetoric of the ancient symbolism of the 
monarchy, which still lay at the heart of French identity.62
In seeking to explain Victor Amadeus’ own appeal to ‘national’ sentiment, 
however, it is important to bear in mind Savoy’s status as part of an ethnically 
and culturally diverse composite state. As John H. Elliott memorably put it, 
most states in the early modern period were composite, though some ‘were 
clearly more composite than others’.63 The Sabaudian state had little sense of 
shared identity, a condition that had been exacerbated by the duke’s policy of 
marginalising Savoy at the expense of his Italian territories. Clearly this lack 
of shared identity posed significant difficulties for the rulers of a composite 
state in wartime, and the duke was attempting to find ways to compensate for 
this problem. Recently historians have highlighted the capacity of early mod-
ern governments to successfully forge and sustain composite political identi-
ties out of disparate ethnic groups, for example in Poland-Lithuania and the 
British Isles. Historians including Jeremy Black and Christopher Storrs have 
also argued that in this period ‘national’ sentiment could be invoked to define 
a common threat.64 But this tactic usually involved a more conscious use of the 
‘Other’; here, because of the strength of the pre-existing Savoyard attachment 
to France, Victor Amadeus instead appealed to this more positive concept of 
la Nation, or le patrie. And his interventions certainly seem to have been very 
effective, judging by French reports.65
The duke appears, therefore, to have made a conscious effort to build a 
sovereign political community grouping his different subject people together. 
61    See e.g. P.R. Campbell, ‘The Language of Patriotism in France, 1750–1770,’ e-France, I 
(2007): 1–43.
62    J. Klaits, Printed Propaganda Under Louis XIV: Absolute Monarchy and Public Opinion 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 210–20.
63    J.H. Elliott, ‘A Europe of Composite Monarchies,’ Past and Present 137 (1992): 51.
64    Black, European International Relations, 22; Storrs, War, Diplomacy, 220. On national senti-
ment in pre-modern times, see the introduction to Len Scales and Oliver Zimmer’s Power 
and the Nation in European History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), espe-
cially 3–13.
65    SHDT A1 1968, 509, Vallière to Chamillart, 17 December 1706; A1 2038, 59, Vallière to 
Chamillart, 28 January 1707.
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This phenomenon—which might be termed ‘proto-nationalism’—emerged 
out of the experience of foreign occupation, and out of Savoy’s particular 
status within a composite monarchy. By the turn of the eighteenth century, the 
traditional sense of loyalty to the ruling dynasty of Savoy was in crisis, as both 
the Savoyards and their duke demonstrated their willingness to abandon each 
other. For their part, the people of Savoy existed in a cultural and economic 
continuum that extended beyond Savoy and into the neighbouring French 
provinces; any form of dynastic attachment was undercut by familial or mate-
rial self-interest. Moreover, their festering sentiments of alienation may have 
been compounded by Victor Amadeus’ manoeuvring in the diplomatic sphere. 
The theme of territorial exchange was a recurrent feature in international 
relations at this time: in the partition treaties drawn up prior to the death 
of Carlos II of Spain in 1700, and also in the negotiations at The Hague and 
Utrecht, Victor Amadeus expressed his willingness to exchange Savoy for Milan 
or even for Spain and its empire. News that the duke was prepared to give up 
his ancient and sacred bonds with the territory for a more prestigious throne 
cannot have endeared him in any way to the people of Savoy.
 Servants of Two Masters?
The behaviour of Savoyard population suggests that they experienced an 
acute conflict of loyalties at the turn of the eighteenth century. While initially 
welcoming the French conquerors, the Savoyards became more cautious as 
the occupations progressed: this shift was largely a result of the actions of 
the ducal government and to a lesser extent the steadily worsening material 
burdens placed upon them by the French. By any measure, the non-elite sec-
tions of Savoyard society were given very little incentive to collaborate with the 
French occupiers: it was they who overwhelmingly bore the brunt of the occu-
pations in terms of providing revenues and war materiel. Yet they passively 
accepted these burdens and were unwilling to rise in revolt against the French 
when prompted to do so by Victor Amadeus. That the Savoyards refused to 
view the French conquerors as the enemy or the ‘Other’ is a reflection of the 
divided and porous nature of loyalty in this frontier region.
Throughout the Nine Years’ War and War of the Spanish Succession, the 
people of Savoy remained ambivalent in their feelings towards both Victor 
Amadeus and Louis XIV. In this regard their responses mirrored those of the 
Savoyard elites: the nobility, the clergy and the administrative elites generally 
demonstrated much less overt hostility to the French than their counterparts 
did in Lorraine, the Franche-Comté, or the other territories conquered by 
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Louis XIV.66 Many initially threw in their lot with the French but would later 
be persuaded to rejoin the service of Victor Amadeus through a mixture of 
threats and appeals to their sense of identity. Yet for all his skilful manipula-
tion of Savoyard ‘national’ feeling during these occupations, Victor Amadeus 
II was far from committed to retaining Savoy: though this was the birthplace 
of his dynasty, he repeatedly indicated that he was prepared to exchange the 
duchy for more lucrative or prestigious territories elsewhere.67 In the European 
dynastic system of the early eighteenth century, ambitious rulers like Victor 
Amadeus increasingly saw their territories as expendable in the pursuit of 
dynastic advancement. The ancient reciprocal bonds of loyalty he had with 
his Savoyard subjects withered as a result. Regional and ‘national’ identities in 
these small states were still shaped in reference to princely dynasties, there-
fore, but in a much less positive way than before.
What effect the duke’s policies had on changing attitudes and loyalties in 
the longer term is beyond the remit of this chapter. What is clear, in the short 
term, is that they were effective at generating fear. As historians of more recent 
occupations have noted, the emotional reactions of the occupied populations 
take on an enormous importance: among these, fear was usually the main 
motive for collaborating with an occupier.68 The greater source of fear in this 
case, however, seems not to have come from the occupying French armies but 
rather from the thought of the eventual return of the duke’s administrators. 
This suggests that for a conquered people in ancien régime Europe, the nature 
of the relationship they had with their legitimate, but usurped, ruler was still 
the most significant factor in determining their responses to foreign occupa-
tion. This was even true, as in this case, where there was a common language 
and culture between themselves and the conquerors. All of which serves to 
illustrate the way in which the study of previously overlooked or neglected 
second- or third-ranking European states can open up important new per-
spectives on early modern history. As a frontier zone and area of cultural and 
economic exchange, and as one part of a composite state, Savoy tells us much 
about how loyalties changed and how identities were redefined in the period 
leading up to the Peace of Utrecht.
66    McCluskey, Absolute monarchy, chapters 5–7.
67    On Victor Amadeus’ attempts to exchange Savoy for Milan see Symcox, Victor Amadeus, 
137–8, 162.
68    P. Burrin, ‘Writing the History of Military Occupations’ in France at war: Vichy and the 
historians, ed. S. Fishman et al. (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 84.
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CHAPTER 4
Pride and Prejudice: Universal Monarchy Discourse 
and the Peace Negotiations of 1709–1710
David Onnekink
In 1725, more than a decade after the Peace of Utrecht, the Frisian politician 
Sicco van Goslinga, now fifty-nine years old, spoke of ‘anti-French principles 
which after three wars had inspired all of the elder regents’.1 The wars against 
Louis XIV, which had commenced with the Year of Disaster in 1672 and which 
had lasted until the Peace of Utrecht, had marked a generation of politicians. 
Anti-French sentiments were deeply entrenched in the national consciousness 
and had not failed to leave their mark on policymakers.
This in itself is no revelation. We know that ever since the late 1660s thou-
sands of pamphlets had flooded the Dutch public with anti-French rhetoric, 
about French pride, deceit, ambition, arrogance, bad religion and corruption.2 
All these qualities merged into a grand narrative about what has become 
known as Universal Monarchy. But historians have been less receptive to the 
fact that such notions also touched the attitude of diplomats and policymak-
ers, even if the Dutch historian Johanna Stork-Penning, who wrote the authori-
tive study on Dutch negotiations for peace during the War of the Spanish 
Succession, spoke of the ‘distrust of France which showed in all Dutch deci-
sions’; she described it as a ‘substantial factor’ in the analysis.3
And yet, despite this observation, arguably the diplomatic history of this 
period has normally been studied through the lens of Realism, relying on intri-
cate empirical analyses of day-to-day diplomatic manoeuvres and counter-
manoeuvres—indeed the very method that Stork-Penning used and which 
has since then been faithfully followed by other historians studying the War 
of the Spanish Succession. In effect Dutch historians have all but ignored the 
impact of Universal Monarchy-discourse on the negotiations. Historians have 
been fully aware of the pervasiveness of the image of France as a Universal 
Monarchy, and have understandably located such discourses in such sources 
1    Quoted in J.G. Stork-Penning, Het grote werk (Wolters: Groningen, 1958), 5n.
2    Donald Haks, Vaderland & Vrede (1672–1713). Publiciteit over de Nederlandse Republiek in oor-
log (Verloren: Hilversum, 2013), 8.
3    Stork-Penning, Het grote werk, 5.
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as pamphlets, satirical poems and songs,4 but have more or less ignored hard-
core diplomatic and political sources such as memorials and correspondence.
The overall purpose of this chapter is to attempt to bridge the methodologi-
cal gap between cultural and diplomatic historians, to see whether Universal 
Monarchy discourse in fact pervaded all of these sources, in order to show 
how policymakers and diplomats did actually work within a wider cultural 
framework. Too often the compartments of popular culture and diplomacy 
are presumed to be strictly divided. I take my cue from recent developments 
in International Relations Theory, in particular from the Danish scholar Lene 
Hansen.5 In building up a case against Realism, she argues that foreign policy 
should not be explained by analysing a rational decision-making process but by 
understanding identity discourses, which are often steeped in popular culture. 
In her words, ‘Foreign policies need an account, or a story, of the problems and 
issue they are trying to address’.6 Such a story is built from a ‘basic discourse,’ 
a foundational story which is produced and reproduced in cultural and for-
eign policy texts. Thus one could argue that cultural and political sources are 
connected through intertextuality.7 Hansen operates from the notion of Julia 
Kristeva that all texts are part of an intertextual web, and she differentiates 
between explicit textual connections (such as references to other literature) 
or implicit textual connections (such as comparable concepts or catchphrases 
like ‘clash of civilizations’).8 It is the second category of intertextual connec-
tions I will be exploring in this chapter, focusing in particular on clusters of 
keywords and catchphrases. Hansen proposes an intertextual model in which 
discourses in various kinds of sources can be compared, in order to find out 
whether a specific discourse was prevalent.9 The purpose is to see whether 
a ‘basic discourse’ permeated both popular and political sources and thus to 
see how diplomats were in fact influenced by their cultural context. This also 
changes our notion on the nature of diplomatic negotiations. Whereas Realist 
historians assume that the language diplomats use was to describe reality, one 
could now argue that their language was self-referential, indeed shaped reality 
by means of the discourse employed. In the words of International Relations 
4    E.g. Tony Claydon, ‘Protestantism, universal monarchy and Christendom in William’s war 
propaganda, 1689–1697,’ in Redefining William III: The Impact of the King-Stadholder in 
International context, ed. E. Mijers and D. Onnekink (Aldershot: Ashgate 2007).
5    Lene Hansen, Security as Practice. Discourse analysis and the Bosnian War (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2006).
6    Hansen, Security as Practice, vi.
7    Hansen, Security as Practice, ch. 4.
8    Hansen, Security as Practice, 56–57.
9    Hansen, Security as Practice, 64.
71Universal Monarchy Discourse and the Negotiations
expert Ken Booth, ‘words shape as well as reflect reality,’ thus underscoring the 
performativity of diplomatic language.10 Such a method would help decom-
partmentalize the study of international relations, which is now often studied 
in isolation by cultural, literary and diplomatic historians. Until now, such a 
method has not been specifically applied to early modern foreign policy.
In order to test this contention I will conduct a short case study into the 
Franco-Dutch negotiations for peace in 1709 and 1710 and track the spread of 
Universal Monarchy discourse: the story Dutch politicians needed to address 
their concerns. It has normally been argued that the talks failed because of 
essential differences of opinion and a conflict of interest between the Dutch 
and the French as well as between the Allies themselves.11 I will investigate 
Dutch prejudices against French intentions that hampered the talks, in order to 
show how identity constructions formed the building blocks of foreign policy 
discourses and may have thus been more influential than rational differences 
of opinion. This will be done by a comparative analysis of the discourses used 
in three categories of sources: public news sources (the Europische Mercurius, 
a newsbook), official government sources (a resolution by the States General) 
and confidential political and diplomatic documents (a political memorial and 
a large number of diplomatic letters). These sources will be matched against a 
foundational text which generated the ‘basic discourse’ of Universal Monarchy 
in the first place, Petrus Valckenier’s Verwerd Europa ofte Polityke en Historische 
Beschrijving der waare Fundamenten en Oorzaken van de Oorlogen en Revolutiën 
in Europa, voornamentlijk in en omtrent de Nederlanden, sedert den jare 1664, 
gecauseert door de gepretenteerde universele Monarchie der Franschen . . . (1675) 
(Europe in turmoil, or the Political and Historical description of the true foun-
dations and causes of the wars and revolutions in Europe . . . caused by the pre-
tended Universal Monarchy of the French).12
 The 1709–10 Peace Negotiations
The Dutch negotiations for peace during the War of the Spanish Succession 
have been researched in detail.13 Between 1705 and 1710 a series of bilateral 
10    Ken Booth, ‘Discussion: a reply to Wallace,’ Review of International Studies 23:3 (1997), 
371–377, 374.
11    Stork-Penning, Het grote werk.
12    An updated version was published in 1688.
13    Stork-Penning, Het grote werk tracks the negotiations for peace between 1705 and 1710 
in detail. See also A.J. Veenendaal, ‘The War of the Spanish Succession in Europe,’ in 
The New Cambridge Modern History VI, ed. J. Bromley (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
72 Onnekink
Franco-Dutch talks took place, which ultimately failed and opened the way 
for talks between the French and the English that would lead to the Peace of 
Utrecht. Wedged between their desire for peace, French ambition and conflicts 
of interests between the Allies, Dutch diplomats were left with very limited 
options and were ultimately unsuccessful in reaching a settlement. The talks 
in 1709 took place in several cities in the United Provinces, mainly Woerden 
near Utrecht, in utter secrecy between the French envoy Pierre Rouillé and the 
Dutch negotiators Willem Buys and Bruno van der Dussen, the pensionaries 
of Amsterdam and Gouda. The French were extremely anxious to conclude 
peace and started negotiating on the basis of turning over the whole of the 
Spanish inheritance to Archduke Charles, if the Allies were willing to provide 
Philip of Anjou with some compensation. In order to show his willingness, 
Louis XIV, reportedly crying in humiliation, decided to send his minister mar-
quis de Torcy to The Hague in May 1709. Ultimately, however, the talks failed 
because the French were unwilling to ratify the preliminaries in June 1709, and 
war continued.
In March 1710 the talks were resumed by the French diplomats marquis 
d’Huxelles and Melchior de Polignac and the Dutch negotiators Buys and 
Van der Dussen in the town of Geertruidenberg. Again the negotiations failed 
(in July) because of the insistence of the Dutch that Louis help the Allies to 
remove Philip from the Spanish throne, which he refused. The success of the 
negotiations hinged on whether Louis would be true to his word in persuading 
Philip of Anjou to vacate the Spanish throne. Ultimately, the Dutch believed 
he would not, and Louis refused to put troops at the disposal of the Allies to 
remove his grandson by force, as the agreement suggested.
Distrust and anti-French prejudice had been feeding Dutch popular politi-
cal discourse ever since the start of the war. Distrust was a key notion in the 
Dutch declaration of war in 1702. Whereas the English issued a short and 
composed statement in which they declared their intention to maintain the 
balance of power in Europe, the Dutch issued a long and emotional declara-
tion centered on the trauma of 1672 and the threat of Universal Monarchy.14 
Distrust of French ambition was so ingrained in Dutch political consciousness 
by 1702 that all of France’s actions were interpreted in this light, even future 
Press, 1970), 410–445, and David Onnekink and Renger de Bruin, De Vrede van Utrecht 
(Hilversum: Verloren 2013).
14    Manifest, houdende de redenen waerom de Hoogh Mog. Heeren Staten Generael der 
Vereenighde Nederlanden genoodsaeckt zijn tegens de koningen van Vranckrijck en Spaigne 
den Oorlogh te declareren, in dato den achtsten Mey 1702 (The Hague: By Paulus Scheltus, 
1702), Knuttel 14760; A proclamation declaring war against France and Spain (s.a./s.l., 1702).
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ones. Indeed, Louis XIV would later say precisely this in a preamble of the 
Treaty of Utrecht, in which he stated that ‘the distant fear of seeing one day our 
crown, and that of Spain, upon the head of one and the same Prince, . . . had 
been the principal cause of the war, seemed also to lay an insuperable obstacle 
in the way to peace.’15 Whereas Louis attributed blame to the Dutch and their 
unfounded prejudices, Dutch pamphleteers were convinced of French pride 
and ambition. This notion needed no proof for it was ‘undeniable that the King 
of France, and those of his secret council, since more than fifty years, have 
made up their minds and deliberated to elevate him as Universal Monarch of 
Europe,’ wrote a pamphleteer in 1702.16
 Valckenier and Universal Monarchy Discourse
The foundational text preceding and inspiring Valckenier’s book was Franz-
Paul Lisola’s Bouclier D’Estat et de Justice contre le dessein manifestement décou-
vert de la Monarchie Universelle, sous le vain prétexte des prétentions de la reyne 
de France, published in 1667. It rehashed sixteenth-century notions of the 
Universal Monarchy of Charles V and applied these to Louis XIV. More specifi-
cally, Lisola criticised the aspirations of Louis XIV which had led to the War of 
Devolution that year.17 It was translated into English and Dutch.18 Well before 
the Dutch War of 1672 the concept of France as aspiring for universal monar-
chy was well known in the Netherlands.
The notion was picked up by Dutch authors, who adapted the concept 
of Universal Monarchy for a Protestant public (Lisola was a Catholic).19 In the 
United Provinces the ideas of Lisola came to their fullest expression in 
the work of Petrus Valckenier (1638?–1712?), a lawyer from Amsterdam who 
15    ‘Preamble to Peace treaty between France and Spain’ (1713), quoted in George Chalmers, 
A Collection of Treaties Between Great Britain and Other Powers (London: Chalmbers, 1790), 
2:56.
16    Het waare intrest van Europa, tot conservatie van hare vryheyt [. . .] (The Hague: J. Kitto, 
1702), Knutel 14800.
17    Horst Lademacher, Phönix aus der Asche?: Politik und Kultur der niederländischen Republik 
im Europa des 17. Jahrhunderts (Münster: Waxmann 2007), 280.
18    In Dutch: Verdedigingh van staet en gerechtigheyt; tegens het [. . .] voorneemen der gantsche 
monarchye, onder d’ydele deckmantel der pretentien [. . .] van de koningin van Vranckrijck 
(Amsterdam: J. Vinckel, 1667), Knuttel 9546.
19    Charles-Edouard Levillain, ‘The intellectual origins of the Anglo-Dutch alliance 1667–
1677,’ Website Le séminaire XVII–XVIII (date of access: 16 July 2014), http://britaix17-18.
univ-provence.fr/texte-seance5.php.
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later became a diplomat in the Empire. His extensive Verwerd Europa [Europe 
in turmoil] (1675) was published during the Franco-Dutch war. It was an impres-
sive, one-thousand-page study of the history and nature of French universal 
monarchy. It tracked French history up to the reign of Louis XIV and provided 
a theoretical framework of states, interests and international relations. It built 
up to the second part of the book, which focused on the troubles in Europe. 
The last part was a narrative of the Franco-Dutch war, detailing the events and 
the problems within the Dutch Republic.20
Valckenier builds his case on the conceptual cornerstone of universal mon-
archy. The trouble in Europe, he states in the title of his book, is ‘caused by the 
pretended Universal Monarchy of the French’.21 He does attribute part of the 
cause to Louis, to be sure, but the root problem goes deeper. There is a reason 
the title speaks of ‘the French,’ rather than the King of France, since Valckenier 
believes pride and aggrandizement to be a feature of Frenchness. The fifth-
century king Clodius, nick-named Long-Hair on account of wearing ritualized 
long hair, did so, like all the Franks, Valckenier argues, ‘as a sign of their nobil-
ity and freedom, which is the reason why all the people they conquered were 
forced to shave and cut off their beards’.22 Along with the French in general, 
the French nobility is culpable. They have been made great by Huge Capet, the 
founder of the French monarchy and have even received ‘crowns on the head’. 
The great houses have become powerful and ‘aspired to a higher step of state 
and dignity’ in search of which they ‘waged war against one another or against 
the kings’.23
Conquest seems typical of the French, as Valckenier described how ‘after-
wards these Franks under Clodoveus (Clovius) not only submitted the Romans, 
Goths and Burgundians in the whole of Gaul, but on top of that also won 
against the Alemans . . . and conquered everything between the Alps and the 
Pyrenees, up to Rhine and sea.’24 Valckenier is not necessarily critical of these 
20    Valckenier, Verwerd Europa.
21    Valckenier, Verwerd Europa.
22    ‘tot een teeken van haaren Edeldom en Vryheyt, om welke reeden sy ook alle Volkeren, 
die sy overwonnen, dwongen haar haer en baarden af te scheeren’, Valckenier, Verwerd 
Europa, 30.
23    ‘Kroon op ’t hooft’, ‘altijd aspireerden na hoger trap van Staat en Digniteyt, en daarom 
de een tegens de ander, ofwel tegens de Koningen selfs oorloogden’, Valckenier, Verwerd 
Europa, 54.
24    ‘Naderhand hebben dese Franken onder de Regeeringe van Clodoveus niet alleen geheel 
Gallien, den Romeynen, Gotten en Bourgondiens ontweldigt, maar daar en boven 
noch overwonnen de Allemannen by Sulpich en verovert al watter leyt van de Alpes en 
Pireneèn tot aan den Rijn en Zee’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 30.
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wars; indeed, he speaks approvingly of Charles Martel who ‘has ‘triumphantly 
won against the Saxons and West-Goths’ and in a battle ‘cut down the Saracens 
who had invaded France’.25 He admires Charlemagne for ‘achieving victory 
over the Brittons, Danes and Normans in France’.26 However, implicitly the 
warlike nature of the Franks is criticized when he writes that ‘Clodius invaded 
the Netherlands,’27 thus foreshadowing the evil things to come.
Arguably, by building a genealogy of wars, Valckenier points to the warmon-
gering nature of the French, which was also proved by the sons of Louis the 
Pious, ‘who waged amongst each other such bloody and terrible wars’ to divide 
the empire.28 Louis XI ‘took’ the Duchy of Burgundy29 while Charles VIII 
‘waged prolongued wars’ with Aragon after 1494.30 With the death of Francis I 
‘the flame of war was not extinguished but rekindled by Henry II’.31 He speaks 
of the ‘long years of domestic wars against the Huguenots’32 in the late six-
teenth century and notes that the murder of Henry IV in 1610 ‘again kindled 
lamentable flames of war’.33 The 1620s saw ‘domestic wars’.34 Valckenier con-
cludes that ‘the French from ancient times have been of such a restless and 
moveable spirit . . . that they do not live in peace, but are always inclined to 
war, both foreign and domestic’.35
Although Valckenier is not necessarily negative about the wars of the French, 
indeed he praises Martel for having safeguarded Europe from the Saracens, the 
narrative tends to be highly critical of the bloodthirsty nature of the French in 
general and the nobility in particular. The pairing of pride and war is obvious 
25    ‘want hy de Saxen en West-Gotten triumphantelijk heeft overwonnen en van de Saracenen 
die Vrankrijk invadeerden, in een Veld-slag terneder gemaakt’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 
31–32.
26    ‘de Britten, Deenen en Noormannen in Vrankrijk overwonnen’, Valckenier, Verwerd 
Europa, 32.
27    ‘invadeerde de Nederlanden’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 30. He refers to the Spanish 
Netherlands, though.
28    ‘sulke bloedige ende affchrikkelyke oorlogen gevoert’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 34.
29    ‘ingenomen’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 41.
30    ‘langduyrige Oorlogen’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 42.
31    ‘is dese Oorlogs-vlam niet uytgeblust, maar voort gestookt door Hendrik II’, Valckenier, 
Verwerd Europa, 44.
32    ‘lange jaaren door de inlandse oorlogen tegens de Hugenoten’, Valckenier, Verwerd 
Europa, 50.
33    ‘jammerlyke Oorlogs-vlammen’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 51.
34    ‘inheemse oorloogen’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 51.
35    ‘daarenboven zijn de Fransche van outs geweest van sulken beweeglyken en onrustigen 
geest, dat sy noyt konden stil zijn, noch vreedsaam leven, maar altijd inclineeren tot 
Buyten en Binnen-landse Oorlogen’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 55.
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in his narrative since it is the proud Franks who insisted on visibly humiliating 
the people they conquered. It is thus when the Franks tend to connect their 
warlike successes with pride that things go terribly wrong. For Pippin also ‘sub-
mitted’ the Kingdom of Lombards, ‘waged war’ against the Saxons for thirty-
three years and finally conquered them.36
The word ‘overheersen’ cannot be translated into English; it literally means 
‘overrule’ and comes closest to ‘subjugate’ or ‘dominate’. According to the early 
modern dictionary of Dutch, it means to rule ‘but with the connotation that it 
is against the will of the subjects’.37 Hence the French kings were determined 
‘to govern’ over parliaments and nobility.38 It is thus the combination of blood-
thirst and pride that makes the French dangerous. Throughout the narrative 
Valckenier gives plenty of examples in which the French kings seek ‘domina-
tion’ (overheersing or heerschappij). This was what the early French kings had 
sought. For instance, Charlemagne, ‘after he had gained such a great reign, as 
never a French king before him,’ re-established the Roman Empire in 800.39 
This connection with the empire is important, as Valckenier suggests it is the 
aim of the French, regarding themselves as the oldest Christian kingdom as 
well as the foremost kingdom, to claim the imperial crown based on their 
superiority to all other kings.40
The lust to rule pervades most of the actions of the early French (Frankish 
and Merovingian) kings. Valckenier approves of Martel’s inherent humility 
when he ‘refused to accept the title of King which he was offered’.41 But he 
was the exception. Important again is the usurpous tendency of many of the 
French kings. Valckenier tends to be critical when he discusses the reign of 
the Merovingian ‘court chamberlains, which gained full royal power, except 
for the title and the crown’.42 Most notably the founder of the modern king-
dom, Huge Capet, ‘who placed himself in the possession of the Realm in 987 
36    ‘ontweldigt’, ‘beoorloogt’, ‘overheert’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 32.
37    ‘overheersen’, reference in Woordenboek der Nederlandsche taal (Instituut voor 
Nederlandse lexicologie), http://gtb.inl.nl.
38    ‘te gouverneeren’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 41.
39    ‘Na dat hy sulken grooten heerschappye hem hadde verworven als noyt eenig Fransche 
Koning voor of naar hem heeft gehad’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 32.
40    Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 63.
41    ‘dat hy refuseerden te accepteeren den Titul van Koning, die hem wierde geoffereert’, 
Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 32.
42    ‘dewelke metter tijd aan haar kreegen de geheele Koninklyke macht, behalven den Titul 
en de Kroon’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 31.
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with general permission from the Grandes in France,’43 thus underscoring the 
ambiguity of his claims. In fact, the ambiguity is emphasized by mentioning 
that the Dukes of Lorraine regard the French kings after Capet ‘as illegal pos-
sessors and usurpers, of which the present king Louis XIV is one’.44
Despite their usurpous claim to the throne, Valckenier explains how they 
aspire to the imperial crown; ‘the great power and riches have led the French 
kings to lift themselves to such heights . . . that they pretend . . . to precede 
the Roman Emperor in rank’.45 They claim precedence because ‘the French 
boast that their realm had become Christian before Spain’ and ‘that their 
title of most Christian king supersedes all others, as the sun does the stars’.46 
This claim has now begun to become reality as from the time of Cardinal 
Richelieu ‘the French have tried to obtain Universal Monarchy, never doubt-
ing that they would surely get it’.47 And Valckenier speaks of the ‘French pre-
tence’ on the Roman Empire.48 Their arrogance knows no boundaries for ‘they 
were not afraid to say in public that their kingdom would last forever, but also 
would dominate over all the realms and lands of the world’.49 As such they 
even challenged God himself, ‘for it is only known to God, and in his power’.50 
Valckenier also explains that Louis XIV, ‘arrogantly’ nicknamed ‘the little god,’ 
is ambitious because of his successes. ‘The prosperity made him inflated and 
ambitious, so that he had no other design as to make him master of the world, 
and . . . universal monarch’.51 Valckenier then repeatedly speaks of ‘ambitious 
43    ‘de possessie van ’t Rijk, daar in sich Hugo Capet sette in ’t jaar 987, met gemeene toestem-
minge van alle de Grooten in Vrankrijk’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 35.
44    ‘voor onwettige besitters en Usurpateurs gehouden, waar uyt desen noch regeerende 
Koning Louis de XIV mede een is’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 35.
45    ‘Door dese groote macht en rykdom hebben haar de Fransche Koningen so hoog ver-
heven, dat sy daar door . . . pretendeeren . . . den Roomschen Keyser in de rang voor te 
gaan’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 63.
46    ‘dat haaren Titul van Alder-Christelijke so verre alle andere overtreft, als de Son de 
Sterren’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 63.
47    ‘hebbende Fransen beginnen te staan na de Universeele Monarchie, niet twijfelende of sy 
souden die seekerlijk verkrygen’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 52.
48    ‘Fransche pretensie’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 52.
49    ‘schaamden sy haar niet openbaarlijk te seggen, als dat haar Koninkrijk niet alleen altijd 
soude duyren, maar ook noch verkrygen de Heerschappye over alle de Rijken en Landen 
van de geheele Wereld’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 52.
50    ‘dat God alleen bekent, en in sijne macht alleen stond’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 52.
51    ‘Desen voorspoet maakt hem so opgeblaasen en ambitieus, dat hy geen ander oogmerk 
heeft, als hem alleen te maken sulken Meester van de Wereld, en sulken Universelen 
Monarch’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 131.
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oppressor,’52 Louis’s ‘ambition,’53 his ‘ambitious designs’54 and his ‘lust for 
dominion and ambition,’55 which was the root cause for the wars he waged 
against the Dutch.56 The French ‘verhovaardigen’ (an archaic verb meaning ‘to 
act haughtily’) themselves.57 Valckenier speaks of the ‘fabricated pretext’ that 
the French have a right to the imperial throne.58 As such the king of France has 
‘climbed to the highest rung of his overmacht’.59 This word ‘overmacht’ (liter-
ally: over might) can also not be translated but suggests dominance, the power 
he has is larger than that of his opponents so that he can subject them. Lastly, 
Valckenier refers to the ‘tyrannical nature’ of the French to underscore their 
design to subject the nations of Europe.60 This is also referred to in a poem 
in the introduction of the book by B. Vollenhove, who speaks of the ‘French 
suppression’.61
Lastly, in addition to the warmongering nature and haughtiness, Valckenier 
refers to France’s ‘ambitious designs, sinister political maxims, strange intrigues 
and corrupt activities at all the courts of the Christian world’.62 Indeed, along 
with warmongering, the French try to achieve their usurpous goal by cunning 
and deceit. Thus, in 1572 the ‘Guisians achieved with cunning and deceit that 
which they did not achieve by war’.63 They ‘tried to decrown [Henry IV] with 
force and cunning’.64 Huge Capet, the founder of the monarchy, was ‘cun-
ning and experienced in affairs of government, and has liquidated everyone 
who has since the beginning of his reign seemed suspect to him’.65 Louis XI 
was good in ‘simulating and dissimulating’ and as such may be regarded the 
52    ‘ambitieusen Dwingeland’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 68.
53    ‘Ambitie’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 137.
54    ‘ambitieuse desseynen’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 139.
55    ‘Heers-sucht en Ambitie’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 154.
56    Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 154.
57    Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 60.
58    ‘gefingeerde pretext’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 53.
59    ‘op de hoogste trap van sijne Overmacht geklommen zijnde’, Valckenier, Verwerd 
Europa, 186.
60    ‘tyrannigen Aart’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 371.
61    ‘dwinglandye’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, poem in introduction.
62    ‘ambitieuse Desseynen, Politijke Maximen, Vreemde Intrigues en Kuyperyen aan alle 
Hoven Van de Christenwerelt’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, ‘Aan den leser’.
63    ‘de Guisianen met list en bedrog verkreegen ’t gene haar het Oorlogsswaard weygerde’, 
Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 45.
64    ‘hoe men hem met geweld en list socht te ontkroonen’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 49.
65    ‘Capet, die listig en ervaaren was in ’t stuk van Regeeringe, heeft in ’t begin van sijne 
heerschappye alle van kant geholpen, die hem eenigsins suspect scheenen’, Valckenier, 
Verwerd Europa, 36.
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‘founder of the present state of France’.66 ‘We can see how the French mislead 
and blind other nations’.67 He speaks of ‘strange intrigues’68 and the ‘pretext’ 
that France always makes to establish peace.69
Valckenier thus consciously employs the universal monarchy discourse 
that Lisola introduced in his book. For this research, for the sake of method-
ological focus, we will look at three aspects related to the supposed French 
aspirations for universal monarchy only, which have come up in the analysis 
above, namely the suggestion that the French kings are proud, that they are 
warlike, and that they cannot be trusted in their negotiations. From the analy-
sis of Valckenier’s book we can deduce a basic discourse on French universal 
monarchy built around several clusters of keywords. For the purpose of this 
chapter I will focus on keywords related to pride, keywords related to warmon-
gering, and keywords related to deceit. Among the first we find heerszucht (lust 
for rule, dominion), trots/hovaardij (pride), ambitie (ambition), the term uni-
versele monarchie (universal monarchy) and opgeblazen (inflated). In the sec-
ond cluster are words that are related to the warlike nature of the French, such 
as overwinnen (conquer), jaloezie (jealousy) and oorlog (war). In the third clus-
ter are words related to list (cunning), pretext (pretext) and intrige (intrigue).
 Universal Monarchy Discourse in News Sources
Let us start with an analysis of public news sources, for which I have selected 
two editions of the Europische Mercurius, a periodical established in 1690 with 
the purpose of narrating political events in Europe. It appeared twice each 
year between 1690 and 1756 and was a voluminous edition of up to three or 
four hundred pages with an overview of international events. It based its infor-
mation for a large part on newspaper articles.70 But the Mercurius also carried 
the complete texts of primary sources, such as resolutions, peace treaties and 
diplomatic documents.71 In fact the bulk of the Mercurius consisted of such 
sources, but these were connected through extensive sections of editorial 
66    ‘Simuleren en dissimuleeren’, ‘waardoor hy geworden de eerste fundateur van den 
hedendaagsen Staat van Vrankrijk’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 41.
67    ‘Hier uyt sien wy, hoe de Fransche andere Natiën misleyden en verblinden’, Valckenier, 
Verwerd Europa, 60.
68    ‘intrigues’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 217.
69    ‘pretext’, Valckenier, Verwerd Europa, 68.
70    Haks, Vaderland & Vrede, 196–197.
71    J.W. Koopmans, ‘De Europische Mercurius (1690–1756) getypeerd,’ Groniek, 33 (2000), 363.
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comments. The price, probably four guilders, suggests that it was read primar-
ily by the more affluent classes in the Dutch Republic.72 The editions of 1709 
and 1710 pay attention to the negotiations in Woerden and Geertruidenberg.73
The Europische Mercurius, established at the start of the Nine Years’ War, 
was from its inception framed around the anti-French cause,74 and it is no 
surprise that both editions open with references to the war against France, 
thereby using specific universal monarchy discourse. Peace was to be wished 
for, the 1709 edition opens, ‘but it appears to be impossible as long as the world 
will stand, and the unjust ambition of kings and other sovereigns does not die 
away’.75 More specifically, the Mercurius referred to ‘the French king’ who is 
‘not content with his realm, and wishes to adhere many conquered places . . . to 
his house’. Through the union with Spain he wishes that ‘all other high authori-
ties are put on a leash, and must bow to him’.76 It refers to the ‘usurpations’ of 
France, its ‘arrogant suppressions’77 and its ‘immoderate lust for dominion’.78
Precisely the same language is used in the 1710 edition, which opens with 
the ‘unchangeable lust for dominion of the French court,’ which keeps to its 
‘ancient usurpations’.79 This is the root cause of the fact that chances for peace 
are slim.80 The warlike nature of the French is emphasized: they want ‘to make 
sure the war will end to the glory of the Crown of Lilies’.81 Their methods are 
cunning. The author speaks of the ‘artifices’ of the French court’82 and of of 
72    Koopmans, ‘De Europische Mercurius,’ 363n, 370.
73    Europische Mercurius, behelzende de voornaamste zaken van staat en oorlog, voorgevallen 
in alle de koningryken en heerschappyen van Europe 20 (1709, 2 vols.) and 21 (1710, 2 vols.).
74    Koopmans, ‘De Europische Mercurius’.
75    ‘dog zulks schynt onmoogelyk zo lange de Waerelt staat, en dat de onregtvaardige Ambitie 
van Koningen en andere Souverainen niet versterft’, Europische Mercurius 20 (1709),  1: 5.
76    ‘dat den Franschen Koning niet te vreeden met zyn eigen Ryk, en nog veel ander 
Geconquesteerde plaatzen . . . aan zyn Huis zoekt te hegten’, ‘alle andere Hooge 
Mogendheden aan den band te leggen, en voor zig te doen buigen’, Europische Mercurius 
20 (1709), 1: 6.
77    ‘usurpeeringe’, ‘hoogmoedige dwinglandyen’, Europische Mercurius 20 (1709), 2: 7, 17; 
‘hoogmoedige dwinglandyen’, Europische Mercurius 20 (1709), 2: 7.
78    ‘onmatige Heerschzugt’, Europische Mercurius 20 (1709), 2: 17.
79    ‘onverzettelyke Heerschzugt van het Fransche Hof’, ‘verouderde Usurpatien’, Europische 
Mercurius 21 (1710), 1: 6.
80    Europische Mercurius 21 (1710), 1: 6.
81    ‘en eindelyk den oorlog nog tot Glorie van de Lely Kroon te doen eindigen’, Europische 
Mercurius 21 (1710), 1: 53.
82    ‘kunstenaryen van het Fransche Hof’, Europische Mercurius 20 (1709), 2: 3,4.
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‘evil practices’ and ‘distrust’.83 The allies were luckily aware of the ‘evil inten-
tion’ and are guarded against ‘such French cunning’.84
Having established the ambition, warlike nature and cunning of the French, 
the author then discusses the negotiations in more detail, within the frame-
work of interpretation already established. ‘Let us now see, how cunning the 
conferences of peace . . . have ended.’85 He concludes with a humorous report 
about a German print on Geertruidenberg, typically depicting ‘a Dutchman 
plainly clothed in a robe, and a Frenchman with, after the latest fashion, 
attired with plumes on his hat,’ thus juxtaposing French warmongering/pride 
with Dutch peace-loving/humility.86
 Universal Monarchy Discourse in Published Government Sources
The actual analysis of the Geertruidenberg negotiations is not discussed by the 
author of the Europische Mercurius but related through publishing a ten-page 
resolution of the States General in response to the breaking off of the negotia-
tions. It is a natural bridge to the second category of sources, then, government 
sources. So far we may establish that public media such as pamphlets and mer-
curies were steeped in the universal monarchy discourse, but was the same 
true for official government sources? These present an interesting category for 
having to peddle both diplomatic language and popular appeal in cases they 
were published.
For obvious reasons the language of the resolution, a formal document 
by a high authority, is different from that of pamphlets and periodicals. It 
uses very official and factual language to describe the negotiations in detail. 
Nevertheless, on closer look the same discourse permeates the resolution.87 
Interestingly, the resolution shows itself to be very aware of its public nature. 
It is a direct response to a published letter of D’Huxelles and Polignac from 
July 1710. The letter was also published with sections from the resolution 
83    ‘snoode praktijken’, ‘mistrouwen’, Europische Mercurius 21 (1710), 1: 6.
84    ‘snood oogmerk’, ‘listigheden’, Europische Mercurius 21 (1710), 1: 53.
85    ‘Laat ons nu eens gaan bezien, hoe slinks de conferentie van Vreede (met de Fransche 
Ministers te Geertruidenberg gehouden) afgeloopen is’, Europische Mercurius 21 (1710), 
2: 134.
86    ‘een Hollander eenvoudig gekleed met zyn mantel om, en een Franschman na de mode, 
gerappierd met pluimen op den hoed’, Europische Mercurius 21 (1710), 2: 152.
87    Resolution States General 27 July 1710, reprinted in Europische Mercurius 21 (1710), 
2: 140–152.
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as a separate pamphlet.88 The French negotiators blamed the failure of the 
Geertruidenberg negotiations on the Dutch, which was, the resolution argues, 
nothing more than an attempt ‘to incite an evil impression among the subjects 
of England as well as in the state against the government’.89 It counters the 
claim of the French who complain about ‘injurious libels’ in the Netherlands, 
which are, after all, ‘in this country forbidden with sharp resolutions,’90 thus 
implicitly underscoring (if critically) the public performances of the negotia-
tions of the diplomats.
The drift of the resolution is that the French never wanted peace in the first 
place. The focus of the resolution is on the negotiations so naturally references 
to the ‘intrigue’ cluster of key words are more frequent than those to ‘war’. The 
States General complain about the ‘fair words’ which are only a ‘pretext’. For 
this reason also, Polignac and d’Huxelles have written a letter full of ‘insinua-
tions’ but ‘did not express themselves more clearly’.91 This phrase is repeated 
several times: they want the French to ‘explain themselves clearly and trans-
parently’ with regard to the preliminaries, a ‘clear and transparent explication’ 
from the side of the French,92 a binary suggesting the deliberate lack of clarity 
of the French which presumably aids their cunning. The allies could not live 
with insecurity or ‘content themselves with words and promises’.93 The resolu-
tion speaks of the ‘pretexts’ to cause ‘jealousy’94 and the ‘design’ to break the 
negotiations, which in turn can be related to the warlike intentions of France.95 
After all, France ‘has on its own occupied the entire Spanish monarchy, and 
88    Knuttel 15896.
89    ‘om aan de onderdanen zo in Engeland als in den Staat, een quade impressie tegen de 
Regeringe in te drukken’, Resolution States General Europische Mercurius 21 (1710), 2, 
149–150.
90    ‘dat het publiceren van injurieuze Libellen hier te Lande met scherpe Placcaten verboden 
is’, Resolution States General, Europische Mercurius 21 (1710), 2, 150.
91    ‘schoone woorden’, ‘voorgegeven’, ‘inzimulatien’, ‘niet klaar expliceerden’, Resolution 
States General, Europische Mercurius 21 (1710), 2, 140–142.
92    ‘een klare en duidelyke explicatie’, Resolution States General, Europische Mercurius 21 
(1710), 2, 144.
93    ‘zig te contenteeren met woorden en beloften’, Resolution States General, Europische 
Mercurius 21 (1710), 2, 144.
94    ‘gezogte middelen’, ‘jalousie’, Resolution States General, Europische Mercurius 21 (1710), 
2, 149.
95    ‘dessein’, Resolution States General, Europische Mercurius 21 (1710), 2, 149.
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threatens the rest of Europe with similar occupation’.96 But with reference to 
the ambition of France, the resolution states that France attempts to ‘reach its 
design’.97 It is related to the fact that France has subjected her own subjects 
to ‘long slavery and suppression’.98 Humiliation is a counterpoint to the arro-
gance of France, who has asked for the protection of God ‘with a simulation of 
humiliation’.99 Combined, this evidence confirms ‘how dear the lust to domi-
nate her neighbours’ is to France.100
 Universal Monarchy Discourse in Political Documents and 
Correspondence
Even though there is a clear universal monarchy discourse pervading the 
resolution, the conventions of the genre are obviously different from those of 
the Europische Mercurius. The bulk of the text is basic, factual and descrip-
tive, but the final part is opiniated. Interestingly, as we have seen, the source 
itself shows awareness of its public role. The question remains, whether pub-
lic opinion sources and published official sources such as the resolution are 
intertextually connected with unpublished and confidential policy sources. 
That is: is there a sharp divide between ‘propagandic’ sources and ‘real’ politi-
cal sources? For the last category I have selected two kinds of sources. The first 
one is a policy advice document, a memorial of about twenty folio pages about 
the negotiations in 1709 and 1710 written by Jacob Surendonck, the secretary 
of Grand Pensionary Anthonie Heinsius, entitled Remarques op de voorslae-
gen van vreede die bij Vrankrijk gedaen sijn off gedaen sullen worden (‘Remarks 
on the proposals of peace to be made or made by France’).101 The source is 
important as there are in fact very few policy documents of this kind. There 
96    ‘als dezelve alleen de gansche Spaansche Monarchie heeft geoccupeert, en de rest van 
Europa voor gelyke occupatien in gevaar gesteld’, Resolution States General, Europische 
Mercurius 21 (1710), 2, 147.
97    ‘oogmerk’, Resolution States General, Europische Mercurius 21 (1710), 2, 149.
98    ‘langduurige slavernye en onderdrukkinge’, Resolution States General, Europische 
Mercurius 21 (1710), 2, 150.
99    ‘schijn’, ‘nedrigheit’, Resolution States General, Europische Mercurius 21 (1710), 2, 149.
100    ‘hoe dier haar staat de begeerte om te heerschen over hare nabuuren’, Resolution States 
General, Europische Mercurius 21 (1710), 2, 150.
101    Jacob Surendonck, ‘Remarques op de voorslaegen van vreede die bij Vrankrijk gedaen sijn 
off gedaen sullen worden’, March or May 1709, Nationaal Archief (The Hague), Archief 
Jacob Surendonck, 3.20.57/161.
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are also few records of deliberations of political debates. Thus the memorial 
gives us an in-depth view of the secret considerations of the political elite. 
However, Surendonck is extremely critical of France and may not be a ‘typical’ 
official. Surendonck is highly critical of the French proposals and is convinced 
that they have been offered only because France is severely weakened and is 
using the talks to divide the allies and gain time. France will use the peace to 
regain strength and start another war, ‘especially when France remains to be 
governed by such ministers and maxims as it has been now for more than half 
a century,’ he suggests, thus underscoring the conventional time frame of uni-
versal monarchy discourse.102
Surendonck’s memorial is steeped in universal monarchy discourse and 
exhibits the three elements we distinguished in the other sources: pride, war 
and intrigue. Surendonck frequently alludes to the pride of France, the ‘des-
potic and arbitrary power’ of the French king who is suppressing his subjects 
and has to ‘master absolutely’ their possessions. He is trying to ‘dominate’ 
the Allies.103 Surendonck complains about the ‘proud, faithless and godless 
enemy’ and its ‘tyrannical and doomed suppression which is unbearable for 
the subjects, as well as dangerous for its neighbours’.104 Should the allies defeat 
France, it would be ‘a just retribution of divine wrath, because of the unbear-
able pride and terrible persecution, destruction and cruelty.’105
In addition to pride and dominion, Surendonck frequently refers to the 
inherently warlike nature of France. He argues that the French will try to 
use the pretext that they are trying to ‘conserve the peace and prevent a new 
war’. But the French ‘design’ is to ‘concoct a new war with greater advantage’.106 
Surendonck also refers to the warlike nature of the French nobility, thereby 
almost directly quoting the basic text of Valckenier’s Verwerd Europa: ‘it is 
known from ancient times that the French nation, especially the nobility, 
102    ‘Soo wanneer Vrankrijk, door sulke ministers en maximen bij Continuatie sal worden gere-
geert, als nu meer als een halve Eeuw herwaerts geschiet is.’, Surendonck, ‘Remarques,’ 2.
103    ‘despotique en arbitraire magt’, ‘absoluijt meester’, ‘overheerschen’, Surendonck, 
‘Remarques,’ 11.
104    ‘trotsen, trouwloosen en godloosen Vijand’, ‘Tyrannique en heijloose dwingelandij, die 
soo ondraeglijk is voor de onderdanen, als gevaerlijk voor de naebuijren’, Surendonck, 
‘Remarques,’ 12.
105    ‘als een regtveerdige vergeldinge van de goddelijke wrake, wegens die ondragelijke trot-
sheijt en gruwelijke vervolginge, verwoestinge en wreetheden’, Surendonck, ‘Remarques,’ 
14. Surendonck refers to the prophecy in Isaiah 33:1.
106    ‘de gemaekte vrede te conserveren en een nieuwe Oorlog te voorkomen’, ‘om daer uijt 
ter gelegener tijt met meerder avantagie een nieuwe oorlog te smeden’, Surendonck, 
‘Remarques,’ 7.
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is of a restless and warmongering nature’.107 He fears the French ‘despotic 
overmacht’.108
Surendonck also observes the intrigues of the French, arguing that in the 
‘last peace negotiations they have used the same language and discourse to 
facilitate the peace, but that we have always been very much deceived’.109 He 
speaks of ‘pretext,’ ‘sinister practices and intrigues’ the French employ to use 
the peace negotiations to prepare a new war.110
It is difficult to say whether Surendonck’s memorial was typical as there are 
few comparable sources and Surendonck was notoriously anti-France and sus-
picious of its policy. Nevertheless, the memorial does underscore the fact that 
such language was actually used in policy documents, even if the prevalence 
cannot be measured by this one example. This can be done, however, by study-
ing a last primary source, namely diplomatic correspondence of Anthonie 
Heinsius, which, unlike the memorial, contains an abundance of material.111
Several constraints hamper an analysis of the correspondence. First of all, 
most of the letters are matter of fact and refer to operational issues. They deal 
with troop movements, reports of the arrivals and departures of diplomats, 
and reports of affairs at foreign courts. There is disappointingly little reflec-
tion upon issues of policy. Moreover, most of the letters are incoming. Heinsius 
received about twenty thousand letters between 1702 and 1720 (the years cov-
ered by the published correspondence), but wrote relatively few letters in 
reply, and those he wrote were curt. There is another matter to be considered, 
namely that the actual negotiations between Buys and Van der Dussen and 
the French diplomats were conducted in utter secrecy, and the negotiators 
were not inclined to entrust their contents or their thoughts to paper in detail. 
Thus, a typical quote from a letter written to Heinsius by Buys and Van der 
Dussen from Geertruidenberg where the negotiations took place reads: ‘we 
107    ‘Sijnde van Outs bekent, dat de fransse natie, en in bijsonder de Adel, is van een onrusti-
gen, en oorlogssugtigen Aert en inborst’, Surendonck, ‘Remarques’, 7. Valckenier wrote 
that ‘the French from ancients times have been from such a restless and moveable 
spirit . . . that they do not live in peace, but are always inclined to war’. Cf. footnote 31.
108    ‘despotique overmagt’, Surendonck, ‘Remarques’, 9.
109    ‘dat men in alle de voorige Vredehandelinge altoos die selve taelen en discoursen gevoert 
heeft, om de vreede te faciliteren, maer dat men sig telkens daer omtrent deerlijk bedro-
gen heeft bevonden’, Surendonck, ‘Remarques’, 7.
110    ‘oogmerk’, ‘sinistre practijcque en intrigieus’, Surendonck, ‘Remarques’, 7.
111    This can be done through the extensive De Briefwisseling van Anthonie Heinsius 1702–1720, 
ed. A.J. Veenendaal (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976–2001), and The Correspondence of John 
Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough, and Anthonie Heinsius, Grand Pensionary of Holland 
1701–1711, ed. B. van ’t Hoff (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1951).
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have arrived yesterday in the early morning in Moerdijk and have met Marshal 
d’Huxelles and Prior de Polignac at around 5 pm . . . we will give you and exten-
sive report orally’ after our return.112 However, a number of correspondents 
were informed in broad lines of the contents of the negotiations and reflected 
upon these.
Interestingly, there are several direct references to the basic source we have 
selected. Albert van der Meer, envoy in Turin, wrote that France will recover and 
probably wage war again because it is ‘an active and restless nation,’ thereby 
using almost precisely the same phrase as Surendonck and Valckenier to point 
to the warlike nature of France.113 More specific was Clignet, the postmaster of 
Utrecht. In a letter to Heinsius he referred to the necessity of curbing French 
ambitions, which, he writes, are all well-known from ‘Lisola, whose memory 
cannot be praised enough, in his Bouclier D’Estat Et De Justice anno 1677’.114
Basic distrust permeates the correspondence, as for instance displayed in a 
letter by Anthonie Heinsius to the Duke of Marlborough, expressing the expec-
tation that the French would use the negotiations in 1709 to divide the Allies.115 
In 1710 he wrote to Marlborough about the start of the negotiations that Van der 
Dussen and Buys were finding out ‘le fond du coeur de France’.116 ‘Je ne suis pas 
tout à fait convaincu de la sincérité de la France dans la négotiation présente,’117 
he wrote, the same phrase Marlborough himself used (‘I see the French minis-
ters continue in their insinserity, which I do not wonder att [sic]’).118
There are a number of references to France’s arrogance and greatness. 
Referring to the negotiation between Rouillé and Buys in 1709, Jacob Hop wrote 
about ‘the great overmacht of France and . . . her pernicious ways of acting’.119 
Van der Meer complained about France’s ‘ambitious designs’.120 The design 
of France is frequently alluded to. Robert Goes, envoy in Copenhagen, wrote 
112    ‘aan dezelve van alles omstandig rapport te doen en verders mondeling te verzekeren . . .’, 
Buys and Van der Dussen to Heinsius, 10 March 1710. See also Buys and Van der Dussen to 
Heinsius 22 March 1710, 8 April 1710. In: De Briefwisseling, ed. Veenendaal, 10: 159, 194, 239.
113    ‘een active en inquiète natie sijnde’, Van der Meer to Heinsius, 29 March 1709, in 
Briefwisseling, 8, ed. Veenendaal: 393.
114    Clignet to Heinsius 16 June 1709, De Briefwisseling, 8, ed. Veenendaal: 609.
115    Heinsius to Marlborough 26 March 1709, Correspondence, ed. Van ’t Hoff: 432.
116    Heinsius to Marlborough, 23 April 1710, Correspondence, ed. Van ’t Hoff: 485.
117    Heinsius to Marlborough, 28 May 1710, Correspondence, ed. Van ’t Hoff: 494.
118    Marlborough to Heinsius, 1 June 1710, Correspondence, ed. Van ’t Hoff: 494.
119    ‘groote overmacht als Vranckrijck en tegens haere pernitieuse manieren’, Hop to Heinsius, 
30 March 1709, De Briefwisseling, 8, ed. Veenendaal: 396.
120    ‘ambitieuse dessijnen’, Van der Meer to Heinsius, 20 April 1709, Briefwisseling, 8, ed. 
Veenendaal: 451.
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in June 1710 about the French ‘pretenses’ to the Spanish monarchy.121 Marinus 
van Vrijbergen, the Dutch ambassador in London, referring to a 1708 military 
operation, brought up the ‘arrogance in this work of the French’.122 The French 
are seen, as another observer wrote in January 1709, as ‘the suppressor, our 
great enemy’.123 Francisco Schonenberg, the Dutch envoy in Lisbon, in a let-
ter of August 1704, referred to French ‘usurpation and tyranny’ with regard to 
her expansion in Spain, Italy and the Netherlands.124 Heinsius as well cited ‘la 
tiranie de nos aversaires’.125 The negotiations are difficult precisely because the 
enemy is strong and arrogant. Heinsius, who writes to Vrijbergen in November 
1710, after the negotiations in Geertruidenberg have failed, that the ‘French 
are inflated by their good fortunes and will be intractable concerning a good 
peace’.126 To Count Rechteren he wrote in September that a military victory 
the French have just achieved ‘has inflated them to the extent that they have 
broken off all negotiations’.127
Interestingly, the agent Helvetius reported that the French ambassadors 
were actually shocked by the arrogant manners of the Dutch negotiators, espe-
cially Van der Dussen, who ‘has a manner which approaches brutality imperti-
nence . . . and that on top of that he is arrogant and insolent and judges nothing 
of value.’128 This may have something to do with the fact that the Dutch were 
supremely confident, being assured that ‘the French are in dire straits and 
inclined to make peace’.129 Many observers were therefore very optimistic 
about chances for peace, despite the basic distrust of the Dutch.
121    ‘pretensiën’, Goes to Heinsius, 21 June 1710, Briefwisseling, 10, ed. Veenendaal: 460.
122    ‘d’arrogantie in dit werck der Franssen’, Vrijbergen to Heinsius, 10 April 1708, Briefwisseling, 
7, ed. Veenendaal: 211.
123    ‘dwinglander onse overgroote vijandt’, Regulus to Heinsius, 6 January 1709, Briefwisseling, 
8, ed. Veenendaal: 180.
124    ‘usurpatie en tyrannie’, Schonenberg to Heinsius, 18 August 1704, Briefwisseling, 3, ed. 
Veenendaal: 284.
125    Heinsius to Goslinga, 21 August 1709, Briefwisseling, 9, ed. Veenendaal: 186.
126    ‘de Fransen door voorspoet opgeblaesen sijnde, sullen ontrent een goede vrede 
intractabel werden’, Heinsius to Vrijbergen, 30 December 1710, Briefwisseling, 11, ed. 
Veenendaal: 458.
127    ‘heeft haer evenwel soo opgeblaesen gemaeckt, dat genoegsaem alle negotiatie weer 
hebben afgebroocken’, Heinsius to Rechteren, 13 September 1709, Briefwisseling, 9, ed. 
Veenendaal: 250.
128    ‘d’une manière dure, qui aproche de la brutalité . . . dat hij daerenbove arrogant en inso-
lent is en niets van waerde oordeelt’, Wassenaar to Heinsius, 13 May 1710, Briefwisseling, 10, 
ed. Veenendaal: 337.
129    ‘de Franse seer in de noot waeren ende genegen sijn om vrede te maken’, Heinsius to Buys, 
17 May 1710, Briefwisseling, 10, ed. Veenendaal: 353.
88 Onnekink
The warlike nature of the French is also emphasized. Jacob Hop, a senior 
administrator in the temporary government of the Spanish Netherlands, 
mentioned the French ‘lust to penetrate up until our border and disturb us 
into the heart of the country’. This ‘lust’ is illustrated when he writes that after 
the Peace of Nijmegen, ‘every time she lusted she entered the territory of the 
Spanish Netherlands’ with soldiers.130 He also referred to the danger to Europe 
of ‘the great overmacht of France and . . . her pernicious manners of acting and 
persistent use of force’.131 Van der Meer spoke of the ‘overmacht’ of France.132 
Heinsius uses the same word, ‘overmacht,’ to describe the position of the 
French.133
As one might expect from reflections upon the talks, they mostly dealt with 
comments on the actual negotiations and thus, within our chosen selection, 
the cluster of keywords related to intrigue. Heinsius was not sure ‘whether the 
French have peace on their minds or not’.134 Van den Bergh was in doubt about 
the ‘designs of the French’ and therefore the negotiations had to proceed with 
‘extreme precaution’.135 Van der Meer stressed the necessity to guard against 
‘her surprises or designs’.136 The terms most often used are thus connected to 
the style of negotiating. Vrijbergen wrote to Heinsius in connection with the 
negotiations in 1709 about the ‘usual chicanery’ of the French.137 The Utrecht 
nobleman Renswoude complained about the ‘effrontery’ of the French to 
raise the demands in the negotiations in April 1709.138 The Holland noble-
man Wassenaer referred to the frequent ‘difficulties’ the French made in the 
130    ‘telkens als ’t haer lust tot op onse frontieren door te boren en ons tot in ’t hert van ’t land 
te ontrusten’, ‘als ’t haer luste op den bodem van de Spaensche Nederlanden quam’, Hop 
to Heinsius, 30 March 1709, Briefwisseling, 8, ed. Veenendaal: 396.
131    ‘tegens soo groote overmacht als Vranckrijck en tegens haere pernitieuse manieren 
van doen en genoechsaem gestadige geweldenaerijen, sijn geweest’, Hop to Heinsius, 
30 March 1709, Briefwisseling, 8, ed. Veenendaal: 396.
132    ‘overmaght’, Van der Meer to Heinsius, 13 March 1709, Briefwisseling, 8, ed. Veenen- 
daal: 334.
133    ‘overmacht’, Heinsius to Vrijbergen, 7 November 1710, Briefwisseling, 11, ed. Veenen- 
daal: 335.
134    ‘off de Fransen in ’t zin hebben de vreede te maken off niet’, Heinsius to Rechteren, 11 June 
1709, Briefwisseling, 8, ed. Veenendaal: 587.
135    ‘desseinen van de France’, ‘d’uyterste precautie’, Heinsius to Van de Bergh, 12 June 1709, 
Briefwisseling, 8, ed. Veenendaal: 594.
136    ‘surprises of dessijnen’, Van der Meer to Heinsius, 13 March 1709, Briefwisseling, 8, ed. 
Veenendaal: 335.
137    ‘gewoolijcke chicanes’, Van de Bergh to Heinsius, 28 March 1709, Briefwisseling, 8, ed. 
Veenendaal: 386.
138    ‘d’effronterie’, Renswoude to Heinsius, 14 April 1709, Briefwisseling, 8, ed. Veenendaal: 439.
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negotiations.139 Heinsius confided to Count Rechteren about his ‘fear that 
her [the French] design is to make diversion and division among the allies’.140 
Van der Meer noted the ‘cunning propositions of the enemies’.141 The deputies 
for foreign affairs concluded in June 1709, after the broken negotiation, that 
there ought to be a firm reply to the ‘French conceits’.142 The States General 
cited the ‘fraudulous conduct of France’.143
One central key word is used surprisingly rarely. Heinsius, towards the end 
of the Geertruidenberg negotiations, referred to the likelihood that France 
would, ‘more than ever before be able to achieve universal monarchy,’144 and in 
December he again observed that ‘the French proceed with giant steps towards 
universal monarchy’.145 These are the only two explicit references I found to 
the term ‘universal monarchy’ in the extensive Heinsius correspondence.
 Conclusion
We may tentatively conclude that the three categories of sources share a 
vocabulary pointing to a pervasive universal monarchy discourse. In addition 
to a few close paraphrases and direct references to Lisola and Valckenier, we 
have distinguished a number of key words spread over three clusters related to 
pride, warlike nature and intrigue. To dominate (heersen, overheersen) is widely 
shared in all sources except for the correspondence of Heinsius. References 
to ‘tyranny’ likewise appear in all sources except for the Resolution of the 
States General. ‘Dwingelandij’ (suppression) appears in all sources except in 
the Resolution. ‘Arrogant’ is used in Valckenier, the Europische Mercurius and 
the Heinsius correspondence. Of course, the resolution and the memorial are 
relatively short sources, and there is no reason to suggest that studying more 
sources would not yield further results. Moreover, when the analysis is broad-
ened to intertextual clusters of keywords, more connections can be made. For 
139    ‘difficulteiten’, Wassenaar to Heinsius, 8 June 1709, Briefwisseling, 8, ed. Veenendaal: 583.
140    ‘om tussen de geallieerden een diversie ende scheuring te maken’, Heinsius to Rechteren, 
22 April 1710, Briefwisseling, 10, ed. Veenendaal: 271.
141    ‘listige propositiën der vijanden’, Van der Meer to Heinsius, 12 October 1709, Briefwisseling, 
9, ed. Veenendaal: 351.
142    ‘Franse bedriegerijen’, quoted in Stork-Penning, Het grote werk, 304.
143    ‘frauduleuse conduites’, quoted in Stork-Penning, Het grote werk, 309.
144    ‘ende licht eer als ooyt tevooren tot de universele monarchie geraken’, Heinsius to 
Vrijbergen, 1 July 1710, Briefwisseling, 10, ed. Veenendaal: 495.
145    ‘gaen de Fransen weer haest voort met groote passen na de universele monarchie’, 
Heinsius to Vrijbergen, 30 December 1710, Briefwisseling, 11, ed. Veenendaal: 459.
90 Onnekink
instance, rather than ‘arrogance’ Surendonck speaks of ‘ondraaglijke trotsheijt’ 
(‘unbearable pride’). ‘Intrigues’ is used by the Europische Mercurius, Valckenier 
and Surendonck. ‘List’ or ‘listigheid’ (cunning) can be found in the Europische 
Mercurius and the Heinsius correspondence. Valckenier actually used the ref-
erence ‘Fransche listen’ as a key concept in his index.146 ‘Usurpor’ appears in 
all sources but Surendonck and the Resolution. Allusions to the French design 
(‘desseign’ or ‘oogmerck’) appear in all sources. ‘Overmacht’ (dominance) 
appears in all sources except the Resolution and the Europische Mercurius. The 
key phrase ‘universal monarchy’ appears in all sources except the Resolution.
The research has thus shown the viability of looking for intertextual connec-
tions; obviously, universal monarchy discourse pervaded all three categories of 
sources. At the same time, it is clear that it was only thinly spread through-
out diplomatic correspondence and much more prevalent in the published 
sources. There are clear reasons for the relative dearth of universal monarchy 
discourse in political correspondence, which was often curt and often omit-
ted the substance of discussions. Nevertheless, even if this is so, intertextual 
connections can be established only if they are actually there. Although this 
case study indicates that universal monarchy discourse is spread throughout 
the categories of sources and that a shared discourse was used, clearly the 
terminology and the frequency of the keywords are genre specific. Moreover, 
Lene Hansen argued that a discourse must be widely spread throughout a 
large number of sources for there to be a ‘basic discourse’.147 In this sense, the 
case has only partially been proven, and the conclusion is therefore indicative 
rather than conclusive.
A question remains regarding the actual performative power of this univer-
sal monarchy discourse. The language used can be seen as a reflection upon 
the reality, but arguably the diplomatic discourse created that very same real-
ity. The observations about French pride were self-affirming, and prejudice 
was inherent in the language the diplomats adopted, a language, we have 
seen, which was intertextually connected to the basic discourse on Universal 
Monarchy. In this view, and in conclusion to my chapter, I suggest that the 
failure of the peace negotiations was caused not so much by a stalemate or 
French unreliability but, to a substantial degree, by Dutch prejudice regarding 
French pride, warmongering and cunning. Although this cannot be proven, the 
fact that the negotiations foundered on mistrust while the Dutch widely used 
 
146    Valckenier, Het Verwerd Europa, index (n.p.).
147    Hansen, Security as practice, 52.
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a discourse on French unreliability strongly points in this direction. Universal 
monarchy discourse, intertextually linked to popular sources cultivating anti-
French sentiments, pervaded Dutch diplomatic sources as well as the news 
and may therefore have influenced the peace negotiations more than has been 
suggested in the past.

part 2
The Publicity Stage
∵
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CHAPTER 5
Madame Du Noyer Presenting and Re-presenting 
the Peace of Utrecht
Henriette Goldwyn and Suzan van Dijk
On Thursday, 27 April 1713, Mme Du Noyer, also known as Anne-Marguerite 
Petit, wrote in her periodical, the Quintessence des nouvelles historiques, cri-
tiques, politiques, morales et galantes:1 ‘On apprend de Paris, par des lettres 
datées du 21 de ce mois que la conclusion et la signature de la paix y a répandu 
une grande joie surtout parmi le peuple et les négociants’.2 In several previ-
ous announcements she had alluded to this much-awaited event and the 
criss-crossing of borders by dignitaries carrying the news to several of the 
monarchs who were the key players in this peace treaty. On 20 April, she wrote: 
‘On apprend de Londres que Mr. de Saint Jean, secrétaire de l’Ambassade 
d’Angleterre, y est heureusement arrivé d’Utrecht, avec le Traité d’Utrecht, qu’il 
est allé porter à la Reine’; earlier she had mentioned: ‘On apprend d’Utrecht 
que Mr. le Commandeur de Béringant en est parti, pour aller porter au Roi de 
France l’agréable nouvelle de la Paix’.3
Mme Du Noyer’s coverage of the Peace negotiations has unfortunately been 
overlooked by twentieth-century historians of the Treaty of Utrecht. Even in 
recent publications by Onnekink and De Bruin, who discuss Freschot’s Histoire 
1    La Quintessence des nouvelles historiques, critiques, politiques, morales et galantes (The Hague: 
Uytwerf, 1689–1730). Du Noyer was one of the successive editors of this biweekly: from 1711, 
taking over from Nicolas de Gueudeville, until her death in 1719. It was originally founded 
by Maximilien Lucas in The Hague (Jean Sgard, Dictionnaire des journaux 1600–1789, Edition 
électronique revue, corrigée et augmentée <http://dictionnaire-journaux.gazettes18e.fr/>).
2    QN, nr. 34, 27 April 1713: ‘We learn from Paris through letters dating to the 21st of this month 
that the conclusion and signature of the peace [treaty] has spread great joy among people 
and merchants’. Translations are by Henriette Goldwyn and Francesca M. Scott; spelling in 
French quotations has been modernized throughout.
3    QN, nr. 32, 20 April 1713: ‘We learn from London that Mr. de Saint Jean, Secretary of the English 
Embassy, has arrived from Utrecht with the Treaty which he has taken to the Queen’; QN, 
nº 31, 17 April 1713: ‘We learn from Utrecht that Mr. de Béringuant has left to carry the good 
news of this new peace to the King of France’.
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du Congrès et de la Paix d’Utrecht,4 there is no mention of Du Noyer’s earlier, 
twofold reporting of this unprecedented historic moment. Therefore, by tak-
ing into account Du Noyer’s voice, we will consider her reporting techniques 
as they shed light on many historic, political and social events of her time, 
which are of particular interest to us. Focusing on the interrelation between 
diplomacy and performative culture in the public sphere, we will examine 
how her blending, mixing, rewriting and blurring texts and genres allow her 
to construct—through a sort of auto-plagiarism—a multi-layered narrative of 
the Peace of Utrecht. She actually composes a two-tier system of reporting the 
events, consisting of an immediate, day-to-day version, in the Quintessence, 
and a reworked, further developed narrative, reissued numerous times over the 
eighteenth century in her successful collection entitled Lettres historiques et 
galantes.5 Du Noyer’s coverage of the negotiations in the Quintessence framed 
the Peace of Utrecht as an event with global consequences that implicated all 
the nations involved rather than two isolated powers.6 In the first issue of 1713, 
her wishes are of a very generous nature: ‘Nous ne saurions mieux commencer 
la première Quintessence de cette année qu’en faisant des vœux [ . . . .] même 
pour nos Ennemis. Fasse le Ciel qu’ils perdent bientôt un nom aussi odieux, 
et qu’une bonne Paix ou nos Victoires rendent le Calme à l’Europe et en fas-
sent la sûreté’.7 Du Noyer was aware of current events and wanted to show that 
the outcome of negotiations in Utrecht played out on a larger, cosmopolitan, 
pan-European and ideological scale, and affected the new ‘balance of power’ 
in Europe and beyond.
4    Casimir Freschot, Histoire du Congrès et de la Paix d’Utrecht, comme aussi de celle de Rastadt 
& de Bade contenant les particularitez les plus remarquables & les plus interessantes desdites 
Negociations depuis leur premiere ouverture jusqu’à la conclusion de la Paix Generale (Utrecht: 
Van Poolsum, 1716). This book is briefly discussed by David Onnekink, ‘The Treaty of Utrecht 
1713’, in Peace was made here. The Treaties of Utrecht, Rastatt and Baden, 1713–1714, ed. Renger 
de Bruin and Maarten Brinkman (Petersberg: Michael Imhof Verlag, 2013), 66 (he gives 1715 
as the publication date), and by David Onnekink and Renger de Bruin, De Vrede van Utrecht 
(1713) (Hilversum: Verloren, 2013), 98.
5    The successive volumes, sticking only loosely together, were published in 1704, 1708, 1710, 1711, 
1712, 1713, 1717. For some of them there were at least ten editions, the last one dating back to 
1790. The one used here is the 1720 edition (Amsterdam: Brunel).
6    Realizing probably that this was ‘the first conflict on a global scale’ (Onnekink, ‘The Treaty of 
Utrecht 1713,’ 60; our italics).
7    QN, nr. 1, 2 January 1713: ‘The best way to open the first Quintessence of this year is by formu-
lating wishes [ . . . .] even for our enemies. Let us hope they will soon lose this awful name, 
and that either a good Peace or our Victories provide calm and security all over Europe’.
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Since previous issues of the Quintessence are difficult to locate,8 we can 
determine only with limited certainty that, at least from 3 October 1712 (nr. 79), 
she informed her network of European readers about the Peace process and 
all the activities taking place in the Utrecht town hall where the ambassadors 
met. For instance, she describes Strafford’s trip back and forth from Utrecht to 
London;9 the death of the Prussian plenipotentiary Consbruch and his replace-
ment by Kirchner in November;10 the illness of count of Tarouca of Portugal 
yet the magnificence of the festivities he organized to celebrate the birth of 
a prince early in January.11 In great detail she depicts the effervescence of the 
cosmopolitan atmosphere in Utrecht, which was, after all, a small town. But 
now French theatre was being performed,12 Queen Anne’s birthday was being 
celebrated,13 and many other festivities and events were taking place. During 
this coverage of the negotiations—eight and a half months—she observes 
and presents all aspects of the peace process and the dignitaries involved. It 
seems probable that her Quintessence attracted an important number of read-
ers beyond its regular audience, which would have been one of her main objec-
tives, especially given the precarious state of her finance.14 This would also 
explain the eagerness with which she started publishing, one month after the 
Peace proclamation, in the sixth volume of her Lettres historiques et galantes: 
de deux dames de condition dont l’une était à Paris et l’autre en Province, the 
reworked version of the bulk of the material included in the Quintessence.
8     Collections of the Quintessence are incomplete: the most important one (at the 
Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal, Paris) which we consulted, does not possess any issues for the 
year 1712 before October.
9     QN, nr. 84, 20 October 1712–nr. 101, 19 December 1712.
10    QN, nr. 89, 7 November 1712–nr. 94, 24 November 1712.
11    QN, nr. 97, 5 December 1712–nr. 5, 16 January 1713.
12    QN, nr. 15, 20 February 1713.
13    QN, nr. 16, 23 February 1713.
14    This is illustrated by remarks of one of her rival reporters, the author of the Histoire amou-
reuse et badine du Congrès et de la Ville d’Utrecht who is supposed to be either Casimir 
Freschot (mentioned in n. 4; most current attribution) or Augustin Freschot (argued by 
Utrecht archivist Erik Tigelaar in his introduction to Roland Fagel’s translation of this 
text: Amoureuze en pikante geschiedenis van het congres en de stad Utrecht. Hilversum: 
Verloren, 2013). The title page announces Liège: Le Doux, Weller, 1713; in fact, it was pub-
lished in Utrecht (Weller: 1713). Freschot criticized Du Noyer for writing quickly out of 
sheer penury: ‘ayant tous les jours à combattre contre la faim et la misère elle se sert des 
armes qu’elle croit les plus propres pour cela, c’est à savoir de sa plume’ (11th letter, 254). 
About the authorship of the Histoire amoureuse et badine, see also Duchhardt’s contribu-
tion to the present volume.
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This collection of fictional letters, the first part of which was published in 
1704, stages two ladies, living in different cities and writing to each other about 
what is happening in their respective locations.15 In the beginning of the sixth 
volume,16 one of the ladies, coming from Aix-la-Chapelle, arrives in Utrecht, 
understanding that this is where everything is going to happen. She plans to 
inform her friend, who spends most of her time in Paris and is very curious to 
know all about it: ‘parlons un peu premièrement du lieu où l’on travaille à cette 
Paix. Le nom en est devenu fameux. On ne parle que d’Utrecht dans toutes les 
conversations; et je voudrais bien pouvoir en parler à mon tour’.17 Her friend 
sends her information about the progress of the conference as well as anec-
dotes about the private activities and behaviour of those in Utrecht.
This fictional epistolary exchange, largely a rewriting of what had been pub-
lished in the Quintessence, provides an interesting case illustrating the impact 
of this formidable event and the intelligent and fascinating use Du Noyer 
makes of it. Below, we discuss Du Noyer’s authorship in relation to the two 
genres she practiced, in which the ‘Peace of Utrecht’ was central.
 Mme Du Noyer (Anne-Marguerite Petit)
A Calvinist refugee, considered to be the first or one of the first women jour-
nalists in the French language to attain fame and notoriety, Mme Du Noyer18 
(1663–1719) took up writing in the Netherlands where she established herself 
(around 1700) after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Taking advantage of 
the freedom of the press afforded by her newly adopted homeland, she con-
tributed to the dissemination of current events not just to the Dutch readers 
but also to those in other European countries. Her role in the history of French-
language journalism under the old Regime went unjustly unrecognized for 
15    Laurent Versini described it as an early version of what would become the genre of the 
epistolary novel. See Laurent Versini, Le roman épistolaire (Paris: PUF, 1979), 61.
16    In later editions the ‘Utrecht letters’ will be in vols. III and IV (see also n. 5).
17    LHG, Letter LXXXVIII (from Paris), 290: ‘let us talk first about the place where Peace is 
being prepared. The name has become famous. Everybody is speaking about Utrecht by 
now; and I would like being able to take part in these discussions’.
18    For more information on Mme Du Noyer, the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, con-
sult the Introduction to the Mémoires de Mme du Noyer, ed. Henriette Goldwyn (Paris: 
Mercure de France, 2005). Incidentally, Marie-Antoinette’s copy of the Mémoires is now 
at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France.
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many years.19 In addition to authoring memoires20 and the Lettres Historiques 
et Galantes, she also became the editor of the Quintessence des Nouvelles, after 
having briefly produced a monthly entitled Nouveau Mercure Galant des Cours 
de l’Europe.21
Joining some of her coreligionists in exile, Mme Du Noyer dedicated the lat-
ter part of her life to the periodical press which provided her with an income to 
support her daughter and grand-daughter in Voorburg, near The Hague, where 
she resided. French Huguenots in Holland produced a dissident press that 
combined journalism, news, editorial reporting, and they were able to articu-
late views that countered the tenets of monarchical absolutism and exposed 
the oppressive, exclusionary policies of Louis XIV.22 These broadsides, gazettes, 
‘mercures’, spectators, letters, also called ‘lardons’, enjoyed considerable suc-
cess in France, the true target of its production, distribution, and criticism. 
Versailles monitored these periodicals closely through its ambassador at The 
Hague, and it has been said that Vauban went so far as ordering the produc-
tion of contre-lardons (counterlardons).23 While this production was vilified by 
some, others consumed it with relish, as Hans Bots indicates in his ‘L’Echo de 
la Révocation dans les Provinces-Unies’.24
As a female journalist, Du Noyer was quite an exception during her time: 
she was successful in the sense that she managed to keep the Quintessence 
alive for eight years, until her death. Her Lettres historiques et galantes were 
reissued over the century, and copies of it were found in numerous eighteenth-
century private libraries in the Netherlands.25 Nancy O’Connor mentions 
19    It was first discussed in Suzan van Dijk, ‘Madame Du Noyer, ou comment tirer parti 
de son travail,’ Documentatieblad Werkgroep Achttiende Eeuw 18 (1986): 15–21, and in 
Suzan van Dijk, Traces de femmes. Présence féminine dans le journalisme français du 
XVIIIe siècle (Maarssen: Holland University Press, 1988), the chapter entitled ‘Madame 
Du Noyer, auteur de la Quintessence des Nouvelles, 1711–1719,’ 85–133, in particular 128–132.
20    Mémoires de Madame du N*** écrits par elle-même (Cologne: P. Marteau, 1709–1710).
21    Nouveau Mercure Galant des Cours de l’Europe (The Hague: E. Foulque, Nov–Dec, 1710).
22    This press was studied in the series Etudes de l’Institut Pierre Bayle, directed by Hans Bots 
of the University of Nijmegen during the last decades of the twentieth century.
23    See p. 101 for an explanation of lardons.
24    ‘Pour une information plus franche et moins partiale les Français en restaient réduits aux 
gazettes de Hollande, dont une partie importante parut d’ailleurs en langue française.’ 
Hans Bots, ‘L’Echo de la Révocation dans les Provinces-Unies,’ in La Révocation de l’Edit 
de Nantes et le protestantisme français en 1685, ed. Roger Zuber and Laurent Theis (Paris: 
Société de l’Histoire du Protestantisme français, 1986), 281–298: 284.
25    And elsewhere probably, but evidence for the Netherlands is available about the LHG 
being included in twenty-nine private and public libraries in the Netherlands in the 
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that the letters were used as a reliable source until well into the nineteenth 
century.26 Du Noyer has, however, suffered—like so many early modern women 
writers—from negative stereotyping and discriminatory remarks.27 Her name 
has been smeared, she has been mocked, and her work has been forgotten. 
Due to the emphasis placed on her unusual life and unorthodox personality, 
serious scientific research on her work is quite arduous. The authors of this 
paper have rectified this trend in earlier publications by underscoring her 
contribution and disseminating her work as an author of diverse and novel 
genres. A forerunner on many fronts, she was appreciated and recognized 
during her time. As an example, we can refer to Justus van Effen, the Dutch 
follower of Addison and Steele, who clearly was familiar with her work. 
At the time, he was also writing French language periodicals, publishing in 
The Hague, as Du Noyer did,28 and referred to her work in a positive way.29
eighteenth century. About this type of source see: Alicia C. Montoya, ‘French and English 
women writers in Dutch library (auction) catalogues, 1700–1800. Some methodological 
considerations and preliminary results,’ in ‘I have heard about you’. Foreign women’s writing 
crossing the Dutch border: from Sappho to Selma Lagerlöf, ed. S. van Dijk et al. (Hilversum: 
Verloren, 2004), 182–216.
26    Nancy O’Connor, in the introduction to her edition of the LHG (Rennes: Presses 
Universitaires de Rennes, 2012), 9–29.
27    For instance, Louis Philipon de la Madelaine, in his Modèles de lettres sur divers sujets 
(1761) comments on her Lettres historiques et galantes in this very negative way: ‘Les Lettres 
de Madame Du Noyer ne méritent pas qu’on s’y arrête. Ce n’est qu’un ramas assez insipide 
d’anecdotes apocryphes, de contes ridicules, d’aventures romanesques, où la bienséance 
et les mœurs ne sont que trop souvent révoltées’ (45).
28    At the end of his life (1731–1735), he published in Dutch his famous Hollandsche Spectator 
(Dutch Spectator) and became one of the canonized Dutch eighteenth-century writers. 
See about his early French spectators S. van Dijk, ‘Un “Spectateur” regarde les femmes: 
Justus van Effen,’ in Traces de femmes, 21–55.
29    In his Misantrope he illustrates the Quintessence’s popularity: “Les Enigmes sont si fort en 
vogue, qu’il est bien juste que j’en dise un mot. Dès qu’on met le pied dans une compagnie, 
‘Ah, Monsieur, ou Madame, vous dit-on, avez-vous deviné une telle Enigme du Mercure, 
ou de la Quintessence?’ ” (1 February 1712); speaking about ‘women of genius’, he takes Du 
Noyer as an example: ‘Les femmes qui ont du génie saisissent d’abord le mot qu’il leur faut 
[. . .]. C’est ce style aisé du beau sexe qui nous sait rendre les plus grandes fariboles intéres-
santes, et qui fait qu’un homme de bon goût peut s’amuser agréablement aux Mémoires 
de Mme du Noyer’ (1 August 1712). Du Noyer herself also mentions and addresses Van 
Effen in her LHG (Letter XCVI, 437–438).
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 The Quintessence des Nouvelles
In 1711, Du Noyer took over the Quintessence, the bi-weekly periodical that had 
been created in 1689 and directed since 1710 by Nicolas de Gueudeville. She 
would remain the editor until 1719, reporting on current events.30 During at 
least part of her coverage of the period from October 1712 until June 1713, six 
months in which the Treaty was being prepared and the following two months 
during which the effects of the Peace were felt, she was probably residing in 
Utrecht. Her reporting is therefore a direct interaction with this specific his-
torical context: the peace negotiations.
Although issues were released on Mondays and Thursdays, the Quintessence 
was called a weekly paper (‘feuille hebdomadaire’) by her successor,31 as well 
as by Hans Bots who uses the term ‘feuille’ (a page/or a leaf) admitting that it 
has much in common with a gazette.32 The Quintessence is also termed lardon 
from the verb ‘larder’,33 which in French combines the meaning of the term 
‘to lard’ as enhance, embellish or give flavor with lard, but also stab, referring to 
political jabs in particular. Additionally, the format itself, consisting of a single 
and very long sheet or leaf, is reminiscent of a strip of lard. All in all, it is a one-
sided page with tight print, between seventy-five and eighty-five lines, with 
international political, societal and literary news printed in one column using 
both verse and prose in a serious, satirical or comical tone.
As reflected in the full title of the Quintessence, in order to pique the inter-
est of her readers, Du Noyer intermingles other, current events, with serious 
world news and cogent political information, personal commentaries, anec-
dotes, gallant tales, moral reflections, letters (fake or real letters to the editors), 
30    Her coverage of the negotiations informed her readers of breaking news in France, as 
well as other nations. Readers were exposed to news from many different nations and 
thus learned about Spain, Prussia, Sweden, Portugal, and even about the war between the 
Emperor and the Turks.
31    QN, nr. 44, 11 June 1719: ‘successeur dans la composition de cette feuille hebdomadaire’. See 
also Van Dijk, ‘La Quintessence après Madame Du Noyer,’ in Traces de femmes, 125–128.
32    Hans Bots, ‘Quelques gazettes de Hollande en langue française et le Mercure Historique 
et politique: une analyse comparative’, in Gazettes et information politique sous l’Ancien 
Régime, ed. Henri Duranton and Pierre Rétat (Saint-Etienne: Publications de l’Université 
de Saint-Etienne, 1999), 166.
33    According to Eugène Hatin, Les gazettes de Hollande et la presse clandestine aux XVIIe 
et XVIIIe siècles (Paris: Pincebourde, 1864), 182. The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
‘lardon’ as ‘one of the pieces of bacon or pork which are inserted in meat in the process of 
larding’, giving primacy to that process.
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poems such as epigrams, odes, madrigals, sonnets, enigmas, even biblical ref-
erences and epitaphs,34 etc. She admits that she wishes to inform and instruct 
but also to entertain and give pleasure to her readers (the expression she uses 
is; ‘réjouir les lecteurs’).35 By taking full advantage of the ‘larding technique’, 
Mme Du Noyer was one of the most famous reporters and editors of this peri-
odical. Her originality—compared to her predecessors and followers—stems 
from her style of reporting which is neither impartial nor impersonal. On the 
contrary, by being very much aware of the tastes of her readership, she is able 
to reconcile breaking news with personal interjections and insertion of various 
literary genres, using a multitude of sources in a very clever way.
The Quintessence incorporates accounts drawn from outside sources both 
official and semi-official. She often relies on hearsay, sometimes first hand 
and sometimes second hand: she would also depend on other gazettes, let-
ters, notices both written and oral, and memoirs. This practice was actually 
quite common among gazetteers throughout the century, and Mme Du Noyer 
does not deny or hide this fact. Although she is not explicit about the origin of 
the information, there are often indirect references to various sources in recur-
rent formulas such as: ‘One learns from special letters from London’, ‘We have 
received from Vienna’, ‘One finds out from Utrecht’ or again ‘One has news 
from Portugal through France’.36 It is difficult to determine if she is referring 
to letters, notices, private informers, hearsay, or conversations.37 However, at 
times, she is more precise, actually revealing her source; for example, when 
she mentions the Supplément de la Gazette d’Utrecht and refers to it for more 
34    Among others, Pierre Jurieu’s in the QN, nr. 9, 30 January 1713, later on those of Louis XIV 
and Queen Anne of England.
35    QN, nr. 12, 9 February 1713.
36    QN, nrs. 4, 5, 7, 9, dated 12, 16, 23 and 30 January 1713.
37    She must have used, for instance, the list providing information about the ambassadors, 
the places where they were living and the colours of their lackeys’ livery: Namen, woon-
plaatsen en livreyen, van Haare Excellentiën, de Heeren Plenipotentiarissen, welke haar 
laten vinden op het Congres van een Generale Vrede t’Utrecht (Utrecht: Van Poolsum, 1712); 
as well as Nicolas Chevalier’s Relation des fêtes que Son Excellence Monseigneur le Duc 
d’Ossune a données au sujet de la naissance du Prince Ferdinand de Castille (Utrecht: chez 
l’auteur, 1713). We thank Floortje Tuinstra, of the Utrecht Archives, for this information. 
Freschot, author of the Histoire amoureuse et badine [. . .], will use this fact in attacking 
her: ‘Mme l’auteur avoue qu’un homme de condition lui avait fourni les mémoires [. . .] 
elle n’entend ni le latin ni le flamand dans lesquelles langues on trouve écrite l’histoire 
d’Utrecht’ (11th letter, 264).
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details.38 In this instance, it is very difficult to determine exactly what was 
copied from the Gazette d’Utrecht as issues from that particular period no 
longer exist.39
Although the much awaited peace is the focal point of the news, many other 
issues and topics seemingly less important are brought to the forefront and 
given prominence. Emerging from behind the political and historical events 
of the peace treaty, a whole colourful spectrum of events is presented to the 
reader, albeit succinctly in the Quintessence, which would later be amplified 
in Du Noyer’s Lettres historiques et galantes. Du Noyer writes about social, 
cultural and religious affairs and presents literary and dramatic criticism and 
short novellas in serial form. As a contemporary of Addison and Steele, authors 
of the Spectator (1711–12), she might have been influenced by them, especially 
in the way that she presents herself in her own texts as a narrator who is not 
completely objective.
 An issue of the Quintessence
To illustrate her method and show how she constructs her narrative, inter-
weaving seemingly heterogeneous topics and genres together, let’s examine 
the issue published on Thursday, 12 January 1713, nº 4. It starts with: ‘On mande 
d’Utrecht qu’il y eut lundi [9-1] un congrès des Ministres des Alliés à l’Hôtel de 
Ville, après quoi ces Seigneurs furent tous chez son Excellence Mgr. le Comte 
de Tarouca [. . .] qui leur donna un Festin magnifique [. . .]’. The feast being in 
honour of the birth of the prince of Brazil, Du Noyer comments on this birth as 
being a good augury for the peace negotiations as ‘il est arrivé trois événements 
considerables à sa naissance’:40 (1) the suspension of war between Portugal, 
France and Spain, (2) the withdrawal of the Spanish forces at the siege of 
Campo Major, and (3) the arrival in Lisbon of the boats from Brazil loaded with 
38    QN, nr. 5, 16 January 1713: ‘On peut voir une description de tout cela dans le supplément de 
la Gazette d’Utrecht, et nous n’en parlerons que succinctement’.
39    The Gazette d’Utrecht actually was entitled at the time Journal d’Utrecht. According to 
Sgard’s Dictionnaire des journaux, there remain only five issues, but they do not cover 
this particular period. <http://dictionnaire-journaux.gazettes18e.fr/journal/0531-gazette-
dutrecht >.
40    ‘One sends from Utrecht that there was a meeting of allied ministers in the city hall, after 
which they all went to a feast thrown by the first plenipotentiary of the King of Portugal, 
the count of Tarouca, in honour of the birth of the Prince of Brazil [. . .] three considerable 
events have taken place’.
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precious goods. She therefore concludes that the prince has brought peace, 
victory and abundance. This is followed by four verses in Latin in honour of 
the prince.
Switching abruptly, she reports on the social occasion and makes auctorial 
interventions by commenting on the beautiful people assembled at the party: 
‘Il eût été à souhaiter qu’on eût pu peindre toute cette belle assemblée [. . .] 
lorsqu’elle était à table [. . .]. Après le dîner il y eut Comédie, dans laquelle les 
Acteurs se surpassèrent’.41 In addition, she describes at great length the décor 
and the excellence of the host, the count of Tarouca, in particular his atten-
tiveness to his lady guests. Continuing in the same vein, she reports that the 
following day there was a ball, listing all those who attended and those who did 
not. She concludes by stating with a hint of irony that: ‘On est si fort occupé 
de plaisir à Utrecht, qu’on n’y parle pas beaucoup d’affaires’.42 However, she 
reports that it is believed that once a much-discussed skirmish between Count 
Rechteren43 and M. Mesnager has been settled, the general conference will 
41    QN, nr. 4, 12 January 1713: ‘it would have been worthwhile to paint this beautiful assembly 
while sitting at the table [. . .] dinner was followed by a play, where the actors surpassed 
themselves . . .’.
42    Ibid.: ‘One is so busy with pleasure in Utrecht that one does not talk much about affairs’.
43    An altercation occurred between the lackeys of Count Rechteren (Netherlands) and 
M. Ménager (the French plenipotentiary). A vulgar gesture made by Ménager’s valet 
degenerated and brought the peace conference to a halt.
Figure 5.1 Picture showing the opening paragraph of Quintessence des Nouvelles for the year 
1713, issue d.d. January 12th, about the feast organized by the count of Tarouca of 
Portugal in celebration of the birth of the Prince of Brazil.  
PHOTO H. GOLDWYN
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resume. This altercation literally brought the peace negotiations to a stand-
still. It is interesting to note here that the mention of this quarrel later became 
an amplified sequence with juicy details in the Lettres historiques et galan-
tes.44 Moving on rapidly, she introduces a song in verse about the Peace that 
the queen of England champions with the assistance of Lord Strafford, her 
equerry. It is entitled: ‘Quand tout est calmé sur la terre, etc.’45 She ends this 
issue by describing the medal of the city of Utrecht featuring two towers, and 
their significance.
As we clearly see here, she juxtaposes the political and historical signifi-
cance of the treaty with items that might appear frivolous at first sight, such 
as meticulous and recurrent accounts of the lavish display of the occasion, 
including detailed portrayals of the festivities (balls, masquerades, dinner par-
ties, theater productions . . .), descriptions of the carriages used by the ambas-
sadors, the clothing they wore, comments about the ladies which smack of 
gossip columns or tabloid journalism—before the word was even invented. 
At a time when reading papers was fashionable and printing periodicals was 
a lucrative business, the peace negotiations and the way they are represented 
through parties, banquets and celebrations are particularly appealing to an 
educated circle of readers. Du Noyer demonstrates that the assemblies fol-
lowed by parties and feasts served as crucial spaces that facilitated interaction 
and the cross-pollination of ideas, bringing together negotiators, ambassadors, 
plenipotentiaries, emissaries and showcased their negotiating prowess. Their 
social skills in diplomacy were thus highlighted at balls, banquets, musical 
performances, and plays. All these events reflect the power and wealth of the 
kings and rulers the plenipotentiaries represented.46
As suggested earlier, although Mme Du Noyer might have been inspired by 
other contemporary writers, and might have even emulated some of them, 
it seems that her reporting style—the clever and entertaining collage she 
champions—is very much her own. She carries this technique a step further 
by rewriting, reworking, and dramatizing the material already used in the 
Quintessence in the sixth volume of the Lettres historiques et galantes, giving it 
a new life and reaching a wider and more international reading public.
44    It is recounted in a highly comical and satirical tone in Letter XCIII, 145.
45    ‘A song on the minuet air of Hesione. When everything has become calm on earth’.
46    See lengthy descriptions in QN nr. 15, 20 February 1713 of the dinner party thrown by the 
count of Tarouca of Portugal during which the play Rodogune by Pierre Corneille was 
performed ‘dans laquelle les acteurs se surpassèrent et [. . .] Colombine fit des mer-
veilles et eut des applaudissements infinis dans le rôle de Cléopâtre’, or again in QN nr. 
16, 23 February 1713 the marvelous party organized by the Earl of Strafford (the British 
ambassador).
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 The Lettres Historiques et Galantes
The strong relationship between the Quintessence and the Lettres Historiques 
et Galantes, most probably directly related to the precariousness of Du Noyer’s 
financial situation, provides us now with the possibility of showing the author 
‘at work’: the Quintessence reporting became a ‘first draft’ of the more lasting 
publication which were the Lettres. This ‘auto-plagiarism’ did not concern only 
the Peace reporting but was characteristic of her work as has been presented 
in more detail elsewhere.47
On 15 May, one month after the signature of the Treaty, the Quintessence 
itself announces the publication of vol. VI of the Lettres historiques et galantes:
Le Sieur Pierre Husson, Marchand libraire sur le Kapelbrug à La Haye, 
avertit le public qu’il vendra au premier jour le sixième volume des Lettres 
Historiques et Galantes, par Madame de C . . . Ouvrage curieux, dans 
lequel on trouve les plans et la description de la Ville d’Utrecht, une rela-
tion de ce qui s’y est passé de plus particulier, pendant le Congrès avec les 
Armes des Plénipotentiaires au dit Congrès.48
It contains twenty letters (LXXXIV–CIII, some of them quite long) dedicated 
to the Peace Congress and the events surrounding it. Du Noyer—while not 
mentioning herself on the title page of this publication—maximized the ben-
efit of the material she had accumulated over 1712 and 1713, when publishing 
daily news about ‘Utrecht’. By repurposing her opportune data, she published 
quickly what seems to have been the first substantial account of the Peace 
conference—apparently before the one by Casimir Freschot entitled Histoire 
du Congrès et de la Paix d’Utrecht, and also before Augustin (?) Freschot’s 
Histoire amoureuse et badine: the latter clearly manifests feelings of jealousy in 
his (already quoted) eleventh letter.49
47    Cf. n. 19. Commemorating the Peace of Utrecht provided an interesting occasion to get 
back to the question discussed more generally earlier.
48    ‘Pierre Husson, Book seller at the Kapelbrug in The Hague, announces that he will sell 
the sixth volume of the Lettres Historiques et Galantes, by Madame de C . . . Interesting 
work in which are to be found maps and the description of the city of Utrecht, and a rela-
tion of what happened during the Congress, with the arms of the Plenipotentiaries of the 
Congress’.
49    This is also Erik Tigelaar’s conclusion in his comments on the translation of the Histoire 
amoureuse et badine (152). See also n. 14.
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From the series of Quintessences, published roughly between October 1712 
and April 1713, i.e. over fifty issues in most of which there was some information 
related to the ‘Peace process’, she derived twenty letters (about four hundred 
pages), some of which included lists of names and geographical and histori-
cal descriptions of Utrecht. In her recent edition of the Lettres Historiques et 
Galantes (2012), O’Connor did not include them for this very reason. As she 
specifies, many long passages of these letters had been taken from Du Noyer’s 
own Quintessence.50 However, this ‘auto-plagiarism’ is exactly what interests 
us now, and the point is to show how Du Noyer proceeded while adapting the 
material from her Quintessence, making it correspond to her fictional character 
who walks around Utrecht, as did the author, writing down her impressions for 
the Parisian friend who is so eager to read them.51
While fictionalizing her own self, she needed to create, in her text, a 
bit more coherence between the narrator and narratee than had existed 
between the journalist and her readers.52 This coherence was created by refer-
ring to the friendship that supposedly existed between the two correspondents, 
who remain anonymous, and by their common interests: they feel ‘linked’ 
to each other in being enthusiastic readers of the Quintessence and fans of 
‘the lady who wrote the Quintessence’ (Du Noyer’s name is not mentioned). 
Furthermore, both are heavily interested in what the other is going to write—
and much less in each other’s personal circumstances. There is no reference to 
any family life, for instance. In a way, these letters are less personal than what 
Du Noyer wrote in the Quintessence as here she supposes her friend curious to 
know everything, meaning everything that might happen and be of any local, 
national or international relevance. Even the history of the city of Utrecht and 
official documents, containing lists of the ambassadors’ names, are included 
for instance in letters XCI and XCV, respectively.
Framing the Peace narrative within a fictional correspondence had some 
interesting consequences, linked to the relationship with time. While the 
Quintessence was published twice a week and the issues needed to be filled 
up anyway, on the contrary, the letters exchanged by the two ladies remained 
undated. Sometimes as a journalist she clearly had difficulties because of the 
too large or too small amount of ‘nouvelles’, while the ‘lardon’ format of the 
50    O’Connor 2012, p. 29.
51    Her correspondent in Paris approves the liberty she is taking with chronology (Letter CIII, 
204).
52    And also, in fact, between narrator and the ‘characters’ described: she suggests, for 
instance, that she had been invited especially by the count of Tarouca (Letter XCVIII, 32).
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Quintessence remained identical: in such cases she tended to use smaller char-
acters or, if need be, add some verses or enigma at the bottom. In the Lettres 
historiques et galantes this problem does not arise: the length of the Utrecht let-
ters is completely dependent on the quantity of material she wants to present, 
and fluctuates between twelve and fifty pages (resp. letters XCVI and XCVIII).
The passing of time is also handled differently—a clear example of which 
might be the repeated announcements in the series of Quintessences of events 
expected to happen, first in the future, then next week, and, finally, on this very 
day. For instance, when Strafford was expected to come back from London to 
Utrecht, the tension grows over a period of two months:
27-10-1712
[. . .] dès le retour de Milord comte de Strafford, les conférences se 
renoueront [. . .]
31-10
[. . .] Il n’y a pas apparence qu’il se tienne d’Assemblée Générale à Utrecht, 
jusqu’au retour de Milord Comte de Strafford, qu’on dit ne devoir pas tar-
der [. . .]
5-12
[. . .] Milord comte de Strafford est attendu dans peu à Utrecht [. . .]
8-12
[. . .] Milord comte de Strafford est arrivé mardi dans la nuit [à La Haye] 
[. . .]
12-12
[. . .] Milord Comte de Strafford est encore ici [La Haye] [. . .]
19-12
[. . .] Milord comte de Strafford partit d’ici [La Haye] jeudi, pour s’en 
retourner à Utrecht [. . .].
Once Strafford is back, there will be a ‘Congrès général’, and things will happen: 
‘les affaires iront à présent plus vite qu’elles n’ont été’.53
In the (undated) Lettres historiques et galantes, such an event tends to be 
mentioned only once but then in more detail, as in Letter XCVIII:
53    ‘Once S. will be back, the conference will start again’; ‘There will be no General Assembly 
in Utrecht, before S. will be back, which should be soon’; ‘S. is expected soon in Utrecht’; 
‘S. arrived in The Hague last night’; ‘S. is still in The Hague’; ‘S. left The Hague Thursday to 
go back to Utrecht’; ‘Things will now be quicker than they were before’.
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[. . .] Milord Strafford est de retour d’Angleterre, on y va travailler à grand 
force [à la paix] [. . .] c’est lui qui lui donne la main pour la conduire à 
Utrecht. Du moins c’est la pensée de ces Vers, qui ont paru dans la 
Quintessence.54
Indeed on 12 December, Du Noyer had included these verses in the Quintessence; 
establishing the link without mentioning the identity of the author, they reap-
pear here:
Strafford paraît à nos yeux
Tout brillant des faveurs d’une puissante Reine.
Il va faire voler des Cieux
La Paix sur ces climats. C’est lui qui la ramène.
[. . .].55
The grouping together—on this and similar occasions—of mentions which 
originally were spread over several weeks allows each letter of Lettres his-
toriques et galantes to be much more individual than was the case for the 
Quintessences, where a certain degree of repetitiousness was difficult to avoid.
 A Feminine Perspective
The poem celebrating Strafford’s return to Utrecht also highlights Du Noyer’s 
interest in Queen Anne, the ‘puissante Reine’. This interest was already visible 
in the Quintessence but is now further expanded in the Lettres: the narrative 
instance is framed much more clearly as a female person, addressing a female 
narratee, both interested in other women, be it Queen Anne,56 the Spanish 
queen,57 the ‘charmante Dauphine’,58 Anna Maria van Schurman, famous 
learned woman from Utrecht,59 or others. Famous women are not the only 
54    ‘Milord Strafford came back from England, one will work hard now for preparing peace 
[. . .] Strafford is the one who will invite her to come to Utrecht. At least this is suggested 
by these verses which were published in the Quintessence’.
55    LHG, Letter XCVIII, 6: ‘Strafford appears in front of us / ablaze by the favours of the mighty 
Queen. / He will make Peace fly toward our climates. He is the one who brings her back’.
56    See letters LXXXVIII, 285; LXXXIX, 291; XCVIII, 17–20; CVIII, 353.
57    LHG, Letter CI, 170.
58    LHG, Letter LXXXVI, 278.
59    LHG, Letter XCI, 303; XCII, 333.
110 Goldwyn and van Dijk
striking figures: in some of the fictional items we also find young, smart girls as 
heroines, manifesting strong will and character.60
Identification with ‘femininity’ and the private life of women is of equal 
concern to both ladies as are their possibilities for happiness in marriage. It is 
interesting to see how Du Noyer has seized the opportunity to discuss this sub-
ject in the middle of a political event dominated by male protagonists, which 
nevertheless led to those social gatherings announced and commented upon 
in the Quintessence.
The Parisian correspondent in the Lettres historiques et galantes is assumed 
to take an interest in the doings of Mylord Albemarle, as seen here:
Il est à présent à La Haye avec Milady son épouse, dont il est toujours 
aussi amoureux qu’il l’était avant son mariage, dont la date est pourtant 
de près de douze ans. Malgré le mauvais usage que la dépravation du siè-
cle a établi, il ne lui a point donné de concurrence ni de coadjutrice, et il 
l’aime avec tant d’ardeur, que lorsqu’elle a été en couches à Tournai, dont 
il est Gouverneur, toutes les cloches ont été muettes pendant quinze 
jours, comme elles le sont en France à la fin de la semaine Sainte. Cela 
s’appelle être un bon mari, et pousser la tendresse conjugale au suprême 
degré.61
This quotation, showing a tender husband creating the best possible condi-
tions for his wife who is about to give birth, is especially compelling in light 
of the aforementioned other—male—reporting about the Peace congress: 
Freschot’s Histoire amoureuse et badine du Congrès et de la Ville d’Utrecht. 
Here the author’s focus62 is completely upon the ‘concurrences’ and the 
‘coadjutrices’ of married men who are looking for romance in Utrecht, while 
their wives are staying at home.
60    For instance: LHG, Letters XCI, 304; XCIV, 405.
61    LHG, Letter XCIII, 330–331 (our italics): ‘He is now in The Hague with Milady his wife, with 
whom he is still in love at the same degree as before his marriage, which dates back to 
twelve years ago. In spite of the bad uses due to the depravity of our times, he did not give 
her any rival, and still loves her with such an ardor, that when she was about to give birth 
in Tournai (where he is the Governor), all bells have been silent during a fortnight, as they 
are in France during the Holy week. This shows his being a good husband, and pushing 
tenderness to the highest degree’.
62    See note 14 about the identity of the author.
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By promoting Albemarle as the ‘bon mari [qui pousse] la tendresse con-
jugale au suprême degré’, Du Noyer (or her imagined Lady from Utrecht) is 
clearly keeping her distance from ‘la dépravation du siècle’ which is so omni-
present in the Histoire amoureuse et badine [. . .], whose author is principally 
interested in scandals related to connections established by foreign visitors. 
These were not only busy discussing the Treaty in the Utrecht Town Hall but 
also engaging with Utrecht’s ‘official’ or improvised prostitutes, daughters of 
wig makers and tavern owners—Freschot formulated explicitly that these 
illicit contacts between the plenipotentiaries (or their servants) with Utrecht 
ladies (or their servants) were the subjects that his intended (male) readers 
wanted to be informed about.63
Du Noyer’s ‘Lady from Utrecht’ does not at all suppose that her Parisian 
friend wants to read about this. On the contrary, she insists upon presenting 
the very respectable spouses who accompany their husbands the ambassadors, 
and she creates occasions that allow her to express her approval of matrimo-
nial happiness and any good relationship between husband and wife—be it 
Mylord and Lady Albemarle, or other couples. This tendency had already been 
suggested in the Quintessence but seems clearer still in the Lettres, thanks to 
the possibility, or even the need, of putting together information that belongs 
together. In that sense we might suggest that Du Noyer adopted here a more 
recognizably ‘feminine’ point of view, insisting upon the qualities and the mer-
its of those spouses who came to Utrecht and who in some cases would seem 
to have played prominent roles:
Il y a assemblée certains jours de la semaine chez les Ministres qui ont ici 
leurs épouses avec eux, et chez d’autres personnes de considération de la 
ville. C’est dans ces Assemblées que l’on voit briller les belles 
Ambassadrices de Prusse, Madame la Comtesse de Dönhof, et Madame 
Marchal. Ces deux Dames font l’admiration du Congrès, et pourraient, 
avec raison, faire celle de tout l’Univers; car on n’a jamais rien vu de plus 
charmant.
And she ‘proves’ the fact by reproducing ‘des vers qui ont paru sur la 
Quintessence’, concerning ‘la Comtesse de Dönhof’:
63    ‘Vous êtes las, me dites-vous Monsieur, d’entendre parler de Traité de Paix [. . .]. Vous 
voudriez que je vous parlasse un peu des intrigues amoureuses, et que je vous fis l’Histoire 
Badine de ce congrès’ (Lettre I, 1).
112 Goldwyn and van Dijk
La Prusse féconde en beauté
Nous en fait voir ici l’élite.
La Seine sur ses bords autrefois tant vantées,
N’eut rien d’égal à leur mérite.64
The same Lettre presents (431–432) a similar poem praising Mme Marchal, 
which had also been included in the Quintessence (31–10–1712). At the end the 
‘Utrecht Lady’ specifies:
Tout ce que je puis vous assurer, c’est qu’il n’entre point de flatterie là-
dedans. Je parle pour avoir vu, et l’on peut dire qu’il n’est rien de plus 
charmant que ces deux dames-là.65
In a more general sense, the Utrecht Lady—or perhaps the author—is showing 
herself off as a well-behaved, lady-like person, a foil to the bad reputation Du 
Noyer had gained. For us today, it is interesting to see this female perspective in 
contrast to the male reporting highlighted during the 2013 commemoration.66
 Conclusion
Mme Du Noyer refers often to her relationship with her educated audience, 
especially her female readership. In the eighteenth century, women became 
avid readers of periodicals where news and other topics were presented in an 
appealing and not overly scholarly tone. Both the Quintessence and the Lettres 
historiques et galantes reflect that concern. Time and again, she reminds us 
with great irony and wit that she is neither a historian nor a theologian or a 
64    ‘One gathers certain days of the week at the homes of the Ministers who brought their 
spouses, and those of other persons of importance in the city. In these meetings we 
see the brilliancy of the beautiful Ambassadresses of Prussia, Madam the Countess of 
Dönhof, and Madam Marchal. These two ladies are admired all over the Congress, and 
could even be admired all over the universe; there was nothing more charming to be seen. 
[. . .] Prussia, fertile in beauty, shows us here its elite. The Seine so much applauded for 
this reason, does not possess anything similar to their merits’. These verses initially pub-
lished in the QN, 3 November 12, reappear in the LHG (Lettre XCV, 431).
65    ‘I can assure that there is no flattery here. I have seen and concluded that there is nothing 
more charming than these two ladies’.
66    For instance in the exhibition organized by the Utrecht Archives (HUA), which was enti-
tled ‘High wigs, low amusement’.
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specialist in rhetoric but a woman writing and wanting to share with other 
women the most important events taking place.
Thus, weaving in and out of two different genres which found their way into 
France and the rest of Europe, a bi-weekly paper and a fictitious epistolary 
exchange between two female correspondents, she often rewrites, reworks and 
dramatizes the same material, especially current events, with a different twist 
and in a different style. It is at times difficult to differentiate where current 
events stop and fiction begins, especially when she interjects or makes aucto-
rial interventions, offers metadiscourse and recounts anecdotes in the third 
person singular [‘on’] in the Quintessence and in the first person in the Lettres 
historiques et galantes [‘je’]. It is precisely this fictionalization of the news or 
the subjectification of political events and the devices used that is of interest 
to her reader. Although she might appear to come across as a political and 
cultural commentator, staging herself as an eye witness, the historical and the 
political are most often spiked and subverted by the social and the literary.
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CHAPTER 6
‘Dieu veuille que cette Paix soit de longue durée . . .’ 
The History of the Congress and the Peace of Utrecht 
by Casimir Freschot
Heinz Duchhardt
In 1716, a five-hundred-page book, long considered for good reason the authori-
tative history of the Utrecht peace congress, was brought out, in octavo format, 
by the enterprising and important Utrecht publisher van Poolsum. It carried 
the Baroque title Histoire du Congrès et de la Paix d’Utrecht, comme aussi de 
celle de Rastadt & de Bade contenant les particularitez les plus remarquables 
& les plus interessantes desdites Negociations depuis leur premiere ouverture 
jusqu’à la conclusion de la Paix Generale, which curiously referred to a ‘general 
peace’ never concluded.1 Rather, in line with the vernacular of the day, only a 
number of bilateral peace treaties were signed at the time.
Interestingly enough, little is known about the author of this book, embel-
lished with an impressive frontispiece engraved by Jan Goeree and a title 
vignette. Scholars generally attribute the work—as also apparent from a hand-
written note on the title page of the volume I used—to Casimir Freschot, who 
shortly after the publication of his Histoire authored a ‘scandal history’ of the 
Utrecht congress and also edited the congress proceedings, as far as they were 
accessible at the time. But who was this man? The research literature2 com-
monly refers to a Benedictine monk named Casimir Freschot, who according 
to his biographical dates—ca. 1640 to 1720—could be the author. This Freschot 
produced other publications that, for example, analysed the Viennese court 
and provided policy recommendations to the office holders involved in the 
War of the Spanish Succession. But is it really conceivable that a Protestant 
Utrecht publisher would have entrusted to an author shaped by the fierce anti- 
Protestantism of the Franche-Comté such an important and rather semi-official 
publication? It is for this reason that the article by Françoise Knopper-Gouron 
1    The quote in the title on p. 486 of Freschot, Histoire, in the context of the conclusion of the 
Austrian-French Treaty of Rastatt.
2    Françoise Knopper-Gouron, ‘Le bénédictin Casimir Freschot pendant la Guerre de 
Succession d’Espagne: patriotisme d’Empire, anti-protestantisme et Jansénisme,’ Francia 12 
(1984): 271–282.
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Figure 6.1 Title page of Histoire du Congrès et de la Paix d’Utrecht (Utrecht: G. van  
Poolsum, 1716), with an engraving by Jan Goeree. 
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points to a ‘homonyme Protestant’ who had immigrated to the Netherlands—
in other words a namesake,3 which in light of the rather unusual name, though, 
would be quite a coincidence. Then again there exist reference works dating 
from the early nineteenth century, implying that the Benedictine monk and 
the author were, after all, one and the same person. What could lead to a more 
certain answer are the archives of the publishing house van Poolsum, should 
they still exist. The question who wrote the book thus remains open but will be 
returned to in the context of the author’s own reflections in the work.
The thesis that the author may have been a French Huguenot émigré gains 
in substance when one takes his open criticism of France and Louis XIV in the 
Histoire du Congrès et de la Paix d’Utrecht into account. It resembles his fierce 
criticism of the French delegation and their entanglement in organised pros-
titution, as made public in his Histoire amoureuse.4 This ‘scandal history’ has 
received much more attention in recent research—see, for example, Lucien 
Bély’s fundamental study5—than the book under discussion here.6
What can be said with certainty, however, is that our author—a Casimir 
Freschot—had already established himself as a specialist on the various 
aspects of the War of the Spanish Succession before he authored his history of 
the Utrecht peace congress and the aforementioned ‘scandal history’. To this 
end three further publications can be named: a Histoire anecdotique de la cour 
de Rome, la part qu’elle a eu dans l’affaire de la succession d’Espagne published 
in Cologne in 1704, a Mémoire de la cour de Vienne contenant les remarques d’un 
voyageur curieux sur l’état présent de cette cour et sur ses interests published 
3    Similar also Abraham van der Aa, Biografisch woordenboek der Nederlanden (Haarlem, 1859), 
6: 62.
4    The book, entitled Histoire amoureuse et badine du congrès et de la ville d’Utrecht was pub-
lished in Liege without date. Interestingly, a German translation was published about a year 
later with the title ‘Der galante Congress in der Stadt Utrecht oder Einige Zeit währender 
Friedensverhandlungen daselbst vorgefallene Liebes-Begebenheiten’. A Dutch translation of 
the book by Roland Fagel was published in 2013: Amoureuze en pikante geschiedenis van het 
congress en de stad Utrecht, ed. Erik Tigelaar (Hilversum: Verloren, 2013).
5    Lucien Bély, Espions et ambassadeurs au temps de Louis XIV (Paris: Fayard, 1990).
6    Recently Inken Schmidt-Voges also dedicated her inaugural lecture at the University of 
Osnabrück to the Histoire amoureuse. I am grateful to Schmidt-Voges for allowing me to 
consult her not yet published manuscript. Schmidt-Voges underlines in her lecture that 
Freschot’s ‘scandal history’ provoked at least two ‘counter-accounts’. It must be pointed out 
here that the obvious and principal target of the book—sex sells—was not the only ‘phi-
losophy’ of journalists; Henriette Goldwyn and Suzan van Dijk refer in their chapter in this 
collection to publications of (female) authors where an intact family life of the diplomats is 
stressed.
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in Cologne in 1705, and a text entitled Les Intrigues secrètes du Duc de Savoye, 
published in Venice also in 1705. The aim of the latter was to shed light on 
the—sometimes problematic (Rome, Turin)—role of actors in the major, if 
not to say global, conflict that had come to preoccupy the continent since the 
death of Carlos II of Spain.
The author opens his book with a dedication to the mayor and senators of 
the city of Utrecht and a preface in which he reflects on the Peace of Utrecht 
in general. I have already written about this matter in the context of contem-
porary debates about treaties of peace7 and here would merely like to men-
tion that Freschot introduced a kind of typology of peace on these opening 
pages, distinguishing between four types of peace: first, the demand placed 
on Christians—in alignment with God’s command for peace—to maintain 
peace; second, peace to retain a status quo; third, peace brought about by 
exhaustion after a long conflict; and fourth and last, hollow peace, resulting 
from the unwillingness of one of the parties to adhere to agreed words and 
documents. These are rather abstract considerations, which, in the absence 
of any examples being given, leave the reader to decide in which typological 
category the author would have placed the Peace of Utrecht.
Freschot quite rightly elaborates extensively in his Histoire du Congrès on 
how the War of the Spanish Succession and the concluding Peace of Utrecht 
can be understood only in the context of the 1659 Treaty of the Pyrenees and 
the ever more insecure Spanish line of the Casa de Austria. He therefore dedi-
cates several dozen pages to the political-diplomatic-military conflicts of the 
1660s: the attempts made by Louis XIV to appropriate or subject, on the basis 
of very weak alleged claims to the Spanish inheritance and naked aggression, 
large parts of Western Europe; the military events, which are described in 
detail; the political reversals of the Roi-Soleil, with which he time and again 
surprised his opposite parties. Freschot interprets the marriage alliance of 1659 
as a fundamental threat to the European equilibrium,8 castigating the French 
attempts to thwart the invalidation of the king’s renunciation of the claims 
to the Spanish inheritance. Freschot thus disapproves of, in all respects, the 
7    Heinz Duchhardt, ‘Die Systematisierung und Typologisierung des Friedens. Das Vorwort 
von Casimir Freschots ‘Histoire du Congres et de la Paix d’Utrecht, comme aussi de celle de 
Rastadt & de Bade’, in Utrecht—Rastatt—Baden 1712–1714. Ein europäisches Friedenswerk am 
Ende des Zeitalters Ludwigs XIV, ed. Heinz Duchhardt and Martin Espenhorst (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoek & Ruprecht 2013), 303–312.
8    The ‘paix de l’Europe’ rests on an ‘espece d’équilibre de forces entre les deux Couronnes de 
France & d’Espagne’, but was placed under scrutiny by the marriage alliance set out in the 
Treaty of the Pyrenees: p. 1.
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political project of the Roi-Soleil, which from the very beginning was focussed 
on dividing his opponents and exploiting the weaknesses in the Spanish royal 
house. He suggests that Louis XIV planned, after the cruel destruction of the 
Palatinate, further campaigns in the Holy Roman Empire9 and complains 
about the king’s duplicity and unscrupulousness when it comes to forcing 
opponents to act against faith and law and to leave, contrary to all contrac-
tual assurances, alliances led by anti-French leaders. Louis’ politics, such as his 
attempt to obtain a favourable final will from the last Spanish-Habsburg ruler, 
verge on the criminal. There is no question that the author was very critical of 
France and, more to the point, highly sceptical of Louis XIV. This finding does 
not provide decisive proof as to who the author was but lends, at least at first 
sight, further support to the thesis that the author may well have been a French 
Huguenot émigré.
But then the work includes other enemy stereotypes as well. In the descrip-
tion and analysis of the history immediately preceding the war, Freschot leaves 
no doubt that he considers the British strategy to agree to a partition treaty 
without involving, or at least informing, the directly affected parties in Vienna 
as counterproductive, if not fatal. And his criticism of the political agenda pur-
sued by Whitehall and of Queen Anne as a monarch only intensifies when he 
writes about the events after 1710. Whereas the text duly acknowledges and 
praises Britain’s military achievements within the Grand Alliance and espe-
cially on the Iberian Peninsula, it also condemns the game played by London 
behind the back of the Allies following the ‘ministerial revolution’ of 1710. To 
this end it portrays the negotiations between Nicolas Mesnager and Matthew 
Prior as diametrically opposed to the spirit and text of the Grand Alliance of 
1701. Likewise the unilateral withdrawal of British troops from the battlefields 
is presented as a striking breach of contract—it appears that London wanted, 
against expressed public opinion, peace at any price.
That the Dutch Republic in the end agreed to enter negotiations with French 
diplomats to achieve a separation agreement Freschot considered a further 
example of British malice. Apparently, the British had exploited the constitu-
tional peculiarities of the States-General and the decision-making processes in 
the United Provinces to relieve the Dutch Republic, which from 1710 onwards 
had to increasingly guard its commercial interests, of its obligations with 
regard to the Alliance. The text leaves no question about the author’s assess-
ment of Britain’s perfidious approach.10
9     Freschot, Histoire, 27.
10    Further to the letter from the States-General to Queen Anne of 5 June 1712, reprinted in 
the Histoire du Congrès in its entirety, Freschot remarks: ‘On a voulu inserer & raporter 
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A third enemy stereotype Freschot develops, at least in preliminary terms, 
concerns the Pope. He takes as his point of departure a letter, since reprinted in 
the original,11 sent by Louis XIV to the head of the Catholic Church in February 
1707, asking the Pope to intervene in the conflict, to even act as an arbitra-
tor, in order to swiftly establish a permanent peace. Freschot uses this letter, 
which he ‘dissects’ with great pleasure, not only to show the absurdity of this 
proposal but also to place Clement XI in the French corner and to ‘expose’ him 
as a supporter of Louis XIV.12 With good reason, so Freschot implies, the Curia 
distanced itself from intervening in the negotiations as an ‘arbiter christianita-
tis’ as such an effort was doomed to fail. In contrast, it would have been quite 
possible to imagine the Republic of Venice, the ‘other’ traditional negotiator, 
assuming a peace-enhancing role, at least with regard to the French-Imperial 
negotiations.13
Freschot describes the actual ‘negotiations’ in Utrecht in a manner that 
leads one to conclude that he was an eyewitness—and not a journalist who 
exploited the periodicals published in the city, e.g. the Gazette d’Utrecht or the 
bi-weekly Quintessences edited by Mme Du Noyer.14 In Utrecht, which had 
been chosen as the place of negotiations on the advice of the British queen,15 
toute cette lettre, quelque longue qu’elle soit, parcequ’elle est une preuve authentique du 
procédé irregulier de la Cour de Londres, par raport aux Alliez, & qu’elle étoit déja gagnée 
en faveur de la France dés avantqu’on eut commencé le Traité de Paix, ne se servant des 
demonstrations & des protestations qu’on faisoit faire à la Reine, que pour mieux tromper, 
attirer & faire tomber les Alliez dans la necessité de souscrire la Paix, telle qu’il plaisoit à 
l’Ennemi commun de la prescrire, après avoir gagné les Ministres de cette Princesse, pour 
qu’ils se servissent de son nom, afinque de faire valoir leurs ménées’. (325f.)
11    Freschot, Histoire, 86–89.
12    Clement XI (elected in 1700) was certainly not a French ‘creature’ in the beginning but was 
gradually pushed by Austria’s politics in Northern Italy towards the anti-imperial camp. 
The attempts made by the Pope to arrive at a peace, as mentioned by Freschot, link to a 
multitude of other attempts to achieve the same outcome; cf. Ludwig Frhr. von Pastor, 
Geschichte der Päpste im Zeitalter des fürstlichen Absolutismus: von der Wahl Klemens‘ XI. 
bis zum Tode Klemens‘ XII. (1700–1740) (Freiburg/Br.: Herder 1930), ch. 1 and ch. 2.
13    Freschot, Histoire, 490f.: ‘On croit avec assez de vraisamblance, que la Republique de 
Venise se seroit contentée, si pour toute reparation de tant de dommages, les Parties qui 
se sont fait chez elle la guerre, lui eussent fait l’honneur de la choisir pour Mediatrice de 
leur accord & reconciliation. Cela sembloit non seulement juste, mais meme necessaire. 
Mais on aima mieux de faire les Traitez entre la France & l’Empire sans Mediateur, de la 
manière qu’on la vu: au lieu que si on avoit choisi pour Mediatrice une Puissance respect-
able, comme celle-là, les choses en seroient peut-étre mieux allés’.
14    Cf. the chapter by Henriette Goldwyn/Suzan van Dijk in this collection.
15    Freschot, Histoire, 233.
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everything had been prepared with the utmost care: to avoid any breaches of 
protocol, a room had been made available in the town hall which could be 
accessed from opposite sides; further rooms served the internal discussions of 
the two parties.16 In addition, to avoid any ceremonial mistakes, an agreement 
had been reached for the respective envoys to enter the main room without 
any pomp and circumstance. Nonetheless, the ‘negotiations’, ultimately few in 
number, did not produce anything more significant than an agreement that 
neither an intermediary nor a keeper of the minutes should be involved. Some 
envoys, such as the Imperial negotiator Count Sinzendorff, preferred to stay in 
The Hague rather than to travel to Utrecht, arguing that the substantial nego-
tiations between the British and the French representatives had already been 
conducted in London. The results of these had been presented to the other 
delegations more or less as a fait accompli. From this point of view, Utrecht 
was merely used for a last round of negotiations to arrive at a peace and was 
entitled to take pride only in a series of bilateral peace treaties having been 
signed within its walls.
There are several reasons that support the assumption that the text is, 
indeed, an eyewitness account: the precision with which Freschot describes 
the (dull) entrances of the envoys; the insights he offers into the social life, 
which he commences with an account of the ball organised by the wife of the 
British envoy, John Robinson, the Bishop of Bristol; and the meticulousness 
with which he writes about an incident involving Dutch and French servants, 
which he attempts to evaluate in terms of international law.17 He is disap-
pointed that the treaties were not signed and, after ratification, exchanged 
in the town hall but in the private quarters of the envoys, or even in an open 
field (!), and complains, at least between the lines, that the city of Utrecht was 
thus denied a spectacular set of peace celebrations.
Nonetheless, the (presumed) eyewitness Freschot rather hesitates when it 
comes to divulging details about the social workings of the peace congress, 
which in light of the extended periods of inactivity allowed the respective 
parties to spend their time other than at the conference table or in private 
political discussions. The reason for this must be that Freschot did not want to 
distract from the abovementioned Histoire amoureuse . . ., which was published 
at the same time. Further, it can be assumed that he considered his Histoire du 
Congrès a serious piece of contemporary historiography and did not want this 
work to diverge from accepted historical writing.
16    The frontispiece reproduced by Bély, now in the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam, gives an 
impression of this (two-door) conference room.
17    Cf. Bély, Espions, 414.
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What is certain is that Freschot was no longer an eyewitness at the suc-
ceeding peace congresses in Rastatt and Baden that engaged Prince Eugene 
of Savoy and Marshall Villars as the Imperial side had shown itself unable to 
sign documents which it had not negotiated. Likewise Freschot was absent in 
Baden / Aargau, where an entire guard of European principalities assembled 
to do little more than translate the Treaty of Rastatt from French into Latin.
Freschot therefore devotes few pages to these two peace congresses, refer-
ring the reader instead to the official publication of the congress papers, the 
Actes, Mémoires et autres pièces authentiques concernant la Paix d’Utrecht, for 
which, in turn, he was responsible and which were published by van Poolsum 
in 1714/15. This publication continues to serve scholars, the interim plan for a 
new edition of the primary sources of the Utrecht peace congress aside,18 as an 
irreplaceable basis for their research.
Of course, Freschot’s Histoire du Congrès also pays tribute to failed attempts 
to conclude a peace, such as the negotiations between the French diplomat 
Rouillé and his allied opponents in The Hague in 1709, set out almost like a 
chronology.19 Freschot concisely describes the key role the possible restitu-
tion of Alsace to the German Empire and the question of Dunkirk played 
at the time. The preliminary articles of peace dated 18 May, as received by 
Torcy and Rouillé, but ultimately never executed, are also included in the 
volume.20 Significantly, Louis XIV is made responsible for the failure of this set 
of negotiations21 as well as for the Geertruidenberg negotiations of 1710, which 
also led to no result.22
On the other hand, Freschot shows no interest in his Histoire du Congrès 
in the impact the War of the Spanish Succession had on events and interests 
outside Europe or in the activities of the lobbyists representing the various 
trading companies, who, of course, presented their cases to the chief negotia-
tors in both London and Utrecht. He reports on the genesis of the various trade 
18    Max Braubach, ‘Die Friedensverhandlungen in Utrecht und Rastatt 1712 bis 1714’, 
Historisches Jahrbuch 90 (1970): 284–298.
19    Freschot, Histoire, 98ff.
20    Freschot, Histoire, 107–127.
21    Freschot, Histoire, 128. For an account of these negotiations see Werner Reese, Das Ringen 
um Frieden und Sicherheit in den Entscheidungsjahren des Spanischen Erbfolgekrieges 1708 
bis 1709 (München: Beck, 1933).
22    Freschot, Histoire, 149ff. Freschot traces the Geertruidenberg negotiations back to the fact 
that Louis XIV had to give his subjects a sign of goodwill to console them after years of 
suffering. This did not stop him from taking the first pretext to again withdraw from the 
negotiations.
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agreements as well as the Asiento contract23 and comments on the differences 
and animosities between Spain and Portugal, but fails to examine them against 
their overseas background. His perspective is first and foremost a European 
one—the continuation of the war beyond the sea and its repercussions on the 
Utrecht negotiations were of only minor importance to him.
Has the analysis of Freschot’s Histoire du Congres helped to resolve the iden-
tity of the author? And has it established whether these very heterogeneous 
publications by Casimir Freschot should be attributed to one or two writers? 
Bély cites a passage from French correspondence according to which the 
Cardinal of Bouillon is said to have made use of the ‘mordante plume d’un 
insigne scélérat et moine apostat bourguignon, marié à Utrecht, nommé 
Freschot’ in his propaganda writings.24 The author is certain that the person 
is the writer of the Histoire du Congres. If one believes this contemporary 
source and assumes—whilst ignoring all the epithets—a renegade monk 
from Burgundy who marries in Utrecht and earns his livelihood by writing 
propaganda pamphlets against Louis XIV, then the puzzle is quickly solved: a 
Benedictine monk who first makes a name for himself by writing Catholic, anti-
Protestant pamphlets but who is equally critical of the Jesuits, who blames the 
Emperor for agreeing to a Grand Alliance with the Protestant states,25 who, for 
whatever reason, leaves his order and converts to some shade of Protestantism, 
settles in Utrecht, distinguishes himself by writing anti-French and (as shown 
here) anti-British publications, and works as a kind of ‘in-house author’ for the 
publisher van Poolsum, where he is also responsible for the production of the 
official publication of the congress papers. Such careers existed, most likely in 
somewhat larger numbers at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Less fre-
quent were cases of reconversion: Knopper-Gouron, who also assumes a linear 
and unbroken career, has established that the (one?) person by this name was 
‘reintegrated’ into the congregation of Saint-Vanne in 1718 and died in Luxueil 
in 1720. The thesis of the exiled Huguenot, next to whom there existed a sec-
ond person of the same name, would thus be refuted. Also the dates—1718 
and 1720—would not contradict the present reconstruction of what was quite 
obviously an eventful life. But perhaps research in Utrecht itself, whether in 
the registry office or in the publishing house, will reveal further findings and 
will further substantiate the assumption set out here.
Translated by Uta Protz.
23    Freschot, Histoire, 368.
24    Bély, Espions, 214.
25    See Knopper-Gouron, ‘Le bénédictin Casimir Freschot’.
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CHAPTER 7
The Treaty of Utrecht and Addison’s Cato:  
Britain’s War of the Spanish Succession, Peace and 
the Imperial Road Map
Samia Al-Shayban
I have this business of ye peace soe much at heart. . . .
(QUEEN ANNE, 1711)1
Queen Anne’s letter to her First Lord of the Treasury, Earl of Oxford, the leader 
of Tory party expresses her keen desire to procure the Peace of Utrecht for her 
war-weary nation. The Treaty of Utrecht was signed to end the War of Spanish 
Succession on 11 April 1713 amidst deep divisions in Queen Anne’s govern-
ment. The Queen, Oxford and their supporters in the government were seek-
ing peace as a means of securing England’s interests that the long war had 
failed to achieve.2 On the opposite side stood the war general, the Duke of 
Marlborough, and his Whig Cabinet allies who were adamant about continu-
ing the fighting.3 Addison premiered Cato at Drury Lane on 14 April 1713 just a 
few days after the signing of the Peace of Utrecht amidst this foray of war and 
peace. It is no coincidence that the core of Cato is the conflict between those 
who seeks peace represented by Julius Caesar and the advocates of war under 
the leadership of Cato Uticensis.
From its first performance, the play proved to be an immediate success. 
On 30 April 1713 Alexander Pope, who attended the premiere, described the 
audience’s enthusiastic reaction to Cato’s struggle. In a letter to John Caryll, 
he wrote:
The numerous and violent claps of the Whig party on the one side of the 
theatre, were echoed back by the Tories on the other.4
1    Queen Anne to 1st Earl of Oxford, Robert Harley, 24 September 1711, Historical Manuscripts 
Commission [UK-Bath 1711] Ms 1:212. The letter is also quoted in Edward Gregg, Queen Anne 
(London: Yale University Press), 341.
2    Gregg, Queen Anne, 330–362.
3    Gregg, Queen Anne, 343–350.
4    The Correspondence of Alexander Pope, ed. George Sherbum (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), 
I, 175.
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According to Pope’s letter, both the Whigs and the Tories tried to stress that 
they were the champions of virtue and liberty, the sentiments expressed in the 
play. Before the end of its first season, Cato had been staged more than twenty 
times. To meet the public demand it was performed the following season.5 
Since its first performance, the play has attracted various critical readings. The 
critical ground shared by contemporary and modern critics concerns the face 
of Caesar’s tyranny and empire. Alexander Pope’s prologue to the play articu-
lates eighteenth-century views. Popes declares
Here tears shall flaw from a more gen’rous cause,
Such tears as patriots shed for dying laws:
He bids your breasts with ancients ardour rise,
And calls forth Roman Drops from British eyes.
Virtue confessed in human shape he draws,
What Plato thought, and godlike Cato was [. . .]
Who hears him groan, and does not wish to bleed?
Ev’n when proud Caesar, midst triumphal cars.6
(13–18, 26–27)
Modern criticism retains a similar approach to the play without attempting to 
untangle the controversy around its meaning. Laura Rosenthal reads Cato as 
a promotion of the struggle for ‘a democratic Roman Republic’ in the face of a 
‘corrupt and overreaching Roman Empire.’7 Lisa Freeman believes that Cato’s 
virtues are an allegorical presentation of patriotism in England.7 Frederic Litto, 
who reveals the deep ideological and cultural bond between Cato and the 
colonists in America, states:
Cato’s last stand for liberty against the usurpation of Caesar found special 
sympathy in the hearts and minds of colonists.8
5    Lincoln Faller, The Popularity of Addison’s Cato and Lillo’s The London Merchant (New York: 
Garland, 1988).
6    Alexander Pope, ‘Prologue to Cato by Joseph Addison,’ The Broadview Anthology of Restoration 
and Early Eighteenth Century Drama, ed. J. Douglas Canfield (Toronto: Broadview Press, 
2005), 187.
7    Lisa Freeman, ‘What is Love Got to do with Addison’s Cato,’ Studies in English Literature 1500–
1900 39 (1999): 463–482.
8   Frederic M. Litto, ‘Addison’s Cato in the Colonies,’ William and Mary Quarterly 23:3 (1966): 
431–449.
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A similar reading is expressed by Julie Ellison, who argues that Cato’s relation-
ship with the Numidian prince, Juba, is a testimony of republicanism’s ability 
to transcend race and geography.9 In his well-known study of Augustan drama, 
John Loftis refrains from taking sides and insists that the political meaning of 
Addison’s Cato ‘was and is still an enigma.’10
 Propaganda, War of the Spanish Succession and Peace of Utrecht
This paper attempts to expand Loftis’ view and offers an explanation of Cato’s 
enigmatic political message. To that end the play is read against the Treaty of 
Utrecht’s historical context as imperial peace propaganda that supports peace 
and denounces the pursuit of war. Addison reaches this end by championing 
Julius Caesar and undermining Cato Uticensis through moral and military 
aspects. The championing of Caesar’s stand is achieved through his physical 
absence from the dramatic scene, his character, and his pursuit of peace and 
a Roman empire. Cato, on the other hand, is undermined through his physi-
cal presence, character, the pursuit of war and a disintegrating Roman repub-
lic. Throughout this contrast, peace pointedly occupies most of the dramatic 
space while war remains in the background. This is achieved through allow-
ing the characters to occupy themselves with discussing the reasons behind 
the choice between embracing or rejecting Caesar’s peace. Within this con-
text, Addison carefully and explicitly embedded historical events related to 
the War of the Spanish Succession and the Treaty of Utrecht. One can trace a 
close connection between Queen Anne’s and Oxford’s tactics to procure peace 
and those of Caesar. The dramatization of Cato’s position in the war evokes a 
comparison with the French and the advocates of war. Through the contrast 
between Caesar and Cato, Addison invites the audience to recognize the differ-
ent stand of each persona, not only dramatically but, most importantly, histor-
ically. Historical Caesar as a glorious military figure was part of British history, 
as the first Roman to invade England. His vision of a Roman empire became 
a reality.11 By contrast, Cato lost his republican cause and gave way to Caesar’s 
9     Julie K. Ellison, ‘Cato’s Tears,’ ELH 63:3 (1996): 571–601.
10    John Loftis, Politics of Drama in Augustan England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 57.
11    Bill Yenne, Julius Caesar: Lessons in Leadership from the Great Conqueror (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 193; Philip Freeman, Julius Caesar (London: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 
243–342.
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victory and empire.12 Thus, Addison’s Cato argues that Caesar’s choice of peace 
over war proves to be an assured way to build an empire. By association, the 
British audience is encouraged to view the Treaty of Utrecht under a similar 
light and perceive it as a sign of power and a road map to building a British 
empire similar to that of the Romans.
Propaganda for the Peace of Utrecht and, by association, the Tory Ministry 
might seem odd under the light of Addison’s well-known Whig sympathises. 
However, it should be noted that it was not unusual for men of letters like him 
to change sides. During Anne’s era political propaganda rendered men of letters 
invaluable. Their writings became part of the power struggle between the rival 
parties, the Whigs and the Tories. The sharp division between the political par-
ties over war and the Peace of Utrecht made it necessary to enlist writers who 
could voice their policies most eloquently. In such heated contexts, it was nor-
mal practice for writers to change sides. Daniel Defoe (1660–1731) and Jonathan 
Swift (1667–1745) are good examples of such behaviour. Swift and Defoe were 
two of the most influential writers of the era who played important roles in the 
propaganda for the War of the Spanish Succession and the Peace of Utrecht. 
Both authors became notorious for changing their political affiliations. Defoe 
supported William III’s preparation for the War of the Spanish Succession. He 
continued his support for the war under Godolphin and his Whig Ministry only 
to change his mind and support the Peace of Utrecht under Oxford Ministry 
in 1710. He employed his periodical The Review (1704–1713) as his medium of 
showing his shifting loyalty.13 Dean Swift revealed similarly fickle affiliations. 
Before joining the Tories in 1710, Swift was employed by the Whig party as a 
propagandist. Oxford enlisted him as the editor of The Examiner to further 
the Tory’s peace agenda. In 1711, Swift published The Conduct of the Allies and 
of the Late Ministry in Beginning and Carrying on the Present War. It is a work of 
peace propaganda that attacks the Austrians, the Dutch, the Whig Junto and, 
above all, Marlborough, the war general. It proved to be extremely influential 
as it increased the public and parliamentary support for the Treaty of Utrecht. 
Soon after the war general Marlborough was dismissed from office.14
Like Defoe and Swift, Addison played an active part in this conflict of war 
and peace long before Cato. After the victory of Blenheim in 1704, the Whig Lord 
12    Rob Goodman and Jimmy Soni, Rome’s Last Citizen: the Life and Legacy of Cato, Mortal 
Enemy of Caesar (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2012), 243–269.
13    William Minto, Daniel Defoe: A Biography (London: Create Space, 2012).
14    Leo Damrosch, Jonathan Swift: His Life and His World (Yale: Yale University Press, 2013), 
164–252.
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Treasurer Godolphin approached Addison to write a commemorative poem. 
Addison composed The Campaign, a heroic celebration of the British victory. 
This celebration of victory was followed by The Present State of War, and the 
Necessity of an Augmentation, consider’d in 1707. The pamphlet was designed 
to oppose peace with France and promote the prolongation of the war. His 
propaganda for the Whigs gained him political offices and social prominence.15 
By the time Addison staged Cato in 1713, he was a popular man of letters, not 
only because of his political affiliation but also as a result of his writings in 
The Tatler and The Spectator.16 As a producer of political propaganda, Addison 
was well aware that his play would be conceived as a political weapon. Rob 
Goodman and Jimmy Soni shed light on the context of staging Cato.
Addison completed the draft under pressure from his well-connected 
friends, prominent liberal Whigs who needed fresh ammunition against 
their Tory opponents. They saw Addison’s unfinished play as a potentially 
valuable propaganda piece.17
It is true that Addison had Whig sympathies; however, he did not want to 
offend the Tories who were in power. He consented to the staging of Cato only 
after coaxing Pope who was a Tory to pen the play’s prologue and convinc-
ing the Tory government censor to sanction its release. This permission would 
not have been granted had the Tory Ministry believed the play to be an attack 
against their Peace of Utrecht, and thus it indicates that Addison must have 
reached an agreement with the Tories regarding the content of the play. Some 
critics argue that Addison did not ‘want to risk offending the Tories, who could 
squash his promising career.’18 In addition to such a reasonable assumption 
one can also conclude that Addison was deliberately supporting the Tories and 
their Peace of Utrecht. Through his friendship with Swift, who abandoned the 
Whigs and wrote The Conduct of the Allies, which supported Harley’s peace pro-
posal, Addison was closely connected to the peace advocates. When The Tatler 
ceased publication on 2 January 1711, John Gay explained that
15    Alexander Staff and Charles Knight, A Political Biography of Joseph Addison (London: 
Pickering and Chatto, 2014).
16    George Simpson Marr, The Periodical Essayists of the Eighteenth Century (London: James 
Clark, 1923), 21–63.
17    Goodman and Soni, Rome’s Last Citizen, 296.
18    Ibid.
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people were [. . .] driven to accept the alternative view that the Tatler was 
laid down ‘as a sort of submission to, or composition with, the Government 
for some past offences.’19
Soon The Tatler was replaced with The Spectator. In 1711, Addison argued in 
The Spectator against the partisan attitude that dominated the political scene:
For my own part, I could heartily wish that all honest Men would enter 
into an Association, for the Support of one another against the Endeavours 
of those whom they ought to look upon as their Common Enemies, what-
soever Side they may belong to . . . . In short, we should not any longer 
regard our Fellow Subjects as Whigs or Tories, but should make the Man 
of Merit our Friend, and the Villain our Enemy.20
By stating his opposition to partisan politics, Addison can be seen preparing 
the ground for supporting the Peace of Utrecht that the war-weary nation 
desired.
 The General and the Stoic: Caesar’s Friendship and Cato’s 
Alienation
To promote peace through championing Caesar, the Roman general, and 
undermining Cato, the illustrious stoic, is a challenging task. To balance the 
picture between a professional man of war and a stoic politician, Addison kept 
Caesar physically off the stage while Cato dominates its centre. To allow Caesar 
with his military might to be physically present, confronting the defeated stoic, 
could vividly revive the battles of Pharsalus (48 BC) and Thapsus (46 BC) in 
which Caesar defeated Cato and his Republican allies.21 In Addison’s particu-
lar dramatic context, this would be a risky option, threatening his ability to 
generate the needed sympathy for Caesar’s peace proposal and, by association, 
19    George A. Aitken, introduction to The Tatler, by Joseph Addison and Richard Steel 
(London: Duckworth, 1899), accessed April 28, 2014, http://www.gutenberg.org/
files/13645/13645-h/13645-h.htm#introduction.
20    Henry Morley, ed., The Spectator, 1:125 (London: George Routledge, 1891), accessed 
April 19, 2014, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/12030/12030-h/12030-h/SV1/Spectator1.
html#section125.
21    Adrian Goldsworthy, Caesar’s Civil War (Oxford: Osprey, 2001), 31–63; William Batstone 
and Cynthia Damon, Caesar’s Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 33–142.
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the Peace of Utrecht. As Caesar is meant to be Addison’s man of peace, bring-
ing his mighty military image onto the stage would undercut his intended role 
as a peacemaker. Such dramatic manipulation enables Addison to screen off 
Caesar’s military superiority and simultaneously empowers Cato. Furthermore, 
it creates a provisional balance of power between the two contenders. Having 
done that, Addison is in a safe position to mask his partiality towards Caesar.
The image Cato projects throughout the entire play has been summarized 
by one of his ardent supporters, his son Marcus. Talking to his brother Portius, 
he tells him that their father,
Pent up in Utica, he vainly forms-
A poor epitome of Roman greatness
And, covered with Numidian guards, directs
A feeble army and an empty senate,
Remnants of mighty battles fought in vain.
By heav’ns, such virtues joined with such success
Distract my very soul: our father’s fortune
Would almost tempt us to renounce his precepts22
(1.40–47)
The picture given by Cato’s dutiful son, though miserable, is tragically accu-
rate. There is nothing impressive about Cato’s political situation. His Senate is 
empty, his army is weak and his guards are not Roman but Numidian. Cato’s 
insistence on producing a poor imitation of Rome’s greatest achievements, a 
senate and an army, stresses his uninspiring situation. It also reflects, though 
implicitly, the unpopularity of his call. The greatness of Rome, which Cato 
promises to maintain, is nowhere to be traced around him. Marcus clarifies 
that the world that abandons his father ‘[. . .] courts the yoke and bows the 
neck to Caesar’ (1.39). Marcus’ words which meant to degrade Caesar, simply 
weaken his father’s position. While his father has few followers and a weak 
army, Caesar, on the other hand, is receiving the world’s homage. Under such 
circumstances, Marcus reaches the conclusion that his father’s misfortune is 
such that Marcus is tempted to abandon Cato’s side. He says, ‘. . . our father’s 
fortune/Would almost tempt us to renounce his precepts’ (1.46–47).
22    The edition used here is: Joseph Addison, Cato, in The Broadview Anthology of Restoration 
and Early Eighteenth Century Drama ed. J. Douglas Canfield (Broadview Press, 2005), 
186–216.
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This contrast between the two men sets the tone for the entire play. 
Significantly, the contrast, though implicit, is highly complex. When we exam-
ine the structure of the contrast between the two men’s characters, Caesar 
emerges as the one with the strong, favourable stand. Significantly, Caesar’s 
negative and positive traits have been portrayed by his enemies, a fact that 
gives him credibility. Cato and his two sons, Portius and Marcus, portray Caesar 
as a bloodthirsty man who spreads war and death. Cato gives Decius, Caesar’s 
messenger, a damning picture of his general:
[. . .] Alas, thy dazzled eye
Behold this man in a false light,
Which conquests and success have thrown upon him;
Didst thou view him right, thou’dst see him black
With murder, treason, sacrilege, and crimes. (II.161–165)
To Cato, Caesar’s light does not come from within but rather from his own 
actions. Once these actions are examined carefully, one can discover that 
victorious Caesar is nothing but a murderer.
Portius and Marcus’ picture of Caesar is identical to that of their father. 
Portius describes Caesar’s actions:
[. . .] Already Caesar
Has ravaged more than half the globe and sees
Mankind grown thin by his destructive sword. (I.6–8)
Marcus follows his father and brother in giving a similar description of Caesar. 
He tells his brother:
[. . .]—I see
Th’ insulting tyrant prancing o’er the field
Strowed with Rome’s citizens and drenched in Slaughter,
His horse’s hoofs wet with patrician blood. (I.18–22)
One cannot help but notice that Cato’s and his sons’ attacks are directed 
against Caesar’s military performance and achievements. According to the 
Roman moral code, such accusations would hardly undermine a victorious 
general such as Caesar.23 It is a well-known fact that military and political 
23    Dorance Stirchfield White, ‘The Attitude of the Romans toward Peace and War,’ 
The Classical Journal 31:8 (1936): 465–478.
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achievements were inextricably connected in ancient Rome.24 The four-
hundred-year-old Roman Republic of which Cato was one of its powerful 
senators was founded through the efforts of men such as Caesar who fought 
ambitiously bloody wars.25 Since Rome depended upon wars to extend its 
territories, it is no surprise that most of these wars were generally annihilat-
ing, especially towards formidable and challenging opponents.26 Cato himself 
was no stranger to Rome’s ruthless and relentless military campaigns. In 72 BC 
Cato volunteered to fight in the war against Spartacus. During Rome’s war with 
Macedon, Cato served on the frontline commanding a legion.27 In such a con-
text, Caesar is no different from Cato except that he is a victorious general. He 
managed to achieve what Rome mostly cherished: he extended its territories 
and displayed its military might.28
Indeed, not all of Caesar’s enemies perceive him negatively. The Roman 
Senators Lucius and Sempronius along with the Numidians’ General Syphax, 
although close allies to Cato, believe Caesar to be a man of unique qualities. 
Lucius believes Caesar to be merciful not only towards his friends but, most 
significantly, towards his enemies. He tells Cato, ‘Caesar has mercy, if we ask it 
of him’ (4.3. 129). Sempronius and Syphax decide to abandon Cato’s cause and 
join Caesar. Sempronius explains that Cato’s
[. . .] baffled arms and ruined cause
Are bars to my ambition. Caesar’s favor,
That show’rs down greatness on his friends, will raise me
To Rome’s first honors. (I.168–171)
In spite of the fact that Sempronius is practically Caesar’s enemy, he never-
theless credited him with generosity and loyalty to his friends. He seems cer-
tain that he can fulfil his dreams of greatness by allying himself with Caesar. 
Historically, Caesar was known for his clemency and generosity, not only 
towards his friends but most significantly towards his political opponents.29 
24    William Vernon Harris, War and Imperialism in Republic Rome, 327–70 BC (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985), 9–53.
25    Adrian Goldsworthy, In the Name of Rome: The Men who Won the Roman Empire (Phoenix: 
Phoenix Press, 2004).
26    Barry Strauss, The Spartacus War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010); see also Adrian 
Goldsworthy, The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars 265–146 BC (London: Cassell, 2007).
27    Goodman and Soni, Rome’s Last Citizen, 39–68.
28    Freeman, Julius Caesar, 328–342.
29    Ernle Bradford, Julius Caesar: the Pursuit of Power (New York: E-Reads, 2013), 11–12.
132 Al-Shayban
Thus, Sempronius’ hope for Caesar’s rewards is not mere speculation but a 
prize that can be achieved. Sempronius describes Caesar’s character not only 
in time of peace but in war as well. He gives Syphax a description of Caesar’s 
performance as a general:
Alas! Thou know’st not Caesar’s active soul,
With what dreadful course he rushes on
From war to war. In vain has nature formed
Mountains and oceans to oppose his passage;
He bound o’er all, victorious in his march.
The Alps and Pyreneans sink before him;
Through winds and waves and storms he works
His way, Impatient for the battle. (I.182–189)
Addison’s description of Caesar’s performance during his military campaigns 
is detailed, rather lengthy and, most importantly, historically accurate. Modern 
analysts paint a picture identical to the one detailed by Sempronius. Wesley 
Clark writes that
As a warrior, Caesar was extraordinarily competent [. . .]. He also had 
extraordinary endurance and stamina, campaigning without let-up for 
years, travelling on horseback, boat, and foot from Britain, Switzerland, 
Croatia, Italy, and back [. . .]. He was a master at the use of quick combat 
Engineering, in the form of earthworks, bridges, and boats [. . .]. Caesar 
was a master of war and politics.30
Fidelity to Caesar’s historical reputation and providing a lengthy and detailed 
description of his unique character as a military general through one of his 
enemies show that Addison is far from undermining him. In fact he is subtly 
and surely championing Caesar at the expense of Cato. Sempronius’ glowing 
account makes up for Caesar’s physical absence from the stage as it ensures 
the audience’s full awareness of his extraordinary talent as a leader and his loy-
alty as a friend. Through Sempronius’ portrayal, Caesar emerges as an embodi-
ment of the Roman virtus. Virtus is a Roman moral concept that highlights 
manliness by means of outstanding military achievements.31 Under this moral 
30    Wesley Clark, foreword to Julius Caesar: Lessons in Leadership from the Great Conqueror, 
by Bill Yenne (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), vii–ix.
31    Myles McDonell, Roman Manliness: ‘Virtus’ and the Roman Republic (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 12–71, 107–141, 300–319.
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system it is the duty of a Roman to serve the public interest of Rome through 
politics and military victories. As a result, conquests and expansions became 
part of the collective duty of Roman society.32 The fact that Cato fails to rec-
ognize and appreciate Caesar’s virtus calls into question his stoic moral values 
and consequently his ability to offer an objective moral judgement.
In contrast to Caesar’s engaging image, Addison furnishes Cato with an 
unflattering persona. This is done by undermining the most important com-
ponent of Cato’s character, his stoic moral values, and by providing him with 
the partial praises of his supporters.33 Cato’s stoic values are undercut by the 
Numidian general Syphax. Syphax, whose army is supposed to fight on Cato’s 
side, denies Cato any special moral merits. He questions the morality of the 
famous Roman stoic ideal of self-control. He asks Juba, the Prince of Numidia:
What are these wondrous civilizing arts,
This Roman polish, and this smooth behavior,
Are they not only to disguise our passions,
In short, to change us into other creatures
Than what our nature and the gods designed us?
(I.275–6,279,282–3)
To the African Syphax, stoic self-control is nothing but moral hypocrisy as it 
disguises one’s real feelings. Furthermore, it is a break from genuine and free 
human nature. In response to the hardships that mark Cato’s diet and lifestyle, 
Syphax tells his Prince:
Believe me, Prince, there’s not an African
that traverse our vast Numidian deserts
But better practices these boasted virtues.
(I.294–295,297)
Syphax insists that the simple and rough life of of the vaunted Cato is but the 
normal practice of ordinary Africans. After denying Cato any unique virtues, 
Syphax argues that his stoic teachings are neither popular nor inspiring. He 
informs Sempronius that the Numidians who are fighting with Cato are
32    Harris, War and Imperialism, 9–53.
33    Rex Stem, ‘The First Eloquent Stoic: Cicero on Cato the Younger,’ Classical Journal 101:1 
(2005): 37–49; Goodman and Soni, Rome’s Last Citizen, 36–39; see also Brad Inwood, 
The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
233–256.
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[. . .] ripe for a revolt. They all
complain aloud of Cato’s discipline
and wait but the command to change their masters.
(I.176–178)
The Numidian soldiers who are used to tough fighting conditions find it dif-
ficult to cope with Cato’s style. As a result they are eager to change sides and 
join Caesar because Cato is not an inspiring leader who can procure loyalty 
from his followers. According to Syphax, Cato is not only uninspiring, but he 
also lacks the human touch. Prince Juba describes Cato’s endurance, declar-
ing: ‘How does he rise against a load of woes / And thank the gods that throw 
the weight upon him!’ (I.316–317) In response, Syphax expresses his opinion of 
Cato’s behaviour: ‘Tis pride, rank pride, and haughtiness of soul: / I think the 
Romans call it stoicism.’ (I.318–319) Cato’s failure to display human sentiments 
can best be perceived through his passive response to his son’s death. Cato has 
been informed that his son Marcus
[. . .] stood the shock of a whole host of foes.
Till, obstinately brave and bent on death,
Oppressed with multitudes, he greatly fell. (IV.3.71–73)
To such news, Cato responds, ‘I’m satisfied’ (IV.3.74). When presented with the 
body, he not only remains unmoved but celebrates the sight of his dead son’s 
fatal wounds:
Welcome, my son! Here lay him down,. . .
Full in my sight, that I may view at leisure
The bloody course and count those glorious wounds
(IV.3.87–89)
Cato’s failure to reveal any signs of emotion or grief over his son’s death is dif-
ficult to comprehend. Most significantly, it gives credibility to Syphax’s judge-
ment that Cato lacks human compassion. In the context of war over the fate 
of Rome, Cato’s stoicism is hardly relevant. It shapes him as a private individ-
ual but not as a public figure. One notices that stoicism, which is Cato’s most 
valued quality, is also the factor that alienates him from those around. As a 
result, his moral system remains tragically individualistic, which explains 
Cato’s constant misfortunes and failures to affect the course of events around 
him. On the other hand, Caesar, who is not a stoic, has the moral power to 
persuade others to help him achieve his vision. Caesar does not appear as 
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an isolated individual like Cato but rather as a mobile and attractive force. 
Comparing the two men makes Addison’s message clear. Rome’s salvation does 
not require a man like Cato who fails to inspire those around him into action. 
Rome needs a Caesar who is both accessible and at the same time inspiring. 
It should be noted that Addison had constructed a moral contrast between 
Caesar and Cato before staging the play. In The Spectator, Addison wrote:
In [the] . . . Passage of Salust, where Cæsar and Cato are placed in such 
beautiful, but opposite Lights; Cæsar’s Character is chiefly made up of 
Good-nature, as it shewed itself in all its Forms towards his Friends or his 
Enemies, his Servants or Dependants, the Guilty or the Distressed. As for 
Cato’s Character, it is rather awful than amiable. Justice seems most 
agreeable to the Nature of God, and Mercy to that of Man.34
Addison renders Caesar as a most agreeable man. The same thing cannot be 
said about Cato whom Addison finds far from amiable. Publishing such an 
opinion in the widely read and popular Spectator shows that Addison’s cham-
pioning of Caesar is a genuine conviction. It is highly likely that those readers 
who follow him closely will be affected by his support of Caesar and condem-
nation of Cato. In the context of Cato and the controversy surrounding the 
Peace of Utrecht, the audience would find themselves more sympathetic with 
Caesar’s call for peace.
To further cast shadow on Cato’s character Addison allows him to be the 
subject of partial praise. Cato is praised by his son Portius and his protégée, 
the young Prince Juba of Numidia. Cato here stands in sharp contrast to Caesar, 
who has been generously praised by his opponents. Portius pays compassion-
ate homage to his father.
How does the luster of our father’s actions,
Through the dark clouds of ills that cover him,
Break out and burn with more triumphant brightness! (I. 28–31)
The homage that is paid by a devoted and loving son does not help Cato 
on the moral and political fronts. The compassionate words give contrast-
ing images between his father’s actual defeat and metaphorical triumph, 
which in turn highlights Cato’s weak position and produces an unfavourable 
34    Morley, The Spectator, 1:169, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/12030/12030-h/12030-h/SV1/
Spectator1.html#section169, accessed 14 April 2014.
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contrast between him and Caesar. Juba, in his turn, praises Cato with undeni-
able enthusiasm. He wonders
Where shall we find the man that bears affliction,
Great and majestic in his griefs, like Cato?
Heav’ns, with what strength, what steadiness of mind
He triumphs in the midst of all his sufferings! (I.312–315)
Juba is as impressed with Cato’s stand in the face of his misfortunes as is his 
son Portius. The way Juba describes Cato stresses his sentimental attachment 
to Cato. To the young inexperienced Prince, Cato is a father figure. His father 
King Juba, who was Cato’s friend and ally, died fighting on his side against 
Caesar. Furthermore, Cato is the father of his love, Marcia. Such sentimental 
attachment colours Juba’s favourable attitude towards Cato by impugning his 
impartiality.
 Utrecht and the Empire: Caesar’s Peace and Cato’s War
In a further step to champion Caesar and undermine Cato, Addison contrasts 
their attitudes towards war and peace. He allows the victorious Caesar to pur-
sue peace while the defeated Cato seeks war. To understand the significance 
of Addison’s manipulation of war and peace we need to consider the mili-
tary context of the conflict between Caesar and Cato. The events are taking 
place immediately after Caesar’s decisive victory at Pharsalus and Thapsus. 
With such decisive victories Caesar does not need to court the defeated and 
weak Cato to accept his peace proposal. However, Caesar displays unrelenting 
determination to procure peace in the face of Cato’s adamant rejection. By 
1710, England was in a position similar to that of Caesar. Like Caesar England’s 
forces had achieved decisive victories in several battles. They won Blenheim 
in 1704, Ramillies in 1705, Oudenaarde in 1708 and Malplaquet in 1709.35 In 
spite of England’s advantageous military position, the Queen and her minis-
ter Oxford were determined to achieve peace and sign the Treaty of Utrecht. 
Before Caesar’s peace proposal is revealed, Addison stresses that peace is the 
sacred demand of the gods. Cato’s friend and ally, Lucius, urges the Senate to 
accept peace. He informs them:
35    Gregg, Queen Anne, 186–289.
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My thoughts, I must confess, are turned on peace.
Already have our quarrels filled the world
With widows and with orphans: Scythia mourns
Our guilty wars, and earth’s remotest regions
Lie half unpopulated by the feuds of Rome.
‘Tis time to sheathe the sword and spare mankind.
It is not Caesar but the gods, my fathers,
The gods declare against us and repel
Our vain attempts.
Now let us show submission to the gods.
(II.56–56–46,69)
Lucius declares that Caesar’s victories and peace proposal are the designs 
of the gods. Addison is in effect claiming Caesar to be a sacred entity favoured 
by the gods. He is the instrument of the gods who executes their victorious wars 
and procures their wishes for peace. Thus, peace becomes a sacred mission 
that has to be embraced and accomplished. To Queen Anne peace was a sacred 
wish as well. Edward Gregg argues that ‘the queen’s anxiety to procure peace 
had a harmful effect on her health.’36 In a manner similar to Lucius, the Queen 
and her government urged the parliament to accept peace. She was concerned 
to the point of warning Oxford, ‘we cannot part with one vote out of house of 
Lords.’37 One can notice that Lucius’ arguments to Cato’s Senate, criticizing the 
warring factions, echo Swift’s position in The Conduct of the Allies in which he 
takes to task all parties involved in the war and calls for an end to the shedding 
of blood and wasting of treasure. Caesar’s desire to stop the war and establish 
peace motivates him to take calculated steps to ensure the success of his pro-
posal. This is apparent through his choice of Decius as his peace messenger to 
Cato. The man Caesar has chosen to be his messenger was Cato’s friend. Cato 
confirms their past friendship to the Senate: ‘Decius was once my friend, but 
other prospects / Have loosed those ties and bound him fast to Caesar’ (I.108–
109) The fact that Caesar has chosen one of Cato’s former friends to be his mes-
senger indicates that he has a strong desire to influence Cato and secure peace. 
Decius reminds Cato of their friendship and reveals his current mission: ‘[. . .] 
I have orders to expostulate / And reason with you, as from friend to friend: [. . .]’ 
36    Ibid., 343.
37    Queen Anne to 1st Earl of Oxford, Robert Harley, 9 November 1711, Historical Manuscripts 
Commission [UK-Bath 1711] Ms 1: 215–16. The letter is also quoted in Gregg, Queen 
Anne, 344.
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(I.127–128) The arrival of the messenger and the confirmation of his mission 
to negotiate peace remind Addison’s audience of the British negotiation of 
Peace of Utrecht with Louis XIV in Paris. The Tory Ministry posed as the friend 
of the French. They conducted exclusive secret negotiations with the French 
based on a balanced view of the interests of both countries.38 The negotiations 
Decius starts with Cato are exclusive as well. Cato’s other generals and partners 
are excluded. As a show of good will, Decius starts by declaring:
My business is with Cato: Caesar sees
The straits to which you’re driven and, as he knows
Cato’s high worth, is anxious for his life. (II.1. 115–117)
Decius reminds Cato of his unpromising position as a result of his military 
defeats. He also stresses Caesar’s appreciation of Cato’s character and concern 
for his physical safety. When the Tory government was negotiating peace with 
Louis XIV in 1710, France like Cato was on the brink of ruin. The French had 
suffered costly defeats in several battles. By 1709 the allied armies under the 
leadership of Marlborough were ‘in the best position ever for an invasion of 
France.’39 Like Caesar, who was desperate of save Cato’s life, Oxford wanted to 
prevent the utter destruction of his enemies. Oxford’s attitude was motivated 
by his desire to save the Treaty of Utrecht. Such a tactic would secure ‘the sepa-
rate and exclusive advantages on which the secret Anglo-French negotiations 
were based.’40 To persuade Cato to choose peace, Decius reminds Cato that 
Caesar is the victor and that
Rome and her Senators submit to Caesar;
Her Gen’rals and her consuls are no more,
Who checked his conquests and denied his triumphs.
(II.1. 122–124)
Politically and militarily, Caesar is in an unchallenged position. The Roman 
Senate supports him. His military and political opponents have lost their 
power. When the play was staged, Britain was in an identical situation. To elim-
inate any obstacles and secure the Peace of Utrecht, Queen Anne had taken 
major steps. She created twelve peers in the House of Lord and dismissed her 
war general, Marlborough, who rejected a royal request to support the peace 
38    Gregg, Queen Anne, 335.
39    Ibid., 343.
40    Ibid., 356.
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proposal.41 Anne and her government were thus in unchallenged position just 
as Caesar was.
In response to Caesar’s keen calls for peace, Cato is courting war. Before the 
arrival of Caesar’s messenger, Cato expresses his determination to go to war. He 
informs the Senate of his opinion regarding their current situation:
Fathers, I cannot see that our affairs
Are grown thus desp’rate. We have bulwarks round us;
within our walls are troops inured to toil
In Africk’s heats and seasoned to the sun;
Numidia’s spacious kingdom lies behind us,
Ready to rise at its young prince call. (I.85–90)
It is of note that Cato is defending Rome with the aid not of a Roman army 
but of Numidian forces. This means that these forces may not be committed 
to Cato’s cause. Indeed they have proven their lack of enthusiasm and loyalty 
through abandoning him and killing his son Marcus. Being a Roman is of high 
importance as characters struggle to prove their moral and military worth. 
Cato displays moral hypocrisy through using Africans in his war for Rome 
while stressing their inferiority to his position as a Roman senator. Dying, he 
tells his daughter, Marcia
[. . .] Juba loves thee, Marcia
A senator of Rome, while Rome survived,
Would not have matched his daughter with a king,
But Caesar’s arms have thrown all distinctions: [. . .] (V.1.190–194)
He makes it clear that his loyal ally Prince Juba, whose father sacrificed his life 
and army for Cato, is not fit to marry his daughter. However, necessity makes 
the marriage possible. Such an attitude weakens Cato’s moral position and 
undercuts his loud voice against oppression and tyranny.
The same lack of good will is present when Cato meets Decius, Caesar’s mes-
senger. He rejects Caesar’s concern for his life and responds to Decius’s entreat-
ies: ‘Tell your dictator this, and tell him Cato / Disdains a life which he has 
pow’r to offer.’ (II. 120–121) Furthermore, he refuses the offer of Caesar’s friend-
ship as he insists that ‘His cares for me are insolent and vain. / Presumptuous 
man! The gods take care of Cato.’ (II. 173–174) As Cato is inclined towards war, 
41    Ibid., 345–350.
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he asks for a high price in return for peace. Decius asks Cato, ‘[. . .] name your 
terms’. To such a generous offer, Cato responds:
Bid him disband his legions,
Restore the commonwealth to liberty,
Submit his actions to the public censure,
And stand the judgment of the Roman senate. (II.141–144)
Cato is fully aware that Caesar will not submit to his terms. Such demands can 
be read as an indirect way of rejecting peace and choosing war. To prevent Cato 
from enjoying any heroic stand against the victorious Caesar, Addison allows 
Cato’s friends, Decius and Lucius, to criticize his refusal to forge peace. Decius 
expresses his deep sorrow:
When I relate hereafter
The tale of this unhappy embassy,
All Rome will be in tears. (II.181–183)
These lines, though they are about Cato, are designed to promote Caesar’s 
cause and his peace proposal. Rome will be in tears as Cato rejects Caesar’s 
peace proposal and seeks war. This means that though Rome cares for Cato, it 
values peace above all else. Lucius, one of Cato’s most loyal friends, once again 
confirms his preference for peace. After Cato’s rejection of Caesar’s embassy, 
Lucius stresses that peace is one of the options a Roman patriot can choose 
in the service of Rome. Lucius answers Sempronius, who desires to die while 
defending Rome, by stating,
[. . .] Others perhaps
May serve their country with as warm a zeal,
Though ‘tis not kindled into so much rage. (II.1.202–4)
These lines can be read as a defence of those who favour peace and reject war 
against any treasonable accusations. For his role in bringing about the Peace of 
Utrecht, Oxford was accused of treason. He was suspected of championing the 
Jacobites and their desire to restore the Pretender, the queen’s Catholic half-
brother. Marlborough was one of Oxford’s enemies who warned the Queen 
against Oxford and his peace proposal. Indeed the Peace of Utrecht’s terms 
proved those involved to be patriots who did their best to serve the British 
interests. Louis XIV expelled the Pretender from France, recognized Anne as 
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the legitimate queen of England and accepted the Protestant succession. The 
British were allowed to retain Gibraltar and Port Mahon, thus becoming 
the dominant naval power in the Mediterranean. They were also given the 
monopoly of the Spanish slave trade for thirty years. As a result of Utrecht, 
Britain not only became a major power but most importantly started on the 
road to becoming an empire.
Cato and Caesar’s conflicting roles regarding peace and war are firmly 
connected to their dramatic personae and historical legacies. This firm con-
nection is of significance to Addison’s period, which was dominated by the 
War of the Spanish Succession and the Treaty of Utrecht that ended the war. 
Dramatically, Caesar emerges as an ideal man not only of war but most sig-
nificantly of peace. His determination to procure peace in spite of his military 
superiority shows him to be a man of strategic vision. War, on the other hand, 
is dramatized as the tragic choice of his opponents. Cato, who promotes war 
and opposes Caesar’s calls for peace, is defeated on both military and moral 
levels. Cato lost his life and republic. Caesar, on the other hand, lived to play 
a crucial role in turning the Roman Republic into an empire that ruled the 
world for more than eight hundred years. Caesar was the first Roman general 
to invade Britain, which became a Roman territory for four hundred years. As 
a result, the English can identify themselves with victorious Caesar and the 
Roman Empire. They have a Roman heritage that can motivate them to build 
an empire like that of the Romans. Queen Anne, who desired very much to end 
the War of the Spanish Succession, can be viewed as a Caesar in her choice to 
sign the Peace of Utrecht Treaty in the face of fierce opposition from the Whig 
party. It is the terms of the Peace of Utrecht and not war that enabled Britain 
to start on the road towards an empire similar to that of the Romans. In the 
dramatic and historical contexts, Caesar and not Cato proved to be the man of 
the moment.
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CHAPTER 8
Jonathan Swift’s Peace of Utrecht
Clare Jackson
In January 1713, Jonathan Swift wrote to Archbishop William King of Dublin 
from London, acknowledging that ‘Some Accidents and Occasions have put 
it in my Way to know every step of this Treaty better, I think, than any Man 
in England.’1 Swift was referring to negotiations, under way since January 
1712, which produced the Treaty of Utrecht in April 1713. The following year, 
Swift petitioned Queen Anne to warn her that, since proceedings ‘in relation 
to the peace and treaties’ were, however, ‘capable of being very maliciously 
represented to posterity,’ he hoped that she might appoint him to the post 
of Historiographer-Royal and thereby enable him to ensure ‘that the truth 
of things may be transmitted to future ages, and bear down the falsehood of 
 malicious pens.’2
As the essays in this volume vividly illustrate, international diplomacy had 
started to attract unprecedented levels of public interest by the early eigh-
teenth century. As Swift acknowledged to King, in another letter of March 1713, 
it was indeed ‘a very new Thing among us,’ to have ‘every Subject interposing 
their Sentiments upon the Management of foreign Negotiations.’3 Moreover, 
Swift’s magniloquent claim to possess unparalleled knowledge of the politi-
cal manoeuvring that underpinned the Treaty of Utrecht was asserted in his 
capacity as a polemical propagandist who remained in London whilst the dip-
lomatic negotiations took place abroad. Accordingly, this essay examines the 
ways in which Swift sought to promote public acceptance of the controversial 
decision of Robert Harley’s Tory government to sue for peace against Britain’s 
traditional enemy, France, and end the War of the Spanish Succession. In doing 
so, it emphasizes the phenomenal influence of Swift’s polemical pamphlet, 
The Conduct of the Allies (1711), whilst also exploring arguments advanced in 
his lesser-known History of the Four Last Years of the Queen, which he wrote 
between September 1712 and May 1713, though the History remained unpub-
lished at the time of Swift’s death in 1745. The manuscript was acclaimed, 
1    The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift, ed. Harold Williams (Oxford: Blackwell, 1963–1965), 1: 328.
2    ‘A Copy of Dr. Swift’s Memorial to the Queen. April 15, 1714,’ in Jonathan Swift, Political Tracts, 
1713–1719 ed. Herbert Davis and Irvin Ehrenpreis (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), 200.
3    Correspondence, ed. Williams, 1: 339.
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 however, by his friend, John Boyle, earl of Orrery, in 1752 as ‘the clearest account 
of the treaty of Utrecht, that has hitherto been written’ and, six years later, 
Swift’s History was published for the first time.4 Whilst The Conduct of the Allies 
sought to vindicate the Tory ministry’s actions and enjoyed sensational com-
mercial success and polemical purchase, Swift’s attempt to supply an ostensi-
bly objective account of the treaty negotiations in his History quickly became 
an awkward and anachronistic liability for the Tory ministers that had insti-
gated peace negotiations.5 For his part, Swift’s keen interest in writing about 
the Peace of Utrecht became inextricably related to his hopes for personal and 
professional preferment that were ultimately frustrated when Swift reluctantly 
left London for Dublin as the newly-appointed Dean of St Patrick’s Cathedral 
in June 1713 and failed to secure appointment as Historiographer-Royal the 
following year.
 Swift’s Case for Making Peace
On 27 November 1711, Swift’s tract entitled The Conduct of the Allies, and of 
the late Ministry in beginning and carrying on the Present War was published 
anonymously and sold prodigiously. Within two days, a second edition was 
printed but sold out within five hours, and, appearing in six editions, more 
than 11,000 copies had been sold by the end of January 1712.6 The day after its 
first publication, Swift related in his Journal to Stella that various people had 
‘advised me to read it, for it was something very extraordinary’ and, two days 
later, gratifyingly confirmed that ‘the pamphlet makes a world of noise, and 
4    John Boyle, Remarks on the Life and Writings of Dr. Jonathan Swift, by John, Earl of Orrery 
(Dublin: Dean of St. Patrick’s, 1752), 327.
5    Extant scholarship has hitherto largely focused on Swift’s phenomenally successful The 
Conduct of the Allies. See particularly, J.A. Downie, ‘The Conduct of the Allies: the question 
of influence,’ in The Art of Jonathan Swift, ed. Clive T. Probyn (London: Vision, 1978), 108–28; 
J.A. Downie, Robert Harley and the press: propaganda and public opinion in the age of Swift 
and Defoe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); J.A. Downie, ‘Polemical strategy 
and Swift’s The Conduct of the Allies,’ Prose Studies 4 (1981), 134–145 and J.A. Downie, ‘Public 
opinion and the political pamphlet,’ in The Cambridge History of English Literature, 1660–
1780, ed. John J. Richetti (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 549–571. Interest 
in The History of the Four Last Years of the Queen has hitherto been largely bibliographical; 
see,  particularly, Harold Williams, ‘Jonathan Swift and The Four Last Years of the Queen,’ The 
Library 16 (1935–6), 60–90 and 343–346 and George P. Mayhew, ‘Swift’s Notes for his The 
History of the Four Last Years, Book IV,’ Huntington Library Quarterly 24 (1961), 311–322.
6    Downie, ‘The Conduct of the Allies: the question of influence,’ 113.
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will do a great deal of good.’7 For Swift was keenly aware that arguments for 
peace would require detailed vindication from those domestic and foreign 
detractors keen to denounce ‘Perfidious Albion’ for initiating peace negotia-
tions with Louis XIV’s France without the knowledge and agreement of the 
Dutch, Austrians and other Allies, thereby contravening the eighth article 
of the Grand Alliance of 1701, which had stipulated that any peace must be 
agreed by all parties involved in hostilities. Indeed, less than a month before 
The Conduct of the Allies was published, Swift had indicated to Stella his inten-
tion to ‘open the eyes of the nation, who are half bewitched against a Peace.’8
Written in trenchantly sparkling prose, Swift sought to disenchant his 
readers by presenting ‘plain Matters of Fact’ to demonstrate that ‘No Nation 
was ever so long or so scandalously abused by the Folly, the Temerity, the 
Corruption [and] the Ambition of its domestick Enemies; or treated with so 
much Insolence, Injustice and Ingratitude by its foreign Friends.’9 Hence the 
tract’s very title—The Conduct of the Allies and of the late Ministry—confirmed 
the dual extent to which Dutch bellicosity and Whig war-mongering were to 
be blamed for unnecessarily prolonging hostilities. Whereas the War’s origi-
nal aim had been to reduce France’s exorbitant power, by 1711, this had been 
achieved. Accordingly, Swift found it difficult to credit that ‘After Ten Years 
War, with perpetual Success, to tell us it is yet impossible to have a good Peace, 
is very surprising, and seems so different from what hath ever hap[pe]ned 
in the World before.’10 Against a vociferous lobby that refused to counte-
nance peace until Louis XIV’s grandson, Philip of Anjou, had been removed as 
Spanish king, Swift insisted that this demand was ‘a new Incident, grafted upon 
the Original Quarrel.’11 Brilliant victories that far exceeded anything that the 
War’s original instigators had envisaged had been won, but it was nevertheless 
alleged that peace was unthinkable. As Swift rued, ‘Ten glorious Campaigns 
are passed, and now at last, like the sick Man [in Aesop’s fable], we are just 
expiring with all sorts of good Symptoms.’12 Moreover, when the Habsburg 
7     Jonathan Swift, Journal to Stella. Letters to Esther Johson and Rebecca Dingley, 1710–1713, ed. 
Abigail Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 332–333.
8     Swift, Journal to Stella, 311.
9     Jonathan Swift, ‘The Conduct of the Allies,’ in English Political Writings, 1711–1714, ed. 
Bernard A. Goldgar and Ian Gadd (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 57.
10    Swift, ‘Conduct,’ Preface: 48.
11    Swift, ‘Conduct,’ 88. In this context, the publication timing of The Conduct of the Allies 
reflected the imminent reopening of Parliament on 7 December 1711, when a motion 
moved that day by Daniel Finch, Earl of Nottingham, demanding ‘No peace without 
Spain’ passed the House of Lords by a narrow majority.
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Emperor, Joseph I, died in April 1711, Swift had privately predicted to Stella that 
his death would ‘cause great alterations in Europe’ and ‘would hasten a Peace.’13 
By the time The Conduct of the Allies was published, therefore, the accession 
as Habsburg Emperor of the Allies’ preferred contender to the Spanish throne, 
Charles VI, had seriously undermined the case of those who continued to 
insist that Philip of Anjou be removed as Spanish king. As Julian Hoppit has 
succinctly put it, ‘many wondered, was a Habsburg leviathan preferable to a 
Bourbon behemoth?’14
For his part, Swift deemed it ‘a very obvious Question to ask, by what 
Motives, or what Management, we are thus become the Dupes and Bubbles 
of Europe?’15 In terms of domestic party politics, his answer was unequivocal: 
‘whether this War were prudently begun or not, it is plain, that the true Spring 
and Motive of it, was the aggrandizing a particular Family [i.e. the Churchills], 
and in short, a War of the General [Marlborough] and the Ministry [the 
Whigs], and not of the Prince or People.’16 Appealing to a provincial patri-
otism easily taken for granted, Swift lamented that it was ‘the Folly of too 
many, to mistake the Eccho of a London Coffee-house for the Voice of the 
Kingdom.’17 City coffee-houses were filled with ‘new men’ whose personal for-
tunes depended on stocks, shares and annuities generated by new systems 
of public credit and the vast sums of government expenditure demanded by 
continuous warfare. Accordingly, Swift alleged that Marlborough and his sup-
porters had formed an insidious alliance with men whose ‘perpetual Harvest 
is War’ and a ‘Solemn League and Covenant’ with ambitious Whigs seeking a 
return to office on any terms.18 There was, indeed, ‘a Conspiracy on all Sides 
to go on with these Measures, which must perpetuate the War.’19 In this way, 
Swift insisted that the War had become a duplicitous scandal, mutating from 
a patriotic struggle against a puissant foreign tyrant who aspired to universal 
monarchy to a shabbily avaricious opportunity for a minority of monied men 
to pursue personal enrichment at the nation’s expense whilst one individual, 
Marlborough, aspired to perpetual power. As Swift narrated, ‘by these Steps, 
a G[enera]l during Pleasure, might have grown into a G[enera]l for Life, and 
13    Swift, Journal to Stella, 188.
14    Julian Hoppit, A Land of Liberty? England, 1689–1727 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 121.
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16    Swift, ‘Conduct,’ 83.
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a G[enera]l for Life into a King.’20 The pitiable victims of this unscrupulous 
Whig conspiracy were not only the hundreds and thousands of British sol-
diers dying and suffering in combat but also the British people, subjected to 
unprecedented fiscal extortion and trade disruption. Burdened by unman-
ageable levels of inherited debt, Swift sarcastically predicted it would be ‘a 
mighty comfort to our Grandchildren,’ to view the colours and standards cap-
tured at the battle of Blenheim as ‘a few Rags hang up at Westminster-Hall,’ 
whilst ‘boasting, as Beggars do, that their Grandfathers were Rich and Great.’21 
Thus Swift’s Conduct of the Allies cleverly converted what had formerly been 
a covert and controversial case for peace into a seemingly incontrovertible 
rationale.
Chronologically, Swift identified the failed peace negotiations at The Hague 
in 1709 as confirmation of the Whig-Dutch conspiracy against peace. Despite 
having already obtained substantial concessions from Louis XIV—including 
the surrender of Newfoundland, dismantling the defences at Dunkirk, with-
drawing French troops from Spain and the abandonment of most French con-
quests on France’s eastern frontier—Louis had refused to accede to the Allies’ 
further insistence that he supply military assistance to ensure the removal 
of his grandson, Anjou, from the Spanish throne within two months, or else 
face renewed war. In his History, Swift later claimed not only that the Allies 
‘knew very well, that the Enemy would never consent to this’ but also that—as 
he put it in The Conduct of the Allies—serious doubt attached to the Whigs’ 
protestation that there could be ‘no security for the island of Britain, unless a 
king of Spain be dethroned by the hands of his grandfather.’22 Following the 
collapse of peace negotiations at The Hague, Swift recounted in his History 
how Louis XIV’s foreign minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Torcy, 
had immediately published the Allies’ peace proposals on Louis’s behalf ‘as 
an Appeal to his Subjects against the Unreasonableness and Injustice of his 
Enemies,’ which secured the desired result: patriotic outrage and an instant 
re-dedication of the French nation to Louis’s service.23 As Swift observed, the 
French king was ‘not so sunk in his Affairs, as we have imagined, and have long 
flattered Our selves with the Hopes of ’—partly because, as Swift lamented, 
‘an absolute Government may endure a long War’ in ways that usually proved 
20    Swift, ‘Conduct,’ 87.
21    Swift, ‘Conduct,’ 97.
22    Jonathan Swift, The History of the Four Last Years of the Queen, Herbert Davis (Oxford: 
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‘ruinous to Free Countries.’24 When renewed peace negotiations convened at 
Geertruidenberg in March 1710 also collapsed, Swift insisted that the failure to 
end the War was wholly due to ‘the Allies insisting upon such Demands as they 
neither expected nor perhaps desired should be granted.’25
As it happened, Swift himself had arrived in London from Ireland, in 
September 1710, ostensibly anticipating a short visit, primarily aimed at lob-
bying the Westminster government for remission of government taxes, known 
as the ‘First Fruits,’ that were levied on the Church of Ireland. His arrival in 
London had thus coincided with the partisan backlash provoked by the Whig 
administration’s decision to impeach the High Church Tory preacher, Henry 
Sacheverell, in March 1710 for the provocative political content of a recent 
sermon entitled The Perils of False Brethren (1709). Despite being convicted of 
high crimes and misdemeanours, Sacheverell received a light sentence, depriv-
ing him of the right to preach for three years, and his popularity was confirmed 
in a subsequent progress around provincial England. In October 1710, the 
Tories swept to a landslide election victory, catalysing the potential to envisage 
liquidation of the War. Keen to promote the prevalent momentum for peace, 
it was Robert Harley and a former Secretary at War, Henry St. John who, as 
A.D. MacLachlan observed, ‘more than most perhaps . . . grasped the grotesque 
paradox of a war that could not be won because it was already won.’26 In this 
context, an anonymous Whig pamphlet entitled The French King’s Reasons 
(1710) ventriloquized Louis XIV’s vicarious delight in the Whig mismanage-
ment of Sacheverell’s trial and the subsequent revitalization of Tory fortunes. 
As the French monarch purported to observe, his subjects ‘easily saw that 
their Case was not desperate, and that their Neighbours, while their Armies 
were assaulting me in my own Territories, were doing my Business at Home.’27 
Accordingly, as Swift later narrated in his History, it was Louis himself, through 
Torcy, who approached Britain in April 1711, with formal overtures aimed at 
‘settling the Tranquillity of Europe upon a solid Foundation.’28 Two months 
later, the English diplomat, Matthew Prior, had been received at Versailles 
‘with great civilities’ and immediately reassured by Louis of his principled 
24    Swift, ‘Conduct,’ 102.
25    Swift, History of the Four Last Years, 35.
26    A.D. MacLachlan, ‘The road to peace, 1710–1713,’ in Britain after the Glorious Revolution, 
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opposition to any potential union of the French and Spanish crowns, ‘being 
persuaded that such an excess of Power’ was indeed ‘contrary to the general 
Good and Repose of Europe.’29 Hence Swift accounted it ‘almost a Miracle’ that 
the Bourbon dynasty had not, in fact, become ‘the universal Monarchy by right 
of Inheritance’ and denounced ‘the unaccountable Stupidity of the Princes of 
Europe’ in having tolerated France observing the restrictions of Salic Law with 
respect to its own monarchy, whilst simultaneously supplying foreign dynas-
ties with female marriage partners whose initial renunciations of claims to 
royal titles could later be silently revoked.30
Indeed, an uninformed reader of Swift’s entries for 1711, in his Journal to 
Stella, might have assumed that Britain was at war with the Dutch, rather than 
the French. On 28 September, for example, Swift related a convivial supper 
he had enjoyed until 1 a.m. that morning, in the company of St. John, Prior 
and two secret French envoys, Mons. Mesnager, and the Abbé du Bois, as 
well as the British-based Abbé Gaultier, who had previously acted an interme-
diary between the French and British courts. Aware that preliminary articles 
of peace had been signed the day before, Swift confided to Stella that ‘We have 
already settled all things with France,’ although ‘this news is a mighty secret.’ 
Confirming that Thomas Wentworth, earl of Strafford, was to be dispatched to 
Holland to ‘let them know what we have been doing,’ Swift acknowledged that 
‘then there will be the devil and all to pay, but we’ll make them [the Dutch] 
swallow it with a pox.’31 As Swift later confirmed in his History, when Strafford 
arrived at the States-General that December, he was ‘instructed to be very dry 
and reserved’ towards the Dutch ministers and to remind his hosts that, with 
the new Tory hue of Queen Anne’s ministry, ‘Britain proceeded in some respects 
upon a New Scheme of Politicks, would no longer struggle for Impossibilities, 
nor be amused by Words’ and that ‘our People come every day more and more 
to their Senses.’32 No longer would ‘the strain of lower Politicks’ practised by 
all Dutch statesmen be endured, whilst Swift also vituperatively denounced 
the strain of ‘inferior cunning’ that characterized all Dutch subjects ‘from the 
Boor to the Burgomaster.’33 Meanwhile, when Marlborough’s replacement as 
Captain General, James Butler, second duke of Ormonde, received his noto-
rious ‘restraining orders’ in May 1712, ordering him to avoid serious military 
engagements whilst peace negotiations were underway, confirmation of these 
29    Swift, History of the Four Last Years, 44.
30    Swift, History of the Four Last Years, 150.
31    Swift, Journal to Stella, 289–290.
32    Swift, History of the Four Last Years, 110–111.
33    Swift, History of the Four Last Years, 109, 23.
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orders was dispatched to the French court but not to Britain’s Allies, and Dutch 
military losses ensued.
Swift’s anti-Dutch animus chimed conveniently with French reasoning. Six 
weeks after The Conduct of the Allies was published in London, Louis XIV’s 
foreign minister, Torcy, ordered that Swift’s tract be immediately translated 
into French and published in Paris,34 and two further editions of La Conduite 
des Alliez et du dernière Ministère were evidently published in Liège and 
Luxembourg in 1712. So comprehensively and effectively did Swift’s Conduct 
of the Allies echo arguments previously disseminated on behalf of Louis XIV’s 
regime by propaganda authors working for Torcy that the French foreign min-
ister thereafter abstained from commissioning any more works to promote the 
case for ending the War. Instead, as Louis’s plenipotentiary at the Congress of 
Utrecht itself, Melchior de Polignac, observed from Utrecht in February 1712, 
the French delegation was content to sit back and watch as their British coun-
terparts ‘executed to the letter’ recommendations contained in Swift’s tract.35 
In his subsequent History, Swift further alleged that Torcy had even sought to 
exploit British irritation at perceived Dutch procrastination during the Utrecht 
negotiations by daringly suggesting that ‘since the States had acted so ungrate-
fully, the Queen should let her Forces join with those of France in order to com-
pel the Confederates to a Peace’; this proposal had, however, generated only 
‘the utmost Abhorrence’ from the British court.36 This alleged French offer only 
echoed a warning in the first sermon preached to the official British delegation 
at Utrecht that, having secured military success, they might ‘grow insolent, and 
will impose, if not impossible, yet unreasonable Terms.’ Yet should they seek to 
humiliate the defeated power and ‘push on their Revenge beyond all bounds.’ 
the preacher, William Ayerst, insisted that it would be ‘just in Providence to 
change sides.’37
 The Influence of Swift’s Critique
By the time the British plenipotentiaries convened at Utrecht, however, Swift’s 
Conduct of the Allies had admirably fulfilled its polemical purpose. A week after 
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its publication, an Oxford don, William Stratford, wrote to Harley from Christ 
Church, observing that the tract ‘takes, as much as you could wish . . . It will put 
the country gentlemen in the temper you desire,’ rendering them ‘very ready 
to battle it at home for a peace abroad.’38 A couple of months later, a series 
of resolutions was passed by the House of Commons, condemning the Allies’ 
wartime record, and Swift claimed credit for the government’s substantial vot-
ing majorities. As he recounted to Stella on 4 February 1712, ‘Those who spoke, 
drew all their arguments from my book, and their votes confirm all I writ; the 
Court had a majority of a hundred and fifty: all agree, that it was my book 
that spirited them to these resolutions.’39 Reprinted seven times by the end 
of March, The Conduct of the Allies was grudgingly deemed ‘this Master-piece,’ 
which ‘was no sooner dispers’d and canvass’d in the world, but it produc’d 
the desir’d Effect’ by a hostile Robert Walpole.40 A generation later, Samuel 
Johnson likewise admired ‘this wonder-working pamphlet,’ whilst primarily 
attributing its success to the fact that ‘the nation was then combustible, and a 
spark set it on fire.’41
On its publication, Swift’s tract predictably unleashed a flurry of support-
ive and hostile printed reaction. In his study of the pamphlet controversy that 
surrounded the ending of the War of the Spanish Succession, Heinz-Joachim 
Müllenbrock found that, in terms of quantitative citation, The Conduct of the 
Allies ‘far surpasses all other pamphlets,’ being ‘quoted almost as many times as 
all other pamphlets together.’42 Denouncing ‘the Frenchfied Principles of this 
Author’ who was intent on ‘rendring the Dutch odious to us,’ Daniel Defoe, for 
instance, described Swift’s pamphlet as having ‘entered the Stage like a gladi-
ator at the Bear-garden, with a great Flourish, Brandishing its Weapons, carry-
ing a fine Feather in its Hat, the Shirt and Hair tied up with Ribbons, a bright 
Weapon in its hand in terrorem . . . ushered in by the Shouts and Huzza’s of the 
Rabble.’43 Coinciding with the fifth edition of Swift’s Conduct in December 
1711, An Account of the Obligations the States of Holland have to Great Britain 
38    Quoted by Richard I. Cook, Jonathan Swift as a Tory pamphleteer (Seattle, London: Univer-
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was published anonymously by the Whig-turned-Jacobite conspirator, Robert 
Ferguson, and supported Swift’s case in its scathing denunciation of Dutch 
deception. Ferguson discerned pervasive evidence of Dutch adherence to ‘the 
good old Cause’—republicanism—being deployed to deter fearful British sub-
jects from pursuing peace by ‘old thre[a]dbare Phrases,’ such as ‘Popery and 
Slavery, Arbitrary Power, French Gold, Wooden Shoes, breach of Faith.’44 The 
following month, Queen Anne appointed a fast-day to pray for the peace nego-
tiations that were starting in Utrecht, for which Joseph Trapp preached a ser-
mon at St. Martin’s in the Fields, London, insisting that ‘Robbing the Publick 
is surely a Sin.’ Equally, of those who used ‘Artifices to prolong so Bloody a 
War, in order to gratify their own Avarice or Ambition, or upon any other pri-
vate consideration whatsoever’ Trapp opined that it would be ‘good for them if 
they had never been born.’ Such strictures evidently elicited a hostile response, 
obliging Trapp to append a postscript to the second edition of the printed ver-
sion, acknowledging that he had been accused not only of ‘burlesquing and 
wresting the Scriptures’ and ‘Jingling and Playing with Words’ but also of ‘being 
in the Interest of the Pretender.’45 As Trapp had found, anti-Dutch attacks 
often attracted allegations of thwarted Jacobitism. A fortnight after the first 
edition of The Conduct of the Allies appeared, an editorial in The Protestant 
Post-Boy had blamed the ‘refin’d French Breeding’ for the tract’s litany of ‘bare-
fac’d Calumnies, wretched Inconsistencies, and direct False-hoods.’46 Indeed, 
the efficacy of Whig insinuations was subsequently acknowledged by Swift 
in a manuscript he composed around 1717, that was published posthumously, 
entitled An Enquiry into the Behaviour of the Queen’s Last Ministry. In this tract, 
Swift recalled discussing the charge of Jacobitism with an unnamed ministe-
rial contact who had evidently denied its validity but ‘said to me with much 
frankness, “You [Tories] sett up the Church and Sacheverall against us, and We 
set up Trade and the Pretender against you”.’47 Nevertheless, as Müllenbrock 
showed, since Whig contributions to the pamphlet debate cited The Conduct 
of the Allies about four times more often than Tory pamphlets, its polemical 
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success was confirmed by the fact that ‘the Whigs simply could not help taking 
up Swift’s arguments.’48
Even within Swift’s own circle, however, the confidentiality necessarily 
imposed on the peace negotiations inevitably provoked incessant rumour 
and suspicion. In an oft-quoted line, taken from a letter to Swift in May 1712, 
Archbishop King of Dublin complained that since ‘perhaps no negotiations 
were ever managed with so much secrecy as this,’ sceptics were suggesting 
‘that this peace is like that of God and passes all understanding.’49 The follow-
ing March, however, he remained confident that when his History of recent 
events was published, it would ‘unriddle you many a dark Problem’ and ensure 
that ‘the World will have other Notions of our Proceedings,’ by showing ‘that 
Faction, Rage, Rebellion, Revenge and Ambition’ had been the sordid motives 
of those who had either disparaged, or directly sought to sabotage, the govern-
ment’s negotiations.50 Delighting in his proximity to the highest ministerial 
échelons and the privileged access he perceived was thereby conferred, Swift 
boasted to Stella in February 1711 of Harley, St. John and other Tories: ‘They call 
me nothing but Jonathan; and I said, I believed they would leave me Jonathan 
as they found me; and that I never knew a ministry do any thing for those 
whom they make companions of their pleasure; and I believe you will find it 
so, but I care not.’51
Swift was thus naïvely confident that his detailed history of the peace nego-
tiations would be both authoritative and impartial, on account of his refusal to 
accept payment for any government-supported publications, in conspicuous 
contrast to hired authors such as Defoe. As Swift confirmed in the preface to 
his History, ‘I never received one shilling . . . except that of a few books; nor 
did I want their assistance to support me. I very often indeed dined with the 
Treasurer and Secretary; but, in those days, that was not reckoned a bribe.’52 
Furthermore, around one-fifth of his printed narrative comprised extracts that 
had been transcribed verbatim from diplomatic documents associated with 
the peace negotiations. Swift took his research project extremely seriously, 
complaining to Stella in October 1712, ‘I toil like a horse, and have hundreds of 
letters still to read; and squeeze a line perhaps out of each, or at least the seeds 
of a line.’53 In contrast, however, to the Tory ministry’s clear sponsorship and 
48    Müllenbrock, Culture of Contention, 108.
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concurrence in publication of The Conduct of the Allies, the idea of producing a 
detailed History of the peace negotiations was very much Swift’s own.54 Hence 
although Swift railed to Stella the following month that ‘I have a world of writ-
ing to finish: & little time; these Toads of Ministers are so slow in their helps,’ 
the politicians’ studied procrastination rather confirmed ministerial unease at 
Swift’s eagerness to publicise the covert overtures made to Louis XIV’s France 
during these years.55
Hence it was much to Swift’s bitter disappointment that his History of the 
Four Last Years was to remain unpublished during his lifetime. If The Conduct 
of the Allies had succeeded in its polemical purpose, Swift’s subsequent History 
was simply too partisan to achieve its aim of supplying an objective narrative. 
Having finished writing the History by May 1713, Swift intended its publica-
tion to coincide with submission of the peace terms agreed at Utrecht before 
Parliament. As he had accurately suspected to Stella in January, however, ‘My 
large Treatise stands stock still; some think it too dangerous to publish, and 
would have me print onely what relates to t[h]e Peace. I can’t tell what I shall 
do.’56 Aside from political sensitivities arising from much of its content, the 
History’s moment had passed. Both Harley and St. John—now elevated as the 
earl of Oxford and Viscount Bolingbroke respectively—feared that its defen-
sively partisan vindication of the rationale for peace might only provoke dis-
tracting counter-attacks at a time when public attention should be focused 
on the territorial and trading gains that Britain stood to derive from treaty 
ratification. Having left London for Dublin in June 1713, Swift subsequently 
learned that various clauses of the proposed Anglo-French commercial treaty 
had been rejected by Parliament. As Swift wrote to his friend and confidant, 
Charles Ford, the following month, he was ‘tempted to think’ that if his History 
‘had been published at the time of the Peace, some ill Consequences might not 
have happened.’57
Swift’s optimism that prompt publication of his History might have miti-
gated the subsequent misfortunes of Oxford, Bolingbroke and the Tory party 
was misplaced. For his claim, in the preface, that his History of the Four Last 
Years was written ‘with the utmost impartiality’ was reflected in his insis-
tence, at the outset of his narrative, that he would not ‘mingle Panegyrick 
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or Satire with an History intended to inform Posterity, as well as to instruct 
those of the present Age.’ His aim was, ostensibly, an objective record ‘Since 
Facts truly related are the best Applauses, or most lasting Reproaches.’58 Yet 
Swift’s avowals should not be taken at face value: Swift, was, after all, an author 
constitutionally incapable of impartiality. The first of the History’s four books 
contained, for example, a series of devastatingly effective and succinct char-
acter assassinations. Of the former Tory peer, Nottingham, who had led the 
‘No peace without Spain’ campaign, apparent virtues were alchemized into 
insidious vices, as Swift alleged that Nottingham’s ‘outward Regularity of Life, 
his Appearance of Religion, and seeming Zeal for the Church, as they are an 
Effect, so they are the Excuse for that Stiffness and Formality with which his 
Nature is fraught.’59 Elsewhere, Swift identified ‘three Furies’ that governed the 
conduct of Sarah, duchess of Marlborough (‘sordid Avarice, disdainful Pride, 
and ungovernable Rage’),60 whilst also directing his caustic wit towards her 
husband whom Swift had privately described to Stella in 1710 as being ‘as cov-
etous as Hell, and ambitious as the Prince of it: he would fain have been gen-
eral for life, and has broken all endeavours for Peace, to keep his greatness and 
get money.’61 In his printed works, however, Swift’s awareness of the popular 
respect that Marlborough continued to command prompted him to deploy 
the rhetorical device of apophasis against the General, thereby discussing 
allegations whilst simultaneously disclaiming his intention of doing so. In The 
Conduct of the Allies, therefore, Swift insisted he would ‘wave any thing that is 
Personal’ regarding Marlborough’s suspected avarice, and thereby ‘say nothing 
of those great Presents made by several Princes, which the Soldiers used to 
call Winter Foraging, and said it was better than that of the Summer; of Two 
and Half per Cent. subtracted out of all the Subsidies we pay in those Parts, 
which amounts to no inconsiderable Sum; and lastly, of the grand Perquisites 
in a long successful War, which are so amicably adjusted between Him and the 
States’ of Holland.62
Ironically—and perhaps unconsciously—Swift himself was also potentially 
guilty of benefiting from the War, via the secret Franco-British negotiations 
that had started in 1711. As seen, his case for pursuing peace was predicated on 
charging the former Whig administration, in conjunction with its Dutch allies, 
of prolonging hostilities against France for reasons of mutual self-interest. 
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Citing the Scriptural text Matthew 21:12, Swift insisted in The Conduct of the 
Allies that the War had been maintained by ‘the Fears of the Mony-changers, 
lest their Tables should be overthrown,’ suiting ‘the Designs of the Whigs, who 
apprehended the Loss of their Credit and Employments in a Peace.’63 Despite 
thus condemning his Whig adversaries for deriving personal profit from the 
financial secrets of waging war, Swift himself could be charged with effec-
tive ‘insider trading’ when, shortly before publication of The Conduct of the 
Allies, he resolved to purchase £500 worth of stocks—‘which will cost me three 
hundred and eighty ready money’—in the new South Sea Company that had 
recently been created by, among others, Harley, as Lord Treasurer.64 Aware that 
Britain was likely to receive, as part of any peace agreement with France, the 
right to supply Spain’s colonies with slaves (known as the Asiento), Harley had 
sought to restore British national solvency through the South Sea Company, 
which would take over the national debt and replace government bonds with 
shares in return for a guaranteed 6% interest payment. Prudently, however, 
Swift had postponed making his actual investment until January 1712: i.e. until 
just after Harley had narrowly secured Parliament’s formal sanction for peace 
negotiations, having relied on Queen Anne’s unprecedented creation of twelve 
new peers on New Year’s Day.65
 Swift’s Retrospective Defence of the Peace
Scattered hints from Swift’s correspondence during the 1720s and 1730s indicate 
that he sporadically returned to the manuscript of his History of the Four Last 
Years, revising certain sections with a view finally to securing its delayed publi-
cation. Two decades after the events it narrated, however, the History’s polemi-
cal and amphibian character continued to provoke unease among not only 
those whose political actions Swift hoped to vindicate but also their descen-
dants. In November 1723, for example, Swift teasingly assured Harley that ‘It 
is destined that you should have great obligations to me, for who else knows 
how to deliver you down to posterity’?66 Over a decade later, in August 1737, 
Swift’s friend and former Under-Secretary of State, Erasmus Lewis, advised 
Swift that it was ‘now too late to publish a pamphlet, and too early to  publish a 
63    Swift, ‘Conduct,’ 85.
64    Swift, Journal to Stella, 322.
65    See John Richardson, Slavery and Augustan literature. Swift, Pope, Gay (London: Routledge, 
2004), 47.
66    Swift, Correspondence, 2: 468.
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history.’67 Eight months later, however, Lewis confirmed to Swift that his manu-
script history had been attentively read by several colleagues ‘who think, in 
all political matters, just as you do,’ including the current earl of Oxford (the 
former Lord Treasurer’s son). According to Lewis, all had concurred that the 
sections relating to negotiation of the Peace of Utrecht ‘they admire exceed-
ingly, and declare they never yet saw that, or any other transaction, drawn up 
with so much perspicuity, or in a style so entertaining and instructive to the 
reader in every respect.’68 At the same time, however, acute residual concern 
had been expressed about several sections including an implied attack on 
Marlborough’s personal courage and Swift’s unsupported claim that the ‘incur-
able hatred’ allegedly felt by the Austrian Habsburg envoy, Prince Eugene of 
Savoy, towards Lord Treasurer Harley had resulted in the Prince’s suggestion 
that Harley might be assassinated, if this could be contrived to appear as an 
accident.69 Warning of dire punishments likely to be meted out to any printer 
who produced Swift’s manuscript in its current form, Lewis urged Swift to pub-
lish the sections relating to negotiations of the Peace of Utrecht ‘and leave out 
everything that savours of acrimony and resentment.’ To do so, Lewis insisted, 
‘would be of great service . . . nothing have yet been published on the peace 
of Utrecht, in such a beautiful and strong manner as you have done it.’70 Now 
aged over seventy, however, Swift evidently had little appetite for such exten-
sive and conceivably craven revisions, but Swift’s London advisers remained 
adamant.
The History of the Four Last Years of the Queen was eventually published 
posthumously in 1758 by Andrew Millar in London and, shortly afterwards, by 
George Faulkner in Dublin, provoking an acrimonious dispute among Swift’s 
literary executors and trustees. It first appeared in print, therefore, during 
the Seven Years’ War, when Britain once again found itself locked into a pro-
tracted armed struggle for global dominance against its old enemy, France. In 
Dublin, the young Edmund Burke seized on the acerbic character-sketches 
that Swift had penned of former Whig ministers and reprinted them in the 
Annual Register ‘as a striking example of the melancholy effects of prejudice, 
and party zeal.’71 Meanwhile the anonymous author of A Whig’s Remarks on the 
Tory History of the Four Last Years of Queen Anne (1768) dismissed ‘the whole 
67    Swift, Correspondence, 5: 66.
68    Swift, Correspondence, 5: 104.
69    See Swift, History of the Four Last Years, 26.
70    Swift, Correspondence, 5: 106.
71    The Annual Register, or A View of the History, Politicks, and Literature, Of the Year 1758 
(London: J. Dodsley, 1759), 256.
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of his historical medley a most infamous libel’ and denounced the History’s 
‘venomed malevolence’ as the debased output of a ‘meddling dean,’ who had 
found himself ‘basking in the sunshine of court favourites, and in warm inti-
macy with the chief betrayers of their country.’72
Controversial at the time of its conclusion, the Peace of Utrecht had a 
prolonged afterlife. During the Seven Years’ War, William Pitt visibly priori-
tized treaty obligations to Britain’s allies over domestic concerns and once 
denounced ‘the treaty of Utrecht, [as] the indelible reproach of the last 
generation.’73 In the preface to his History, however, Swift had confidently 
averred that no other negotiators could ‘have bound up the French king, or 
the Hollanders more strictly than the Queen’s plenipotentiaries’ had done at 
Utrecht.74 From France, Britain had regained Hudson Bay, Nova Scotia and 
Newfoundland in Canada, St Kitts in the West Indies, and a commitment to the 
Hanoverian succession, whilst Spain had ceded to Britain Gibraltar, Minorca 
and the Asiento contract. Anticipating imminent signing of the Treaty by the 
British delegation in early March 1713, Swift reported dining with Harley, who 
had showed him portions of the speech on the Peace that had been drafted 
for Queen Anne to deliver to the Westminster Parliament ‘wch I corrected in 
sevrall Places and penned th[e] vote of Address of thanks for th[e] Speech’ that 
was duly returned by members of the House of Lords on 11 April.75 In celebrat-
ing this Tory diplomatic feat, Swift remained as central as in supporting its 
prosecution.
Before the Peace had been concluded, however, Swift had insisted to 
Archbishop King in January 1713 that ‘We have done all we can,’ denying that ‘in 
publick Affairs, human Wisdom is able to make Provisions for Futurity.’76 Three 
months later, however, King had directed Swift to ‘look back on all the treaties 
that have been between England and France for the last four hundred years’ to 
realize that France had always ultimately triumphed over Britain in the long 
term.77 Indeed, Queen Anne died in August 1714, a Whig ministry returned 
to power the following February and Louis XIV died in August 1715. By that 
72    A Whig’s Remarks on the Tory History of the Four Last Years of Queen Anne (London: Printed 
for J. Staples, 1768), 65, iv, 63, 3.
73    Quoted by Brendan Simms, ‘British strategic culture, 1714–1760,’ in Cultures of Power 
in Europe during the Long Eighteenth Century, ed. Brendan Simms and Hamish Scott 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 129.
74    Swift, History of the Four Last Years, xxxvi.
75    Swift, Journal to Stella, 509.
76    Correspondence, 1, ed. Williams: 329.
77    Correspondence, 1, ed. Williams: 343.
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time, impeachment proceedings had been lodged against Bolingbroke, Oxford 
and Ormonde on charges relating to their alleged foreign policy mismanage-
ment and betrayals. For his part, Swift had left London, having reluctantly 
accepted the deanship of St. Patrick’s Cathedral, Dublin, where a special Te 
Deum was commissioned by the Bratislavan-born composer, John Sigismund 
Cousser, for the public thanksgiving held to celebrate the Peace of Utrecht.78 
Swift’s dreams of being appointed Historiographer-Royal following publica-
tion of an acclaimed History of the Four Last Years had, however, evaporated; 
instead, in March 1714, his Whig enemies successfully manoeuvred Queen 
Anne into issuing a proclamation that formally denounced Swift’s anonymous 
The Public Spirit of the Whigs (1714) as a ‘false, malicious and factious libel’ and 
offered a reward of £300 for identification of the tract’s author.79 The follow-
ing September, Swift received a letter from an Irish colleague ‘delivered . . . in 
such a Manner’ that he nostalgically confessed to having—momentarily—
‘thought that I was at Court again,’ before recalling that ‘I was in Irel[an]d, that 
the Queen was dead, the Ministry changed, and I was onely the poor Dean of 
St. Patrick’s.’80
78    Brian Boydell, ‘Music, 1700–1850,’ in A New History of Ireland. IV. Eighteenth Century 
Ireland, 1691–1800, ed. T.W. Moody and W.E. Vaughan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986), 574.
79    See Maurice J. Quinlan, ‘The prosecution of Swift’s Public Spirit of the Whigs,’ Texas Studies 
in Literature and Language 9 (1967–8), 176–184.
80    Correspondence, 2, ed. Williams: 132–133.
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CHAPTER 9
Visions of Europe: Contrasts and Combinations  
of National and European Identities in Literary 
Representations of the Peace of Utrecht (1713)
Lotte Jensen
The god of peace wishes
That no more war should rage through Europe
But in the end that all becomes quiet, calm and still
He lets the fatherland enjoy the fruits of peace
And allows Friesland the full benefit of this pleasure.1
These verses were written by the bookseller François Halma (1653–1722), who 
lived in Leeuwarden, the capital of the province of Friesland. In 1713 he wrote 
an extensive poem to celebrate the Peace of Utrecht, which he dedicated to the 
governors of Friesland. From these verses the reader can discern that Halma 
identified with Europe and the Dutch Republic (here denoted as ‘the father-
land’) as well as with the province of Friesland. The point he tries to make is 
clear: on all these different levels the Peace of Utrecht, which ended a long and 
destructive war, was expected to be beneficial.
Halma was not the only poet to celebrate the Peace of Utrecht. It incited 
many Dutch authors to write literary appraisals: around thirty literary works, 
including two theatre plays, were published by a wide range of authors.2 
Although a large number of texts (approximately one third) were printed in 
Amsterdam, it would be a mistake to think that the treaty was celebrated pri-
marily in Amsterdam. Pamphlets were also published in Harlingen, Zierikzee, 
Groningen, Leeuwarden, Leiden, Haarlem, Rotterdam, and Utrecht. In The 
1    ‘De Vredegodt wil [. . .] / Dat wy geen krygsloet meer zien in Europe blaaken, / Maar alles 
raake, in ’t end, gerust, bedaart, en stil! / Hij laate ’t Vaderland de vredevrucht genieten, / En 
geeve Vrieslandts Staat daar van het vol genot’. F. Halma, Vredezang (Amsterdam: Johannes 
Oosterwyk, 1713), 26. I would like to thank Marguérite Corporaal and Liedeke Plate for their 
comments and suggestions.
2    The titles are listed in Lotte Jensen, ‘Nationaal versus Europees gemeenschapsgevoel. 
Gelegenheidsverzen op de Vrede van Utrecht (1713),’ Jaarboek Oud-Utrecht (2013): 117–132, 
here 129. This chapter is an elaboration of the preliminary findings presented in that article.
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Figure 9.1 Portrait of the poet and publisher François Halma (1653–1722) by Arnoud van Halen. 
rijksmuseum amsterdam
Hague, Leeuwarden, and Haarlem fireworks were organised.3 This outburst 
of activity indicates that the Peace of Utrecht was welcomed and celebrated 
throughout the Dutch Republic. It also becomes apparent from the contents of 
3    Cf. Willem Frijhoff ’s contribution to this book.
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these pamphlets that the Peace was a national event: the entire Dutch Republic 
is addressed, in terms like ‘The Dutch free state’ (‘Neêrlands vrijen staat’), ‘the 
Sevenstates’ (‘de Zevenstaat’), ‘the Nation of Seven Arrows’ (‘Zeven-pijlig 
Landt’), or, simply: ‘the Netherlands’ (‘Nederland’). In short, these pamphlets 
clearly express a form of national consciousness, which can be distinguished 
from a European or regional identity.
How should we interpret these expressions of Dutch national awareness in 
light of current research on the rise of national thought and nationalism? The 
emergence of nationalism is usually considered to be a nineteenth-century 
phenomenon, but these eighteenth-century texts already express a growing 
sense of national consciousness.4 In this chapter I will discuss several literary 
appraisals of the Peace of Utrecht, in which national identity plays a signifi-
cant role.5 Research has shown that literary utterances were an essential part 
of national peace celebrations; the Treaty of Münster (1648) was, for instance 
celebrated with many theatre plays, poetry and allegories.6 Very little attention, 
however, has been devoted to peace treaties from a national-cultural perspec-
tive or to the question of how these texts relate to the rise of national con-
sciousness and national thought in early modern Europe. Literary sources are 
very apt for investigating this question: it is in the field of literature that identi-
ties are most effectively formulated because literature often works with dis-
cursive patterns of self-identification, convincing images and commonplaces.7
4    Since the 1990s a growing number of studies about pre-modern national consciousness 
have appeared. Some seminal studies about eighteenth century national thought in vari-
ous European nations are: Linda Colley, Britons. Forging the Nation 1707–1837 (New Haven/ 
London: Yale University Press, 1992); Hans Martin Blitz, Aus Liebe zum Vaterland. Die deutsche 
Nation im 18.Jahurhundert (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2000); David A. Bell, The Cult of the 
Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism 1680–1800 (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2001) 
and Pasi Ihalainen, Protestant nations redefined. Changing perceptions of national identity in 
the rhetoric of the English, Dutch, and Swedish public churches, 1685–1772 (Leiden / Boston: 
Brill, 2005).
5    The rise of national thought in Europe is also discussed in Joep Leerssen, National Thought 
in Europe. A Cultural History (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008). In his account 
of the Early Modern period he focuses on the widely spread taxonomy of national characters 
and climate theory (36–70).
6    For Dutch literary celebrations of the Peace of Münster, see for instance J. de Gier, ‘ “Den 
krijg is uitgebannen”. De Vrede van Munster in de poëzie,’ in Vrede, vrijheid, vaderland. 
Nederlandse protestanten en de Vrede van Munster, ed. H.H.J. van As, C.R. van den Berg and 
R. Bisschop (Rotterdam: Vereniging Protestants Nederland, 1998), 150–171.
7    See Imagology. The Cultural Construction and Literary Representation of National Characters. 
A Critical Survey, ed. Manfred Beller and Joep Leerssen (Amsterdam / New York: Rodopi, 
2007), 26.
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However, as the national level is shaped in relation and in contrast to the 
levels below and above, this national identity can be viewed only in combina-
tion with and in contrast to a regional or European level.8 In this chapter I will 
attempt to demonstrate how authors expressed a growing sense of ‘Europe’ as 
an international community while at the same time sought to uphold a dis-
tinctly Dutch identity by contrasting their nation’s commendable contribu-
tion to the peace process with the malevolence of foreign powers threatening 
Europe’s newly achieved political stability. These unifying expressions were, 
however, not homogeneous: there was a great variety in the poetical represen-
tations of national and European identity.
This chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, some critical remarks 
will be made about the current framework of studies on nationalism: it will be 
argued that early modern writings, especially occasional peace poetry, can be 
used as a source to shed new light on the discussion about the rise of national 
thought in pre-modern times. In the second part several poems and two the-
atre plays about the Peace of Utrecht, which specifically address the issues of 
national and European identity, will be discussed.9
 National Thought and Nationalism
The question of whether nations existed in the pre-modern era has caused 
much debate in the field of nationalism studies. It has led to a sharp distinction 
between so-called ‘modernists,’ who regard the nation as a quintessentially 
modern political phenomenon, and ‘traditionalists,’ who believe that nations 
already began to take shape before the advent of modernity. While the mod-
ernist paradigm has been dominant, it has been challenged in recent years by 
a growing number of case studies that situate the origins of nationalism and 
nationhood in earlier times.
The seemingly unbridgeable gap is worsened by the varying and some-
times contradictory ways scholars use concepts like ‘nation’, ‘nationalism’ and 
8    Cf. Astrid Erll, ‘Regional integration and (trans)cultural memory’, Asia Europe Journal 8 
(2010): 305–315. Accessed 4 November 2013, doi: 10.1007/s10308-010-0268-5.
9    This means that poems with less relevance for this particular theme have been left out, for 
example the playful account of the Spanish Succession War: Vreede-toorts, met vreugd ontsto-
ken op Rots-oort (Utrecht: Willem van de Water, 1713) by Frans van Oort. This poem deserves 
further investigation. It is referred to in Jeroen van Heemskerck Düker, ‘De “Pottebakkers 
Huur-Galey” van Frans van Oort,’ Mededelingen van de Stichting Jacob Campo Weyerman 12 
(1989): 84–89.
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‘national thought’. Here, I follow the definitions given by Joep Leerssen in his 
study National Thought in Europe. A Cultural History (2006).10 The ‘nation’ is 
defined as ‘a subjective community established by shared culture and his-
torical memories’; it can refer to local, regional and supra-regional commu-
nities, which are united by ‘a sense of belonging together’ but also of ‘being 
distinct from others’. ‘Nationalism’ points the political ideology or doctrine of 
nationalism, which emerges in the nineteenth century and which takes the 
modern nation-state as the constitutive unity. ‘National thought’ refers to 
pre- nineteenth-century source traditions and has a broader meaning than 
‘nationalism’. It includes ‘all pre-nineteenth century source traditions and 
ramifications of the nationalist ideology’ and refers to ‘a way of seeing human 
society primarily as consisting of discrete, different nations, each with an obvi-
ous right to exist and to command loyalty, each characterized and set apart 
unambiguously by its own separate identity and culture’. Making this distinc-
tion between ‘nationalism’ and ‘national thought’ allows us to start a dialogue 
between modernists and traditionalists: we can trace the idea that people 
belonged to the same ‘nation’ or ‘national’ community back to earlier stages of 
history, while it also suggests that there are continuities between pre-modern 
and modern developments.11
Anthony Smith in particular has emphasised the continuity between devel-
opments from the past and modernity by pointing at the older, cultural foun-
dations of nations. He argues that the origins of the nation can be found in 
pre-modern ethnic ties or coalitions of ethnic groupings, while, at the same 
time, emphasizing the difference between these pre-modern ‘ethnies’ and 
modern nations.12 Recently, Azar Gat has questioned the dichotomy between 
10    All following quotations are derived from Leerssen, National Thought in Europe, 14–17.
11    These continuities are, however, not always recognized in modernist accounts. Despite 
his ample discussion of pre-modern source traditions, Leerssen leaves little room for 
continuities between pre-modern source traditions and modern expressions of cultural 
nationalism. Although Smith emphasizes the importance of pre-modern ethnic ties, 
which are expressed by symbols, rituals, myths of origins and memories, these pre-mod-
ern ‘ethnies’ are only linked in a weak sense to the modern nation-state. See Anthony D. 
Smith, The Nation in History. Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism 
(Lebanon: University Press of New England), 76–77. In The Roots of Nationalism. National 
Identity Formation in Early Modern Europe, 1600–1815, ed. Lotte Jensen (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, forthcoming) it is argued that the divide between tradition-
alists and modernists is unsatisfactory, and that cultural continuities between pre-mod-
ern and modern expressions of nationhood deserve much more attention.
12    For example in: Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno / Las Vegas: University of 
Nevada Press, 1991); Anthony D. Smith, The Antiquity of Nations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
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the modernists and traditionalists by stating that it is artificial and based upon 
false assumptions. One of these is the emphasis on literacy, which denies the 
fact that ‘illiterate societies had their own potent means of wide-scale cultural 
transmission,’ such as oral epic, plays, games, festivals and rituals.13 Accordingly, 
he argues that nations and national thought predate modernity and that cul-
ture, religion, and language were major vehicles of common national identity 
and community.14
Although both scholars differ widely in their approach towards national 
thought and nationalism, they both single out the United Provinces as one of 
the nations that took the form of a national cultural and political community 
from a very early stage.15 Indeed, the perception of the Low Countries as the 
common fatherland can already be witnessed in the mid-sixteenth century. It 
expanded rapidly during the Revolt against Spain and took firm political shape 
with the establishment of the Union of Utrecht (1579), which united the north-
ern provinces in their struggle to liberate themselves from Spanish  oppression.16 
2004) and Anthony D. Smith, The Cultural Foundations of Nations. Hierarchy, Covenant, 
and Republic (Malden / Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008).
13    Azar Gat, Nations The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 12.
14    Gat, Nations. For other critical views on the modernist approach, see Caspar Hirschi, The 
Origins of Nationalism. An Alternative History from Ancient Rome to Early Modern German 
to Early Modern Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), Against Ortho-
doxy. Studies in Nationalism, ed. Trevor W. Harrison and Slobodan Drakulicz (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2011) and Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood. Ethnicity, Religion 
and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
15    The difference is, however, that Gat speaks of a ‘national state’, while Smith uses the phrase 
‘a growing Dutch national community, albeit incomplete’. Gat, Nations, 82; Anthony D. 
Smith, National Identity (Reno/Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press, 1993), 10. Schama 
regards the period between 1550– and 1650 as the era in which ‘the political identity of 
an independent Netherlands nation was established’ and speaks of ‘a strong sense of 
national identity’. See Simon Schama, The Embarassment of Riches. An Interpretation 
of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 34, 54.
16    See Alistair Duke, ‘The Elusive Netherlands. The question of national identity in the Early 
Modern Low Countries on the Eve of the Revolt,’ Bijdragen en Medelingen betreffende de 
de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 119 (2004) 1: 10–38 and several contributions in Networks, 
Regions and Nations. Shaping Identities in the Low Countries, 1300–1650, ed. R. Stein and 
J. Pollmann (Leiden / Boston: Brill 2010), in particular those of Robert Stein (‘Introduction’, 
1–18), Alistair Duke (‘In defence of the Common Fatherland. Patriotism and Liberty in the 
Low Countries, 1555–1576,’ 217–239) and Judith Pollmann (‘No Man’s Land. Reinventing 
Netherlandish Identities, 1585–1621,’ 241–261). Also see the contributions of Simon 
Groenveld (‘Natie en patria bij zestiende-eeuwse Nederlanders’) and Guido de Bruin 
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The Eighty Years’ War ended with the signing of the Treaty of Münster in 1648 
and the official acknowledgement of the Dutch Republic as a sovereign state. 
The celebration of this event, as well as the ongoing commemoration of the 
Dutch victories during the Eighty Years’ War, contributed to the increase of 
national consciousness. The urge for unity received a new impulse when a new 
power threatened the nation’s freedom: the French king Louis XIV. References 
to the Spanish tyranny were easily supplanted by condemnations of this new 
French tyranny, emphasising the continuity between the past and the present.17 
With the signing of the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, a period of nearly forty years of 
ongoing war between France and the Dutch Republic came to an end.
The remembrance of the national past—the distressful moments as well as 
the heroic ones—and the hopeful vision of the return of a ‘new golden age’ play 
a significant role in the writings on this event. In studying the rise of national 
consciousness through the lens of the peace celebrations of 1713 the concept of 
the ‘imagined community’, which is usually applied to the modern era, can be 
of particular value. Benedict Anderson has pointed out that modern nations 
function as imagined communities: although members do not know most 
of their fellow-members, they all have an image of their community in their 
minds. These images are spread mainly through mass media and other insti-
tutions, such as newspapers and books.18 A parallel can be drawn with early 
modern times because, although the circulation of printed material was much 
lower, pamphlets, periodicals, newspapers, poems, and theatre plays were also 
(‘Het begrip “vaderland” in de pamfletliteratuur ten tijde van de Republiek, 1600–1750’), 
both in Vaderland. Een geschiedenis vanaf de vijftiende eeuw tot 1940, ed. N.C.F. van Sas 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1999), 55–81 and 143–161. In the abovemen-
tioned article, Groenveld points at the fact, that a nineteenth-century, nationalistic per-
spective is to be avoided: the nation was a much more complex, and layered concept 
in early modern times. Nevertheless, there were all sorts of elements present that con-
tributed to a sense of a common national identity and ultimately led to the shaping of 
a single nation which can be equated with the national state. In a more recent study, 
Groenveld, Wagenaar and Van der Meer pay ample attention to centralist trends in Dutch 
state-politics before the nineteenth century. They were much more present than is usu-
ally assumed: Simon Groenveld, Pieter Wagenaar and Frits van der Meer, ‘Pre-Napoleonic 
centralization in a decentralized polity: the case of the Dutch Republic,’ International 
Review of Administrative Sciences 76 (2010): 47–64.
17    On publicity, identity and self-image of the Dutch Republic during these years, see 
Donald Haks, Vaderland en vrede 1672–1713. Publiciteit over de Nederlandse Republiek in 
oorlog (Hilversum: Verloren, 2013).
18    B. Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London / New York: Verso 1987) (4th edition), 16, 38–39.
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used to unite people for common causes in early modern Europe. Particularly 
in times of war or political crisis, feelings of patriotism and unity were spread 
by means of these media.19 The point made in this chapter is, therefore, that 
writings occasioned by the Peace of Utrecht, including poetry and theatre 
plays, are important sources for studying the emergence of national thought 
in the Dutch Republic.
The limited number of prints as well as the underdeveloped infrastructure 
in the early modern period have been used as arguments to question the exis-
tence of pre-modern national thought. Historians have argued that most peo-
ple used their village, city, region, or religious community as their main point 
of identification.20 This might indeed be the case, but at the same time utter-
ances of national and European thought are abundantly present in the early 
modern period. Not all people may have identified with these larger ‘imagined’ 
communities, but they did exist, at least in the minds of authors and poets.21 
They created different kinds of unifying images, using metaphors and topoi 
that surpassed regional borders, and even national or religious borders.
Of course, these ‘imagined communities’ are of a completely different nature 
than those of the nineteenth century. As Peter Burke has rightly pointed out, we 
should beware of interpreting early modern texts in modern terms: European 
consciousness was still weak compared to regional consciousness.22 This does 
not mean, however, that expressions of national and European thought were 
absent in the early modern period. On the contrary, as in later times, the men-
tal landscape of authors and readers was shaped through  concepts such as ‘the 
19    For an international perspective on this issue, see Orest Ranum, National consciousness, 
history, and political culture in early modern Europe (Baltimore / London: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1975). For some Dutch examples: Marijke Meijer Drees, Andere landen, 
andere mensen. De beeldvorming van Holland versus Spanje en Engeland omstreeks 1650 
(The Hague: SUN Uitgevers, 1997) and Haks, Vaderland en vrede.
20    For Dutch examples: E.H. Kossmann, ‘The Dutch case: a national or a regional culture?’, 
in Politieke theorie en geschiedenis. Verspreide opstellen en voordrachten aangeboden aan 
de schrijver bij zijn aftreden als hoogleraar aan de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen (Amsterdam: 
C.G. Bakker, 1987), 198–210; P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, ‘Beeld en zelfbeeld. “Nederlandse iden-
titeit” in politieke structuur en polititeke cultuur tijdens de Republiek,’ Bijdragen en 
Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 107: 4 (1992): 635–656.
21    For a case study on peace poetry and the shaping of Dutch national identity in 1748, see 
Lotte Jensen, ‘“Toen ’t volk als uit één’ mond, lang leve Oranje! riep”. Orangisme in het 
vredesjaar 1748,’ Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis 128 (2015): 1–22.
22    Peter Burke, ‘Did Europe exist before 1700?,’ History of European Ideas 1 (1980): 21–29, 29.
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fatherland’, ‘the nation’ and ‘Europe’.23 To use a phrase by George Lakoff and 
Mark Johnson, these were concepts and metaphors people lived by.24 A close 
reading of the texts in which these concepts play a dominant role can therefore 
teach us something about the way people related to these ‘imagined communi-
ties’: how were feelings of national and European consciousness expressed by 
the authors of occasional poetry and theatre plays about the Peace of Utrecht?
 Poetical Celebrations of the Peace of Utrecht
Generally speaking, the poems can be divided into three distinct categories: 
pastoral, historical-political, and religious poetry. These categories are partly 
related, but reflect three different attitudes towards the position of the Dutch 
Republic within the larger European framework.
The first category—pastoral poetry—celebrates the peace for bringing 
harmony and wealth back to Europe. Most of these poems take the form of 
a conversation between shepherds and shepherdesses rejoicing in the new, 
favourable conditions. In accordance with the genre conventions they are sur-
rounded by nature, harmony and prosperity. Although the peace is seen as 
a benefit to all, the Dutch Republic is considered the best place to be. Here, 
cows roam freely, and butter, milk and cheese are abundant. ‘Golden times’ 
are about to return to the nation.25 Some poems explicitly refer to the pas-
toral play Leeuwendalers (1647), by the well-known Dutch poet Joost van 
23    For example, from the political-juridical perspective: Heinz Duchhardt, ‘ “Europa” als 
Begründungs- und Legitimationsformel in völkerrechtlichen Verträgen der Frühen 
Neuzeit’, in Heinz Duchhardt, Frieden im Europa der Vormoderne. Ausgewählte Aufsätze 
1979–2011. Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Martin Espenhorst (Paderborn etc.: 
Ferdinand Schöningh, 2012), 111–120. For an overview of visual images of Europe see 
Michael Wintle, The Image of Europe. Visualizing Europe in Cartography and Iconography 
throughout the Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). A selection of key 
texts on European identity throughout the ages is given in Alex Drace-Francis, European 
identity. A Historical Reader (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
24    George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors we live by (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1980).
25    This phrase is used in Prudenter, De vrede. Veldzang (Amsterdam: Johannes van Leeuwen, 
1713), 4. Other pastoral poems: H. van den Burg, Herderszang op de vrede (Amsterdam: 
Marcelis van Heems, 1713); Balthasar Huydecoper, Herderszang op de vrede (s.l.: s.n., 1713); 
Johannes Schróder, Leeuwendal, herders-zang op den vrede (Leiden: Hendrik Mulhovius) 
1713; Barend Warnaar, Floriaan en Silvia, herderszang, Op het teekenen der vreede binnen 
Utrecht, den 11 april, 1713 (Haarlem: Isaäk Enschedé, 1713).
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den Vondel, which alludes to the peace process that led to the signing of the 
Treaty of Münster in 1648. In this poem, the Dutch Republic is symbolised as 
‘Leeuwendal’ or ‘Lion’s vale’; the lion referres to the heraldic representation 
of the United Provinces. By referring to Vondel’s play, authors emphasised the 
continuity between the past and the present as well as the idea that the Dutch 
Republic could experience a new ‘golden age’.
An example of such a nationally minded pastoral poem is Herderszang op de 
vrede by Herman van den Burg. His poem consists of a conversation between 
three shepherds and three shepherdesses. The ploughman, sower and farmer 
are relieved that peace has been restored while the female characters are happy 
that they can produce butter, cheese and milk once more. Their conversation is 
rife with anti-French sentiment, and the peace is attributed to the efforts of the 
Dutch Republic alone. All of Europe benefits from the new political stability, 
but the Dutch are responsible for these benefits:
I see that Friendship, Abundance and Joy accompany her [Peace]
She shall restore Europe in all her glory
[. . .]
One cannot disturb the Dutch Virgin, without punishment
Whoever denies her rest, will carry his wounds with him.26
In other words: the Dutch always take revenge on their enemies and those 
who assault the Dutch Lion are wasting their powers and will flee shamefully. 
According to the shepherds and shepherdesses, the goddess of Peace has now 
chosen ‘Leeuwendal’ (‘the lion’s vale’) as her residence and will stay there 
eternally.
The second category—historical-political poetry—also singles out the 
Dutch Republic as the best part of Europe. These poems, however, contain 
more references to the War of the Spanish Succession. They also reflect inter-
nal differences between the supporters of the Stadtholder (‘Oranjegezinden’) 
and their opponents (‘Staatsgezinden’). The death of William III in 1702 
marked the beginning of the so-called second stadtholderless period (1702–
1747). Most of the provinces had not appointed a successor, and after the death 
of the  stadtholder of Friesland and Groningen (Johan William Friso) in 1711, an 
Orangist reign seemed farther away than ever. His son, William Karel Hendrik 
26    ‘k Zie Vriendschap, Overvloed, en Wellust haar verzellen; / Zij zal Europa weêr in de oude 
pracht herstellen [. . .] / Men stoort nooit ongestraft, de Nederlandsche Maagd; / Want 
die haar rust betwist, zyn wonden met zig draagt’. Van den Burg, Herderszang op de vrede, 
13–14.
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Friso (the later stadtholder William IV), who was born after his father’s death, 
had been named the new stadtholder of Friesland (and in 1718 of Groningen), 
but he was still too young to actually fulfil this task.
Against this background it is not surprising that most authors made no refer-
ence to stadtholders at all. The poet and lawyer P. de Bye, for instance, skipped 
recent history and looked towards the ancient past for exemplary behaviour. He 
considered the peace to be the achievement of the ancient courage and brav-
ery of the Batavian people, who were seen as the ancestors of the present-day 
inhabitants of the Dutch Republic. According to De Bye, this old Batavian love 
of freedom and liberty of conscience manifested itself most prominently when 
threatened by foreign tyrants. Throughout the course of history, the Batavian 
people had always succeeded in protecting their territory and defending them-
selves against mindless oppression. However, they also knew when to stop 
fighting and restore the peace. In the end, the Batavians were the ones who 
had shown mercy and decided to end the war. Therefore, the goddess of Peace 
has chosen the Dutch Republic as the location for the peace negotiations: 
‘I have once again chosen your garden, the best part of Europe, as my residence 
and bower’.27
Such poetical representation of the peace negotiations did not reflect 
reality at all. In fact, the Dutch negotiators were resentful because they were 
completely overshadowed by the other European powers: the Dutch had little 
impact on the actual results.28 However, the aim of this kind of poetry was not 
to give a realistic account of affairs; it reflected the contemporary rhetoric of 
war and propaganda texts.
Some authors, like Coenraet Droste, Jacobus de Groot and François Halma, 
grabbed the opportunity to make an Orangist statement. While Droste and De 
Groot focused on the nation’s glorious past and especially the rule of William 
III, Halma’s verses were directed more at the future. He was very explicit in his 
wish for the establishment of a general and hereditary stadtholdership.
The lack of a future perspective probably explains why Droste’s and De 
Groot’s pamphlets, which were published in the province of Holland (The 
27    ‘K heb wederom uw’ tuin verkoren, / Europe’s allerbeste deel / Tot myn verblyf en lust-
prieel, / Daar niemandt licht myn rust zal storen.’ P. de Bye, Vredezang op de langgewen-
schte vrede tusschen Vrankryk en de Vereenigde Nederlanden. Gesloten te Utrecht Op den 
11 April van het Jaar 1713 (s.l.: s.n., 1713), fol. B2.
28    David Onnekink and Renger de Bruin, De Vrede van Utrecht (1713) (Hilversum: Verloren, 
2013), 74–75; D. Onnekink, ‘The Treaty of Utrecht 1713,’ in Peace was made here. The Treaties 
of Utrecht, Rastatt and Baden 1713–1714, ed. R. de Bruin and M. Brinkman (Petersberg: 
Michael Imhof Verlag, 2013), 60–69.
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Hague and Amsterdam), concentrate on the past. Both include extensive 
appraisals of William III in their works, stating that he had been one of the 
greatest defenders of true religion in the nation’s history. Droste’s positive ref-
erences to William III are the more remarkable considering the fact that dur-
ing the 1670s he had been a fierce adherent of the leader of the ‘staatsgezinden’, 
Johan de Witt. He resigned from military service in 1676 because he had not 
been promoted by William III.29 Spreading the true Protestant faith, however, 
made William III a true hero and was outweighed any internal struggles from 
the past.30
De Groot also portrays William III as a great hero.31 In his detailed descrip-
tion of the War of the Spanish Succession he makes a sharp distinction between 
the evil French and the allied forces. Accordingly, he condemns Catholicism, 
while praising the Protestant faith. He depicts the Peace of Utrecht as the 
defeat of Louis XIV and as a great victory for England, the Netherlands, and 
Prussia. He also showers praise on the heroes of the allied forces. The duke 
of Marlborough and Frederick of Prussia, for instance, are celebrated for hav-
ing liberated the Dutch Republic from the ‘hungry French wolves.’ In contrast 
with most other Dutch poets De Groot gives the other allied forces most of the 
credit. However, by including William III in his appraisal, he does allow the 
Dutch Republic a significant role in his narrative. Regionalism is included as 
well: his poem ends by wishing all ‘governors of the free Netherlands’, espe-
cially those of Amsterdam, a flourishing future.
A similar pattern can be discerned in the poem by François Halma. He also 
represents the peace as a victory of the Dutch Republic and England over 
France, but his Orangism was much more directed towards the future. This can 
be partly explained by his Frisian perspective. In his view, a new Golden Age 
could be achieved only with a new stadtholder at the head of all the provinces; 
the Frisian stadtholder William would make an excellent candidate. Halma’s 
poem consists of two parts: in the first half he describes the misery of war 
and the great damage caused by it all over Europe. In the second half his tone 
changes completely, when he sketches the benefits of peace and the rebirth 
of a prosperous nation. His Garden of Eden is clearly situated in the Dutch 
Republic and more precisely in Friesland. Like De Groot, Halma wrote from 
an Orangist perspective: the new-born Prince William IV was expected to be 
29    Brugmans, ‘Droste, Coenraet’, in Nieuw Nederlandsch biografisch woordenboek, vol. 6, ed. 
P.C. Molhuysen and P.J. Blok (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff 1924), 453–454.
30    C. Droste, Op de vreede Tot Uytrecht gesloten den 11. april 1713, naer den Twaelf jaerigen 
Oorlog (’s-Gravenhage: Gerrit Rammazeyn, 1713), 10–11.
31    Jacobus de Groot, Vreedezang (Amsterdam: H. van Ditmer, 1713).
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figure 9.2 Title page of Halma’s poem on the Peace of Utrecht: Vredezang (Amsterdam:  
J. Oosterwyk, 1713).
university library, leiden
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the new and great ruler of the Seven Provinces one day; in the meantime the 
Frisian governors would do everything they could to protect their province. In 
short, Halma’s main concern was the Frisian State; after that came the Dutch 
Republic, and, finally Europe. All three identities played significant roles, but 
regional identity came first.
While in the first two categories—pastoral and political-historical poetry—
the laudable contribution of the Dutch Republic and the return of a new 
Golden Age are emphasised, in the third category religious values prevail. 
Most religious poems were written from an explicitly Protestant and Dutch 
point of view, employing the topos of ‘Dutch Israël’, which suggested that the 
Dutch were the chosen people.32 Nevertheless, the tone is more humble than 
in the pastoral and historical-political poetry. Two women poets, Jetske Reinou 
van der Malen and Susanna van der Wier, paid just as much attention to the 
miseries of war as to the newly established peace. Pointing out the suffering 
caused by war strengthened their argument to be thankful for God’s mercy.33 
Hubert Korneliszoon Poot, one of the best-known Dutch poets of that period, 
also expressed feelings of grief and despair. He laments the disasters that hit 
the Dutch Republic after the establishment of the peace. In Rampen van het 
vredejaer (Disasters of the Peace Year, 1713) he bewails the storm that destroyed 
the complete harvest and the rinderpest (or cattle plague) that struck the live-
stock. Poot even questions what purpose God might have in sending all these 
punishments to the Dutch Republic: why first liberate the Dutch from Spanish 
and French tyranny, only to send all this misery? His message, however, is clear: 
one should never doubt the wisdom of God. Although God’s methods can be 
unfathomable, it is important to keep faith. Poot fills his lament with anti-
Catholic statements and compares the Calvinists with God’s chosen people. 
He states that the Calvinists have to meet many challenges, but that their faith 
will be rewarded in the end.34
32    The idea of the Dutch as the chosen people was often used in sermons: Cornelis Huisman, 
Neerlands Israël. Het natiebesef der traditioneel-gereformeerden in de achttiende eeuw 
(Dordrecht: Van den Tol, 1983) and Ihalainen, Protestant nations redefined.
33    Jetske Reinou van der Malen, Olyfkrans gevlochten op Neerlands plegtiglyke dank- en 
vreugdedag over de langgewenschte vrede: gesloten binnen Utrecht den 11. April des jaars 
1713 (Leeuwarden: Karst Tjallings, 1713); Susanna de Wier, Pligtsbetragting, wegens de 
lang verwagte vreede; Geslooten tot Utregt den 11. April, en Geratificeert den 12. Mey, 1713 
(s.l.: s.n., 1713).
34    H.K. Poot, Rampen van het vredejaer (s.l. 1713). An analysis of this poem can be found in 
C.M. Geerars, Hubert Korneliszoon Poot (Groningen: Bouma’s Boekhuis; Catricum: Bert 
Hagen 1979), 33–36.
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A universal Christian perspective can be found in the poem of Adriaan 
Spinniker, who was a former Mennonite clergyman now working as an accoun-
tant. In his Vreedezang (Peace song, 1713) he spends several pages explaining 
the causes of the War of the Spanish Succession, which nations and sovereigns 
were involved, and how the peace was restored. His detailed account shows 
that he was familiar with the various interests of the different European rulers. 
He clearly blamed the French king, Louis XIV, for having brought about all this 
misery, not only in the Netherlands, but in the whole of Europe. Nevertheless 
his poem was not meant to express hatred against the French or to claim Dutch 
superiority. On the contrary, Spinniker ends with a plea for religious peace and 
harmony within Europe. Ultimately, God was to be thanked for all the good 
that peace would bring. It was God, who decided to end the war, and it was 
God who appointed Utrecht the city where the negotiations were to take place. 
Spinniker’s peace is a universal, Christian peace, which unites all European 
nations. He makes no distinction between Protestants and Catholics, but 
speaks of one heavenly kingdom of peace. This fits in with his Mennonite 
background.35
 Europe on Stage
On the occasion of the Utrecht peace treaty two theatre plays were pub-
lished: Europa verkwikt op’t gezicht der vrede (1712) by Jan Jacob Mauricius and 
Staatkunde (1713) by Enoch Krook. Both plays are allegorical pieces depicting 
how peace was brought to Europe. The plot of both plays can be summarised 
as follows: Europe is the main character, struggling against hostile figures, such 
as War, Dispute, Discord, Cruelty and Malice. At the same time, Europe is sup-
ported by friendly characters such as Friendship and Unity. The good forces 
win, and in the end Europe celebrates having conquered the evil forces.
The two authors, however, hold very different positions when it comes to 
the role of France, the Dutch Republic and the city of Utrecht in the whole pro-
cess. Mauricius, a young lawyer in The Hague, wrote his play to celebrate the 
inauguration of the theatre in Utrecht. During the peace negotiations the pro-
hibition on theatre performances was suspended to make the sojourn of the 
negotiators and ambassadors in Utrecht more pleasurable. For that  purpose 
35    Adriaan Spinniker, Zeege der vrede, behaald in Utrecht den 11den van Grasmaand in ’t 1713e 
jaar (Haarlem: s.n., s.a.).
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figure 9.3 Title page of Enoch Krook's play Staatkunde (Amsterdam: J. Lescailje en  
Dirk Rank, 1713).
university library, amsterdam
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a temporary wooden theatre was constructed.36 This particular occasion also 
explains Mauricius’ marked attention for the city of Utrecht. He creates an 
extremely positive image of Utrecht, praising the city as the episcopal centre 
of all festivities. Mauricius emphasises that Utrecht is the perfect choice for 
the peace negotiations as it contains the seat of a bishop, and the city can boast 
great victories of the past when Utrecht managed to withstand attacks from 
northern tribes.
Strikingly, no positive national self-image can be found in this play. Mauricius 
strongly condemns all European nations for having been so aggressive, includ-
ing the Dutch. The allegorical figure of Peace states that the Batavian and the 
Englishman should stop fighting and shake hands with their neighbour and 
old friend, France:
These vile disputes, the plague of kingdoms,
Have for too long destroyed the universe
And hauled a horrifying harvest
Of thousands of corpses of heroes.
Stop, plagued Batavian,
Stop, clever Englishman
The time has come to plant the
Peace flag.
[. . .]
This is the right time
To shake hands as brothers,
With your good old neighbour, the honest Frank
And to live together quietly in peace and harmony.37
Against the background of the other commemorative poems, Mauricius’ rep-
rimand of the Batavians and English on the one hand and his friendly words 
towards the French on the other, are remarkable. Perhaps these lines refer 
36    Kornee van der Haven, ‘ “Een spiegel aller grooten”. Theater als deugdenspiegel voor 
Utrechtse regenten (1711–1728),’ Jaarboek Oud-Utrecht (2005): 55–76; Onnekink and De 
Bruin, De vrede van Utrecht, 91.
37    ‘Het vinnig landkrakeel, die pest der koninkryken, / Heeft lang genoeg ’t Heelal verwoest, 
En eenen ysselyken oest / Gemaaid van duizenden heldenlyken. Hou op, gesarde Batavier, 
Hou op, doorluchtige Engelander, / ’t Is tyd, ’t is tyd den vredestander / Te planten [. . .] 
’t Is tyd om eens ter goeder uur / Den braven Frank, uw’ vriend en ouden nagebuur / De 
broederlyke hand te geven, / En rustiglyk in min en Eendragt t’saam te leeven’. Jan Jacob 
Mauricius, Europa verkwikt op ’t gezicht der vrede (Amsterdam: Hendrik van de Gaete, 
1713), 13.
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to the pro-French attitude of the States of Utrecht; choosing this city as the 
place for the negotiations may have been a gesture towards the French king 
Louis XIV.38
The other play, written by Enoch Krook, is more in line with the other texts. 
Krook was an actor and a successful playwright in the Amsterdam theatre, who 
wrote three plays about important events during the war, namely the battles 
at Blenheim (1704), Ramillies (1706) and Oudenaarde (1708) and the siege of 
Lille (1708). He wrote his play on the Peace of Utrecht as a charity project: 
the proceeds were to be given to an orphanage and a home for the elderly in 
Amsterdam.
A central role is played by the allegorical figure of Politics (‘Staatkunde’), 
who manages to convince all European nations, even the French king, to make 
peace. She has to overcome the evil forces of War, Envy, and Anger, and finally 
manages to get all the European nations gathered in Utrecht to negotiate 
peace. At first some nations have their reservations, but in the end they come 
to an agreement. All European nations join forces to capture Dispute while 
Friendship joyfully announces that trade and prosperity will flourish again. 
Then the allegorical figure of ‘Harmony’ enters the scene and claims that the 
Golden Age will be restored. She sketches a beautiful pastoral scene, where 
cows roam freely and butter and cheese are abundant. This all seems typically 
Dutch and recalls the pastoral play which the Dutch playwright Joost van den 
Vondel created to celebrate the Peace of Münster sixty-five years earlier. So, 
although Krook’s play is about the stability of Europe, he ends with a typically 
Dutch scene that symbolises the restoration of a Golden Age in the Dutch 
Republic.
Krook depicts the larger European community as a union that needs to pro-
tect its internal stability.39 At the same time, Europe is represented by different 
38    M. van der Bijl, ‘Utrechts weerstand tegen de oorlogspolitiek tijdens de Spaanse 
Successieoorlog. De rol van de heer van Welland van 1672 tot 1708,’ in Van Standen tot 
Staten. 600 Jaar Staten van Utrecht, 1375–1975, ed. H.L.Ph. Leeuwen and L. van Tongerloo 
(Utrecht: Stichting Stichtse Historische Reeks, 1975), 135–199; Onnekink, ‘The Treaty of 
Utrecht,’ 62.
39    The concept of Europe as a Christian union (pax christiana), united in its fight against the 
pagan Ottoman Empire, plays a dominant role in the poems written on the occasion of 
the Peace of Rijswijk (1697). This argument seems to have been replaced by a vocabulary 
which circles around the idea of a balance of power. See for changing concepts of Europe 
around 1700: Burke, ‘Did Europe exist before 1700,’ 27, Duchhardt, ‘Europa,’ and Winfried 
Schulze, ‘Europa in der frühen Neuzeit—Begriffsgeschichtliche Befunde,’ in: Europäische 
Geschichte als historiographisches Problem, ed. H. Duchhardt and Andreas Kunz (Mainz: 
von Zabern, 1997), 35–65.
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allegorical figures (rivers such as the Seine, Thames and Rhine), each defend-
ing its own, particular interest. In the end, however, the main characters,—the 
Rhine, Meuse, Thames, and Seine—agree that peace is the best solution for all 
of them. The Dutch Republic is completely left out of these discussions and 
does not play any role of significance. Despite the idealistic Dutch pastoral 
scene in the play, it also seems to have been coloured by reality. Although the 
Dutch managed to fulfil their most important wish, namely to restrict French 
power, in the end the results were disappointing. The Dutch negotiators had 
little influence on the actual outcome and were completely outweighed by the 
other European negotiators. The Treaty of Utrecht would also mark the end of 
the Dutch Republic as a major European power.40
 Conclusion
The poetry and theatre plays written on the occasion of the Utrecht peace 
treaty can be used as a source to shed new light on the discussion about the rise 
of national thought in the early modern period. Through poetical language, 
authors expressed their ties to the Dutch Republic, often claiming the supe-
riority of the nation. To see how this ‘national thought’ was articulated, it is, 
however, necessary to also take into consideration the levels below and above 
the nation: the national perspective was shaped in dialogue with the regional 
and European levels. For an author like Halma, the national level for instance 
was secondary to his provincial commitment: the welfare of the Frisian region 
was his main concern. Others singled out the Dutch Republic as the best part 
of Europe and emphasised the laudable contribution of their nation to the 
peace negotiations. From a Protestant perspective, it was argued that the 
Dutch were God’s chosen people, who, in spite of difficult times, would one 
day be rewarded for their perseverance. This argumentation made sense only 
by implying that the other European nations—especially the French—were 
inferior to the Dutch.
However, authors had their own particular way of conceptualising 
‘Dutchness’ within the larger European framework: the fact that they expressed 
feelings of national unity did not imply that their views were homogenous. 
Quite the contrary, their writings reflect religious differences and internal 
40    Onnekink and De Bruin, De Vrede van Utrecht, 74–75; Onnekink, ‘The treaty of Utrecht 
1713,’ 62.
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political struggles.41 We see how political differences seeped through. De Bye 
for instance used the Batavian myth as a point of reference without any refer-
ences to the stadtholders of the past. Others looked for bravery in Orangist 
spheres by pointing toward the achievements of William III. The most explicit 
Orangist statement was made by Halma, who projected all his hopes on the 
Frisian stadtholder William. Less political were the writings of Mauricius, 
Krook and Spinniker. They refrained from such political statements and con-
sidered the benefits of the peace for Europe as a whole. Spinniker’s European 
‘imagined community’ was—in contrast with most other writings—based 
on religious tolerance: in the end, all (Christian) inhabitants of Europe were 
bound together in one ‘heavenly kingdom of peace.’
Finally, the question might be asked whether these ‘imagined communi-
ties’ existed beyond the realm of the text and to what extent they appealed 
to a broader audience. Were these ideas restricted to the elite, or did they 
reflect broader tendencies in society as well? What connections can be made 
between the topical character of these texts and actual, historical develop-
ments? Studying commemorative writings, including poetry, in combination 
with other sources from transnational and transcultural perspectives may 
deepen our understanding of the historical grounding of different imagined 
communities.
41    Cf. Smith’s observations on the roots of nationalism in Europe during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century, in: Anthony D. Smith, ‘Nationalism in early modern Europe,’ History 
and Theory 44 (2005): 405–415, 411.
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CHAPTER 10
Theatres of War and Diplomacy on the  
Early-Eighteenth-Century Amsterdam Stage
Cornelis van der Haven
The trope of the theatre is deeply rooted in Western military strategy. The 
‘theatre of war’ metaphor enables military strategists (especially since 
Clausewitz) to imagine the playing field of war events from a panoramic point 
of view,1 i.e. as a theatre with a stage (the battlefield) and actors (officers and 
soldiers) who can be commanded by a group of directors (military staff). At 
the same time these directing professionals constitute the audience, whereas 
citizens, the suffering population in cities and villages, are no more than stage 
extras, part of the scenery. One could say that it is this image of war as theatre 
that transforms it into the directors’ playing tool instead of an event governed 
by equal individuals in combat. Fighters on both sides are equally transformed 
into the puppets of a huge theatrical war play, ‘mere bodies (on stage) that 
neither think nor feel.’2
The theatre metaphor had a huge impact on the representation of war in 
military strategy, cartography and early modern war publicity. Paul Virilio has 
shown that the baroque depiction of war often suggested an immediate and 
complete (hence ‘amedial’) perception of war, highlighting the totality of the 
war spectacle in one image, a panoramic overview primarily reserved for the 
genius of the general.3 Imagining war as a theatre (theatrum belli), however, 
was not only instrumental to phantasies of total control of the battlefield 
as an international playing field for royal and military powers. According to 
Marian Füssel, the image and the language of the theatre were also applied 
to war representations for mnemonic reasons and for reasons of knowledge 
production.4 Plans, newspapers and theatre plays translated the chaotic  reality 
of  seventeenth- and eighteenth- century war acts into convenient theatrical 
1    On ‘panoramic war’ in the late eighteenth century, see: Gillian Russell, The Theatres of War. 
Performance, Politics, and Society 1793–1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 74–78.
2    Cf. Yuval N. Harari, The Ultimate Experience. Battlefield Revelations and the Making of Modern 
War Culture, 1450–2000 (Hampshire/New York: Palgrave, 2008), 122–123.
3    See Paul Virilio, Krieg und Kino: Logistik der Wahrnehmung (München: Fischer, 1986), 115–116.
4    See Marian Füssel, ‘Theatrum Belli. Der Krieg als Inszenierung und Wissensschauplatz im 
17. und 18. Jahrhundert,’ Metaphorik.de (2008): 205–230, 214–215.
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overviews of the different battles to inform a broader audience and reading 
public about recent or historical battles.
The distance in time, space and experience between (war) professionals on 
the one hand and those who ‘consume’ their (military) performances (the citi-
zens, the audience) on the other was crucial for the idea of war and diplomacy 
as (entertaining) theatres. The idea and language of the theatre enabled the 
audience to imagine war as an exotic distanced experience that could safely 
be related to their own perception, but it also confronted the citizen with his 
own role of observer and media consumer. Parallel to the increasing distance 
between the experiences of civic communities and the execution of military 
operations due to military professionalisation, Dutch citizens manifested a 
growing fascination with war journalism and the details of war acts during the 
first half of the eighteenth century. Public interest in the acts of war encouraged 
authors to write commercial re-enactments of the most important battles, like 
the three oorslogsspelen published and performed in Amsterdam between 1704 
and 1708. Also the peace negotiations in Utrecht were considered suitable for 
the theatre: an occasion to display the exotic world of international politics on 
the Amsterdam stage featuring courtiers and diplomats during their ‘business’ 
of making peace.
In this chapter I would like to discuss these theatrical imaginations of the 
battlefield and the world of diplomacy on the Amsterdam stage and in travel-
ing peepshows (rarekiek) of the early eighteenth century. My main focus will 
be on how the public was expected to ‘see’ and experience acts of war and 
the peace negotiations when these acts were mediated by theatrical perfor-
mances and staged as theatre. Fair visitors, spectators in the municipal theatre 
and newspaper readers certainly represented socially diverse audiences, but 
all were confronted with theatrical representations of what previously had 
been a hidden reality for the general public of the Dutch Republic: the daily 
practice of war and diplomacy. I will especially explore the spatial and discur-
sive perspectives that were dominant in these representations and how they 
framed the early modern popular vision of war and diplomacy. On the one 
hand, the early modern focus on war and diplomacy as entertaining specta-
cles prevented a more personal identification with the military and diplomats 
as these plays featured negotiations and military actions as primarily attrac-
tive events taking place in a distanced and exotic world. On the other hand, 
however, the mediated theatres of war and diplomacy of the early eighteenth 
century could have triggered the curiosity of larger audiences to get a better 
understanding of the distant experiences of militaries and diplomats. What do 
these theatrical representations and the different perspectives related to it tell 
us about the difficult relationship between war, politics, and entertainment in 
the eighteenth century?
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 The Theatre of Diplomacy
Not only the early modern spectacle of war could be characterised as a theatre; 
the world of diplomacy often was considered in the same vein. When we take 
a closer look at that fascinating picture by Simon Fokke of the negotiations in 
Utrecht on the cover of this book, there is no doubt: to achieve peace by means 
of high politics, the successful diplomat is expected to behave like an actor. 
The depicted room in the Utrecht city hall in this picture is such a theatre. The 
pose of the standing diplomat, his gestures, his position in the room—all these 
factors, in combination with the heavy curtains behind him, strengthen our 
impression of watching a performance, a performance on a stage and before 
an audience. The performer not only needs his own gestures; he is in need of 
that audience to achieve his goals and needs listeners, a public to whom he can 
address his statements and for whom he could ‘perform a peace’.
The idea of the diplomat as an actor (comédien) functioned as a common-
place in early modern diplomatic handbooks. Both François de Callières and 
Abraham de Wicquefort for instance refer to this image of the diplomat as an 
actor, with the court as his main stage and theatre.5 While performing on that 
stage, he must master the art of ‘dissimulation’ in order to hide the true inten-
tions of his negotiation strategies. Callières refers to the ambassador as an 
actor also because of the public nature of his acting. The scene of his political 
interventions is laid on a semi-public stage, where he has to play his role of a 
negotiating representative in a most convincing way. The ambassador is at the 
same time a servant and someone who speaks on behalf of his master, which 
means: he plays the ‘grand role’ of representing this master at foreign courts:
Un Ambassadeur ressemble en quelque maniere maniere à un Comedien, 
exposé sur le theatre aux yeux du Public pour y joüer de grands rôles, 
comme son emploi l’éleve au-dessus de sa condition & l’égale en quelque 
sorte aux Maîtres de la terre par le droit de presentation qui y est 
attaché, & par le commerce particulier qu’il lui donne avec eux, il ne 
peut passer que pour un mauvais Acteur s’il n’en fait pas soûtenir la 
diginité; (. . .).6
5    See Dorothea Schröder, Zeitgeschichte auf der Opernbühne. Barockes Musiktheater in Hamburg 
im Dienst von Politik und Diplomatie (1690–1745) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), 
40–41.
6    François de Callières, De la Manière de negocier avec les Souverains (Amsterdam: La 
Compagnie, 1716), 23–24.
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The idea of representing someone or something else (here: the representa-
tion of sovereign power) implies that the ambassador has to imagine himself 
impersonalizing that power. His performance in public and in front of other 
representatives and diplomats determines how the dignity related to that 
power is represented.
The theatre itself was one of the diplomat’s representative instruments to 
strengthen diplomatic relations between the European powers during the cel-
ebration of political events. Julius Bernhard von Rohr for instance describes in 
his Einleitung zur Ceremoniel-Wissenschaft der grossen Herren of 1733, with a 
separate chapter on ‘Opern und Comœdien’, the ways in which these political 
events—like a recently signed peace treaty, the birth and baptism of a royal 
scion, or a wedding within the royal family—had to be celebrated.7 Von Rohr 
mainly describes celebrations at the court, but these richly decorated court 
festivities served as a model for the small-scale celebrations ambassadors were 
expected to organize abroad, as in the relatively small and provincial town of 
Utrecht. The diplomats who worked in the Dutch Republic, however, rarely 
had access to a private or public theatre where they could organize their fes-
tivities. Thus, in Utrecht, theatre ‘tents’ were built to offer a space for theatrical 
performances and the ‘hotels’ of the different diplomats could also serve as 
locations for such theatrical events.8
The Hague, Leiden and Amsterdam were the only cities in the Dutch 
Republic with a theatre building. In Amsterdam, the municipal theatre (the 
Schouwburg) was used regularly for the performance of so-called ‘peace 
plays’ depicting a recently signed peace treaty. The treaties of Munster (1648), 
Nijmegen (1678) and Rijswijk (1697) were all celebrated in the Amsterdam 
municipal theatre with the performance of such peace plays, which were often 
part of more extensive urban festivities with fireworks and thanksgiving ser-
vices in the churches.9 The performance of 1713 even took place one month 
before the official festivities because the Peace of Utrecht was signed shortly 
7    Julius Bernhard von Rohr, Einleitung zur Ceremoniel-Wissenschaft der großen Herrn, die in vier 
besondern Theilen die meisten Ceremoniel-Handlunge, so die Europäischen Puissencen über-
haupt, und die Teutschen Landes-Fürsten insonderheit, sowohl in ihren Häusern, in Ansehung 
ihrer selbst, ihrer Familie und Bedienten, als auch gegen ihre Mitregenten, und gegen ihre 
Unterthanen bey Kriegs- und Friedens-Zeiten zu beobachten pflegen (Berlin: Rüdiger, 1729), 
706–815.
8    Cf. Kornee van der Haven, ‘ “Een spiegel aller grooten”. Theater als deugdenspiegel voor 
Utrechtse regenten (1711–1728),’ Jaarboek Oud-Utrecht (2005): 55–76.
9    For an overview, see: Kornee van der Haven, Achter de schermen van het stadstoneel. 
Theaterbedrijf en toneelpolemiek in Amsterdam en Hamburg 1675–1750 (Zutphen: Walburg 
Pers, 2008), 72–87.
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before the summer pause of the Amsterdam playhouse.10 The last scenes of 
this play called Staatkunde (‘Politics’ [Amsterdam 1713], by Enoch Krook) 
re-enact something that is in itself a very theatrical act: the official announce-
ment of peace and signing of the peace treaty.11
As Lotte Jensen has already shown in Chapter 9, it is not only the celebration 
of peace as such but the celebration of ‘Europe’ (and the larger European com-
munity) as a peacemaker, which makes this allegorical play so remarkable. The 
play however also functioned as a theatrical news medium attracting public 
attention to what took place behind the scenes of diplomacy before the peace 
treaty was signed. Doing so, it made the ‘theatre of diplomacy’ accessible to a 
larger audience and enabled the viewers to reflect on the political and tactical 
skills that were important in the world of diplomats. The play incorporates the 
idea that diplomatic acting before the public eye concerns the ‘grands roles’ of 
the diplomat as the representative of state power. The remarks of Callières that 
a well-educated ambassador should know how to represent the dignity of his 
master well enough are embedded here in doubling the roles of the allegori-
cal characters who represent four European nations, as they also act as those 
nations’ negotiators. The rivers Rhine, Meuse, Thames, and Seine are their 
nations, but they also play a role focused on mediating between the nation’s 
interests, political power, and diplomatic prudence.
The second act of the play opens with a silent performance of the nego-
tiators who are welcomed by the patroness of Utrecht (Vrouw Uitrecht). They 
are surrounded by a curious (nieuwsgierig—literally: longing for news) public: 
‘thousands of people, recommended by Dame Curiosity to satisfy the fancy 
of their eyes’, as one of the explicating verses describes it.12 It is the figure of 
Staatkunde (‘Politics’) who brings the different countries in the play together 
and transforms them from suffering and fighting nations into negotiat-
ing  powers. ‘Friendship’ and other (political) virtues (‘Patience’, ‘Unity’) are 
Politics’ helpers. They support the negotiations behind the scenes and try to 
convince ‘Europe’ that her future peace is nearing since ‘Politics’, who repre-
sents the prudence of negotiating nations, opposes the dominance of war and 
conflict. The four rivers reflect on the power of ‘Politics’ to unite them, and 
10    Van der Haven, Achter de schermen van het stadstoneel, 80.
11    E.M.L. van der Maas, ‘De Vrede verbeeld. Zeventiende-eeuwse vredes in de prentkunst,’ 
in 1648. Vrede van Munster. Feit en verbeelding, ed. Jacques Dane (Zwolle: Waanders, 1998), 
173–204.
12    ‘Waar by dat duizende van menschen, aangeraaden / Van Vrouw Nieuwsgierigheid, haar 
oogenlust verzaaden’. Enoch Krook, Staatkunde, vredespel (Amsterdam: J. Lescailje en 
Dirk Rank, 1713), 24.
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they  explicitly mention the balance of power as the main principle on which 
the future peace treaty should be based.13 Fighting against the incertitude of 
‘Thames’ (caused by internal dissent), ‘Politics’ manages in the last act to bring 
‘Peace’ to ‘Europe’, and thus the play ends with a silent performance of the dif-
ferent countries and their representatives signing the peace treaty.
 Military Peepshows
The early modern concept of war and diplomacy as a theatre was strongly con-
nected to the expectations of curious audiences, longing for news about what 
exactly is taking place behind the scenes of war and diplomacy. Even when 
people had direct access to information about war and diplomacy in the early 
modern period, it was not self-evident that they also had the reading skills to 
take in the whole story. A striking characteristic of war reports in  seventeenth- 
and early-eighteenth-century newspapers is their complexity and the often 
incomprehensible military, legal, and political jargon that upholds the idea of 
secrecy and confidentiality related to the official documents the newspapers 
editors used for their reports.14 The impression of having access to confidential 
papers may have increased a certain reading pleasure but was not yet based 
on what Mary Favret (in relation to late-eighteenth-century war journalism) 
calls ‘war literacy’ or the ability of the public to become competent readers 
of news about war events.15 Rather, it might be argued that the intention of 
 seventeenth- and early-eighteenth-century newspaper editors was the oppo-
site, namely to preclude a full understanding of the facts about war. This inter-
pretation would enable us to characterize the newspaper war report as an 
exciting ‘peepshow’: the idea of reading something the reader should not be 
able to read; of seeing something he should not be able to see.
The peepshow in its literal sense is another form of war entertainment quite 
similar to the war re-enactments on stage I will discuss later on. Travelling 
peepshows in the Dutch Republic (called rarekiek, literally: ‘rare view’) and in 
other parts of Europe confronted the public with scenes of foreign towns and 
landscapes. The battlefield was one of the peculiarities, or ‘worlds beyond one’s 
self ’, that showmen at fairs presented to the public in a wooden box with a 
13    Krook, Staatkunde, 26.
14    Cf. Donald Haks, Vaderland & Vrede 1672–1713. Publiciteit over de Nederlandse Republiek in 
oorlog (Hilversum: Verloren, 2013), 194–196.
15    Mary A. Favret, ‘War Correspondence. Reading Romantic War,’ Prose Studies 19:2 (1996): 
173–185, 180–181.
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looking glass, as Richard Balzer writes in his history of the peepshow in Europe: 
‘In an era when individual lives were constrained by time and space, the box 
suggested escape from the boundaries of daily lives and gave a glimpse of a 
world beyond one’s self.’16 Through a system of mirrors and lenses, these shows 
confronted their audience with movements of some cut-out paper images of 
troops and their generals, ready to meet each other in battle. The showman of 
the early peepshows was able to change the scenes quite rapidly, by pulling a 
string, with tape connected to the top of the print, to manipulate the views.17
Showmen had to be first-rate storytellers in order to focus and keep the 
viewers’ attention on their shows. Many of them were wandering Savoyards, 
and a large group of showmen were disabled soldiers. Their shows often led to 
comic misunderstandings, at least in a Dutch satirical poem by Jan Pook about 
a military peepshow of the Battle of Wijnendale and the Siege of Lille (1708),18 
with a harlequin as showman and villager ‘Jaap’ passing by:
Harlequin:
Look through the small glass: look
There you will see, on your right hand
The General, from every side:
Monsieur Vendoom, Bourgon, Berri:
Brave Generals, marching all three
With their armies around Lille.
Jaap:
Yes, but where’s the fight?
Harlequin:
 Will follow!
Wait a little bit. So, now you see,
Them sitting next to each other:
Could you see how that heap is talking?
Jaap:
Well, what’s this?
Harlequin:
 That’s the war council.19
16    Richard Balzer, Peepshows. A visual history (New York: Abrams, 1998), 20–43.
17    Balzer, Peepshows, 12.
18    Cf. Haks, Vaderland & Vrede 1672–1713, 202–205. Haks refers to Jan van Gyzen as the author 
of this poem. The edition of Pook may be plagiarism.
19    ‘Harlequin: Kyk deur die glaasje maar: daar ziet, / Daar ziet jy, aan die rekt’re hante / De 
Generaals, aan alle kante: / Mesjeurs Vendoom, Bourgon, Berri, / Braav Generaals, trekke 
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Figure 10.1 Showman with peepshow. ‘Eerste Harlequin’, from: Jan Pook, Rommelzoodje.
Eerste Harlequin, reizende met zijn Rarekiek (Amsterdam: Timotheus ten 
Hoorn, 1709), fol. 19. 
university library, ghent
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It may come as unexpected that this impatient viewer Jaap has presented 
himself in the preceding verses as a newspaper reader. It is through reading 
that he already knows about the battles the showman presents. The Battle of 
Wijnendale is not new to him, and Jaap refers to his disappointing reading 
experience concerning the battle reports in the newspapers:
Jaap: I have to see this, or I would be a fool!
Yes, it must be funny, for sure!
I just read, today, the newspaper,
But there was not a single word
In print, saying straight
The French, if they, long ago,
Won something, or did something remarkable,
Because, they only show us
How swift-footed they are.20
Apart from his focus on the ‘rare’ and remarkable aspects of a war act, Jaap 
also differentiates between a battle report in the newspapers, which represents 
movements but not the fight itself, and what he expects to see during the peep-
show. It is the spectacle of the fight Jaap is interested in, and he could not 
care less about names, troop movements, war councils, or any details about the 
generals who were traveling through the Southern Netherlands. What interests 
him is to see the fight, to get the key moment of the battle visualized, especially 
when the soldiers are ready to attack each other with their naked swords.
The French-coloured vocabulary of the showman, which seems to 
strengthen the stereotype of the showman as a Frenchman or Walloon, could 
also be seen as a caricature of abstruse newspaper language, as it causes a lot 
of confusion between Jaap and Harlequin. The attack of comte de la Mothe, 
for instance, is understood by Jaap as the circling of a moth (mot in Dutch) 
and the word retireeren (to retire) turns out to be no part of Jaap’s vocabulary, 
alle drie, / De leger nou veur Ryssel omme. / Jaap: Ja, maar waar ‘s ’t vechte: Harl.: Ze zel 
komme: / Wackt maar ien beekje. Nou, zie je daar, / Hum alle drie zit by malkaar: / Zie 
jy hoe dat hum zootje praate? / Jaap: Wel we tzel dat? Harl.: Dat ’s krygsferate; [. . .].’ Jan 
Pook: Rommelzoodje. Eerste Harlequin, reizende met zijn Rarekiek (Amsterdam: Timotheus 
ten Hoorn, 1709), 25–26 [translation CvdH].
20    ‘Jaap: Dat mòt ik zien, of ‘k bin ien guit! / Wel, dat mòt zeper koddig wezen! / ‘k Heb nog, 
van Daag, de Krant elezen, / En daar stond niet ien enkeld woord. / Gedrukt in, dat nou 
rechtevoord / De Fransen, of veur lang eleden, / Wet wonnen, of wet wonders deden; / As, 
dat zy altyd laten zien, / Hoe gaauw dat zy luy zyn ter bien: [. . .].’ Pook, Rommelzoodje, 25.
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while Jaap is also mystified by the numbers of the different squadrons.21 Jaap 
is a newspaper reader with a very low level of ‘war literacy’, and it is the spec-
tacle that fascinates him, not the facts behind the war. The visualisation of the 
battlefield enables Jaap to ‘enjoy’ the war not in its appearance as a collection 
of dry military strategic facts, but as an experience of the battlefield ‘as if it 
were real’, which occurs for instance when Harlequin tries to clarify some cha-
otic scenes in the box, like comte de la Mothe fleeing, blinded and disoriented 
by the smoke of the gunfire, from the battlefield.22
The depiction of the battlefield in this peepshow is of course very different 
from the way in which a military map confronts the public with the details 
of a war (see for instance fig. 10.3). The military map functions like an icon 
of both military knowledge, state power and territorial claims, depicted as a 
paper landscape with silent lines, as a ‘socially empty space, functioning as 
both metaphor and metonym for political domination.’23 Whereas the mili-
tary map thus hold to the abstraction of the professional, distant view from 
above, theatrical representations like the peepshows explored different ways 
of ‘seeing’ at once. On an etching by Romeyn de Hooghe for instance (fig. 10.2), 
published and distributed as a pamphlet, we clearly see the battle of Blenheim 
of 1704 depicted, on the one hand, from a professional, distanced point of view, 
taking the position of the general who overlooks the battlefield from a hill. 
This slightly elevated perspective enables the etcher to depict and foreground 
all of the twenty-six heroes of Blenheim, but he avoids letting these heroes 
determine the whole scene. Like the numerous soldiers and officers in the 
background, they seem to be totally absorbed in the baroque spectacle of war. 
Looking closer however, we discover a totally different face of war: the pain, 
horror, fear and anger of the dramatically shadowed faces, bodies and horses 
in the forefront, and the minor figures in the background.
The tension between a distanced overview of the battlefield as a whole and 
the proximity of emotions, pain, and death that becomes visible when observ-
ing the details of the etching is similar to the tension that could be related to 
other theatrical imaginations of the battlefield. The reader or viewer shares 
the professional perspective, but this seemingly distanced and detached look 
on the fighting masses hides another view that allows for much more atten-
tion to the details of the fight. De Hooghe’s etching pays attention not only to 
the movements and fighting as such—the sword flashes Jaap wants to see—
but also to the faces of the fighting soldiers, which show a range of emotions, 
21    Ibid., 20, 26.
22    Ibid., 28.
23    Chatherine Mary McLoughlin, Authoring War: The Literary Representation of War from the 
Iliad to Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 88.
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thus providing insight into a more personal experience of combat. The viewer, 
however, like the peepshow audience, has to break through the distanced over-
all perspective in order to recognize these details. He needs the words of the 
showman to learn more about the sensual experiences behind the scene, about 
smoke and confusion for instance. His eyes have to be directed to the depicted 
individuals in order to see what is actually happening on the battlefield, not 
only in relation to the troops, masses, and the changing lines of attack, but also 
in relation to the feelings of the individual soldiers, officers and generals who 
carry out these movements.
 War Journalism on Stage
Before the allegorical ‘peace play’ Staatkunde was performed in the 
Amsterdam municipal theatre to celebrate the Peace of Utrecht and to stage 
the triumph of the European ‘theatre of diplomacy,’ three spectacular ‘war 
Figure 10.2 Coloured etching of the Battle of Blenheim. Romeyn de Hooghe, Zegen by 
Hoogstad op de Fransen en Beyersen door S.H: Marlbourg en Pr. Eugenius van 
Savoyen verkreegen (Amsterdam: Pieter Schenck, 1704).
rijksmuseum amsterdam
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Figure 10.3 Map of the Battle of Wijnendale. Jacobus Harrewijn, De l’Action entre le Corps 
des troupes Alliez Commandé par le G. Maj. Webb. Contre l’Armée des 
François Commandé par le Comte de la Motte aupres de Wynendale le 28. 
Sept. 1708 (Brussels: Eugene Henri Fricx, s.a.).
university library, ghent
plays’ ( oorlogsspelen) were performed in the years of the War of the Spanish 
Succession. Daniël Kroon and Enoch Krook were the authors of these plays, 
which contain re-enactments of the most important battles of the war: 
Blenheim (1704), Ramillies (1706), Oudenaarde (1708) and the siege of Lille 
(1708).24 The war spectacle on stage, illuminated with performances (tableaux 
vivants), music and dances, was intended to impress the public visually and 
with sound effects. The seventeenth-century Dutch patriotic discourse of 
civic self-defence is more or less absent from these plays and replaced by the 
 personal heroism of some generals who defend the country, not as citizens but 
24    Door Yver Bloeid de Kunst [motto of the authors Daniel Kroon and Enoch Krook], De 
roemruchtige zegepraal van de veldslag bij Hoogstet (Amsterdam: Lescailje, 1704); Het ver-
loste Brabant en Vlaanderen, door de veldslag bij Rammellies (Amsterdam: Lescailje, 1706); 
De nederlaag der Seine, door de veldslag bij Oudenaarde, ’t bemachtigen van Rijssel, en ver-
dere overwinningen (Amsterdam: Lescailje, 1709).
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as military professionals, like Prince Eugene of Savoy, John Churchill duke of 
Marlborough and Prince John William Friso. These heroes, however, remain 
flat characters and appear on stage only during silent performances.
A remarkable aspect of the three Amsterdam ‘war plays’ is the fact that they 
do not present military power itself as an acting force. The performances serve 
as a kind of spectacular ‘furnishing’ of the real actions, carried out mainly by 
allegorical characters. The military is presented in tableaux vivants that in a 
way unite the different actors on the battlefield: both generals and common 
soldiers silently perform the spectacular happenings that took place dur-
ing recent war acts. In the spectacle play about the Battle of Blenheim—De 
 roemruchtige zegepraal van de veldslag bij Hoogstet (1704)—the princes and 
generals direct the clashes between the different armies, but only during the 
silent performances:
First Performance: In the forefront of the stage stands Prince Eugenius on 
the one, and the Elector of Bavaria on the other side, each with his Officers 
and Soldiers, who are at grips. [. . .]
Second Performance: A new scene: Marlbough, Hessenkassel, Hompesch, 
with other Officers and Soldiers, are pursuing the fleeing Enemies.25
The tableaux vivants were intended to show the public lively images of military 
actions that took place far from home, but their patriotic rhetoric is obligatory 
and hardly has any affective function. The main appeal of the play is the visual 
spectacle of shootings, bloodshed, and scenes of dying soldiers. The military 
operations as such are presented in quite a stiff way, but the horror of the war 
is painted in lively colours:
Third Performance: After an explanation the prospect is lifted, after 
which we see the Danube; which the Enemies, with crowds, jump into; 
while one sees out of the River now and then People, and Horse Heads, 
going down and under.26
25    ‘Op de Voorgrond van het Tooneel staat Prins Eugenius aan de eene, en den Keurvorst 
van Beyeren aan de andere zyde, yder met zyn Bevelhebbers en Soldaaten, die met elkan-
deren handgemeen zyn. [. . .] Hier gaat een Verschiet op, en vertoond zich Marlbourg, 
Hessenkassel, Hompesch, met andere Bevelhebbers en Soldaaten, die de vlugtende 
Vyanden vervolgen.’ Door Yver Bloeid de Kunst [motto of the author Enoch Krook], De 
roemruchtige zegepraal van de veldslag bij Hoogstet (Amsterdam: Lescailje, 1704), 37–38.
26    ‘Na deze Uitlegging gaat ‘er weder een Verschiet op, alwaar men den Donau ziet; daar 
de Vyanden, met menigten, in springen; terwyl men uit den Stroom somtyds Menschen, 
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These spectacular performances in the Amsterdam Schouwburg are strongly 
focused on the visual and auditory appeal of battlefield scenes. With special 
effects, including smoke, shouting, sounds of shootings, and ‘war music’, the 
important battles of the War of the Spanish Succession are transformed into 
a kind of early modern multi-media experience. In some cases, the presenta-
tion of the battle is even multi-layered, with a tableau in the forefront of the 
stage, and another tableau in the background which had to represent the com-
plex character of battle with simultaneous attacks from the flanks as well as 
from behind.27
The perspective of the audience in these Amsterdam battle plays is tied 
up with the distanced perspective of the strategist or with that of the official 
reporter (the explicator of the performances) who is above all an observer 
and does not take part in the event itself. The heroes of the play remain flat 
characters, commanders without any script who seem to endure their perfor-
mances rather than directing or even experiencing them. The role of the actor 
who recites the verses explaining the tableaux vivants could be compared with 
both the role of the newspaper editor and the role of the showmen of peep-
shows. The explanations of what is shown on stage are primarily meant to be 
 informative, but they are also of course interpretations of the battle and are 
often combined with a political, Dutch military propaganda frame. On the 
other hand, post-battle commentating voices referring to the chaos of war, 
the streams of blood, the turmoil, the fear of the soldiers, the steam, and the 
smoke, reveal how participants in war are sensually and emotionally affected 
by the battlefield experience.28
Suffering and pain are presented not just with words but also with sounds. 
The above-mentioned war music resounds during a discussion between the 
allegorical characters about the more abstract political effects of the war. 
Here we see a direct confrontation of allegory representing a distanced politi-
cal and ideological framing of the battle with war as a sensual and auditory 
experience. In the second Amsterdam war play—Het verloste Braband en 
Vlaanderen (1706)—about the battle of Ramillies, sounds and cries literally 
disturb the political interpretation of the facts in a dialogue between the ‘Dyl’ 
river, ‘Flanders,’ and ‘Braband;’ forcing these characters into a more affective 
en Paerdehoofden, op en onder ziet gaan.’ Door Yver Bloeid de Kunst, De roemruchtige 
zegepraal, 38.
27    Ibid., 22–23.
28    Ibid., 32–33.
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response towards the facts of war.29 Both these auditory intermezzos and the 
silent performances show that early modern theatre was able to break through 
the detached perspective of the political commentator and that it could chal-
lenge the audience to be all eyes and ears and cast a closer look at the spec-
tacle, which also aimed at representing the sensual reality of war itself.
 Conclusion
The representations of war and diplomacy in eighteenth-century Dutch the-
atre, peepshows, and re-enactments on stage discussed here showcase the 
range of early modern ‘theatrical’ imaginations of what was happening on 
Europe’s battlefields and in the rooms of negotiating diplomats. The tableaux 
vivants and dialogues of Krook’s ‘peace play’ Staatkunde (1713) stage the theatre 
of diplomacy as an object of public interest. Diplomatic handbooks also high-
light the image of the diplomat as a performer who needs acting skills in order 
to represent and ‘play’ sovereign power in public. Krook’s play addresses the 
public attention for the negotiations that would lead to the Peace of Utrecht, 
but it also discusses the principles on which these negotiations should be 
based. The allegorical characters who represent the suffering and fighting 
nations are transformed into impersonations of prudence and negotiating 
qualities, more explicitly represented by the main character ‘Politics’ and his 
helpers. The peace play enables the audience not only to imagine the world of 
negotiating powers, but also to learn about the political principles of balance 
of power and the rules of international diplomacy.
The incomprehensible idiom and exotic jargon of diplomats and the mili-
tary are satirically spotlighted in the poem that describes a travelling peepshow 
about the Battle of Wijnendale. These travelling peepshows enabled the public 
in small villages and towns in the Dutch countryside to see and experience the 
spectacular theatres of war which were absent from everyday life in the Dutch 
Republic in the early eighteenth century. The technique of looking through a 
glass in order to discover a distant world also transforms a public event into 
a private experience. The peepshow not only brought the war, as a miniature 
29    ‘De Dyl: Kund gy dat krygsalarm, dat veldgeschrei niet hooren? / Hier word weêr gerucht 
van binnen gemaakt. / Braband: Ach! ach! ik schrik, helaas! voor deeze naare klank.’ 
Translation: De Dyl: Can’t you here that battle alarm, these war cries? Again, noises can be 
heard, from within. Braband: Oh! oh! I am frightened, alas! for this horrible sound.’ Door 
Yver Bloeid de Kunst, Het verloste Braband en Vlaanderen door den Veldslag bij Rammellies 
(Amsterdam: Lescailje, 1706), 29.
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battle, back to the towns and villages of the Dutch Republic of the early eigh-
teenth century; it also (re)connected the experience of war with the citizen’s 
private sphere. It transformed battles into attractive and convenient theatrical 
events, but it also confronted the audience with its own role as an observer of 
war events, which became clear in the references made by ‘Jaap’, who explicitly 
refers to his own role as a newspaper reader and critically reflects on the con-
fusing information flow about military operations.
The above-discussed ‘theatres’ as ways of seeing and experiencing distant 
acts of war and diplomacy relate various genres in their attempts to open up the 
experience of battles and peace negotiations to a larger audience than just mil-
itary professionals and diplomats. Playing with the tension between distance 
and closeness on different levels, the peepshows and re-enactments explore 
various modes of combining more factual war representations with theatrical 
displays that had to attract curious spectators and ‘to satisfy the fancy of their 
eyes’, as it is the aim of ‘Dame Curiosity’ in the Amsterdam peace play of 1713. 
Showmen and explicicators are essential ‘actors’ during these performances, 
drawing attention to meaningful details that tend to be overlooked or misun-
derstood by the audience. Musical and auditory intermezzos provide the audi-
ence a sensual experience of the actions taking place at far-away battlezones 
or around Europe’s negotiation tables. The strategic overview of the spectacle 
of war often interacts with the intimacy of faces and voices that interrupt the 
spectator’s detached enjoyment of a distant battle. The friction between diplo-
macy as a distant representational event (viz. signing a peace treaty) and the 
harsh reality behind the scenes of diplomatic business (the negotiations) may 
be less painful or disruptive, but still confronts us with the twofold function of 
early modern theatre as an instrument for mediating experiences from a dis-
tant world and fostering personal identification, while simultaneously allow-
ing for enjoying that distance and the spectacles related to it.
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CHAPTER 11
Performance and Propaganda in Spanish America 
during the War of the Spanish Succession
Aaron Alejandro Olivas
In September 1708, the royal officials of Caracas submitted to the Spanish 
crown a zealous handwritten account of their nine-day festivities commemo-
rating the birth of Don Luis, the prince of Asturias. Held a year earlier, the 
celebrations honouring the new-born heir to the throne included public 
acclamations of Philip V as true king of Spain, followed by illuminations, mili-
tary and religious processions, and a banquet hosted by French slave traders. 
Despite the hardships endured throughout the Caribbean during the War of 
the Spanish Succession, the spectacles in Venezuela also facilitated the col-
lection of ten thousand pesos in silver for the urgencies of the Bourbons’ 
European and North African campaigns. More importantly for local elites, 
however, the account served as an opportunity to discredit ‘idle voices’ circu-
lating from Havana that the caraqueños had recently proclaimed Archduke 
Charles as their sovereign with the aide of Dutch forces in Curaçao—allies of 
the Habsburgs. Such an incident had notoriously occurred in Venezuela in 1702 
and had required immediate counteraction. Six years later, the royal officials 
needed the account of their celebrations for the prince of Asturias to reassure 
Philip V of his ‘reacclamation’ by the populace as well as their full commitment 
to the Bourbon dynasty’s objectives in the war: victory over the enemy Dutch 
and English, the defence of a united Spanish monarchy, and the preservation 
of the Catholic faith.1
Spectacle accounts such as these have provided scholars with rich source 
material for understanding the experiences of the War of the Spanish 
Succession as a global conflict—above all, the uncertainty and disorder the 
war provoked in the Iberian Atlantic World. The crown’s particular demands 
for wartime spectacles and their execution by viceregal officials were supposed 
to emphasize the coherence of a single monarchy working together in a time 
of crisis to preserve Bourbon rule over the Spanish empire. Nonetheless, while 
Spanish colonial accounts do convey a sense of shared imperial struggle, they 
1    Cabildo of Caracas to Philip V, Caracas, 3 September 1708, Archivo General de Indias 
(AGI), Santo Domingo, 717.
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also expose a heightened sense of discord and rivalry between social groups, 
cities, and even competing European empires as a result of the dynastic transi-
tion. These public performances do in fact emphasize the larger connections 
Spanish-American subjects had to the succession crisis as well as their role 
in its final conclusion and victory. Among other things, these acclamations of 
Philip V demonstrate the importance of public rituals in legitimizing politi-
cal authority, reinforcing unity within the Hispanic monarchy, and mediating 
local concerns in late colonial Spanish America.
Legitimizing the new dynasty’s rule over Spanish America—the world’s 
most important silver-producing region—was an urgent concern for Philip V 
and his closest advisors. Although it was unclear whether or not armed con-
flict would erupt in Europe, by November 1700 ministers of state in Madrid 
were convinced that the succession and subsequent ‘Union of the Two Crowns’ 
between Spain and France would prompt the English and the Dutch to insti-
gate a war in the Americas. These fears were well-founded, as evident in the 
outbreak of violence in the Caribbean and Pacific Rim beginning in the sum-
mer of 1702 and lasting through the end of 1712. As colonial correspondence 
and wartime maps suggest, the Habsburgs’ allies responded to the dynastic 
quarrel in Europe with a commercial war targeting the silver fleets and prin-
cipal Spanish-American trade routes.2 Throughout this period, Anglo-Dutch 
agents used both aggressive measures (such as commerce raiding) and peaceful 
means (such as pamphleteering and smuggling) in their attempts to persuade 
Spanish colonial subjects to recognize Habsburg sovereignty as a challenge to 
Philip V’s alliance with the French.3
2    Pierre Mortier, Téâtre de la guerre en Amerique telle qu’elle est à present possedée par les 
Espagnols, Anglois, François, et Hollandois &c. (Amsterdam: P. Mortier, 1703). For example, 
Mortier’s map highlights important Spanish colonial trade routes targeted by the Dutch and 
English navies in the Caribbean. By the end of the seventeenth century, the viceroyalties of 
New Spain and Peru had become the world’s most lucrative markets for African slaves and 
European manufactured goods (above all, luxury textiles)—demands stimulated by the min-
ing economies of Northern Mexico and the Andes.
3    David Marley’s Wars of the Americas: a Chronology of Armed Conflict in the Western 
Hemisphere (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2008) offers the broadest overview of the military 
history of Spanish America during the War of the Spanish Succession. Charles Arnade and 
W. Stitt Robinson have written about the earliest skirmishs in Spanish Florida and the 
northern borderlands. J. Ignacio Rubio Mañé deals with confrontations between novohis-
panic militias and Jamaican privateers and logwood cutters in the Yucatan Peninsula in 
El Virreinato, Vol. III: Expansión y defensa (Mexico City: Universidad Autónoma de México, 
1983). Carla Rahn Phillips, Charles Boxer, and Eduardo Brazão have written about major 
naval battles such as the English admiral Charles Wager’s assalt on the Peruvian silver fleet at 
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From the start of Philip V’s rule, the Spanish crown counted on a deliberate pro-
gram of spectacles to safeguard Spanish-American loyalties from such enemy 
assaults.4 The official proclamation regarding the succession—delayed due to 
a disagreement between the king and the Council of the Indies over colonial 
defence—first arrived in Veracruz on March 3, 1701 with orders for the admiral 
of the silver fleet and all royal officials to honour a clause in Carlos II’s tes-
tament to immediately display of the pendón (royal standard) in recognition 
of Bourbon succession even before proceeding with the exequies for the late 
king. A clear break with standard ceremonial protocol, the urgency of this ini-
tial spectacle was meant to ensure instant legitimization of the political transi-
tion in the face of potential resistance among the colonial populace—whether 
inspired by Anglo-Dutch propaganda or any lingering sympathies for the 
Caragena de Indias (1708) and the French corsair René Duguay-Trouin’s victory at the battle 
of Rio de Janeiro (1711).
4    David González Cruz, ‘Propaganda y estrategias de legitimación de la sucesión en los 
dominios de la Monarquía Hispánica (1700–1714),’ in La sucesión de la Monarquía Hispánica, 
1665–1725: biografías relevantes y procesos complejos, ed. José Manuel Bernardo Ares (Madrid: 
Sílex, 2009), 201–203.
Figure 11.1 Téâtre de la guerre en Amerique telle qu’elle est à present possedée par les 
Espagnols, Anglois, François, et Hollandois &c. (Amsterdam: P. Mortier, 1703). 
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Habsburgs.5 Again, the crown’s concerns were rather justified. Public knowl-
edge of disloyalty among certain elites in Spain spread to Spanish America at 
the same time as the succession proclamation and continued to be a popular 
source of gossip throughout the war.6 Although these cases did not immedi-
ately inspire colonial disloyalty, later ones—such as uprisings in Cremona and 
Naples and the defection of the Admiral of Castile to the Habsburg cause—
influenced sedition and conspiracies in places such as Caracas (1702), Panama 
City (1704), and Mexico City (1707).7
The use of public ceremonies as inoculation against colonial Austriacism 
may have had its limits, yet it was still highly successful for conveying propa-
ganda for the new dynasty. Such ceremonies, of course, were a common part 
of the everyday lives of Spanish-American subjects, much like in other parts 
of the Spanish Empire. The most expected of these festivals, known as  fiestas 
de tabla, were official holidays approved by the crown and based on the litur-
gical calendar, with the exception of the años del rey (king’s birthday), and 
the años de la reina, (queen’s birthday). Even these were marked by Catholic 
overtones but also constant references to Bourbon military progresses. The 
Spanish crown exerted control over public festivals to the extent that com-
munities were legally obligated to celebrate the fiestas de tabla and any other 
holidays demanded by the monarch. To ensure the celebration of the approved 
festivals, fiestas de tabla were required by law to be marked on tables or charts 
and displayed publically, both in religious spaces—such cathedrals and 
5    Víctor Mínguez Cornelles, ‘Imperio y muerte: las exequias de Carlos II y el fin de la dinastía 
a ambas orillas del Atlántico,’ in Arte, poder e identidad en Iberoamérica: de los virreinatos a 
la construction nacional, ed. Inmaculada Rodríquez Moy (Castellón de la Plana: Universitat 
Jaume I, 2008), 33–43; María José del Río Barredo, ‘Los rituales públicos de Madrid en el cam-
bio de dinastía (1700–1710),’ in Philip V y su tiempo, ed. Eliseo Serrano (Zaragoza: Institución 
Fernando el Católico, 2004), II: 736–737. The decree sent to Spanish America was dated a 
mere three days after the public acclamation of Philip V in Madrid spectacles. It reached 
Lima by 27 April 1701. The matter of raising the pendón had even been a concern in Madrid, 
where the regency council accelerated the staging of Philip V’s acclamation ceremony to 
24 November 1700—within forty-eight hours of Louis XIV’s acceptance of the will and five 
months before the new king made his entry into the capital—in order to discourage any 
Habsburg pretensions.
6    Antonio de Robles, Diario de Sucesos Notables (1665–1703), vol. 3, ed. Antonio Castro Leal 
(Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, S.A., 1946), 145; 157–159.
7    AGI, Escribanía 690A; AGI, México 661; François-Amboise Daubenton de Villebois to the 
comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 22 June 1704, ANF, Marine, B7 232, fol. 52–53.
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churches—and secular spaces—such as the halls of municipal councils and 
royal courtrooms.8
Royal officials in the viceroyalties would be notified of additional holi-
days by the arrival of proclamations from the Spanish court. These were 
required to be announced in public squares by pregoneros—town criers usu-
ally of Indigenous or African descent. Ecclesiastical and secular officials were 
required by law to participate in these celebrations as well as plan many of the 
festivities, otherwise face penalties. For example, during the acclamation cer-
emony for Philip V, there was a 10 peso fine imposed on any royal official who 
neglected to participate in illuminations along the parade route of the pendón, 
the symbolic representation of the absentee monarch. Heavier fines could be 
expected at the end of an official’s term in office if he was denounced to the 
crown in his juicio de residencia, or trial of residence, for lack of participation 
in spectacles.9
Although the crown was insistent about the celebration of specific holidays 
and events, it seldom stipulated how these public festivals should be cele-
brated, leaving communities at liberty to mark these occasions ‘in the man-
ner most accustomed’—a common phrase in the decrees. Therefore, royal 
officials, municipal magistrates, and local clergy could determine for them-
selves the number of days and the types of festivities for each holiday. As such, 
their planning and execution became a central duty in the careers of colonial 
authorities—and one that could be used to advance them.10
Spanish colonial subjects witnessed a prodigious series of festivals dur-
ing the War of the Spanish Succession, as Philip V demanded the major 
events of his succession and the war to be celebrated throughout the empire. 
Each of these celebrations reminded royal officials and the general populace 
alike of the Union of the Two Crowns—Spain’s dynastic alliance with France 
that was also political, economic, military, and religious in nature. These  public 
 spectacles can be grouped together in three categories: celebrations of mile-
stones in the lives of the members of the Bourbon dynasty, celebrations of 
8     Alejandro Cañeque, The King’s Living Image: the Culture and Politics of Viceregal Power in 
Colonial Mexico (New York: Routledge, 2004), 132–142.
9     Miguel Ángel Marín, ‘El sonido de una ciudad pequeña en tiempos de Philip V,’ in Philip V 
y su tiempo, ed. Eliseo Serrano (Zaragoza: Institución Fernando el Católico, 2004), II: 18–19.
10    Mínguez, ‘Imperio y muerte,’ 17–51; Frances L. Ramos, ‘Succession and Death: Royal 
Ceremonies in Colonial Puebla,’ The Americas 60:2 (2003): 185–215. Mínguez and Ramos 
have noted the importance of local variation and ingenuity in Bourbon spectacles in both 
colonial Mexico City and Puebla de los Ángeles.
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Bourbon military victories, and the celebration of a new war-related religious 
holiday.11
Of the celebrations pertaining to the royal family, the first and most imme-
diate events commemorated Philip V’s arrival in Madrid, his acclamation as 
king of Spain, and the king’s marriage to Maria Luisa of Savoy—all of which 
occurred between 1701 and 1702. These were followed between 1707 and 1709 
by celebrations for the pregnancy of the queen, which required acts of thanks-
giving for her good health, festivities commemorating the eventual birth of 
don Luis, prince of Asturias, and—at age two—the prince’s jura as successor 
to the throne. Celebrations for the birth of the king’s second son, the Infante 
Ferdinand, followed in 1713. Similar festivities dedicated to royal births had not 
been celebrated in the Spanish Empire in over forty years, as Carlos II pro-
duced no heirs during his reign. There were also important spectacles com-
memorating royal deaths, which took place between 1711–1715. These not only 
commemorated the 1714 passing of Queen Maria Luisa of Savoy but also deaths 
among the Bourbons of France, such as Philip V’s father, the Dauphin, who 
died 1711, and the king’s brothers, the Duke of Burgundy and the Duke of Berry, 
who died in 1711 and 1712 respectively. Later the death of Louis XIV in 1715 was 
observed throughout the Spanish colonies as well-commemorated in Mexico 
City with a catafalque in the cathedral.12
Celebrations for Bourbon military victories focused on the peninsular cam-
paigns of the War of the Spanish Succession, although news of the Italian and 
Northern European campaigns circulated widely. The most important military 
celebrations revolved around the recapture of Madrid from the Allied army 
in 1706 and 1710, the battle of Almansa in 1707, the 1709 victories along the 
Portuguese border, and the successive victories at Zaragoza, Brihuega, and 
Villaviciosa between 1710–1711. Likewise, in 1711, Philip V proclaimed a new 
religious holiday, known as the Celebration of the Holy Sacrament, in the 
wake of the Allied retreat from Castile. This event was observed in December, 
on the Sunday after the Immaculate Conception, as an annual votive fiesta 
 commemorating the sacrileges committed by the Habsburgs’ allies,  particularly 
Anglo-Dutch pillaging of Castilian churches and their desecration of the 
Eucharist at many of these religious sites. According to a Franciscan  sermon 
11    Del Río, ‘Los rituales públicos de Madrid,’ 752. These colonial spectacles followed patterns 
set by court ceremonial in Madrid, which were equally propagandistic in nature.
12    Victor Mínguez, ‘La imagen de Luis XIV en sus exequias novohispanas: la “Flor Francesa” 
y el ‘Espeso de Príncipes,”’ in Tiempos de Latinoamérica, ed. M. Chust, V. Mínguez, and 
V. Ortells (Castellón de la Plana: Biblioteca de la Universitat Jaume I), 85–112.
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from the celebrations in Puebla, Philip V’s reverence for the Immaculate 
Conception and the Eucharist would unquestionably assure his victory in the 
war.13
We get a sense of just how excessive this sequence of dynastic holidays, 
military commemorations, and religious ceremonies could be in a 1710 letter 
from the Audiencia of Guadalajara to the viceroy of New Spain. In the letter, 
the president of the audiencia noted that work on the city’s aqueduct had 
been set back a good eight years due to the length of the wartime festivities, 
their expense, and the resulting incapacity of the city’s laborers due to con-
tinuous drunkenness—the ban on mescal having been lifted at the begin-
ning of Philip V’s reign for such special occasions.14 Nonetheless, Philip V’s 
heavy demand for spectacles in Spanish America can be considered part of a 
larger Bourbon strategy to winning a global war. The governments of Philip V 
and Louis XIV expected the wealth of Spanish America to finance the war in 
Europe, given the wide circulation of silver and gold specie in the Spanish 
colonies.15 Hence the growing multitude of public celebrations during the war 
served as fundraising opportunities to tap into that wealth through the request 
of donativos, or voluntary donations to the crown. Along with the benefits of 
Spanish American trade, donativos acted as vital sources of revenue for the 
Bourbons, and by-and-large contributed to prolonging the war. The crown’s 
requests for such donativos in New Spain and Peru always coincided with 
public holidays: for example, the first donativo declared in 1701 for the relief of 
Ceuta and Oran in Spanish North Africa, two general ones for the urgencies of 
the war in 1703 and 1705, three for the Catalan campaigns in 1707, 1713, and 1714, 
several requests in the 1710s for endeavours in Naples, and the last in 1715 for 
the reconquest of Mallorca.16
Although donations were supposed to be voluntary, in reality they were 
expected, and the ability to collect them could make or break the career of a 
13    ‘A los virreyes del Perú y Nueva España, gobernadores, arzobispos, obispos, y ciudades de 
ambos reinos para que en todas las iglesias de sus territorios se celebre una fiesta votiva 
anual en el día que se señala a Nuestro Señor Sacramentado en desagravio de los ultrajes 
que le fueron hechos por los enemigos de la religión,’ Corella, 19 June 1711, AGI, Indiferente 
General 432, fol. 230v–233r.
14    Toribio Rodríguez de Solís to the Duke of Alburquerque, Guadalajara, 30 September 1710, 
Archivo General de la Nación Mexicana, Reales Cédulas Originales 34, fol. 99r–106v.
15    François-Amboise Daubenton de Villebois to the comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 26 
October 1703, Archives Nationales de France (ANF), Marine, B7 229, fol. 221r–226r.
16    The file AGI Indiferente General 431 (book 45) gives testimony to the crown’s incessant 
call for colonial donativos throughout the war.
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royal official. For example, the Duke of Alburquerque, viceroy of New Spain, 
was rewarded with the toison de oro and a longer term in office for success-
fully raising one million pesos during the 1707 celebrations for the birth of the 
prince of Asturias. By contrast, the marquis of Castelldosrius, viceroy of Peru, 
did not appear as useful to the crown in this regard, which in part led to his 
disgrace by 1708.17
Public spectacles were also geared towards controlling information about 
the progresses of the war, as the crown hoped to prevent the possibility 
of wavering loyalties by publicizing through celebrations the successes of 
Bourbon troops and Philip V’s fulfilment of his duties as king—above all, to 
protect the foral privileges of his subjects and produce heirs. Both the courts 
of Madrid and Versailles were quite concerned about conveying an impression 
across the Atlantic that the Bourbons were winning the war in order to com-
bat pro-Habsburg propaganda campaigns led by the English and the Dutch. 
Particularly after 1704, the English secretaries of the Southern Department—
Hedges and Sunderland—and also the directors of the Dutch West India 
Company encouraged colonial governors in Jamaica and Curaçao to take a 
non-violent approach to the war by using smugglers to disperse engravings 
of the Archduke and Spanish-language pamphlets, gazettes, and amnesty 
decrees throughout Spanish America. The objective was to implant doubts 
about Bourbon sovereignty, raise anxieties about the intentions of the French, 
and promise arms and naval support should Spanish colonial subjects revolt in 
the name of the Archduke. Naturally, the campaigns were also geared towards 
boosting Anglo-Dutch trade, with the assumption that once Archduke Charles 
was firmly in place on the throne and recognized as king of Spain, England 
and the Netherlands would be granted the Spanish colonial trade privileges 
enjoyed by the French under Philip V.18 Similar propaganda campaigns were 
17    ‘Memorandum,’ Madrid, 14 March 1707, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de 
France (AE), Correspondance Politique, Espagne, 167, fol. 73r–74v; Michel-Jean Amelot 
de Gournay to Louis XIV, Madrid, March 17, 1707, AE, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, 
167, fol. 77r–80r; Louis XIV to Michel-Jean Amelot de Gournay, Fontainebleau, 30 July 
1708, AE, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, 181, fol. 115r–116v; Michel-Jean Amelot de 
Gournay to Louis XIV, Madrid, 13 August 1708, AE, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, 181, 
fol. 203r–208r.
18    For example, see Sir Charles Hedges to Thomas Handasyde, Saint James’s, 4 May 1704, 
Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies, Volume 22: 1704–1705, ed. Cecil 
Headlam (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1916), 111–123; the Earl of Sunderland 
to Thomas Handasyde, Windsor, 19 July 1708, in Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America 
and West Indies, Volume 24: 1708–1709, ed. Cecil Headlam (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, 1922), 37.
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highly effective in Catalonia and Valencia, and did in fact  contribute to an out-
cropping of cases of disloyalty and sedition among elites in Spanish America 
and the Philippines, which spanned the entire duration of the war. The most 
common crimes were those of lese majesté and sedition, either by word of 
mouth or by circulating enemy pamphlets and engravings. However, there were 
also cases of actual interest in inciting revolts in the name of the Archduke 
with Anglo-Dutch aide.19
To conclude, it is crucial to note the importance of local uses of wartime 
spectacles in proving the loyalty of colonial elites and reinforcing the bonds of 
patronage with Bourbon Spain and even France, as paranoia of political dis-
integration rocked the empire. This particular usage of ceremony was appar-
ent not long after the acclamation of Philip V in the America. For example, 
the commander of the fort of San Juan de Ulúa in Veracruz, who in a letter to 
Philip V relished in the fact that he was the first in Mexico to display the new 
dynasty’s banner, considered the gesture worthy of a pension or noble privi-
lege. Likewise, the feverish endeavours of the indigenous lords of Tlaxcala to 
stage a royal acclamation ceremony in their city before celebrations in Mexico 
City allude to the potential advantages of patronage to be garnered during the 
succession crisis. By publishing descriptions of their triumphal arches and loas 
from the event, the Tlaxcalteca assured Philip V of their support of his succes-
sion and thus justified their request that the king restore the tax exemptions 
long bestowed on them by Emperor Charles V for their assistance of Cortés’s 
army in the conquest of Mexico.20 Similarly, the Count of la Moncolva, viceroy 
of Peru, staged the lavish opera La púrpura de la rosa on the king’s birthday in 
1701 as a response to popular rumours in Lima that he was sympathetic to the 
Habsburgs. The libretto was based on a play by Calderón de la Barca that was 
originally used to celebrate the marriage of Louis XIV to Infanta Maria Teresa 
and again to celebrate the marriage of Carlos II to the Duchess of Orleans, 
19    For a broad overview of these cases, see Aaron Alejandro Olivas, ‘Loyalty and Disloyalty 
to the Bourbon Dynasty in Spanish America and the Philippines During the War of the 
Spanish Succession (1700–1715)’ (dissertation, the University of California, Los Angeles, 
2013). Also, Analola Borges’s monograph La Casa de Austria en Venezuela durante la 
Guerra de Sucesión española (Salzburg / Tenerife: [s.n.], 1963) and Luis Navarro García’s 
conspiración en México durante el gobierno del Virrey Alburquerque (Valladolid: Casa-
Museo de Colón, Seminario Americanista de la Universidad de Valladolid, 1982) deal with 
particular cases in Caracas and Mexico City.
20    Crespones y Campanas Tlaxcaltecas en 1701, ed. Alejandro González Acosta (Mexico City: 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2000), 9.
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so the viceroy’s choice of the piece was supposed to subtly suggest to the king 
his support of the Union of the Two Crowns.21
As demonstrated by the zeal of the royal officials of Caracas in celebrating 
the birth of the prince of Asturias, such ceremonies were instrumental in con-
veying to Philip V Spanish colonial dedication to his cause in the war as well 
as strengthening trans-imperial bonds with the France crown. Accounts such 
as this emphasize Spanish royal officials’ devotion to the Union of the Two 
Crowns and the inclusion of French military and slave company personnel in 
public celebrations, evoking a sense of friendship and cooperation between 
the two nations in the face of Anglo-Dutch opposition. Therefore, public dis-
plays of Bourbon support were also supposed to reassure patronage bonds and 
loyalty to the French court.
21    José A. Rodríguez Garrido, ‘El teatro cortesano en la Lima colonial: recepción y practicas 
esénicas,’ Histórica 32:1 (2008): 115–143.
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CHAPTER 12
Promoting the Peace: Queen Anne and the Public 
Thanksgiving at St Paul’s Cathedral
Julie Farguson
On 7 July 1713 a ‘Publick Thanksgiving’ was held at St. Paul’s Cathedral in London 
for the ‘Blessings of Peace’.1 This event involved a grand procession from the 
Houses of Parliament to the Cathedral, a long religious service accompanied 
by music, followed in the evening by spectacular firework displays and other 
forms of celebration. Enormous crowds turned out to watch the processions, 
some paying to watch the festivities from balconies overlooking the proceed-
ings, while others sat on specially prepared stands.2 Four thousand children 
from London charity schools were ‘placed upon a machine in the Strand’ and 
throughout the event they sang ‘hymns of . . . praise to God, for her Majesty’ 
and the gift of peace.3 As the queen had issued a proclamation for a general 
thanksgiving, religious ceremonies were held in towns and cities all over the 
country.4 The form of service to be used for these ceremonies was dictated by 
the Church of England and authorised by Queen Anne who read the document 
before it was printed.5 These regional ceremonies were accompanied by civic 
festivities which brought local communities together, and generated outpour-
ings of fidelity to the queen. At provincial gatherings aldermen and other civic 
dignitaries made speeches and drank loyal toasts to the ‘Queen’, the ‘Peace’ 
and the ‘Protestant succession’.6 But not everyone was enamoured of the Peace 
Treaty. On the day of the St Paul’s ceremony a number of Whigs resisted the 
1    The service at St Paul’s Cathedral was originally planned for 16 June. I would like to thank Dr 
Toby Barnard and Dr Hannah Smith for their assistance in the preparation of this chapter.
2    Daily Courant 4 July 1713: 3658; Evening Post 2–4 June 1713: 596; Evening Post 2 July 1713: 609; 
Post Boy, 7–9 July 1713: 2834.
3    Post Boy, 7–9 July 1713: 2834; British Museum thereafter BM Mm, 2.106, engraved print.
4    A simple search on Solo (the online catalogue for the Bodleian Library, Oxford) and the 
British Library online catalogue produced 29 thanksgiving sermons from different parts of 
the country.
5    The National Archives SP/34/21/7 f. 14–15 Archbishop of Canterbury to Lord Dartmouth 
7 April 1713; The National Archives, SP/34/21/9 Archbishop of Canterbury to Lord Dartmouth 
8 April 1713.
6    For examples see: Post Boy, 2–4 June 1713: 2819; Post Boy, 11–14 July 1713: 2836.
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royal call. Peers and Members of Parliament stayed away from the celebrations, 
and no doubt in the localities, other less prominent individuals also ignored 
the call to give thanks.7 These absences reflect the long-standing political con-
troversies that surrounded the Peace Treaty and continuing animosity.
As the queen’s health deteriorated political acrimony was also fuelled by 
the question of the succession. Political intrigue and subterfuges during the 
negotiations for the peace treaty had made many in both Houses of Parliament 
feel uneasy, and anxiety over the security of the Protestant succession reached 
a critical level in the summer of 1713. Both Anne’s right to the throne and the 
Hanoverian succession were recognised in the treaty, but the queen and her 
Tory ministers were widely suspected of wishing to reinstate the Stuart heir 
to the throne—James Francis Edward; commonly known as the Pretender—
and these misgivings were not without reason. Jacobite strength in Parliament 
was greater than in any House of Commons since the queen’s accession, and 
Anne’s chief minister, Robert Harley, the 1st earl of Oxford had needed Jacobite 
support to achieve his peace policy.8 On a trip to Paris, Oxford’s political 
ally—Lord Bolingbroke—had attended the opera and been seen sitting in a 
box near the Pretender, news which quickly got back to London and caused 
 outrage.9 Furthermore, with the tacit support of the government, Jacobite 
rebels flooded back into Britain.10 These and other, similar acts simply height-
ened the atmosphere of distrust. The leaders of the Whig party, realising they 
could not prevent the conclusion of the peace, sponsored a propaganda cam-
paign to arouse the widest possible suspicion of the Tory ministry’s future 
intentions towards the Protestant succession, once the Peace was concluded. 
These political manoeuvres simply exacerbated an already inflamed situation 
and undermined the authority of the Crown. With the Scots pushing for the 
dissolution of the union, the queen feared a civil war and others shared her 
concerns.11 Political factionalism had reached such a pitch that the British 
nation was threatened with destruction.
7     Donald Burrows, Handel and the English Chapel Royal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 82.
8     For an overview of the politics of Anne’s later years see: Julian Hoppit, A Land of Liberty? 
England 1689–1727 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 300–312.
9     Edward Gregg, Queen Anne (London, Boston and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1980), 359; for the intricacies of the complex working relationship between Harley and 
Bolingbroke who oscillated between being close allies and rivals see: Sheila Biddle, 
Bolingbroke and Harley (London: Allen and Unwin, 1975).
10    Gregg, Anne, 363.
11    Gregg, Anne, 334, 367.
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Historians of British political history generally analyse the conclusion 
of the war and the signing of the peace treaty along with the furore over 
the succession in secular terms, focussing on debates in Parliament and the 
manoeuvrings of politicians and generals. The role of Queen Anne in all these 
processes has largely been disregarded; the political implications of the cer-
emonial aspects of the treaty ignored. This neglect is in keeping with a histo-
riography that argues for decline during this period, not only in the culture of 
the court but also in terms of how the monarchy functioned.12 It also relates to 
long-standing scholarly assumptions about the secularisation of royal power 
in the eighteenth century.13 Consequently the religious dimension to the peace 
treaty—the public thanksgiving at St Paul’s and the role Anne played both as 
an advocate and, in the end, a sort of virtual participant in the ceremony—has 
been overlooked.14
In the last few years, however, there has been a reversal in these histo-
riographical trends. Older narratives of decline are being replaced by new 
 perspectives.15 A growing awareness of the symbolic dimension to politics 
has revealed the continuing importance of courtly ceremonies and rituals as 
a means of not only presenting princely status and royal authority but also 
12    Robert O. Bucholz, The Augustan Court: Queen Anne and the Decline of Court Culture 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993), passim; Kevin Sharpe, Rebranding 
Rule: the Restoration and Revolution Monarchy, 1660–1714 (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 2013), 507–646 and the epilogue. According to Sharpe by the 
end of Anne’s reign ‘the monarchy as the affective centre of the nation was . . . mori-
bund’ . . . ‘Representational monarchy perforce gave way to a fully rational public sphere’: 
676, 680.
13    Paul Kléber Monod, The Power of Kings: Monarchy and Religion in Europe, 1589–1715 (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press 1999), 273–315. Monod acknowledges Anne’s 
personal piety but suggests she was a ‘rationalist’, 293.
14    Sharpe, Rebranding Rule, Kevin Sharpe pays little attention to the public thanksgiving 
held during Anne’s reign. He sees these ceremonies, in addition to being a thanksgiving to 
God, as ‘an act of worship of the queen’. This assessment suggests these ceremonies were 
reinforcing divine-right notions of monarchical rule; see 620–21; quote, 620.
15    These include: The Princely Courts of Europe: Ritual, Politics and Culture under the Ancien 
Régime 1500–1750, ed. John Adamson (London: Seven Dials, Cassel & Company, 2000); Tim 
Blanning, The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture: Old Regime Europe, 1660–1789 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Jeroen Duindam, Vienna and Versailles: the Courts 
of Europe’s Dynastic Rivals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Queenship 
in Europe, 1660–1815: the Role of the Consort, ed. Clarissa Campbell Orr (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004); Julie Farguson, ‘Art, Ceremony and the British 
Monarchy, 1689–1714’ (DPhil diss., University of Oxford, 2013).
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in communicating with princes, courtiers and subjects on political matters.16 
Running in parallel with this reassessment of court culture, a number of 
scholars have reconsidered the role of religion in the representation of royal 
power during the eighteenth century, and have argued that religion remained 
a ‘vibrant force’ at all European courts during this period.17 It is within these 
recent historiographical developments that my essay will be situated.
By re-examining the architectural setting for this event, along with the 
religious service and its music, this essay will demonstrate that—despite not 
being well enough to attend the service—Queen Anne used ceremonial per-
formance as a means of asserting her political authority: to promote the peace, 
but also to publicise her desire for civic harmony and national unity. An under-
lying, but nonetheless important aim, which was expressed more subtly, was 
to distance herself from the Caesaro-papal style of monarchy practised by her 
father—James II—and stress her commitment to the Hanoverian succession. 
But to understand the significance of the 1713 ceremony we need to engage 
briefly with the history of public thanksgivings in England and examine how 
this ceremonial form was utilised by Queen Anne to mark military victories.
 The History of Public Thanksgivings in England and the  
New Arrangements
Since medieval times St Paul’s Cathedral had been used by monarchs for 
the celebration and commemoration of events deemed to be of national 
 importance.18 Victory in battle was thought to be a blessing from God, and 
divine intervention in military affairs called for a powerful expression of 
communal gratitude.19 The most famous of these wartime ceremonies at 
St Paul’s was the public thanksgiving led by Elizabeth I in 1588, to celebrate vic-
tory over the Spanish Armada. The tradition of thanksgiving continued under 
the Stuarts, albeit in a different architectural setting as by the 1620s the three 
16    For an overview of these historiographical shifts see: Michael Schaich, ‘Introduction,’ in 
Monarchy and Religion: The Transformation of Royal Culture in Eighteenth-Century Europe, 
ed. Michael Schaich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 1–40.
17    Ibid.
18    David J. Crankshaw, ‘Community, City and Nation, 1540–1714’, in St Paul’s: the Cathedral 
Church of London, ed. D. Keene et al. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
2004), 45–70.
19    Natalie Mears, ‘Public Worship and Political Participation in Elizabethan England,’ 
Journal of British Studies 51 (2012): 4–25.
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institutions of government worshipped separately: the monarch at the Chapel 
Royal at Whitehall Palace, the House of Lords at Westminster Abbey, and the 
House of Commons at St Margaret’s Church, Westminster.20 In the years fol-
lowing the Restoration of Charles II, a significant number of thanksgivings 
were held in response to military victories and the signing of peace treaties, 
most notably during the Nine Years’ War (1688–97). Between 1689 and 1701 the 
Crown ordered seven public thanksgivings in connection with the war effort. 
Two were to give thanks for military victory (Boyne, 1690; Namur, 1695), five 
marked the safe return of the king at the end of the campaign season (1691–96) 
and one was staged to celebrate the Peace of Ryswick (1697).21 None of these, 
however, was held at St. Paul’s although the new cathedral was being built, 
and by 1697 the building was ready enough to be used for religious services.22 
Instead William and Mary continued to follow the old system, and they wor-
shipped in the Chapel Royal. William followed the same pattern when he ruled 
alone after Mary’s death in 1694. Once Anne had ascended the throne and 
Britain was again at war, the way military victories were celebrated changed 
completely.
The Crown had always chosen the events that warranted nationwide wor-
ship, and in the Tudor period they oversaw the production of approved prayers 
and special liturgies by Church of England clergymen.23 Similarly, the deci-
sion to hold a state thanksgiving outside the palace setting was the monarch’s 
prerogative. Consequently, these ceremonies and their attendant processions 
came under the jurisdiction of the royal household and were organised by the 
Lord Chamberlain supported by officers from the College of Arms.24 Following 
allied victory at the battle of Vigo in October 1702, the queen announced 
there would be a public thanksgiving at St Paul’s Cathedral and throughout 
20    Burrows, Handel and the English Chapel Royal, 29. The last monarch to worship at St Paul’s 
‘in state’, prior to 1702, was James I. He attended a service at the old cathedral on 26 March 
1620. See: Lambeth Palace, Fulham Papers, Porteus 17, fol. 138–140.
21    Lambeth Palace, Fulham Papers, Porteus, 17, fol. 142–144; Tony Claydon, William III and 
the Godly Revolution, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 58, 106–108; Sharpe, 
Rebranding Rule, 367–368; Burrows, Handel and the English Chapel Royal, 29. The 1692 
thanksgiving also mentioned a victory by the fleet.
22    The old cathedral had been destroyed in the Great Fire of London (1666). Designed by 
Christopher Wren, the new cathedral was built between 1675 and 1710.
23    Mears, ‘Public Worship and Political Participation in Elizabethan England,’ 2–25.
24    Helen Jacobsen, Luxury and Power: the Material World of the Stuart Diplomat, 1660–1714 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 91.
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her  kingdom.25 As the last state thanksgiving had occurred in 1588, Anne gave 
orders for a ‘Committee of the Council’ to arrange the first ceremony of state 
in the new cathedral.26 Although in some areas the committee followed the 
precedent set in 1588, it was unclear who had overseen the liturgical arrange-
ments for the ceremony. The committee addressed this problem and specified 
that St Paul’s Cathedral would become the ‘Queen’s Chapel Royal’ on the day 
of thanksgiving.27 This meant that the religious service came under the control 
of the Crown. The evidence suggests that the appointment of the person who 
would preach the sermon was a decision taken by the government in consul-
tation with the queen and senior clergymen. The Archbishop of Canterbury 
wrote the form of prayers for the service at St Paul’s and the version designed 
for national distribution. Nonetheless, the queen was in overall charge of these 
events. The monarch was the head of the Church of England, and Anne was a 
deeply religious woman, so she took great interest in the form these ceremo-
nies would take. In fact, at times, she exercised considerable control over the 
proceedings. Anne chose the anthems, examined the prayers to be used, dis-
cussed the choice of biblical texts for the sermon, approved the order of ser-
vice before it went to print, and on at least two occasions chose the men who 
would preach before her, suggesting a degree of political agency on Anne’s part 
that has hitherto gone largely unnoticed.28
Gender historians have long argued that religion provided women from all 
social levels with a powerful justification for independent action. In times of 
emergency or instability, religious institutions and ceremonies offered women 
opportunities to play a public religious role.29 In other words, public religion 
empowered women, and in the case of female rulers, enabled direct politi-
cal action.30 The issue of how to present a female king in wartime presented 
considerable challenges to Anne and her advisors. To a large extent these dif-
ficulties were overcome by the pivotal role the queen played in drawing the 
25    By the Queen. A Proclamation, for a Publick Thanksgiving. [3 November 1702] (London, 
1702).
26    College of Arms, M3 bis (Ceremonial), last page in the volume (unpaginated).
27    College of Arms, M3 bis (Ceremonial), fol. 36–45, last page in the volume (unpaginated).
28    HMC, Eleventh Report, Appendix Part V, Dartmouth Papers, 315, 15 May 1713, Whitehall: Earl 
of Dartmouth to the Queen; Lambeth Palace MS 930 (Correspondence), 29 July 1705 Lord 
Godolphin to Thomas Tenison, Archbishop of Canterbury; Luttrell, vi, 157; Burrows, 34, 
36; Hannah Smith, ‘Last of all the Heavenly Birth: Queen Anne and Sacral Queenship,’ 
Parliamentary History 28 (2009): 137–149; Gregg, 165.
29    For example see: Merry Wiesner-Hanks, Women and Gender in Early Modern Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 207–251.
30    Wiesner-Hanks, Women and Gender, 208.
 213Queen Anne Promoting The Peace
political nation together in the performance of a corporate religious act. But 
religion was inextricably connected to politics in the early modern period. 
Disputes over issues such as popery, religious toleration and the practice of 
occasional conformity by Protestant nonconformists continued to cause con-
troversy in England. Despite the passing of the Act of Toleration (1689), these 
concerns regularly fuelled debates in parliament and in the press in the open-
ing decade of the eighteenth century.31 As outlined above, religious contro-
versies were generally concerned with public policy and practice, what Mark 
Knights calls ‘politicized religion’.32 A public religious act by the monarch 
was a visible indicator of the ruler’s commitment to the Church of England. 
During this period, however, state thanksgivings were also used to promote the 
Protestant nature of the British monarchy to a wider public, and these grand 
ceremonies highlighted the queen’s commitment to Protestantism, not just 
the Church of England. By participating in these services at St Paul’s, Anne 
presented herself as powerful wartime leader, emancipated from absolutist 
monarchical ambitions and committed to parliamentary monarchy. During 
the sermon clergymen portrayed Anne as being morally and spiritually supe-
rior to the ‘common enemy’—Louis XIV—and as a Protestant exemplar they 
promoted her as a symbol of national unity. Aside from giving thanks to God, 
from the very beginning of the reign, these ceremonies were designed to gen-
erate patriotic feelings and encourage loyalty to the post-Glorious Revolution 
monarchy. Thanksgivings held in the localities enhanced this process.
 Military Queenship through Religious Devotion: Queen Anne  
and the Thanksgivings at St Paul’s Cathedral, 1702–8
On 12 November 1702 Queen Anne led a public thanksgiving at St Paul’s 
Cathedral to offer thanks to God for his ‘protection and assistance’ in the 
‘just war’ against France.33 By 1708 six more of these state occasions had been 
staged at St. Paul’s. All these thanksgivings involved a grand cavalcade to 
St. Paul’s, a royal procession into the cathedral, followed by a long, elaborate 
religious ceremony attended by the queen. If, as some scholars have claimed, 
the intention with the first thanksgiving was to emulate Elizabeth I, in terms of 
31    Melinda Zook, Protestantism, Politics and Women in Britain, 1660–1714 (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), 8.
32    Mark Knights, Representation and Misrepresentation in Later Stuart Britain: Partisanship 
and Political Culture, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 18; Zook, Protestantism, 8.
33    London Gazette 2–5 November 1702: 3859.
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frequency and political impact, Queen Anne’s thanksgivings soon outstripped 
the Elizabethan version, and arguably nothing since has surpassed them.34 
Being held in a newly built Protestant cathedral maximised their impact. As 
the new St Paul’s was the first Protestant cathedral to be built in Britain, and 
in terms of area, one of the largest cathedrals in Europe, the building acquired 
additional political significance. St Paul’s Cathedral symbolised Protestant 
nationhood and British Imperial power, making it an unparalleled setting for 
the celebration of military triumph and the affirmation of national unity.35
In terms of size and scale, the new cathedral differed considerably from its 
medieval counterpart. Wren’s building offered a vast promenading space, and 
the choir served as both a seating area and an auditory. Most importantly, in the 
context of royal ceremony, there was no designated seating for the monarch, as 
would be found in the chapels royal. When worshipping in the chapels in her 
palaces, Anne sat in the royal closet and generally was hidden from view by 
the traverse: a curtained tabernacle-like area that emphasised the sacredness 
of the monarch.36 During the thanksgiving ceremonies at St Paul’s, however, 
Anne was placed on a chair of state, raised on a dais, surmounted by a canopy 
of state situated in the body of the choir, so in full view of the  congregation.37 
This high level of visibility while in the act of her religious devotions was 
unusual and commented on by observers.38
Once the Queen was installed in her seat in the cathedral, the seating arrange-
ments in the choir allowed for a visualisation of the whole political nation 
joined together in the worship of God, symbolising as Jonathan Trelawney put 
it in his 1702 thanksgiving sermon, the ‘. . . Act of the Whole Kingdom’.39 By mir-
roring the seating arrangements in the House of Lords Anne was visibly part of 
34    Bucholz, The Augustan Court, 206–207.
35    Crankshaw, ‘Community, City and Nation, 1540–1714,’ 45–70.
36    The practice of using the traverse continued at the English court until the end of the eigh-
teenth century. For details see: John Adamson, ‘The Tudor and Stuart Courts 1509–1714,’ 
in The Princely Courts of Europe, ed. Adamson, 104; in other courts this area was known 
variously as the cortina or oratorium.
37    College of Arms MS 3 Bis (1702 proceedings), fol. 36–45; The National Archives, LC 5/70 
(Lord Chamberlain: Miscellaneous Records), fol. 194; Lambeth Palace MS 938 (A Copy of a 
letter, Sent from a Gentleman in London to His Friend in the Country, Nov. 12th giving some 
Account of that Day’s Solemnity, 1702), fol. 33.
38    College of Arms MS 3 Bis (1702 proceedings), fol. 36–45; Lambeth Palace MS 938 (A Copy of 
a letter, Sent from a Gentleman in London to His Friend in the Country, Nov. 12th giving some 
Account of that Day’s Solemnity, 1702), fol. 33.
39    Johnathan Trelawney, A Sermon Preach’d Before the Queen and Both Houses of Parliament 
at the Cathedral Church of St Paul’s November 12th, 1702 (London, 1702), 34.
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the governing body, her elevated position emphasising her superior status and 
confirming her central role in parliamentary monarchical government. The 
close proximity of the members of the House of Commons; nearby, but sitting 
separately, reiterated the point. The thanksgiving sermons gave aural expres-
sion to these symbolic visual forms. A recurring theme was the benefit of ‘the 
body politick’, ‘our publick councils’, ‘the balance of government’, with Gilbert 
Burnet referring to the good relationship between the queen and Parliament 
as ‘the harmony between these bodies’.40 The way Anne was positioned in the 
choir also visibly demonstrated her disdain for divine-right theories. Anne may 
have been the anointed queen of England, but she was made of flesh and blood 
too, and her location during these thanksgivings, which enabled the audience 
to see all her physical gestures, demonstrated that fact more clearly than any 
pronouncement or speech and set her apart from her Stuart ancestors. These 
events were as infused with political meaning as a debate in Parliament, and 
the sermon effectively served as a royal speech conveying important political 
messages on behalf of the queen and her government. Consequently, all the 
thanksgiving sermons that were preached at St. Paul’s were published subse-
quently. Public Thanksgivings were also reported in the newspapers.
 Promoting the Peace and the Protestant Succession:  
The 1713 Ceremony
Although all the thanksgivings at St Paul’s Cathedral were important, in terms 
of the queen’s own political agenda, the 1713 ceremony was especially signifi-
cant. Public thanksgivings at St Paul’s Cathedral for the celebration of military 
victories had stopped in 1708, and the queen had ordered a return to the old sys-
tem of thanksgiving. The reasons for this change remain unclear, but arguably 
the withdrawal of this public ceremony was a political manoeuvre by Anne to 
express her disagreement with the continuation of the war.41 It certainly seems 
40    George Stanhope, A Sermon . . . Preach’d Before the Queen the xxvii day of June 1706 
(London, 1706), 15; William Talbot, A Sermon Preach’d Before the Queen at the Cathedral 
Church of St Paul’s on May 1st 1707 (London, 1707), 4; William Fleetwood, A Sermon Preach’d 
before the Queen at St Paul’s, 19 August 1708: the day of thanksgiving for our deliverance from 
the late invasion and for the victory obtain’d at Audenard (London, 1708), 9; Gilbert Burnet, 
A Sermon Preach’d before the Queen and the two Houses of Parliament at St Paul’s on the 
31st December, 1706 the day of thanksgiving for the wonderful successes of the year (London, 
1707), 13, 29.
41    For an overview of possible reasons for the shift see: Burrows, Handel and the English 
Chapel Royal, 37–39; Farguson, ‘Art, Ceremony and the British Monarchy’, 247–256.
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notable that despite the absence of the queen, the state thanksgiving staged 
in 1713 surpassed those held for military victory. Some of the processional ele-
ments were aggrandised with lavish firework displays being held in two sepa-
rate locations, a maypole was set up near the Strand, and the musical elements 
of the religious ceremony were enhanced.42
Music had played an important part in the public thanksgivings held in the 
previous decade. Various anthems were sung, but Henry Purcell’s settings for 
the Te Deum and Jubilate were the main musical components of these services. 
For the 1713 Thanksgiving, however, Anne commissioned George Frederic 
Handel, who at the time served as Kapellmeister to the court in Hanover, to 
write a new setting. Musicologists have been aware of Anne’s involvement in 
this decision since the 1980s, but the work has generally been analysed from the 
perspective of Handel’s career and the promotion of his operas, therefore the 
political implications of Anne’s patronage have not been fully appreciated.43 
For an English queen to abandon the work of a renowned native composer for a 
ceremony closely associated with the British monarchy in favour of music writ-
ten by a German in the service of the Elector of Hanover, seems  extraordinary 
42    Evening Post, 7–9 July 1713: 611; British Mercury 3 June 1713: 413; BM 1854, 0614.232; BM 1880, 
113.1357; BM 1902, 1011.7977 engraved prints of the fireworks on the River Thames.
43    Donald Burrows first provided evidence for Anne’s involvement in Handel’s setting for 
the Te Deum in his essay entitled ‘Handel and Hanover’ in Bach, Handel, Scarlatti: tercen-
tenary essays, ed. Peter Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 35–60. 
However, in the absence of what Burrows calls ‘authority’, by the time he published his 
book on Handel and the Chapel Royal he was reluctant to rely on the evidence produced 
in his earlier essay as verification of Anne’s commission nor on the statement by Thomas 
Tudway (which in the intervening years Burrows had uncovered)—Professor of Music at 
the University of Cambridge and a composer and organist—that Handel had composed 
the new setting ‘by the Queen’s orders’, see: Burrows, Handel and the English Chapel Royal, 
78 and n. 8. Given Tudway’s close association with Robert Harley and his son Edward, 
along with his knowledge of contemporary church music, his assertion should be taken 
seriously. Indeed Tudway repeated the claim in a letter to Humfrey Wanley, the eminent 
scholar and head of the Harley Library, see: BL Harl. 3782, f. 70 letter from Thomas Tudway 
to Humfrey Wanley, 23 February, 1716/17; W. Weber, ‘Thomas Tudway and the Harleian 
Collection of Ancient Church Music,’ Electronic British Library Journal (1989), article 13, 
187–205 [http://www.bl.uk/eblj/1989articles/article13.html], accessed 26 March 2013). It 
should also be noted that on 28 December 1713 Anne granted Handel an annual pension 
of £200, which adds substance to Tudway’s claims, see Burrows, Handel and the English 
Chapel, 114; Ellen Harris, Handel as Orpheus: Voice and Desire in the Chamber Cantatas 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001), 186; For a discussion of Handel’s operas 
from a political perspective see: Paul Kléber Monod, ‘The Politics of Handel’s Early 
London Operas, 1711–1718,’ Journal of Interdisciplinary History 36 (2005): 445–472.
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until we consider the contemporary situation in terms of Anne’s desire to pro-
mote the peace and her commitment to the Hanoverian succession.
Anne feared that a rival court in London would diminish her political 
authority; therefore she would not allow any members of the electoral family 
to visit or reside in England.44 But Anne still supported the Protestant suc-
cession, and visitors and diplomatic representatives from Hanover were regu-
larly received by the queen at court. These political acts were given additional 
emphasis by cultural gestures such as the maintenance of Prince George of 
Denmark’s German Chapel at St James’ Palace. After his death in 1708, the 
chapel continued to be staffed by Lutheran preachers from Germany and pro-
vided a place of worship for Hanoverian diplomats.45 Engaging the services of 
the ‘renowned Mr Handel’ should be viewed in a similar light. Handel effec-
tively functioned as a cultural envoy for the Elector, and for Anne to com-
mission a new setting for the Te Deum from Handel—although an aesthetic 
choice—was laden with political meaning. Handel’s association with Anne’s 
court which began soon after his arrival in London in 1710, not only symbolised 
Anne’s commitment to the succession but also promoted cultural unity with 
Hanover. This was especially important by the time of Handel’s second visit to 
London in 1712. Political relations were strained at this point as both the royal 
and electoral houses were pursuing policies which benefitted their own ter-
ritories, but Anne’s policy undermined Hanoverian confidence in the queen. 
The  short-term implications of Anne’s patronage, which resulted in Handel’s 
dismissal from Hanoverian service shortly before the public thanksgiving in 
London took place, should not, however, distract us from the considerable 
benefits to the Hanoverian dynasty in the longer term.
The elector knew Handel was composing a new Te Deum to mark the 
expected proclamation of peace. In a letter dated 13 January 1713 Thomas 
Grote, the Hanoverian Resident in London informed the elector of Anne’s 
commission and requested permission for Handel to stay on in London until 
it was completed.46 Presumably, this was granted. This cultural exchange was 
important for the two dynasties, but in 1713 the main beneficiaries of this polit-
ical gesture were particular sections of the British public. The formal connec-
tion between Handel and the court in Hanover remained intact until June 1713. 
Through newspaper reports and contemporary accounts of his performances, 
44    Gregg, Anne, 366.
45    Susanne Steinmetz, ‘The German Churches in London, 1669–1914,’ in Germans in Britain 
Since 1500, ed. Panikos Panayi (London: Hambledon Press, 1996), 57 and n. 29.
46    Letter from Thomas Grote to the Elector of Hanover, 13 January 1713 translated from 
German and cited by Burrows, ‘Handel and Hanover,’ 36–60; citation 42–43.
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Handel’s attachment to Hanover was well known among the elite groups who 
went to the opera but also among those who attended court on the queen’s 
birthday, where for at least two years, possibly three, Handel’s music was 
played.47 When we turn to the music commissioned for the 1713 thanksgiving, 
it is important to note that Handel’s Te Deum sounded distinctly different from 
Purcell’s work. Although Handel continued to use the English text and emu-
lated Purcell’s style, he provided a ‘more complex and expansive treatment’ 
than Purcell, and according to musicologists, added a ‘Germanic emphasis’ to 
certain sections.48 Overall the music and singing would have sounded more 
powerful than Purcell’s work, and to contemporary ears, fresh and invigorat-
ing. Arguably the Utrecht Te Deum was designed to symbolise change: the shift 
from war to peace, which Anne helped to orchestrate and wanted to endorse 
but also the eventual shift to a new dynasty. Certainly it seems noteworthy that 
in September, 1714, on the first Sunday George I attended the Chapel Royal 
after his arrival in London, Handel’s Te Deum was played.49 This ceremonial 
performance with musical accompaniment helped to stress continuity dur-
ing a period of political transition. In 1713, however, Anne and her supporters 
wanted to advertise the benefits of peace as widely as possibly, but also to high-
light her steadfastness to the Hanoverian succession. Handel’s music played a 
part in that process.
In an unprecedented move, once Handel had completed his Te Deum, 
the work was performed in a series of public rehearsals prior to the thanks-
giving service at St Paul’s, and these events were reported in the newspa-
pers. Furthermore these concerts were held in buildings that were linked to 
the British monarchy, and in keeping with the thanksgiving performance, 
Handel utilised the queen’s musicians and choristers.50 These gestures further 
emphasised royal involvement. Early in March the piece was practised twice at 
St Paul’s Cathedral, and later in the month it was rehearsed at the Banqueting 
House, Whitehall, ‘where ‘[an] abundance of the Nobility and Gentry were 
47    Burrows, ‘Handel and Hanover,’ 35–60; Burrows, Handel and the English Chapel Royal, 
75–80; James Winn, ‘Style and Politics in the Philips-Handel Ode for Queen Anne’s 
Birthday, 1713,’ Music and Letters 89 (2008): 547–561.
48    George Buelow, A History of Baroque Music (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University 
Press, 2004), 485–486.
49    British Mercury, 22–29 September 1714: 482; Evening Post, 25–28 September 1714; Post Boy 
25–28 September 1714: 3025; Harris, Handel as Orpheus, 187; Burrows, Handel and the 
English Chapel Royal, 116–117; although Burrows acknowledges that the Utrecht Te Deum 
may have been sung on 26 September, he raises the possibility that the Caroline Te Deum 
may have been performed instead.
50    Burrows, Handel and the English Chapel Royal, 78.
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present’.51 Another public rehearsal was staged at Whitehall in May.52 Although 
these performances were held in religious buildings, they were removed from 
a religious ceremony which celebrated an event that some found  distasteful.53 
They also exposed people who supported the peace treaty, but were not among 
those invited to attend the St Paul’s service, to Handel’s music. Thus, the audi-
ences in London for these promotional efforts were widened. In terms of 
publicising the God-given benefits of peace nationally, however, the religious 
ceremony at St Paul’s Cathedral was of paramount importance.
There is no doubt that Anne intended to appear at the service at St Paul’s. 
A new state coach had been built; the queen had sent a message to both Houses 
of Parliament outlining her intention to attend, and the militia had been com-
manded to line the processional route.54 Due to her physicians’ concern about 
Anne becoming ‘fatigued’, the queen announced on 6 July that she would not 
be able to attend the ceremony but instead would offer thanks ‘for the blessings 
of peace in her Chapel at St James’s’.55 But the queen insisted that ‘the House’ 
should still attend the cathedral ceremony, ‘with as much Solemnity as if her 
Majesty’ were there in person.56 Anne’s instructions meant the grand proces-
sion still took place. They also ensured the seating in the cathedral would be 
configured as if the monarch were in attendance. In Anne’s absence, a chair of 
state was placed in the body of the choir as a symbol of the queen’s power and 
authority.57 Consequently, the sermon resonated as though the queen were 
present at the ceremony.
The Bishop of Bath and Wells, George Hooper, preached the sermon on the 
text of Psalm 122, verse 7: ‘Peace be within thy walls and Plenteousness within 
thy palaces’.58 Almost immediately Hooper placed the Peace in a religious 
framework saying that ‘it has pleased God, in his goodness to these kingdoms, 
to put a happy end to a necessary and victorious . . . war’.59 Hooper went on to 
state that ‘Thanks are justly due to God and the Queen for this great  blessing’, 
51    The Post Boy, 5–7 March 1713: 2781; Burrows, Handel and the English Chapel Royal, 79.
52    British Mercury 13 May 1713: 410; Burrows, Handel and the English Chapel Royal, 79.
53    During this period the Banqueting House served as a royal chapel: Burrows, Handel and 
the English Chapel Royal, 528–529.
54    Burrows, Handel and the English Chapel Royal, 79.
55    Burrows, Handel and the English Chapel Royal, 80.
56    Ibid.
57    John Newman, ‘Fittings and Liturgy in post-fire St Paul’s,’ in St Paul’s, ed. D. Keene et al., 
222–230.
58    George Hooper, A Sermon Preach’d Before Both Houses of Parliament, in the Cathedral 
Church of St Paul’s, on Tuesday July 7, 1713 . . . (London: s.n., 1713).
59    Hooper, Sermon, 3.
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highlighting Anne’s role as a negotiator in the spiritual peace  process.60 Hooper 
acknowledged that at times war may be necessary but went on to say that even 
in a ‘just war . . .’ to persist longer in it than is necessary is to ‘. . . begin to war 
against the gospel’, making it clear that an end to the war was necessary on 
religious grounds.61 Hooper then listed the material benefits accruing to the 
British people from ‘this long desired peace’.62 But Hooper soon turned his 
attention to the situation ‘WITHIN OUR WALLS’, and it is at this moment the 
full political message becomes clear.63
By bringing about the peace, Anne ‘in her wisdom and goodness [had] 
secur’d’ Britain from her external enemies’, but Hooper told his audience that 
regardless of their ‘Religious congregations . . . all our domestick contentions 
and little wars at home should cease . . . let peace be within your walls’.64 In 
other words, now that the war had ended, all Anne’s subjects should ensure 
that Britain became peaceful. Hooper went on to extol the benefits of peace 
for national unity as ‘nothing can be more . . . destructive of human society, 
than feuds and animosities when they divide and distract a nation.’65 Indeed, 
for Hooper ‘the Calamities of a civil war’ were by every means possible ‘to be 
avoided’.66 There had been calls for national unity before in thanksgiving ser-
mons at St Paul’s, but nothing as explicit as Hooper’s pronouncements. Equally 
new, was the idea that the queen could restore ‘tranquillity’ to the British peo-
ple only if their ‘professions of allegiance’, which had first been made at the 
‘coronation’, were at this moment repeated.67 These dual aspects reflect the 
urgent need for Anne to assert her political authority but also to generate a 
sense of social cohesion. In early modern Europe, ‘worldly peace’ was believed 
to be part of a ‘universal peace order’.68 This ‘order’ had first been revealed in 
the tranquilitas ordinis, or tranquillity of order, as described by Augustine of 
Hippo in his treatise De Civitate Dei.69 By emphasising Anne’s piety and her 
desire to act in the ‘publick good’, Hooper was able to call for national unity 
60    Hooper, Sermon, 19.
61    Hooper, Sermon, 6.
62    Hooper, Sermon, 3.
63    Hooper, Sermon, 12.
64    Hooper, Sermon, 12.
65    Hooper, Sermon, 13–14.
66    Hooper, Sermon, 13–14.
67    Hooper, Sermon, 20–22.
68    Inken Schmidt-Voges, ‘Making Peace in Early Modern Europe,’ in Peace Was Made Here: 
The Treaties of Utrecht, Rastatt and Baden, 1713–14. ed. Renger de Bruin and Maarten 
Brinkman (Petersberg: Michael Imhof Verlag, 2013), 49–59.
69    Schmidt-Voges, ‘Making Peace’.
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and the maintenance of social order and ‘tranquillity’ in Anne’s name. The idea 
of Anne as a defender of the national interest found further expression in the 
medal commissioned by the Crown to commemorate the Treaty of Utrecht.70 
This medal conflated Anne with Britannia: a female figure with a long- standing 
history as the personification of the state and used by male and female mon-
archs to evoke both English and British nationhood.71
The Treaty of Utrecht ushered in an era of prosperity for the British people, 
but French recognition of Anne’s rights to the Crown and the legitimacy of the 
Hanoverian succession meant the treaty also marked the beginning of a period 
of political transition, which generated great uncertainty about the future of 
the British monarchy. A Public Thanksgiving was called in order to promote 
the peace brokered at Utrecht but also to assert Anne’s sovereign authority 
at a moment of political crisis. By focusing on the queen’s religious devotion 
and desire to act in the ‘publick good’, Hooper presented Anne as a locus for 
national unity and called for the British people to renew their allegiance to 
her. The orchestration of the religious ceremonies held in the localities by the 
queen and her government ensured the majority of her subjects responded to 
Anne’s call for loyalty and peace. For the Tories there were tangible benefits to 
these politico-religious outpourings. As Britain prepared for a general election 
in August 1713, it was the peace treaty which dominated prints and pamphlets, 
and the fact the Tories managed to increase their majority in the Commons by 
a significant margin may in part be due to the impact of the thanksgiving cer-
emonies. These ceremonies may also have helped to prevent the descent into 
civil war and chaos that some contemporaries feared. Historians have rightly 
examined the forces that caused divisions during this period but have paid 
little attention to what held society together. It seems likely that during Anne’s 
reign, public thanksgivings, especially the 1713 ceremonies, played a part in that 
process. Even though she was absent from the service at St Paul’s Cathedral, 
Anne was still presented as a Stuart emancipated from absolutist monarchi-
cal ambitions, committed to parliamentary government and removed from 
party factionalism. Hooper then promoted the queen as a symbol of national 
70    BL Add. MS 21238 (Warrant . . . for the manufacture and distribution of 812 gold medals to 
commemorate the Peace of Utrecht: 14 July 1713).
71    Maggie Dresser, ‘Britannia’ in Patriotism and the making and unmaking of British National 
Identity, volume III, ed. Raphael Samuel (London: Routledge, 1989), 26–49; Roy Matthews, 
‘Britannia and John Bull: from Birth to Maturity,’ The Historian, 62 (2000), 799–820; Anne 
Helmreich, ‘Domesticating Britannia: Representations of the Nation in Punch, 1870–1880,’ 
in Art, Nations and Gender: Ethnic Landscapes, Myths and Mother Figures, ed. Tricia 
Cusack and Síghle Bhreathnach-Lynch (Aldershot and Burlington, Vermont, 2003), 15–28.
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unity, and the religious setting reinforced these efforts. Although liturgically 
speaking Public thanksgivings at St Paul’s Cathedral were Church of England 
ceremonies, it was Protestantism that preachers constantly referred to in their 
sermons. This meant that in 1713 Anne and her supporters could use religion to 
publicise the benefits of international peace, but also to ‘cultivate and promote 
peace at home’.72
72    The Examiner Remarks upon Papers and Occurrences 6–10 July 1713: 16.
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CHAPTER 13
Fiery Metaphors in the Public Space: Celebratory 
Culture and Political Consciousness around the 
Peace of Utrecht
Willem Frijhoff
In the evening of 13 April 2013, the Tercentenary celebration of the Peace 
Treaty of Utrecht was inaugurated by a sensational event that took place on 
top of the A2 motorway and was finished by spectacular fireworks.1 Three cen-
turies earlier, fireworks also marked the end of the war and the conclusion 
of the Utrecht Peace in the principal cities of the former belligerent nations. 
Why fireworks? Why the visual representation of fire as the zenith of such a 
political celebration? There are some good reasons for this practice. While 
massive public rejoicings usually feature open-air festivities visible on a large 
scale, the popular success of fireworks is rooted above all in the social and 
cultural anthropology of the element ‘fire’. The use and experience of fire and 
its (changing) meanings in ancient and non-Western societies as well as in 
Western civilization have been at the core of a long series of seminal works 
from various disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, not to speak of 
occultism and esotericism.2
For these authors, fire is the ultimate proof of resistance, truth and veraci ty. 
Moreover, as a spectacular, moving form of lightning, fire is also a symbol of 
1    The spectacle can be viewed at ‘3 voor 12,’ VPRO, http://3voor12.vpro.nl/lokaal/utrecht/
nieuws/2013/april/3voor12-Utrecht-TV--De-Slag-om-Vrede.html, accessed 1 November 2013.
2    Among the most important are James George Frazer, Myths on the Origin of Fire (London: 
Macmillan, 1930); Gaston Bachelard, The Psychoanalysis of Fire [1938], trans. Alan M.C. Ross 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1964); Claude Lévi-Strauss, Mythologiques: The Raw and the Cooked 
[1964] (London: Cape, 1970); Jacques Le Goff, The Birth of Purgatory [1981] (London: Scolar 
Press, 1984); Géza Róheim, Fire in the Dragon, and other Psychoanalytic essays on Folklore, 
ed. Alan Dundes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Johan Goudsblom, Fire 
and Civilization (London: Allan Lane, 1992); Jonathan Sternfield, Firewalk: The Psychology of 
Physical Immunity (Stockbridge: Berkshire House, 1992); Richard W. Wrangham, Catching 
Fire: How Cooking Made Us Human (New York: Basic Books, 2009); Frances D. Burton, Fire: 
The Spark that Ignited Human Evolution (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 
2009); Nevill Drury, Stealing Fire from Heaven. The Rise of Modern Western Magic (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011).
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energy, passion and love, of the desire for purity and the aspiration to gain 
access to higher, intangible values. Finally, as an airy element fire is a metaphor 
for transition and transformation. Fire graphically represents the sparkling vic-
tory of the world of light over the universe of darkness. Fire elucidates the dan-
gers and destroys the past, leaving behind a fertile soil where soon new shoots 
emerge to shape a fresh, new world. Therefore fire embodies hope, and an 
entirely new beginning. It brings the spectators together in a sense of redemp-
tion and of community without divisions or borders. The fascination with fire, 
either as a danger or as a source of hope, has therefore firm anthropological 
roots that explain why mass festivities generally include some form of perfor-
mance in which fire plays a determinant role.
The best known and most universally appreciated of those performances 
involve fireworks.3 Independently of the idiosyncrasies of various human civi-
lizations, fireworks are considered everywhere the ultimate celebratory perfor-
mance, in the East as well as in the West. Fireworks technology, pyrotechnics, 
came to the West from the East, from China in particular. It probably spread 
from Italy (Vicenza 1379) and the Holy Roman Empire (Vienna 1438, Constance 
1506, Nuremberg 1536) to France and the Netherlands. At first it served military 
aims and it has long continued to do so, but in the second half of the sixteenth 
century the first recreational fireworks emerge in our sources, in particular in 
our visual evidence. As early as the last quarter of the sixteenth century images 
of fireworks were published, and soon no public fireworks were performed 
without a pictorial publication of their exhibition.
Yet fire had been playing its role in public celebrations or recreational activi-
ties for centuries before this time, mainly in the form of bonfires (the pekton-
nen of the Dutch), an older, fixed variety of fiery performance that could be 
lighted without an explosive ignition.4 But once adopted in Western Europe 
during the sixteenth century, recreational or celebratory fireworks have taken 
root and developed their own modalities characteristic either of the hierarchi-
cal or of the more popular organization of the societies of Europe. Fireworks 
could serve to sing the praises of the highest authority of the state and their 
victories, as well as celebrate the unity and cohesion of the community. 
Over the past centuries there has virtually been no major event or festivity 
in Western Europe that was not finished, solemnly concluded, and anchored 
3    Kevin Salatino, Incendiary art: the representation of fireworks in early modern Europe (Los 
Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 1997); D.P. Snoep, Praal en propaganda. Triumfalia in de 
Noordelijke Nederlanden in de 16e en 17e eeuw (Alphen aan de Rijn: Canaletto, 1975).
4    A useful survey of fireworks technology and its evolution, including references to ancient 
treatises and literature, in the article ‘Feuerwerk’, http://linux2.fbi.fh-koeln.de/rdk-smw/
Feuerwerk, accessed 1 November 2013.
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in the community’s memory by the performance of fireworks. Moreover, the 
steady repetition of fireworks in the public space has moulded them into the 
universal political manifestation par excellence. As visible manifestations in 
the undivided sky, fireworks transcend political divisions, even if the political 
message attached to them by the organizers or the political authorities may 
be skilfully directive. They celebrate events that are meaningful for the whole 
community: the conclusion of a peace treaty, the birth or the advent of a new 
ruler or the confirmation of his or her reign, a military victory, the reception 
of a powerful friend, or the anniversary or the remembrance of an histori-
cal event. Though the anthropological values of fire are virtually never made 
explicit, they play their role in the background for motivating the complicated 
set-up of fireworks, justifying the often considerable expense, and shaping the 
constructions from which the fireworks will be set off and which will have to 
confer a precise meaning on the fireworks in the eyes of the spectators.
In addition to the meanings that are plain and publicly known, others 
are hidden behind the visual performance or embodied in the shape of the 
 fireworks. Quite often a more intricate or complicated web of surreptitious or 
overt meanings is involved, which has been set up by the founding authorities 
and the designers and architects who created the fireworks on their behalf. 
Such hidden meanings need an elaborate explanation in order to be rightly 
understood. Fireworks are therefore an intricate and rich instrument of 
cultural communication that can be used at several levels, and it is as means 
of communication that we should analyse them. They embrace different 
layers of meaningful representation at the same time: a broad anthropologi-
cal layer of embodied values that can be shared by all; the social layer of a 
community  festivity limited to those actually involved; and the political layer 
of a more precise message about the present and the future of the social and 
political body.
During the opening event of the Peace of Utrecht Tercentenary on 13 April, 
these three layers were quite evident for the observer: the community festivity 
of the anniversary of the peace treaty was marked by a huge theatrical per-
formance, combining music, acting, dancing and all the sensorial experiences 
that are involved in a mass manifestation, carrying anthropological values. The 
political layer was made visible in the play that was performed on the open-air 
stage by actors and soldiers. Surprisingly, the political message was wrapped 
up in a military staging, and the spectacle was named the Battle for the Peace, 
although the peace negotiation of 1713 deliberately was set far from the battle-
fields. But central to the theatrical performance as well as to the political mes-
sage was the fire, combined with a play of lights and with a compelling musical 
accompaniment. Bonfires rising in the air from the top of the four watch tow-
ers that formed the centre of the stage and the fiery outbursts of the fireworks 
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themselves concluded the performance: starting with a fiery imitation of the 
war violence, the fireworks advanced gradually over a quarter hour, climaxing 
in explosions of joy.
The sensorial experience of the present-day spectators must have come 
very close to what the bystanders may have felt during the 1713 fireworks. If 
we take, for example, the fireworks organized by the States General at The 
Hague on 14 June 1713, the similarity of the visual representations in pictures 
is striking, including the suggestion of smoke. Of course, we cannot smell 
the smoke of 1713 anymore, but this was one of the conditioning elements of 
that mass experience, along with the obsessive and penetrating sound of the 
repeated  explosions.5 The 2013 trajectories of the rockets, fireballs, fire foun-
tains and other implements of the spectacle correspond closely to those of 
1713. Most of all, the constructed setting of the spectacle, the theatre or ‘fire-
works castle’ as it was formerly called, appeals to a sense of recognition, to a 
retrieval of our centuries-old memory of the political meaning of fireworks 
for the community. The four watch towers and the city wall represented at the 
2013 celebration were theatrical constructions which not only supported the 
launching platform of the fireworks, but surrounded it at the same time with a 
politically inspired framework. The representation that was embodied in this 
constructed frame guided the event’s meaning: the victory of the peace nego-
tiations was clearly linked to the urban war experience, and it was implicitly 
suggested that civilization, as opposed to the violence of war, comes from the 
politically regulated society of the urban Netherlands. This message reflected 
in a modern way the meanings purposely conveyed through their fireworks 
three centuries earlier by the city, provincial and state authorities of the early 
modern Dutch Republic.
 The Fireworks Castles
For the 1713 celebration, the States General had chosen a triumphal arch of 
160 × 90 feet in surface, and 50 feet high, as the centrepiece of the fireworks 
5    Whereas most engravings of the fireworks published on the initiative of the organizers or by 
individual print sellers present a clear and detailed picture of the fireworks castle and the 
symbolic representations it conveys, the engraving Lust-park vande Vreede tussen de Hooge 
Bondgenooten ende Fransen, geslooten te Utrecht den 11 April en bevestigd den 12 Mey 1713 
(Amsterdam: Abraham Allard, 1713) [Utrechts Archief, Historische Atlas: S 13.22], displaying 
the peace process in eight episodes, emphasizes in the last picture the repeated fire explo-
sions and smoke curtains caused by the fireworks, hiding the view of the theatre itself.
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 amphitheatre, whereas the States of Holland and West-Friesland had built a 
temple of similar size, 150 × 109 feet, and 85 feet high. Classical imagery domi-
nated the representations on the castle of the States General (fig. 13.1). It was 
crowned by a huge statue of the deified Peace with the cornucopia, watching 
over the arms of the Union and of the seven Provinces, and surrounded by six-
teen victory banners. In the centre of the castle was a huge painting of ‘Mercury 
bringing the joyful message of peace and abundance to the many countries 
and realms involved, who hold out each other’s hands, above Ceres and some 
minor deities who supply all kind of fruits’, as described in the printed expla-
nation for the general public. Two huge statues on both sides of this central 
Figure 13.1 Afbeeldingh van het Theater met zyn Ornamenten en Constigh Vuurwerck 
opgericht door ordre van haar Hoog Mog. de Heeren Staten Generael der 
Vereenichde Nederlanden etc. etc. etc. in s’Gravenhage in de Vyver [. . .] 
 afgestoken op den 14 Iuny 1713. Ter occasie van de Vrede met zyn 
Alderchristelyksten Maj.t Louis den XIIII. Con. van Vrankryck etc. etc. etc.  
tot Uytrecht geslooten op den 11 April 1713. Engraving by D. Stoopendaal  
after H. Pola (The Hague: Anna Beeck, 1713). 
atlas van stolk, rotterdam
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picture represented the continents (Europe and Asia?), Neptune and Triton 
embodied the oceans, whereas Pallas and again Mercury closed the aisles of 
the amphitheatre castle at its extremities. The castle of the States of Holland 
took the form of the temple of Janus, the doors of which had to be opened in 
wartime and closed in a period of peace (fig. 13.2). The metaphorical scenery 
was rather similar to that of the States General, but predictably the statue on 
top represented the Virgin of Holland raising on a stake the traditional Hat 
of Liberty, whereas, a bit surprisingly in this classical universe, the female fig-
ure in the centre depicted the (Christian) Faith, with the dove of peace, sur-
mounted by the maxim Deo conf[idi] (My trust is in God). It is this religious 
element of the repertoire that points us to the deeper, inward-directed mean-
ing of the fireworks imagery.
The Janus symbolism, expressing a final and hopefully definitive change 
of state, is visible in all the fireworks. This metaphor was, for instance, also 
applied by the municipality of The Hague on the façade of the Town Hall: 
the doors of the temple of war were closed in order to give way to Apollo and 
the Muses making music on behalf of the peace, to the Peace itself seated 
on its throne with the cornucopia, and to a cheerful Bacchus, drinking to the 
renewed arrival of fully loaded merchant ships. A popular song entitled Lof van 
de Vreugde Theaters (Praise of the Theatres of Joy) and written on the occasion 
of the Utrecht Peace stresses the political dimension of the scenery on the dif-
ferent theatres at The Hague: the Union of the Seven Provinces, the Janus met-
aphor, the urban pride of The Hague expressed in the figures of two storks (the 
local totem animal from the city arms) and the lion, as a symbol of courage.6 
However, what is most striking in the visual language of the castles of the States 
General and the provincial States in The Hague is not the predictable general 
symbolism of the Union, the Dutch lion and the peace (the virgin of peace, the 
horn of abundance, the Dutch hat of freedom), and the classical metaphors, 
or, in The Hague as well as in Rotterdam and Leeuwarden, Mercurius as the 
symbol of a renewed commercial liberty, prosperity and abundance, but the 
moral dimensions of the representation they intend to transmit.
Indeed, the most explicit message expressed by the emblems and meta-
phors was not turned toward the international community or the outer world, 
but inner-directed, in a moral as well as a political register of a more topical 
nature. The statues on the corners of pedestal of the temple of the States of 
6    This song on a melody by J. van Elsland (1717), printed in De Gekroonde Utrechtze Vreede 
(1718), was recorded in 2013 on the compact disc De Vrede van Utrecht (1713). Muziek uit de 
Spaanse Successieoorlog, performed by the Utrecht music ensemble Camerata Trajectina 
(cd Globe: GLO5256).
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Holland embodied the four main moral virtues: charity, justice, prudence, and 
courage, while the four figures surrounding the temple on top of the pedestal 
represented religion, freedom, commerce, and the arts. In the political register, 
both castles at The Hague were dominated by heraldry referring to the seven 
Provinces and, in the case of the States of Holland, to their sovereign rulers, i.e., 
the nobility and the eighteen voting towns that together composed the ruling 
assembly of Holland and West-Friesland. The arms of each town were exposed 
on top of the centrepiece and underscored by an appropriate device, either a 
traditional one, such as the ancient Vicit vim virtus for the city of Haarlem, the 
highly applicable Terra marique potentissima for the metropolis of Amsterdam, 
or newly made, suitable texts, such as Hostium per fulmina terror for Delft, seat 
of the provincial arsenal, or Bataviae nutrix, for cheese-making Edam (fig. 13.3).
The moral message was most clearly expressed in the maxims that were lav-
ishly added to the different elements of the monuments and explained to the 
general public in the booklets and flyers produced for the occasion. Consider, 
for instance, phrases such as Patet Deum quaerentibus (Open for those who 
are in search of God) at the entrance of the temple of the States, Fax in mundo 
fluctuantis (A beacon for those who wander in the world) under the image of 
religion, or Illius in verba (I trust in God’s Word alone) under that of the Bible, 
on top of the temple. They match similar statements on the liberation of the 
nation from slavery (!) in Non erit liberae reditus, on the universal blessings of 
the Dutch Republic imagined as a bee-hive, where the bees Sibi laborant et urbi 
(They work for themselves and for the whole world) or on the arrival of the 
East India fleet Hic plusquam vellus aureum (Better than the Golden Fleece) 
and on the union of faith and freedom Alterius altera poscit opem (They need 
each other’s help). The whole imagery is summarized in the maxim Tantum 
religio potuit conferre bonorum (So many blessings has religion bestowed upon 
us), uniting in a single phrase the meaning of four objects: the hat of freedom, a 
well-filled purse, a book, and a try square, symbols of the fruitful union of poli-
tics, commerce, science and industry. Through such metaphors, the fireworks 
castles present themselves as instruments for the education of the nation
 Symbolic Language and Political Message
Naturally the multi-layered character of the public festivities including a 
clearly voiced or visualized political meaning is not limited to the fireworks 
performances alone, nor is it characteristic of the Dutch Republic as such, 
although the visual and textual languages reflect, of course, Dutch idiosyn-
crasies. But more generally speaking, for the present-day observer the Peace 
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Treaty of Utrecht has become a multi-layered political fact in itself. Its long-
term consequences are rather obvious, but by now the meanings embodied 
in the performances at the 1713 peace celebration are for us difficult to grasp. 
One of the reasons for this dissonance is the dominant place taken by the sym-
bolic expressions of the peace communication. Of course, celebrations always 
carry symbolism. They communicate the multiple messages of the celebrated 
facts or events in symbolic languages known by the groups or communities 
addressed and liable to be decoded by them in order to be correctly under-
stood and appropriated. After decoding, their elements must be selected and 
appropriated as meaningful for the community involved in the spectacle or 
intended by its organizers. Celebrations are passing and volatile. They are per-
formed in a short time period, as instantaneous events in theatrical settings, 
Figure 13.3 Devises et Inscriptions Contenuës dans la construction érigée pour le Feu 
d’Artifice de la Province de Hollande & de Westfrise, au sujet de la Paix avec  
la France. Concluë à Utrecht le 11. Avril en l’année 1713. Composées par Mr. De 
Vrigny (The Hague: chez Gerard Rammazeyn, pour Pierre Loofs, s.a. [1713]).
RIJKSMUSEUM AMSTERDAM 
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but they carry messages with a long-term meaning. Therefore the language 
used by the celebration itself normally is metaphorical because metaphors 
belong to symbolic systems vested in the community’s history. Visual, tex-
tual and sensorial metaphors appeal to well-known and coherent registers of 
memory and allow a compression of the intended meaning into simple repre-
sentations that can be easily performed but long remembered. Fireworks as a 
public spectacle were visually accessible to everyone and indeed unavoidable 
for the common citizen on the street. They were immediately experienced as 
a sensorial event and occupied therefore a particular place in the performance 
of public celebrations.
However, the rich content of such metaphoric messages is not immediately 
legible or understandable in its full depth, not for us or for the spectator of the 
year 1713. The message had to be decoded and translated into other registers of 
understanding. For instance, political messages were wrapped up in the visual 
and textual languages of the classical Antiquity or of the ancient pantheon. 
Heroes, myths and emblematic figures were the key elements of these lan-
guages that needed translation into the everyday realities of the world of 1713. 
At the same time, metaphors permit us to transcend the limits of topical repre-
sentation and of the day-to-day experience because they are applicable to any 
similar event in any time period, provided that the register of understanding 
is still working in the community’s memory. But for most of us the language of 
classical Antiquity, of the ancient mythological pantheon and even of the bib-
lical metaphors is no longer at the core of our collective memory. It has lost its 
validity for our life experience, and we are no longer able to recognize sponta-
neously its symbolic values. Therefore, although the procedures were the same 
as in 1713, the 2013 fireworks had to adopt a new metaphoric language.
The peace celebration of 1713 was marked by a remarkably rich number of 
performances and representations with a symbolic charge or of a metaphori-
cal character: festivities, balls, dinners, spectacles, musical performances, reli-
gious services, celebratory poems, popular plays, and so on. Yet in the symbolic 
register the fireworks stand out, both in quantity and in quality. Probably no 
peace celebration was accompanied by such a rich series of fireworks in so 
many cities in the Netherlands and beyond. Only the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, 
celebrated across Europe, may have had a similar impact, but it has left fewer 
visual traces in historical memory. The authorities responsible for the fireworks 
were quite conscious of the weight these fireworks had in the public opinion 
and of the educational dimension attached to their political programme. 
Therefore, fireworks were not simply decided by the authorities themselves or 
discussed in the representative bodies, they were also publicly announced and 
interpreted, and the best designers were engaged.
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 Fireworks Traditions
Behind the immediate, crude experience of the fireworks as a public event, 
the constructions which formed the support and the fixed background of the 
volatile fireworks told another, symbolic story meant for those who were able 
to decode it politically. As early as 1649, a satirical description was published of 
such an elaborate symbolic castle allegedly to be built at The Hague for the fire-
works produced for the marriage of the king of Spain and the daughter of the 
Emperor.7 Such texts show how notorious the typical decoration programmes 
of the public fireworks already were. Around 1700, their design in the Dutch 
Republic was entrusted to reputed architects and artists, such as the Huguenot 
refugee Daniel Marot, the architect Pieter Roman, the engraver Pierre Loofs, 
or the versatile artist Romeyn de Hooghe, while the execution was the work 
of technical specialists in the service of the authorities. Broadsheets, printed 
images, explanatory booklets and flyers documenting the fireworks castles 
down to their tiniest details and explaining the elements of the constructions 
were published before the fireworks or sold during and after the performance 
in order to help the recording of the celebration, the preservation and structur-
ing of the public memory, and the trickling-down of the message. In Friesland, 
for instance, the learned bookseller François Halma published an extensive 
explanation of the Leeuwarden fireworks, probably authorized by the States of 
that province.8 They helped the public to understand their political and social 
layers of meaning. In what follows, I shall concentrate on some of these forms 
of representation and decoding, and try to understand why the political mes-
sages were brought in that utterly complicated way.
Ever since the very first political representation underpinned fireworks in 
late-sixteenth-century Europe, the lay-out of the scene had been fixed: fire-
works had to be set off from a platform showing a fixed construction, the 
‘castle’, that by its shape, mostly as a theatre or a stage, and still more by the 
images and pictures attached to it, conveyed a precise political, social, cultural 
and moral message for the community in a metaphorical language, in fact the 
language that was derived from the classical imagery characteristic for the edu-
7    Modelle ou project du feu d’artifice qui se doibt faire a la Haye le Mardy 16. Nov. pour la rejoüys-
sance sur le mariage du Roy Catholique & la Serenissime Archiduchesse fille de l’Empereur 
(Brussels: s.n., 1649), 8 p. [The Hague, Koninklijke Bibliotheek: Pamphlet 6460].
8    F. Halmaes Vredezang den Edelen Mogenden Heeren Staten van Frieslandt eerbiedigst 
toegewydt, by d’afkondiging van den gesloten Vrede den XIV. Van Zomermaandt, MDCCXIII 
(Amsterdam: Johannes Oosterwyk, 1713) [The Hague, Koninklijke Bibliotheek: Pamphlet 
16184].
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cation of the political and learned elites.9 The fire itself had to spring off from 
the major elements of the construction, quite often in a combination of fixed 
bonfires on top of pillars, pinnacles or other decorative elements of the castle, 
and of repeated discharges of moving fireworks behind or beside the theatre or 
the castle. In fact, two basic formulas imposed themselves quickly for the ideal 
material support: the temple of peace or joy and the triumphal arch. Most fire-
work architects made a choice between these two formulas, probably submit-
ting them to their principal before the actual construction took place and the 
decoration programme was elaborated in detail. In the Dutch Republic, the 
major firework spectacles were set up as waterworks, but the association of 
water and fire, two opposite elements involving an anthropological value in 
itself, was also popular elsewhere. At Amsterdam, the Amstel or one of the 
main canals could be adopted for the central stage of the fireworks, while 
at Rotterdam a platform could be constructed on the river Meuse. But large 
urban spaces would also do. The Leeuwarden fireworks construction of 1713 
was set up on the Marktveld as were the less elaborate fireworks castle on the 
Grote Markt at Haarlem and the fiery decorations in front of the Town Hall of 
The Hague (fig. 13.4).
The two governmental fireworks of 14 June 1713 in The Hague were set up 
in the Hofvijver, in front of the meeting halls of the States General and of the 
States of Holland and West-Friesland. This huge pond offered the most suitable 
setting for fireworks, not only because of its eminently significant political situ-
ation but also because it could host many spectators along its three banks and 
provide relative safety. Indeed, fireworks could be dangerous, even for those in 
power: witness the famous injury suffered by the Polish king Ladislas IV Vasa 
from a rocket as he watched fireworks from a window of his palace in 1636. 
Some fireworks were not intended for the celebration of peace but of war and 
conquest. On the birthday of the French king Louis XIV, 5 September 1673, 
the municipal council of Marseille in Southern France, for instance, set off a 
huge fireworks showing how the monarch had taken the city of Maastricht at 
the end of June of that year after its memorable siege by Vauban—revived in 
our long-term memory by Alexandre Dumas’ exaltation of the heroic death of 
musketeer captain d’Artagnan. Apparently no image remains of the Marseille 
fireworks castle, but according to its published description it represented a 
 victorious King Louis launching his lightning on the city of Maastricht which 
9    The Haags Historisch Museum still conserves the wooden model made by Mrs. Valkenaer-
Duyvensteijn, after the design by court architect Pieter de Swart, of the theatre for the 
fireworks in the Hofvijver in The Hague on 13 June 1749, at the celebration of the Peace of 
Aix-la-Chapelle (18 October 1748).
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was then metaphorically consumed, while images of humiliated towns, such as 
Utrecht, Nijmegen and other conquered cities, surrounded the central scene.10
Since fireworks were visible for everyone and constituted the ultimate social 
sensation, they were a matter of public interest. The physical dangers involved 
required regulation or intervention by the public authorities, as did the con-
siderable cost of the representation. There have, of course, been private fire-
works initiatives, either for celebratory or for publicity reasons, but obviously 
such private castles were of a less complicated design and their decoration 
10    Triomphe de Louis XIV dans Marseille, pour ses conquestes dans la Hollande. Qui paroistra 
le 5. Septembre 1673, jour de sa naissance (Marseille: chez Charles Brebion, 1673), 9 p. [Paris, 
BNF: 8º Lk7.50213].
Figure 13.4 Afbeelding van het Theater met syn Ornemente en Constig Vuurwerk, 
opgeregt door ordre van haer Ed. Mog. de Heeren Staeten van Vrieslandt etc. 
etc. etc. in Leeuwaerden op ’t Markvelt, afgestooken op den 14 Junij 1713. Ter 
occasie van de Vrede met Syn Alderchristelyksten Maj.t Louis de XIIII Coning 
van Vranckryck etc. etc. etc. Engraving by P. van Call after D. Marot
tresoar, leeuwarden
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programmes, though still highly learned and often barely accessible to the 
common spectator, were of a lower metaphorical level. The most sensational 
private fireworks were those prepared by the student associations of Utrecht 
and Leiden for the prince of Orange in 1747 and 1766, and at the centenaries 
of their own universities, founded in 1575 and 1636. The students may have 
felt challenged to triumphantly display their level of learning to the common 
people, and those of 1736 in Utrecht made up for the regrettable negligence of 
the city council in 1713.
 Politicization
But generally speaking, technical, financial and management factors limited 
fireworks to the domain of public decision-making. Although the discovery 
of the full potential of celebratory or recreational fireworks for political pro-
paganda and social education has taken some time, public authorities came 
gradually to perceive fireworks as an excellent means for transmitting a pub-
lic message intended for the whole population. The first visually documented 
fireworks still remain close to the traditional bonfires. They express joy and 
celebrate facts, not intentions. They stress the spectacular effects of the fire 
itself, the explosions of fire and the lightning, not, or to a lesser extent, the 
message attached to the event. The symbolism of the castle that supported the 
fireworks remained long implicit. The Paris fireworks of 1642 for the king and 
queen of France, the Nuremberg fireworks for the Peace of Westphalia at the 
1649 and 1650 Friedensmähle,11 and the Dutch fireworks for the 1654 victories 
over the English fleet, preceding the first Peace of Westminster, were essen-
tially huge bonfires, at best a bunch or row of exploding rockets. Their meaning 
was in the event itself, rather than in the moral message which the celebration 
was able to convey. The 1649 Osnabruck fireworks apparently lasted two hours, 
but their Theatrum Ceremoniale just shows the traditional political metaphors 
in a purely emphatic mode: the maxim Vivat Pax surrounded by a dragon and 
a crowned eagle holding a sceptre and a sword.
Yet the use of fireworks was already changing. As early as 1585, on the 
occasion of the ducal marriage at Dusseldorf, a festival extended over three 
evenings combined a series of still rather simple celebratory fireworks with 
elaborate theatrical performances set against a metaphorical background and 
11    Sigmund von Birken, Teutscher Kriegs Ab- und Friedenseinzug (Nuremberg: s.n., 1650), 
40 p. Accessed 1 November 2013. http://www.mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn 
=urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb105139011.
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representing different stages of the eternal fight between good and evil, and 
indeed between the religious confessions, amply explained in a book drafted 
by the duke’s Catholic councillor Theodorus (or Diederich) Graminaeus 
and illustrated by the famous engraver Franz Hogenberg.12 This festival must 
have set the tone for further developments. Fireworks henceforth became 
an integral part of European court culture and a much cherished privilege of 
the prince.
From the 1670s on, political symbolism literally exploded in the fireworks, 
due to a combination of factors: the emancipation of a truly secular festival 
tradition, new fashions in the arts, the breakthrough of formal classicism in 
public representation, and the influence of French baroque court culture. After 
the Italian Renaissance, the heavy rhetorical idiom and the rich but rapidly 
standardized metaphorical language of French classicism exercised a tremen-
dous influence on the design of the public space and of public performances 
in Europe. In fact, rather quickly public manifestations, in particular fireworks, 
adopted everywhere in Europe a similar metaphorical language and as such 
became universally understandable: Mercury for the fruits of commerce, Mars 
for war, Pallas for wisdom, Ceres for agriculture, Neptune for maritime naviga-
tion, and so on. Hence, without the help of published explications providing 
a topical interpretation it is on a European scale difficult to distinguish each 
event’s unique meaning. Yet behind these global symbols, local and national 
realities steered their combination, their meaning and their interpretation. It 
was the gradual discovery of fireworks castles as privileged conveyors of politi-
cal messages for the global population that made them popular among the 
ruling elites but diversified at the same time their composition and the mes-
sages which the common imagery was intended to inculcate in the minds of 
the locals.
In the Dutch Republic, Romeyn de Hooghe was one of the great creators 
and purveyors of that increasing instrumental use of fireworks at the service 
of the nation-state. Born in 1645, he worked as a gifted engraver, a poet, and a 
politically engaged author in Amsterdam and after 1682 in Haarlem, until his 
death in 1708. In the ‘pamphlet wars’ of these decades, he took decidedly sides 
in favour of the Orange party and Protestant policy, and against France and 
12    Diederich Graminaeus, Beschreibung derer Fürstlicher Güligscher &c. Hochzeit, so im jahr 
Christi tausent fünffhundert achtzig fünff am sechszehenden Junij vnd nechstfolgenden acht 
tagen zu Düsseldorff mit grossen freuden, Fürstlichen Triumph vnd herrligkeit gehalten wor-
den (Cologne: s.n., 1587), 246 p. [reprint Düsseldorf: Verlag Hans Marcus, 1982].
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the Catholics.13 Many fireworks engravings bear his name, and it certainly is 
no coincidence that he was asked on several occasions to design public fire-
works for state affairs himself. Some of the most elaborate etchings of such 
performances are of his making, for instance those related to the coronation 
of Prince William III of Orange and Mary Stuart as rulers of England in 1689 
and the solemn entries of the king-stadholder in different cities of the Dutch 
Republic during the following years. It is precisely in the course of his career 
that we discover the changing trend and the increasing tendency to attach 
political intentions and moral messages to the fireworks castles. John Amos 
Comenius had already stressed the moral meaning of exploding and falling 
rockets, as signs of pride, conversion and repentance. An engraving represent-
ing the fireworks set off in London, in several Dutch towns (Leiden, Maastricht, 
Haarlem, Amsterdam) and in Hamburg at William & Mary’s coronation on 21 
April 1689 shows in fact a combination of traditional bonfires and of more 
modern fireworks of a rather complicated pyrotechnic character.14 A view, 
published separately, by Romeyn de Hooghe of the fireworks displayed in his 
home town Haarlem on that occasion, shows a spectacular but still rather tra-
ditional display of a long string of bonfires circling around three constructions 
identified by the royal emblems and initials. In spite of the great number of 
formal or literal references to the king or the coronation, no great decoration 
programme going beyond the mere mention of the event and its protagonists 
is visible in those pictures, nor can we detect a general design to which the 
individual fireworks in particular places were subordinate.15 It is just one enor-
mous, multi-located and multifaceted explosion of intended public rejoicing. 
The Amsterdam fireworks for William and Mary in April 1689 show this quite 
clearly: the celebration is exhibited as a masterly and captivating pyrotechnic 
spectacle uniting bonfires and fireworks but destitute of any moral message 
other than the political virtue of the monarchy in the confederate republic that 
the United Provinces still were. The message remains implicit, even if many 
spectators must have understood it quite well.
13    On his work as en engraver: Henk van Nierop, et al., Romeyn de Hooghe: de verbeelding van 
de late Gouden Eeuw (Zwolle: Waanders, 2008).
14    Vreugde-vuuren. Tot Londen, en in verscheidene Steeden van Holland en Braband, en tot 
Hamburg; over de Krooning van haare Majesteyten van Groot Britannien, Willem de Derde, 
en Maria, Ontstooken [April 21, 1689], engraving after Romeyn de Hooghe [Rotterdam, 
Atlas van Stolk, n° 2787 (inv. n° 44624)].
15    Vuur-staken en Vreugt-bewysen, door de Ed. Agtb. Heeren vande Regeering tot Haarlem, op 
de Markt, Toorens, etc. den 21 April 1689, engraving after Romeyn de Hooghe [Rotterdam, 
Atlas van Stolk, inv. n° 36900].
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Subsequent fireworks in the last decade of the seventeenth century put an 
ever greater stress on the visualization of the political message in metaphori-
cal images. The 1691 entry of the king-stadholder into The Hague shows the 
first signs of a pervasion of the spectacle by barely hidden patriotic meanings: 
the motto on the fireworks castle, the metaphorical lion, and the initials of the 
royal couple and their crown. Eight values of the Dutch Republic are visualized 
on the four faces of two columns, the most visible being the two key words of 
its historical identity: religio and libertas, placed on the front side of the castle. 
Unsurprisingly, these emblems and texts represent the common knowledge 
and the broad political consciousness of the well-schooled part of the Dutch 
bourgeoisie and in particular of its upper layers, without any indication of 
resistance or subversion.
Virtually the same observation holds for the fireworks performed for the 
reduction of the castle of Namur, four years later, and that in honour of the 
Russian embassy accompanying Tsar Peter the Great to Amsterdam in 1697. 
They show essentially the uncomplicated pleasure of a great pyrotechni-
cal prowess around a barely visible minimum of symbolic representation, 
included in a rather traditional castle—a spectacle that was undoubtedly 
adapted to the still rather modest culture of the young tsar. However, a con-
siderable change now occurs in the sphere of the publicity surrounding the 
fireworks. Henceforth, the published images of the fireworks contain not only 
the customary caption stating their actual and historical meaning, but they 
provide also a detailed description of the castle, the metaphorical elements it 
contains, and the meanings that should be attached to them.
In fact, around the turn of the seventeenth century the ideal fireworks per-
formance would consist of a shrewd combination of a recreational spectacle 
and an educational show of a political nature, to be experienced de visu and in 
actu by the spectators with all the senses of the human body and to be remem-
bered and reflected on afterwards, in the search for new, other, or at first sight 
hidden meanings. Fireworks become now primarily an instrument of top-
down public communication. Henceforth the third layer, that of political con-
sciousness, assumes a growing importance.16 The fireworks are from now on 
16    A similar evolution has marked the literary production of that period, according to 
W. van Ravesteyn, ‘Iets over politieke poëzie in het begin der achttiende eeuw,’ 
Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje V, 4 (1946): 49–65. Excellent examples are the learned address 
by the Utrecht history professor Petrus Burmannus (Pieter Burman), Oratio de Pace 
inter potentissimum Galliarum regem & praepotentes Foederati Belgii Ordines composita 
(Utrecht: G. van de Water, 1713), and the popular peace poem by the Haarlem weaver 
Jan van Gijsen, Vree bazuyn, toegepast, op de algemeene dank, vuur en vreugden dag: 
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one of the privileged instruments of the perfect politician, and, for that matter, 
of the perfect ideologist. Their very cost and rarity makes them an object of 
choice for a thorough political education.
After the turn of the century things continue therefore to change quickly. 
The ideological message grows in political importance and assumes an ever 
greater role in the elaboration of the fireworks as a multifaceted spectacle. The 
fireworks set off in the Hofvijver in The Hague on 13 December 1702, created 
by Daniel Marot, on the occasion of the victory of the Anglo-Dutch fleet in the 
bay of Vigo in Spain, show a clear rhetorical effort to transmit and inculcate the 
values of the victorious captains of the fleet. In this case, we know that a spe-
cial committee of the States prepared the design of the fireworks. The texts and 
images on the pedestals of the fireworks castle combine bilingual references 
to the antique deities Neptune, Hercules, Mars and Pallas, with metaphorical 
scenes and animals, and well-known Latin devices. In fact, all these elements 
were familiar to the educated citizen of that time, schooled in Latin and still 
familiar with the metaphorical language of classical Antiquity. It is their com-
bination that must surprise him, convey a new, precise message, and make him 
think about the happy state of public affairs and the glory of those in power.17
 1713: The Zenith of Political Symbolism
The 1713 fireworks set off for the celebration of the Peace Treaty of Utrecht prob-
ably represent the zenith of this evolution and the most advanced development 
of the educational and patriotic dimension of the art of pyrotechnics.18 As the 
engraving that unites in a single image the different fireworks of 14 June 1713 
shows, they may appear as one great political design, a common, pan-republican 
enterprise of all the public authorities involved, endowed with a single political 
meaning: celebrating the nation in all its political dimensions. The differences 
in the lay-out of the fireworks are clearly linked to the level of authority of the 
respective organizers and their financial resources: urban fireworks like those 
set up at Haarlem or even by the municipality of The Hague were of a much 
simpler design than those of the provincial States of Holland and Friesland or 
 uytgeschreeven tegens den 14. Junij, 1713 (Amsterdam: J. van Egmont, 1713) [copies in the 
Library of the University of Amsterdam].
17    C.W. Fock, ‘Vuurwerk op de Haagse vijver in 1702,’ Bulletin van het Rijksmuseum 16 (1968): 
122–129.
18    See for the Dutch engravings concerning the 1713 fireworks also my essay ‘Utrechts vreug-
devuur: masker voor ’s Lands neergang?’ De Achtttiende Eeuw 40:2 (2008): 5–20.
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of the important Admiralty in the booming commercial town of Rotterdam 
(fig. 13.5). The urban fireworks address the common people and just want to 
provide a celebratory message of joy and conviviality, whereas the States use 
the occasion to tell a story and pass on a message of authority, power or policy.19 
After 1713 fireworks become common practice in Europe for every possible 
public celebration and their organization breaks away from the  semi-monopoly 
19    A naughty narrative on the debauchery characterizing the daily life of the plenipoten-
tiaries at Utrecht during the peace negotiations: Casimir [= Augustin] Freschot, Histoire 
amoureuse et badine du congrès et de la ville d’Utrecht (Liège: Jacob Le Doux, 1713), to con-
front with the analysis of the events by Lucien Bély, ‘Utrecht, un théâtre pour la paix,’ in 
W. Frijhoff, O. Moorman van Kappen (eds.), Les Pays-Bas et la France des guerres de reli-
gion à la création de la République Batave (Nijmegen: Gerard Noodt Instituut, 1993), 53–76; 
a Dutch translation of Freschot’s text has been published by Erik Tigelaar and Roland 
Fagel (Hilversum: Verloren, 2013).
Figure 13.5 Afbeelding van het Theater en Vuurwerck opgeregt in de Maese door  
ordre van de Ed. Mog. Heeren de Gecommitteerde Raden ter Admiraliteyt  
resideerende te Rotterdam over de Vrede gesloten tot Uitregt in den Jaere 1713. 
Engraving by B. Picart after F. van Douwe (s.l., 1713).
gemeentearchief rotterdam
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of the public authorities, but rarely do they rise to the same level of emblem-
atic riches and educational effort for a greater political consciousness. 
Imperceptibly the recreational element, one of the basic dimensions of the 
earliest fireworks, again triumphs over the educational dimension and prevails 
over the political goals. In that sense too, the Peace Treaty of Utrecht marks 
a summit and at the same time a turning-point in the art of representation. 
On the other hand, although a comparative study of all the fireworks in early 
modern Europe remains to be accomplished, the available evidence shows 
rather clearly that the Dutch fireworks occupied at that time a special place 
in the art of public recreational imagery. They excelled in their scholarly, per-
fectly reasoned use of emblematic scenery and in their educational efforts, 
and as such exceeded by far the fireworks displays of other countries, such as 
England, France or Italy, in spite of the latter country’s pyrotechnical excel-
lence. Although the real impact of such performances on mass mentalities 
remains of course questionable, they testify to a very high level of political 
consciousness of their inventors and to the conviction that through these new 
forms of public representation the citizens would be able to assimilate new 
images and new meanings, and would pledge a greater political commitment 
to the public cause.
Admittedly the city of Utrecht itself was not really in the forefront of this 
evolution. Surprised that all the other major cities of the Dutch Republic 
almost simultaneously organized fireworks for the celebration of the Utrecht 
Peace, some historians have attributed several images of fireworks to Utrecht 
for which no such initiative was known. It is still striking that the city which 
had so greatly benefited from the peace negotiations did not really invest in 
performances celebrating the outcome of the peace process, and apparently 
not at all in fireworks. One of the reasons may have been that the city council 
traditionally operated under much pressure from the church council, which 
in Utrecht for many decades was of a stern, orthodox persuasion in the line of 
Gisbertus Voetius, the former Utrecht professor of theology known as the ‘Pope 
of the Reformed’.
In the course of the seventeenth century the Utrecht ministers, elders and 
deacons became radically opposed to any form of public rejoicings and more 
generally to whatever resembled theatrical representation, be it comedy or 
tragedy, all of which were considered as devilish art. When in December 1711 
Utrecht was selected as the place where the peace negotiation were to be car-
ried out, the problem of the social events and the recreational activities of the 
delegates became urgent. The town had to be attractive in order to favour a har-
monious climate. Theatre was essential, as were public music performances, 
dances and balls for the high representatives and their company. Earlier in that 
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year, the question of the theatre had been put on the public agenda by Pieter 
Burman, professor of history, eloquence and politics at Utrecht University, who 
argued against the Utrecht church council that remained firmly opposed to 
any public plays. On 6 June 1713 the city council decided finally to proclaim the 
Peace publicly on 14 June, after the first predication, and to authorize the bur-
gomasters ‘to regulate the signs and demonstrations of joy in front of the town 
hall, in the city and in the canals’—a decision that probably implied more an 
interest in control than an expansion of relief and pleasure. At any rate, no 
fireworks are known to have been set off in Utrecht on that date.
 Celebrating the Nation
Outside Utrecht, in the national centre of political power The Hague, a combi-
nation of fireworks was organized that had to show an equal commitment to 
the peace by the three layers of political power traditionally united in a body 
called the Society of The Hague, i.e., the States General of the United Provinces, 
the States of the province of Holland, and the town council of The Hague itself. 
The States General fixed the date of 14 June for the whole country as a formal 
day of thanksgiving and prayer, free of working obligations, and therefore fit for 
all kinds of festivities. The three political bodies in The Hague made an agree-
ment for the set-up of the fireworks and their metaphorical content, entrusting 
the formulation of the inscriptions and devices to a French Huguenot refugee 
familiar with the language of classical representation, Philippe de Vrigny.20 The 
semantic riches of each of the three representations reflects with precision the 
status of the organizing bodies: the municipality of The Hague contented itself 
with the sumptuous illumination of the front of the town hall in an allegorical 
20    Verhael en uytleg van de twee uytmuntende Vuurwerken, zo van Haer Ed.Gr.Mog. de Heeren 
Staaten van Holland en West-Vriesland, als van haer Ho.Mog. de Heeren Staaten Generaal 
der Vereenigde Nederlanden, met goet succes aengestoken op den 14. Junij 1713 . . . (The 
Hague: Pieter Husson, 1713), 26 p. [The Hague, Koninklijke Bibliotheek: Pamphlet 16175]. 
French version: Devises et inscriptions contenües dans la construction érigée pour le Feu 
d’Artifice de la Province de Hollande & de Westfrise, au sujet de la Pai avec la France. Concluë 
à Utrecht le 11. Avril en l’année 1713. Composées par Mr. De Vrigny [The Hague, Royal Library: 
Pamphlet 16177]. The most important engravings of the 1713 Dutch fireworks are listed 
in Frederik Muller, De Nederlandsche geschiedenis in platen. Beredeneerde beschrijving 
van Nederlandsche historieplaten, zinneprenten en historische kaarten (4 vol.; Amsterdam: 
Frederik Muller, 1863–1870; reprint Amsterdam: N. Israel, 1970), II, n, 3497–3513, and in the 
printed catalogue of the Rotterdam Atlas van Stolk, IV, n, 3415–3430, to which the unpub-
lished descriptions S 1710/56–64 have to be added from www.atlasvanstolk.nl.
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setting, whereas the States General and the States of Holland built their mag-
nificent fireworks castles in the Hofvijver, the pond in front of the government 
quarter. Naturally, that of the States of Holland was the smaller and simpler of 
the two. In the pond, the fireworks theatre of the States General occupied the 
place of honour in front of the Mauritshuis; the peace negotiation delegates 
were invited to enjoy these fireworks from the windows of that urban palace. 
The front side of the fireworks castle was therefore turned away from the mass 
of the spectators on the three other sides of the pond, a disposition that made 
it still more necessary to provide them with printed images of the front side 
and explanations of the visual presentations.
More than for other fireworks, we must for 1713 distinguish between the 
‘castle’, i.e. the constructed substrate of a durable character and the concrete 
representations built upon it, and, on the other hand, the fireworks perfor-
mance in the proper sense of the word, by definition short-lived and volatile. 
Consequently, a clear distinction must also be made between the realms of 
meaning involved. Yet the theatre and the performance were closely inter-
twined, and it would be an error to consider the fiery performance as an 
autonomous spectacle of a lower cultural level for the common people, while 
the fireworks theatre served as an implement for the learned elite. In fact, all 
published representations, engravings and broadsheets of the fireworks dis-
play a perfect match between performance and theatre. These engravings were 
reproduced many times by printers in The Hague, Utrecht and Amsterdam, and 
even abroad, in numbers we do not know but which must have been impor-
tant. The popular market for such items went well beyond the social upper 
crust. The publishers competed in their claims that their own product was the 
most perfect reproduction of the event, providing the most complete explana-
tion of the fireworks castle and its meanings. Finally, the journal Europische 
Mercurius reproduced the descriptions of the fireworks in full, making their 
messages available for those who had not been able to attend the performance 
and separating the documentary and educational function of the spectacle 
from the performance itself.21 In that way, the message provided became a for-
mal, long-lasting element of the narrative about the Peace negotiations and 
the Treaty of Utrecht.
Yet the engravings clearly represent the double impact of the fireworks, 
learned and popular together. They connect the instantaneous event with 
the durable setting and make them understandable in their mutual rela-
tion. The scenery shows how the short-lived rockets and other implements 
are released from the top of the fixed components of the theatre. Instead of 
21    Europische Mercurius 24 (1713): 302–309, with ill.
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remaining  simple construction elements, the presence of these components is 
 emphasized by the fire, and the spectacle inspires a search for their  meaning, 
the more so as that meaning is symbolically or metaphorically included in 
the emblematic figures represented on the components. Therefore, perfor-
mance and visual representation reinforce each other in the act—public and 
at the same time very personal—by which the fireworks are emotionally expe-
rienced and mentally assimilated. The rich, intricate, but basically stable and 
rather heavy structure of the theatre contrasts so strikingly with the airy and 
fiery performance represented by the visual, auditory and olfactory experi-
ence of the exploding fire, that it produces a strong mental impulsion to look 
for a collective meaning that unites the spectator and the community in a sin-
gle act of appropriation of the event. On the other hand, the interpretation of 
the meaning of the emblematic representations, including the structure of the 
theatre itself, is intensified by the memory of the fiery explosions, just as it is 
guided by the visual repertories from which they are borrowed and to which 
they refer in the memory of the spectators and interpreters.
These visual repertories pertained to the visual domains that were common 
knowledge for the contemporaries, at least for those who had gone to school, 
as was the case of the majority of the Dutch population as early as the late 
sixteenth century. We may retrieve them from the formal or visual conventions 
of the world of art, of printed publications, and of any other form of decora-
tion, even the most basic ones in print work or house decoration. The selec-
tion that had to be made in the extremely rich domain of the available forms 
of figuration proved to be mostly political, sometimes linked with social and 
moral considerations. The documentation produced before, during and after 
the fireworks shows that the inventors or designers of the fireworks developed 
a visual programme that corresponded closely to the political message which 
the organizing authorities wanted to be inculcated by the combination of 
performance and representation. But for visualizing concepts and ideas, they 
needed a translation into a visual repertory that could be recognized, either 
because it had long formed part of society’s memory and charged with precise, 
recognizable meanings for everybody or because it had been learned for use 
in precise situations or conditions. In theory it would have been possible, and 
perhaps more effective in the short run, to represent political ideas in the form 
of a strictly contemporary performance, for example by marking with preci-
sion the adversaries, performing a battle on the stage or at least showing its 
results, or representing a negotiation in action, as it would be done in the 2013 
fireworks theatre in Utrecht.
However, there were at least three reasons for not clinging too closely to the 
political world of those years but instead adopting a more distant language of 
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representation. Firstly, the peace had been achieved with difficulty and its issue 
was still pending for a number of belligerents; therefore caution was needed. 
Secondly, ever since the Middle Ages the representation of political realities had 
been moulded in symbolic imagery and more precisely in emblematic heraldry. 
Thirdly, the political language was fundamentally designed and controlled by 
the social elite, which, in spite of the predominance of the early modern court 
culture and the civilité register in its social life, had been educated in the clas-
sical culture of the Latin schools and universities. The symbolic language of 
Greco-Roman Antiquity or the register of the biblical references constituted 
therefore its main reference frame. Peace, for instance, was always represented 
by an emblematic figure referring to either the Greco-Roman pantheon with 
its innumerable deities or to the Judeo-Christian world with its biblical figures, 
angels or early Christian saints at the centre of the stage.
 Conclusion
The rich emblems and metaphors would need a more thorough analysis of this 
complicated imagery. The apparent global language of the imagery is treacher-
ous because it hides diverse political, social and cultural meanings and chang-
ing cultures of memory. Allow me just a triple conclusion. First, seen from the 
point of view of public festivities, the Peace of Utrecht appears indeed as the 
zenith of a long evolution and as the summit of the art of firework-making, in 
its pyrotechnical aspects as well as regards political representation. Given the 
lavish execution of the fireworks castles and the extremely broad diffusion of 
the visual publications and their textual explanations, we may conclude that 
the authorities of the time were quite aware of the exceptional weight of what 
happened at that moment and purposely tried to make it benefit their cause.
Second, with respect to that public cause, the present-day observer cannot 
refrain from a certain disappointment. With the exception of a general sense 
of relief because of the peace, the sumptuous, even magnificent emblematic 
decoration programmes remain totally inward-turned, inside the boundaries 
of the Dutch Republic and the structures of the state. They support a patriotic 
mentality. Again with the exception of some general references to commerce, 
they do not refer at all to any form of alliance, any expansion worldwide or any 
responsibility of the Dutch in the political theatre of Europe. Paradoxically, 
it is the political structure of the Dutch community itself that is celebrated, 
whereas this structure was of virtually no importance for the peace negotia-
tions. 1713 displays a nationalizing celebration, a return to patriotism orga-
nized by the highest authorities of the provinces and the state itself, not the 
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festive and trustful proclamation of the international creed one would expect 
from them on the threshold of the cosmopolitan Enlightenment. Was this 
magnificent but disappointing turning inward a political conjuration of inner 
dangers, of the fear of disintegration of the Dutch commonwealth? At any rate, 
the authorities must have realised that the leading European role of the Dutch 
was finished and must have consequently adapted the educational message of 
the fireworks to the changing times.
Thirdly, and more generally, I hope to have shown in this short analysis that 
early modern fireworks represent much more than the bit of idle entertain-
ment they may have provided at first sight. The fireworks formula was used by 
the political authorities with a triple aim: a celebratory function, a recreational 
function, and, much more than nowadays, an educational function for their 
political cause. This third function justified the considerable expense of the 
fireworks, both as a volatile performance and as a more durable theatre for 
political messages. In the early modern period, the fireworks on the occasion 
of the Peace of Utrecht were probably the most perfect and most balanced 
expression of this double goal.
Part 4
The Commemorative Stage
∵
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CHAPTER 14
Memory Theatre: Remembering the Peace after 
Three Hundred Years
Jane O. Newman
 Act I—Theatres of Memory
In his De oratore, Cicero recounts the famous story of the poet, Simonides 
of Ceos, who, having been present at a banquet in honour of a nobleman 
of Thessaly, was fortunate enough to have been called out of the hall before 
the roof of the building caved in, crushing everyone to death. Because of his 
prodigious memory, Simonides was able to recall exactly where each of the 
guests had been seated and could thus assist with the identification of the 
mangled bodies. The tale introduces Cicero’s discussion of the ‘art of memory’ 
in his treatise on rhetoric; there he writes that, as a result of his experience, 
Simonides ‘inferred that persons desiring to train this faculty [memory] must 
select places and form mental images of the things they wish to remember 
and store those images in the places, so that the order of the places will pre-
serve the order of the things’.1 Thus was born the idea of the ‘memory the-
atre,’ made famous in the Renaissance by Giulio Camillo, Giordano Bruno, and 
Robert Fludd, and still operative in the early modern scientific work of Bacon, 
Descartes, and Leibniz.2 Arguments and information deposited in orderly 
fashion in strategic locations around a central ‘stage’ could be summoned 
forth, ‘found’, or ‘invented’ (from the Latin invenio) for a specific occasion and 
in a specific way, to build a compelling speech, present a focused argument, or 
sustain a particular claim.
The conceit of the memory theatre is a useful one in the context of a vol-
ume entitled Performances of Peace, in which the contributors, using a diverse 
set of methods and texts, examine the various ‘stages’—both literal and figu-
rative—on which the Peace of Utrecht was enacted. The rich array of politi-
cal, social, and cultural issues, the myriad locations and occasions discussed, 
and the diverse methodologies employed by the authors suggest not only the 
1    Cicero, De Oratore, vol. 2, ed. A. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 
86: 351–354.
2    See Francis Yates, The Art of Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).
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 considerable heft that ‘Utrecht’ had in its original historical ‘performance’, but 
also the degree to which scholarly memories of the past are also always already 
determined by and for specific audiences to meet specific (disciplinary) needs. 
As De Bruin et al. argue in their ‘Introduction’ to the present volume, ‘perfor-
mance’ is a capaciously ‘porous’ concept which certainly includes the act of 
recollection itself, with the one or the other version of a local or global, a socio-
historical or cultural past either called forth or left to languish in the wings, 
depending on the memorializer’s needs. Jubilee years naturally stage memory 
in particularly arresting ways. The essays collected here, all originally presented 
at a 2013 conference commemorating Utrecht’s tercentenary, ask us to consider 
the question of what the modern world might have inherited from Utrecht 
and thus which present-day conundrums could be said to have found their 
origins there. In each case, we are either implicitly or directly asked to reflect 
on how future generations will look back at the various tercentenary com-
memorations as ‘performative acts’ (de Bruin et al.)—from the ‘Performances 
of Peace’ conference documented here to the ‘Colonial Legacy’ conference 
sponsored by the University of Utrecht’s Centre for the Humanities, to the fire-
works, concerts, and museum exhibits sponsored by the city of Utrecht and 
Arts Holland, also in 2013—as they become objects of analysis in turn, just as 
interesting as the historical events they take as their subject.
From a scholarly perspective, the memory work performed by these essays 
is in no small part shaped by many of the same questions that interest what 
has come to be called the New Diplomatic History, which, as John Watkins 
writes, consists in the ‘multidisciplinary reevaluation’3 of the periodization 
schemes, geographical imaginaries, gendered knowledges, and economies of 
political scale that have limited how international relations in earlier periods 
have been studied to date. Such limitations have also restricted the sources, 
including literary and art historical ones, that can be used to tell the complex 
stories of earlier periods (for a related initiative, see also ‘Textual Ambassadors’ 
at http://www.textualambassadors.org). Like this new ‘inter-discipline,’ whose 
re-invention is both long overdue and timely in a postmodern, ‘globalized’ 
world that resembles its early modern twin in so many ways, the present vol-
ume calls attention to a theatre of politics understood in this more expansive 
way. The essays consider how ‘Utrecht’ was ‘performed’ below, at, and beyond 
the level of the nation-state (Frey and Frey and Onnekink) while also calling 
attention to the fraught economic and social legacies of empire and colonial-
ism in a simultaneously ever more internationalizing and ever more local, 
3    John Watkins, ‘Toward a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe,’ 
Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 38:1 (2008): 1–14, 1.
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particularized world (Olivas, Bély, and McCluskey) not unlike our own. As 
we read, we also catch sight of the important role of the media in ‘producing’ 
political events, then as now, with media understood broadly here to include 
fireworks and public spectacles and rituals, diplomatic correspondence and 
historiographic accounts, print and image journalism and the periodical press, 
as well as occasional poetry, public theatre and ‘peep show’ plays (see Frijhoff, 
Farguson, van der Haven, Goldwyn/van Dijk, Al-Shayban, Jackson, Jensen, 
and Duchhardt). The essays thus summon forth the events and the ‘achieve-
ments’ of 1713 not only because of that year’s importance as the alleged origin 
of various forms of political modernity, such as the balance of power and the 
international acceptance and regulation of the slave trade, and the political 
instrumentalization (Frijhoff) of public culture, but also because of the optic 
that such inquiries provide for re-considering the legacies of this modernity 
that lie at the heart of contemporary theoretical and literary-historical as well 
as historiographic debates. Taken together they thus pose the question of how 
to use cultural artefacts, social history, and an expanded sense of the archive to 
tell in new ways the (hi)story of a specific moment and set of events long con-
sidered to reside only within the purview of International Relations theorists 
and historians of international law.
Thinking a thickly described past of peace-making and our present together 
suggests the importance of understanding the many ways that the early mod-
ern and the post-modern are always already locked in a complex embrace. In 
closing this volume, I would like to challenge its readers to reflect on the dif-
ferent kinds of rhetorical-political work that the ‘performances’ of memory 
involved in this particular tercentenary celebration are doing for us. My ques-
tion is a simple one, namely: How will the future read the memories of 1713 as 
they were constructed in 2013? What will the future say, that is, about how the 
early twenty-first century conceived of the early eighteenth-century theatres of 
both peace and war? Indeed, in the language of the Introduction by de Bruin et 
al., what kinds of ‘identity’ are constructed—and for whom—by the memories 
of ‘Utrecht’ performed here? By way of considering how any number of answers 
to such questions might be framed, I turn to another three-hundredth-year 
anniversary of a companion early modern peace-making event, namely, the 
Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, as it was recalled in its tercentenary year (1948). 
A number of commemorations of Westphalia took place in that year; I will 
deal with only two of the most salient of them, one that occurred in post-1945 
Germany and one that occurred in post-1945 France. The complex and multi-
layered nature of these two performances of treaty memory is not surprising. 
For, as much as the actual treaties of Westphalia—like most such instruments 
of peace—may have enjoined their signatories to ‘forget’ the  conflicts they had 
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been convened to put to rest,4 it was only by strategically recalling the details 
of a lengthy war that the conflict could be claimed to have been brought to 
an end. By definition, then, there is never ‘oblivion’ when it comes to creating 
peace but, rather, only differential performances of memories of war and thus 
competing notions of what stands to be gained (or lost) by signing on. The two 
tercentenary commemorations of Westphalia that I describe are good exam-
ples of this kind of duelling memory work. Occurring in the direct aftermath 
of a war that, for many of the mid-twentieth century actors involved, had been 
just as devastating as the one that Westphalia brought to an end, the French 
and German memories of 1648 were staged in instrumentalizing ways that 
corresponded to their respective present-day needs. The general metaphor of 
memory as theatre takes on an additionally specific form in this case, since the 
question of genre—whether the 1948 celebrations of Westphalia were com-
edies or tragedies—looms large. Again, looking back at how 1648 was staged 
three hundred years on is simply one way of wondering aloud how future gen-
erations will look back at the recollections of ‘Utrecht’ in its three-hundredth 
jubilee year as they are ‘performed’ here.
 Act II—The Archive as Arsenal / France Celebrates Westphalia 
after Three Hundred Years
Given how much we now actually know about the differential scale and iden-
tities of the plenipotentiaries treating at Münster and Osnabrück between 
1643–44 and 1648, when representatives from both large and smaller-scale 
territorial states rubbed shoulders with representatives of urban polities, for 
example, as well as with papal nuncios, imperial emissaries, and many more, 
and in light of the persistence after 1648 of several important imperial institu-
tions on whose continuing existence its agreements in point of fact relied,5 it 
is ironic how uniformly the Treaty of Westphalia is remembered as the origin 
of a political modernity organized more or less exclusively around the rise of 
the territorially-bounded sovereign state. In this story, Westphalia functions as 
4    See Jane O. Newman, ‘Perpetual Oblivion? Remembering Westphalia in a Post-Secular Age,’ 
in Forgetting Faith: Negotiating Confessional Conflict in Early Modern Europe, ed. Isabel 
Karremann, Inga Mai Groote, and Cornel Zwierlein (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2012), 
261–275.
5    See Stéphane Beaulac, ‘The Westphalian Model in Defining International Law: Challenging 
the Myth,’ Australian Journal of Legal History 8 (2004): 181–203 and Benjamin Straumann, 
‘The Peace of Westphalia as a Secular Constitution,’ Constellations 15:2 (2008): 173–188.
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what Heinz Duchhardt has called a ‘Denkfigur’,6 which shapes the narrative of 
the signing of the Treaty in the wake of the century of religious wars arising out 
of the Reformation and the resulting gutting of the universal orders of the Holy 
Roman Empire and the Holy See into a story of the birth and subsequent rise 
of modern statism as such, with its most modern form, the nation-state, as the 
hero. Knowing no sovereign instance above itself (even a divine one), this state 
holds the exclusive power to deny ‘external actors’ the possibility of interfer-
ence in affairs within its territorial boundaries, on the one hand, and, also via 
that sovereignty, the power to ‘determine [all] domestic authority structures’, 
including the ones related to those all-too-divisive matters of belief, on the 
other.7 When Westphalia is remembered in this way as the origin of what even-
tually became the secularism triumphans of an internally homogeneous and 
secure (nation) state, the Treaty is invested with the power to have (thankfully) 
closed the door on the age of devastating pan-European religious wars. But this 
version of the tale also lays at Westphalia’s feet the responsibility for having 
sanctioned precisely the proto-totalitarian authoritarianism associated with 
the state’s right to both pre-emptive aggression against potential foes from the 
outside and to normative ‘domestic jurisdiction’ within as well.8 Seen from 
this perspective, the inauguration of the ‘modern’ era of territorially-organized 
political culture in 1648 may appear to us today to have been something of a 
mixed blessing.
In 1948 and in France, however, the memory of an earlier time when the 
integrity of a state’s borders and the possibility of self-rule were perceived as 
the norm was something to celebrate; the nationalist thrust of memory here is 
reminiscent of the celebrations of ‘Utrecht’, which, as a number of the essays 
make clear (Frijhoff, Olivas, and Farguson, for example), were also designed 
for local consumption. Still traumatized, that is, by the German occupation 
of 1940 to 1944 and by the more or less literal splintering of the nation into 
the two sub-national and regionally identified Occupied and Vichy parts, and 
then by the shattering of post-war solidarity by waves of retributive justice 
after 1945, the official French public sphere was more than happy to engage 
6    Heinz Duchhardt, ‘Peace Treaties from Westphalia to the Revolutionary Era,’ in Peace Treaties 
and International Law in European History, ed. Randall C.H. Lesaffer (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 46 (note 3).
7    See Richard Falk, ‘Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia,’ The Journal of Ethics 
6:4 (2002): 311–52.
8    See Falk, ‘Revisiting Westphalia’; Beaulac, ‘The Westphalian Model’ and Andreas Osiander, 
The States System of Europe, 1640–1990. Peacemaking and the Conditions of International 
Stability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
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in the commemoration of an earlier time when the nation-state was allegedly 
still intact. The early modern France of the Westphalian and post-Westphalian 
eras, with a glorious ‘most Christian King’ at the helm, was obviously a good 
candidate for a celebration of this sort—especially if one strategically elided 
the years of the Fronde—since it could be made to represent not only national 
political harmony, but also a moment of territorial enlargement that would 
make the nation whole again and secure. For it was via the Treaty signed in 
Münster in 1648 that the much disputed ‘three bishoprics,’ les Trois-Évêchés, 
as well as Alsace and the French cities of Brisach and Pignerol were officially 
realigned with France.9 In this context, and in light of the aptness of invok-
ing an earlier moment of French solidarity with itself and territorial  autonomy 
too, the French ‘Parlement’ and the ‘gouvernement de la République’ voted 
on 11 September 1947 to fund tercentenary celebrations of Westphalia 
throughout the nation and to introduce materials about the Treaty into all 
French schools.10
Beginning, naturally, in the once again reclaimed region of Alsace, and then 
followed by festivities in Paris, the quintessential capital of the modern cen-
tralized state, these commemorative performances were the products of con-
siderable work. A grand tercentenary exhibit was mounted in Strasbourg at Le 
Château des Rohan, which opened on 13 June 1948, after a number of learned 
conferences on the topic had already occurred. The unmistakably localist 
thrust of the Strasbourg event is audible in the title of the exhibit: ‘L’Alsace 
française, 1648–1948’, and was also visible in the choreography of the show, at 
which, alongside the treaties and a variety of war-related portraits, maps, and 
artefacts, an array of Alsatian paintings as well as examples of the local indus-
tries of gold- and silver-smithery (‘orfèvrerie’), for which the city was so well 
known, were on view. The people of Strasbourg and visiting dignitaries alike 
were treated to spectacular fireworks on the evening of the 3rd of July; dancing 
in local Alsatian costumes took place on the main square the following day.11 
9     The Treaty of Münster (24 October 1646), in: ‘Instrumentum Pacis Monasteriensis,’ 
Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte, http://www.pax-westphalica.de/
ipmipo/index.html, accessed 11 May 2014, § 70–73. Jean Bérenger, ‘Historiographie,’ in 
1648. La Paix de Westphalie. Vers l’Europe  moderne ed. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 
(Paris: Imprimerie nationale Éditions, 1998), 164.
10    Élisabeth Pauly, ‘1948—Tricentenaire des Traités de Westphalie,’ 1648. La Paix de 
Westphalie. Vers l’Europe modern, ed. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (Paris: Imprimerie 
nationale Éditions, 1998), 185–187 and Paul Pieper, ‘Der Westfälische Friede. Die 
Gedächtnis-Ausstellungen 1648–1948,’ Westfalen 28 (1950): 59–75.
11    See Pauly, ‘1948,’ 186–187 and Exposition l’Alsace française, 1648–1948, ed. Chateau des 
Rohan, Musée historique. Comité regional des fêtes commemoratives de 1648–1798–
1848–1948 (Strasbourg: Hotel de la société des Amis des Arts, 1948).
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All of this was, of course, far more than just provincial entertainment, since, as 
in 1648, so too in 1948, the reclaiming of Alsace from Germany was one of the 
centrepieces of the post-war settlement and thus also of considerable trans-
regional patriotic significance and national pride. Remembering Westphalia in 
Alsace after three hundred years was thus as instrumentalizing as the original 
celebrations of the Treaty themselves.
It was Paris’s turn to take up the baton of the nation’s memory-work 
three months later, celebrating the anniversary of Westphalia with a perhaps 
more historically oriented, although not entirely de-provincialized exhibit. The 
exhibit, ‘La Paix de Westphalie. 1648’, opened at the Parisian Hôtel de Rohan, 
where the French National Archives were and are housed, on 26 October, just 
two days after the actual anniversary of the day on which the treaties were his-
torically signed on 24 October 1648.12 The curator of the Paris exhibit was the 
recently appointed director of the French National Archives, Charles Braibant. 
Braibant is remembered now as a middling novelist and, more importantly, as 
the man who centralized and systematized the country’s scattered archives in 
the difficult post-war years; his purpose in so doing can be heard in his famous 
description of the archive’s task. ‘Les archives sont l’arsenal de l’administration 
avant d’être le grenier de l’histoire’.13 Braibant penned a rousing preface to the 
slim exhibition catalogue that accompanied the Paris show; both his words 
and the selection of items displayed speak volumes about which memory of 
Westphalia the French ‘administration’ wanted to produce at the time.
Braibant opens his ‘Préface’ to the exhibition catalogue with a brisk, four-
page account of France’s long, yet almost organically pre-determined ‘prog-
ress’ toward the Rhine.14 Beginning in the thirteenth century and continuing 
up through Francis I’s valiant efforts against the enemy Habsburgs—with the 
‘support’ of course of ‘des princes protestants d’Allemagne en lutte contre 
l’empereur’15—and culminating in the efforts of ‘le grand cardinal’ Richelieu 
on behalf of ‘nôtre pays’,16 France became ‘complete’, its natural self, once the 
Three Bishoprics, Brisach, and of course Alsace were re-secured for the crown 
at the signing of the Treaty at Münster in 1648.17 ‘L’Alsace étant  française’, 
12    See Charles Braibant, La Paix de Westphalie, 1648 (Hôtel de Rohan, Paris: Les Amis des 
Archives Nationales, 1948), Préface.
13    See Pauly, ‘1948’ and Charles Braibant, Le ‘Grenier de l’histoire’ et l’Arsenal de l’Administration: 
Introduction aux Cours des Stages d’Archives de l’Hôtel de Rohan (Paris: Impr. Nationale, 
1957).
14    Braibant, La Paix de Westphalie, 5.
15    Ibid., 7.
16   Ibid., 7.
17   Ibid., 8.
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Braibant writes, ‘la France est faite’.18 The Westphalian achievement was thus 
commemorated in Paris, as it had already been in Strasbourg, not as the begin-
ning of a peaceful Europe-wide international system-of-states but, rather, as 
the triumph of the expansion and re-securing of a single nation-state’s bor-
ders. Braibant may have wanted to avoid appearing to be only the patriotic 
partisan that he was for he goes on to explain that, in light of the ‘crucial 
stage’ (‘étape decisive’) that Westphalia represented in the constitution of ‘les 
grandes concentrations nationales’ of ‘une Europe nouvelle’, he had early on 
invited the museums of France’s two greatest allies in the Thirty Years’ War, 
the Low Countries and Sweden, to contribute pieces to his exhibit. There had 
been tercentenary exhibits already in Delft and Stockholm, with one hundred 
thousand and three hundred thousand visitors respectively, he notes. In acts 
of modern solidarity that matched those noble efforts of arms in the past, 
France’s ‘deux grands alliés’19 had generously complied by lending a variety 
of objects. After thanking any number of colleagues and institutions for their 
help, Braibant closes his preface by recalling that the exhibit’s title—‘La Paix 
de Westphalie’—underscores not the conflicts of both the more distant and 
nearer past but, rather, the long wished-for peace. He writes: ‘La paix: les hom-
mes d’aujourd’hui sentient par expérience le poids divin de ce mot. Encore la 
guerre de Trente ans dépasse-t-elle en cruauté et en horreur les deux catastro-
phes que les présentes generations ont subies’.20 ‘La paix: en 1948 les hommes 
de toute l’Europe n’en ont-ils pas la même soif que leurs pères et leurs mères de 
1648? Pax optima rerum’, he declaims. Gesturing toward the opening meetings 
of the United Nations in Paris at approximately the same time,21 Braibant con-
cludes with a somewhat perplexingly doubled cosmopolitanist and national-
istic wish: ‘Est-il vain de souhaiter que les traits en gestation à cette heure, s’ils 
ne peuvent donner à notre pays autant de glorie et puissance que ceux dont 
les instruments figurent à l’hôtel de Rohan’, in his exhibit, ‘du moins ne soient 
pas une trêve passagère’.22
In their Introduction, de Bruin et al. argue that performative acts must be 
‘public’ in order to exist. It is useful to consider the public nature of the exhibit 
in Paris in these terms. For example, the militaristically inflected vocabulary 
that Braibant uses (‘trêve’ as both armistice and cease-fire as well as pause or 
recess) and the catalogue of the ‘La Paix de Westphalie’ exhibit itself suggest 
18    Ibid., 9.
19    Ibid., 10.
20    Ibid., 14–15.
21    Ibid., 10.
22    Ibid., 15–16.
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the kind of rich memory-palace experience (575 items were displayed) that 
visitors to the exhibit in post-war Paris would have been swept up into as a 
collective as they entered. The first seventy-seven items—various versions of 
the treaties and portraits of the major participants in the lengthy negotiations 
that finally came to fruition on that October day—work hard to convince the 
viewing public that the exhibit’s intention was to perform a memory of peace. 
We may nevertheless be forgiven, after considering the entire catalogue, for 
thinking that its overwhelming agenda was, rather, to appeal to a public with a 
taste for the tools and machinery of war. Perhaps displacing their memories of 
a more recent conflict by looking at one in the past, or perhaps, just as plausi-
bly, recalling via the juxtaposition that, for all the brief ‘armistices’, or respites, 
from violence, what human history teaches is that war never really goes away, 
the exhibit may have been not just educational but also troubling for the 
Parisian public during its Fall run. The 286 war-related items that were dis-
played—four times the number of ‘peace’ items—create a somewhat different 
impression than Braibant’s opening praise of peace, in other words. Countless 
fine engravings of famous battles and sieges and military encampments were 
included, only occasionally interrupted by a number of ‘personal’, yet still bat-
tlefield-related items, including the armour and equipment of several of the 
better-known combatants, such as the sword and pourpoint, or padded shirt 
worn under the heavy armour, of Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, and a 
picture of the garb worn on formal occasions by his horse. Visitors could also 
admire the armour of the great and brutal French general, Turenne, even as 
they shrank back from his scowling portrait. This part of the show thus clearly 
relied on and endorsed the more or less magisterial version of the peace as a 
national military victory recounted by the winners.
It would be unfair not to note that the 1948 ‘La Paix de Westphalie’ exhibit 
did also feature a smallish selection of items, numbering just seven, that 
included several imprints from Callot’s famous etching series, ‘Les petites’ and 
‘Les grandes Misères de la Guerre’ (1636 and 1633, respectively) displayed as 
items #344 and #345, thereby nodding ever so briefly in the direction of the 
truth of the matter, namely, that in wartime, it is the citizenry and unprotected 
who suffer. But these testimonies to the ‘miseries of war’ are dwarfed by the 
rest of the objects in both size and number as the exhibit barrels ahead, with a 
breathtaking matter-of-factness, to its final 210 objects, which celebrate what 
was to remain the real achievement of Westphalia in the French mind, again, 
the reacquisition of Alsace for ‘la France’. These final objects include maps and 
battle plans and city vistas of Metz, Verdun, and Strasbourg, with its mighty 
fortifications, which teach visitors over and over again that it was the expan-
sion of the nation’s territorial borders that was the real point of the peace. The 
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underlying logic of the exhibit is unmistakable in the crowning shout-out to 
the enlarged nation represented by the final object displayed, Pierre du Val’s 
‘Les Acquisitions de la France par la paix’, which catalogues the serial acquisi-
tion of territory by France up until the Treaty of Nijmegen of 1679 in detail. 
As it was ‘performed’ in Paris at the Hôtel de Rohan in 1948, then, the mem-
ory of the Peace of Westphalia was, well, Westphalian in the extreme, when 
Westphalianism is defined as the origin of the legitimacy of waging war when 
the borders of the sovereign territorial state must be secured. This was, of 
course, properly the case for France after its occupation by the Germans. But 
the nonchalant triumphalism of its ‘performance’ of memory is troubling all 
the same.
 Act III—Westphalia in the Ruins / Germany Remembers 1648  
after Three Hundred Years
The tone that governed the celebrations among the rubble in German Münster, 
the city where the Treaty of Westphalia between France’s ‘Most Christian King’ 
and the Holy Roman Empire had originally been signed, was decidedly differ-
ent than the one that informed Braibant’s tercentenary exhibit in Paris. For 
example, on the poster designed by Joseph Faßbaender to announce the paral-
lel German exhibit at the Münster Landesmuseum in 1948 the angel of peace, 
with her centrally placed trumpet, appears to call for a unifying reconciliation 
of peoples rather than for either Germany or France to (post-Potsdam) hunker 
down behind realigned borders.23 If the Münster exhibit may not have inten-
tionally been designed to offer a metaphorical version of the literal olive branch 
that the angel holds in her left hand (which interestingly obscures the faintly 
Nazified imperial eagle of the Habsburg Empire beneath it in the image), it was 
clearly meant as a meditation on the way that Germany was going to rejoin 
the ‘family of nations’ that Westphalia was taken to signify24 after the defeat 
of a National Socialist state (a state that, after 1933, had of course endorsed a 
Westphalianism of a particularly ugly and destructive sort). It is in any case 
difficult to look at this poster or the pictures that survive of the ceremonial 
events that took place in Münster in October of 1948, including parades against 
the backdrop of still bombed-out buildings (91% of the centre of Münster had 
been destroyed by air bombardment in 1944–45) and ‘open-air’ lectures held 
23    Heinz Duchhardt, Das Feiern des Friedens. Der Westfälische Friede im kollektiven Gedächtnis 
der Friedensstadt Münster (Münster: Verlag Regensberg, 1997), 90.
24    Ibid., 85.
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inside the museum, since the roof had not yet been repaired,25 and not see a 
performance of memory equally as ‘identity-forming’ as the one enacted in 
Paris, a performance that was, of course, also in clear contrast to Braibant’s 
exhibit, with its celebration of a victorious France.
Heinz Duchhardt has analysed the several different political economies visi-
ble in both the planning of the Münster exhibit and the attendant commemora-
tive events in great detail.26 Depending on where one looks, one finds evidence 
for several differential memories of how Westphalia lived on for the Germans 
after the war. On the one hand, the original impetus for the tercentenary cel-
ebrations in Münster had come from the German office of the internationalist 
Union Européene des Fédéralistes (UEF), which was committed to a confed-
erative model of a post-war ‘United States of Europe’ of a decidedly westward-
leaning cast. Taken together, the other events of that year, including the London 
Six-Power Conference on (Western) Germany’s future as a composite occupied 
zone, the Blockade of Berlin (June 1948 to May 1949), and the 1948 currency 
reform, created a context within which remembering Westphalia as the found-
ing moment of a peaceful international system of cooperating states could 
have been designed to signal Germany’s—and the Germans’—willingness to 
engage peacefully, if in a subordinate position, with its and their (Western) 
partners on equal footing. The ceremonies that opened on 24 October 1948 
in the reassembled historical Hall of Peace (Friedenssaal) in the Münster City 
Hall (it had been dismantled and stored outside the city during the bombings), 
where the Treaty of Westphalia had originally been signed, and then moved 
into the museum for the official opening of the exhibit, in fact began with a 
greeting by Minister-President of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia Arnold, 
a ‘committed ‘European’ devoted to the (Catholic) Christian idea of a conti-
nent-spanning ‘Occident’ (‘Abendland’);27 the claim was, of course, somewhat 
at odds with the idea of Westphalia as having inaugurated the secular era of 
autonomous territorial states. Still and all, as Duchhardt reports, the idea of 
celebrating 1648 as the end of thirty years of divisive intra-European war and 
as the beginning of an era of inter-state cooperation was confirmed by a Dutch 
representative of Union Européene des Fédéralistes, one Dr. W. Kerkrade, who 
announced in his speech the publication of a ‘peace manifesto’ by the UEF 
that would be signed by local dignitaries and then brought via horse-relay (!) 
to The Hague. As in the case of English performances of Handel’s Te Deum on 
the occasion of Utrecht jubilees described in the Introduction, music played 
25    Ibid., 91, 93.
26   Ibid., 85–108.
27    Romberg-Jaschinski, cited in Ibid., 89.
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a central role; a concert featuring Beethoven’s Ninth, followed by a massive 
peace demonstration in the centre of the city said to have drawn some twenty 
to thirty thousand people, at which more speeches celebrating the peace were 
followed by an evening of fireworks (perhaps uncomfortably reminiscent of 
the rain of bombs that many survivors had probably not yet forgotten), closed 
out a day on which Westphalia was remembered somewhat differently than 
in Paris, not as a celebration of the triumph of a single, re-consolidated, even 
expanded nation, in other words, but, rather, as a sober moment of recalling 
the historical creation of an international system of states that should have 
prevented the more recent intra-European conflict, perhaps even as a way 
of confirming that the newly formed United Nations (formally established, 
 interestingly, on 24 October 1945), alongside the many other political and eco-
nomic forms of European cooperation that were emerging, ought now to take 
the lead.
On the other hand, the ‘internationalist’ version of Westphalia remembered 
by Arnold and Kerkrade et al. was not the only one in circulation in Münster in 
1948 and for good reason, since there was already a lengthy history in Germany, 
beginning soon after the ink on the Treaty was dry and building to a crescendo 
over the course of the nineteenth century and especially after Versailles, of see-
ing Westphalia as the origin of what can only be understood as the nation’s sub-
sequent political tragedy, its subsequent failures (and horrifying successes as 
well) as a modern nation-state. While this longer history of the historiography 
of the Treaty had itself been a kind of battlefield, as Bernd Schönemann has 
shown, a clear narrative had begun to emerge between the end of the Old Reich 
in 1806 and the establishing of the new one in 1871. Bernhard Erdmannsdörffer’s 
‘Zur Geschichte und Geschichtsschreibung des Dreißigjährigen Krieges’ (1865) 
belongs to the tradition of the ‘klein-Deutschland’-affiliated side of these mem-
ories; it tells the tale of the Westphalian peace as catastrophic for Germany not 
only because the Treaty permitted foreign states (Sweden and France) to throw 
the dice that shaped Germany’s political future but also because it at least in 
theory allowed the old Reich (the Holy Roman one) to continue as a political 
actor. Both moves delayed for an unpardonably long time the emergence of 
the ‘real’ (e.g. post-1871) German Reich out of its original princely territorial 
(e.g. Brandenburg-Prussian) roots to its rightful position as an independent 
state.28 Somewhat earlier, the opposing ‘Großdeutschland’-position had been 
articulated by one Onno Klopp in his Der König Friedrich II. von Preussen und 
28    Bernd Schönemann, ‘Die Rezeption des Westfälischen Friedens durch die deutsche 
Geschichtswissenschaft,’ in Der Westfälische Frieden, ed. Heinz Duchhardt (Munich: 
Oldenbourg 1998 [=Historische Zeitschrift, 26 (1998): 805–25]).
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die deutsche Nation (1860). According to Klopp, it was as a result of the Treaty’s 
‘sacrifice’ of the ‘ancient’ German ‘Stände und Corporationen’ (estates and 
corporations) to ‘dem Willen [von] Territorialfürsten’ (the will of territorial 
princes), both large and small, that rulers like Frederick II could eventually 
came to power, only to undertake the splintering apart of ‘das Reich’ in a delib-
erate way when he did so. The effect—according to Klopp—was to consign to 
its political grave the only form of state organization (the imperial, all-encom-
passing one that included Austria-Hungary) that could have defended a truly 
universal German ‘Nationalgeist’ (national spirit) with success. The period of 
the Great War of 1914–18 and Germany’s defeat had thus already been under-
stood as a particularly painful revival of Westphalia, with the German Reich 
forced yet again to submit to the jurisdiction of foreign powers and rendered 
incapable of protecting not only ‘ancient’ but modern German rights as well. 
In spite of the Congress of Vienna, this same Westphalian dispensation, the 
devolution of power to the level of the individual sovereign state, that is, had 
permitted political and military adventures on the part of autonomous secu-
lar polities unconstrained by any limiting powers of an inter- or transnational 
sort, thereby granting permission, as it were, to those very same bellicose 
states, including Germany, to go to war in 1914. This same logic then went on to 
permit the rise of Nazi Germany and the ensuing defeat a second time around 
just three years before the celebrations at Münster took place.
A tradition of negative memories of Westphalia of such vehemence and 
depth would have been difficult to suppress; indeed, as Duchhardt has shown, 
at least two of the eminences featured on 24 October 1948, the first a professor 
from the University of Münster, Kurt von Raumer, the second an invited speaker 
from Bonn University, Professor Max Braubach, solidly endorsed it. Raumer’s 
article, entitled ‘Overcoming the Peace of Westphalia’ (‘Die Überwindung des 
Westfälischen Friedens’), appeared in a special edition of the local newspa-
per, Westfälische Nachrichten, published on that day; in it, he articulates a 
‘Großdeutschland’-position, whereby the Treaty is said to have been respon-
sible for the destruction of Germany’s primal unity.29 Although Raumer does 
not appear to have mentioned it, the de facto partitioning of the country into 
an Allied and a Soviet zone that the Currency Reform of 1948 more or less guar-
anteed meant that this same ‘tragedy’ would be performed again in the here-
and-now; the resulting absorption of Germany into a Europe-wide ‘occidental’ 
West made the revival of a true German unity even less likely. For his part, 
Braubach, in his speech at the commemorative event, which was also pub-
lished that year, likewise characterized the Treaty of Westphalia as a ‘ fatefully 
29    Cf. Duchhardt, Das Feiern des Friedens, 94–95.
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mistaken decision’ (‘eine verhängnisvolle Fehlentscheidung’) that permitted 
‘self-interested neighbours’ (France) to dominate Germany, which, as a result, 
became ‘a lifeless ruin’, an ‘insubstantial shadow [of itself] with no hope for 
healing or reform’.30 One can only wonder how the audience responded to 
such downbeat ‘celebrations’ of peace, which were part of what Duchhardt 
calls an ‘exculpatory’ campaign31 designed to explain (if not explain away) 
Germany’s fall into National Socialism as the perverse result of the nation’s 
political belatedness, its desperate attempt to assert a sovereign self.
The actual tercentenary exhibit mounted at the Münster Landesmuseum 
nevertheless seems to have taken a somewhat different tack or at least pre-
sented its public with an opportunity to engage in acts of memory that revised 
(or could even resist) these kinds of inherited narratives by participating in 
a more present-, if not also future-oriented, project of critical remembering.32 
No catalogue survives, but of its some five hundred items (described in an 
essay published by Paul Pieper a year after the exhibit closed), a certain num-
ber were of primarily local interest, including Gerard Terborch’s 1646 painting 
of the arrival of the Dutch ambassador, Adrian Pauw, in Münster for the Treaty 
negotiations. Citizens were thus to recall not only that it was in their home 
town that the peace had originally been performed—and was thus necessar-
ily to be performed again by them—but also that it was in all likelihood to be 
at the level of the local (rather than the national) that a new German identity 
would have to be sought. Duchhardt notes that there was a surprising lack of 
glossing interpretations or re-enactment dioramas of either the war’s deadly 
battles or the treaty negotiations and signing. Rather, the viewing public was 
exposed to ‘original’ materials from the period and left to draw their own 
conclusions, perhaps even to debate the significance of the historical events 
to which they referred. Most interesting is the fact that the final room of the 
exhibit, mounted in a museum where the majority of the rooms had yet to be 
rebuilt, was devoted to documenting a second time and place that thus appears 
to have been just as much on the organizers’ minds as the Treaty signing itself, 
namely, the so-called ‘negotiations regarding the implementation of the peace’ 
(the ‘Friedensexekutionsverhandlungen’) that took place in Nuremberg in 
1649–50. As vexed as the historical wrangling over the payment of reparations 
and debts and the stationing or withdrawal of occupying troops may have 
been in early modern Nuremberg in ways that would have clearly had post-
30    Ctd. in Ibid., 95–6.
31    Ibid., 99.
32    See Ibid., 102.
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1945 parallels,33 Duchhardt speculates that it may have been the intention of 
the exhibit to suggest that even this kind of not-entirely-‘optimal’ peace was to 
be preferred to the continuation of the war34 that had left their city in ruins. In 
any case, the Münster exhibit ended with a quite different sense of the future 
that Westphalia had produced for their country than the one Braibant curated 
in Paris. Acknowledging the realities of occupation rather than of enlargement 
and based on a clear-eyed presentation of the pros and cons of war and peace 
instead of a rousing patriotic show, the German tercentenary memory theatre 
in Münster thus ‘invented’ a 1648 that suited its own post-war sensibilities and 
political-ideological needs.
 Epilogue
Looking now at some distance at the ways in which the memory of the 1648 
Treaty of Westphalia travelled into the present in its tercentenary year of 1948 
may prompt us to consider how the ways in which the 1713 Peace of Utrecht 
was called onto centre stage in 2013 will themselves be remembered, perhaps 
also allegorically, by future generations. It remains open whether the two-act 
‘play’ about the several afterlives of Westphalia that I have staged here reveals 
performances that were more comic or more tragic, whether, that is, the vari-
ous historical actors, after apparent conflicts, might themselves have under-
stood the need for and embraced harmony at the end, or whether it is only we, 
as a latter-day spectator audience in the privileged position of having observed 
their division into two or more camps, can leave the theatre of history under-
standing these positions’ essential similarity and much better equipped to find 
our own new identity by playing a third, more peaceful role. As for the Peace 
of Utrecht: Here too it remains open which of the many memories of Utrecht 
staged in the present volume will be the ones that will be said to have figured 
early twenty-first century conditions and concerns. What is clear, however, is 
that as we remember, so will we be remembered in turn.
33    See Antje Oschmann, Der Nürnberger Exekutionstag 1649–1650: Das Ende des Dreissigjähri-
gen Krieges in Deutschland (Münster: Aschendorff, 1991).
34    Duchhardt, Das Feiern des Friedens, 102.
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CHAPTER 15
Peace Was Made Here: The Tercentennial  
of the Treaty of Utrecht, 2013–2015
Renger E. de Bruin
Performances of Peace, the topic of this volume, has been dealt with in the pre-
vious chapters with regard to the period of the Treaty of Utrecht itself. In this 
contribution, I will deal with the way this peace was commemorated 300 years 
later. The tercentennial, of which the conference ‘Performances of Peace’ was 
also a part, gave rise to debates both on its historical meaning and the political 
message for today. The tension between past and present in the celebration will 
be a major element of this article. A comparison with the jubilee of the other 
major peace treaty in early modern history, Westphalia, is easily made.1 In the 
previous chapter, Jane O. Newman deals with the tercentennial of the Peace of 
Westphalia in both France and Germany in the immediate post-war context.2 
In 1998, half a century later, 350 years of Westphalia was commemorated in the 
two peace cities of Münster and Osnabrück, as well as in the Netherlands. For 
the celebration of the Treaty of Utrecht, Westphalia 1998 served as a source 
of inspiration, but was not followed as an example. A major difference was 
the relative obscurity of 1713 among a wider audience, whereas 1648 had been 
widely known for a long time. The challenge of commemorating an unknown 
event is one of the topics in this article. I participated in both the Westphalia 
and Utrecht commemorations, so, in a way, it will a personal account of the 
commemoration projects. The international exhibition ‘Peace Was Made Here’ 
is the central element. This exhibition was organized by museums in four cities 
that hosted negotiations leading to treaties in the framework of the Treaty of 
Utrecht: Utrecht, Madrid, Rastatt and Baden. Like Westphalia 1998, the peace 
cities of the past were the commemoration venues of today. I will analyse the 
concept of this exhibition (based on academic research), its organization and 
its tercentennial context.
1    Renger E. de Bruin and Alexander Jordan, ‘Commemorations compared: Münster-Osnabrück 
(1998) and Utrecht-Rastatt-Baden (2013–2014), in Pax perpetua. Neuere Forschungen zum 
Frieden in der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. Inken Schmidt-Voges, Siegrid Westphal, Volker Arnke & 
Tobias Bartke (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2010) 81–100.
2    See chapter 14 in this volume.
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 Commemorating an Unknown Peace
During the celebrations in 2013 it was impossible to escape the peace of 300 
years ago in Utrecht and its surroundings. By the autumn of 2013 most inhab-
itants and visitors of the city must have noticed the flags, posters, adds, TV 
programs or the large picture by the British photographer Red Saunders on 
the town hall, even if they had not participated in one of the numerous activi-
ties organized by the commemoration committee, the ‘Stichting Vrede van 
Utrecht’ (Foundation Peace of Utrecht).3 A decade earlier, the Peace of Utrecht 
was a historical event unknown in the Netherlands and even in Utrecht itself. 
The few people who had a clue often mixed it up with the Union of Utrecht of 
1579. This ignorance of such an important event in the country where it took 
place, contrasted to the situation in Britain, where the Treaty of Utrecht had 
long been part of the well-known core of historical knowledge. In an episode of 
Monty Python’s Flying Circus, two miners in Wales get into an argument about 
whether the Treaty of Utrecht was concluded in 1713 or in 1714, causing a dan-
gerous situation a mile underground. John Cleese and his companions must 
have taken it for granted that the Treaty of Utrecht was widely known among 
their audience in order for them to make a point with their sketch.
The reason for this difference in appreciation is quite obvious. For the Dutch 
the Union of Utrecht as the founding of their nation and the Peace of Münster 
as the international recognition of their independence were far more glorious 
than the Treaty of Utrecht. The negotiations in Utrecht were rather humiliating 
for the Dutch envoys and the final results disappointing. The phrase from the 
French ambassador Melchior de Polignac: ‘nous traiterons chez vous, de vous 
et sans vous’ expressed the superiority of the great powers and fed the fear 
of an Anglo-French deal excluding the smaller allies.4 In the Dutch collective 
memory this phrase was symbolic for all the negative connotations with 1713. 
The Treaty of Utrecht marked the end of the Golden Age and the role of the 
Dutch Republic as a great power. For in the nationalist view of the nineteenth 
3    For an overview of the activities of the Tercentennial Foundation, both the preparations and 
the celebration in 2013, see: 9 jaar Stichting Vrede van Utrecht 2005–2013, ed. Lieke Hoitink and 
Petra Orthel (Utrecht: Stichting Vrede van Utrecht, 2013).
4    Cited by J.W. Gerard, The Peace of Utrecht (New York – London, 1885) 275–276; David 
Onnekink, ‘The Treaty of Utrecht 1713,’ in In Vredesnaam. De Vrede van Utrecht, Rastatt en 
Baden, 1713–1714/ Peace was made here. The Treaties of Utrecht, Rastatt and Baden, 1713–1714/ 
Friedensstädte. Die Verträge von Utrecht, Rastatt und Baden, 1713–1714, ed. Renger de Bruin 
and Maarten Brinkman (Michael Imhoff Verlag, Petersberg, 2013), 65. Exhibition catalogue 
for Centraal Museum Utrecht, Wehrgeschichtliches Museum Rastatt, Historisches Museum 
Baden). Alexander Jordan was co-editor of the German edition.
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century this peace should be forgotten rather than remembered like glorious 
periods such as the Eighty Years’ War. For the British, on the other hand, the 
Treaty of Utrecht was an enormous success, creating a balance of power in 
Europe and a British dominance at sea with an extension of overseas’ posses-
sions, notably in Canada. On the European continent, 1713 was overshadowed 
by the liberation from the French dominance exactly a century later.
So when the governments of the city and of the province of Utrecht decided 
to celebrate the tercentennial of the Treaty of Utrecht, it was quite a challenge 
to commemorate a forgotten event. The task was much more complicated than 
it had been in 1948 and 1998 for the Peace of Münster, in 1979 for the Union of 
Utrecht or in 1995, half a century after the liberation from the Nazis. Originally 
the tercentennial served as a historical occasion for the application to become 
European Cultural Capital in 2013. Due to the extension of the European Union 
the Netherlands’ next turn was five years later, but the decision was to be made 
in 2013. The ‘Stichting Vrede van Utrecht’ was commissioned to organize the 
commemoration and to bid for European Cultural Capital. The preparations by 
the Foundation for the tercentennial focused on the current political message 
of the Treaty of Utrecht rather than holding a primarily historical commemora-
tion such as 350 years Westphalia in 1998. In that sense, the 2013 tercentennial 
resembled that of Westphalia of 1948 described by Jane Newman: resurrected 
France and Germany looking for peace as a political message three years after 
the Second World War.5 Although European integration was an underlying 
thought in the 1998 commemoration, this was not as obvious in the festivities 
as it was in 1948 or 2013.
In this way the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Utrecht was meant as 
an overture for the nomination as European Cultural Capital. All the activi-
ties, from festivals and concerts to exhibitions and conferences, should serve 
to convince the European jury to opt for Utrecht. The presentation of the bid 
book in October 2012 clearly incorporated the perspective of the tercentennial 
of the Treaty of Utrecht and the organization of the Cultural Capital. Great 
was the disappointment, a month later, when Utrecht did not survive the first 
round. In the end, the northern city of Leeuwarden won the nomination and 
will serve as European Cultural Capital in 2018, together with Malta. Although 
the ‘Stichting Vrede van Utrecht’ had to give up on its final goal, it went on to 
make the tercentennial of the Treaty of Utrecht a success. On 21 September 2013 
the tercentennial finished off with a final manifestation, ‘Sound of Freedom,’ 
on the former NATO airbase Soesterberg. The evening with singers, speakers 
5    See chapter 14 in this volume.
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and a weapons demonstration, ended like the start of the show on 13 April (The 
Battle for Peace), with fireworks resembling the fireworks of 1713.6
 The Treaty of Utrecht as a Beacon of Peace for the  
Twenty-First Century
The commemoration committee emphasised the perspective of peace, toler-
ance and European integration. This program served as a counterbalance to 
populist tendencies in Dutch society during the preceding decade. In the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century the Netherlands was considered as a haven 
of tolerance and liberty, but after the turn of the century ethnic tensions came 
to the surface. In the wake of 9/11 a right-wing populist movement entered the 
political stage. Its leader, Pim Fortuyn, was killed in May 2002 by a left-wing 
activist. In November 2004 the controversial film director Theo van Gogh was 
assassinated by a Muslim fundamentalist. The rise of a new populist move-
ment led by Geert Wilders made him—an advocate of struggle against the 
political Islam and for restrictions on immigration—the best known Dutch 
politician abroad. His opponents desperately searched for arguments to coun-
ter his one-liners that brought him great success in the 2006 and 2010 general 
elections. History might offer such arguments: the tolerance of the seventeenth 
century protecting freethinkers such as René Descartes or Baruch de Spinoza, 
the waves of immigrants finding a new home in the Netherlands or the long 
tradition of ‘polder democracy,’ the politics of consensus dating back to Middle 
Ages. The Treaty of Utrecht might offer a new inspiration.
Current concerns were central in the events during the long preparation 
period as well as in the activities during the commemoration between April 
and September 2013. Central was a document, ‘the Utrecht Principles,’ signed 
by the then Crown Prince Willem Alexander in 2008. These principles, claimed 
to be derived from the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, implied: respect for cultural, 
ethnic and religious diversity; the power of art and multilingualism for social 
sustainability and, finally, exchange of knowledge of social cohesion and inno-
vation.7 It is not surprising that the authors of the Utrecht Principles did not 
quote articles from the 1713 treaty documents to underline the historical origin 
of these principles. With a more general approach to peace between  countries 
6    9 jaar Stichting Vrede van Utrecht, 96–101; 231. For a comparison between the fireworks of 1713 
and those of 2013, see chapter 13 in this volume.
7    ‘The Utrecht Principles,’ Stichting Vrede van Utrecht, http://www.vredevanutrecht2013.nl/
over/the-utrecht-principles, accessed 29 March 2015.
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and European cooperation, a message for today could have been derived 
from the preambles of the various 1713 treaties and the writings of the Abbé 
St. Pierre, who pleaded for a European security system. The opening sentence 
of the preamble of the British-French treaty of 11 April 1713 could have served 
as point of departure for a modern peace statement: ‘WHEREAS it has pleased 
Almighty God, for the glory of his name, and for the universal welfare, to direct 
the minds of Kings for the healing, now in his own time, the miseries of the 
wasted world, that they are disposed towards one another with a mutual desire 
of making peace’.8 However, the condemnation of racism was difficult to find 
in the original texts. As for the condemnation of slavery and slave trade, the 
treaty itself was quite to the contrary, since it gave the asiento de negros, the 
monopoly on the transatlantic trade in Africans on the Spanish colonies, to 
the British for 30 years. Nevertheless, a conference on the topic of slavery was 
organized on 21–22 June 2013. Other activities in Utrecht related to diversity 
were the festival Cross Culture (13–14 July 2013) and the project “The Peaceful 
City” (“De Vreedzame Stad”).9 This project, initiated by the local police, set 
examples of conflict control and co-operation, particularly in immigration 
neighbourhoods with high crime rates.
In Rastatt the title of the commemoration had a European peace mes-
sage: ‘Frieden für Europa—300 Jahre Rastatter Frieden 1714–2014’. However, 
the Rastatt version of ‘Peace Was Made Here’ at the Wehrgeschichtliches 
Museum and a staging of the events of 1714 at Rastatt Palace by museum 
director Alexander Jordan and castle curator Petra Pechacek had a historical 
undertone. The same was true for the exhibition at the Town Museum.10 A day 
devoted to German-French relations was organised in the light of friendship 
with the neighbouring Alsace. The texts of leaflets and programs were also in 
French. In Baden the message of peace for today was stronger than in Rastatt. 
The local government wanted to use the tercentennial for the promotion of 
the town both as a spa and a conference centre. During the official celebra-
tion (‘Festakt’) on 6 September 2014, the issues of mutual understanding and 
8     The Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the most Serene and most Potent Princess Anne, 
by the grace of God, Queen of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, and the most Serene and 
most Potent Prince Lewis, the XIVth, the most Christian King, concluded at Utrecht, the 
11. Day of April 1713. Wikisource, http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Peace_and_Friendship_
Treaty_of_Utrecht_between_France_and_Great_Britain; accessed 2 April 2015.
9     9 jaar Stichting Vrede van Utrecht, 140–147, 180–181.
10    See: Alexander Jordan and Petra Pechacek, ‘Frieden für Europa—300 Janhre Rastatter 
Frieden, 1714–2014, ein Rückblick,’ Der Bote aus dem Wehrgeschichtlichen Museum 46 
(2014): 4–11.
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European cooperation were underlined. Surprisingly enough, the Swiss town 
of Baden contained the strongest European element of the four cities, and EU 
bunting carried first in the parade of flags. National, regional and local poli-
ticians repeated the necessity of peace and European cooperation in their 
speeches. The city slogan ‘Baden ist’ was in this case ‘Baden ist. . . . Frieden ver-
handeln’ (Baden is negotiating peace).11 Near the railway station there arose an 
art project designed by a local sculptor: a peace bridge constructed with panels 
containing messages. On the closing day of the project, 25 January 2015, the last 
panel, signed by the curators of the exhibition, was fit in.
The political support was evident in all four venues. Politicians from local, 
regional and even national levels attended the openings of the commemora-
tions. In Utrecht the commemoration started with minting a special 10 euro 
coin by the Dutch Secretary of State for Finance in the city hall, followed by 
an opening act in the Centraal Museum: the unveiling of the showcase with 
the Franco-Dutch peace treaty of 11 April 1713 by the French ambassador 
in the Netherlands Pierre Ménat and the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Frans Timmermans. In the evening, a concert in Utrecht Cathedral with 
Handel’s Utrecht Te Deum was hosted by Queen Beatrix. It was to be one of her 
last public appearances before her abdication. The mayor of Utrecht and the 
head of the provincial government were present at all the opening events, as 
were foreign ambassadors and delegations from Rastatt and Baden. In Madrid 
the exhibition was opened by the ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence. 
In Rastatt the mayor, the prime minister of the state of Baden-Württemberg 
and Prince Bernhard of Baden (descendant of the last grand duke) hosted the 
opening. In Switzerland all political levels addressed the audience at the offi-
cial commemoration of the Treaty of Baden on 6 September 2014 with their 
pro-European messages.
 A European Exhibition as the Historical Anchor of the 
Commemorations
Whereas the Utrecht and the Baden commemorations had a strong contem-
porary, political character, the exhibitions in the Centraal Museum Utrecht 
and the Historisches Museum Baden emphasized historical elements. In their 
educational programs a link to the present was clearly made, but the presenta-
tion of the objects was historical. A slide show with images of war and peace 
11    For a project description of the Swiss venue see: Stafanie Brunschwiler and Carol Nater 
Cartier, Frieden verhandeln (Baden: Historisches Museum Baden, 2014).
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from the War of the Austrian Succession to the Syrian Civil War connected 
past and present. At the venues in Madrid and Rastatt the commemorations 
were not embedded in a contemporary context, although Rastatt presented 
the slide show and, like Utrecht and Baden, offered visitors the possibility 
to leave a personal peace message. The European exhibition project had as 
a common title in English: ‘Peace Was Made Here. The Treaties of Utrecht, 
Madrid, Rastatt and Baden’. Each partner was free to choose a name in the 
vernacular: ‘In Vredesnaam’, ‘En Nombre de la Paz’, ‘Frieden für Europa’ and 
‘Frieden verhandeln’.
All four venues had a chronological story line. In Utrecht and Rastatt 
European history was shown from the Reformation onwards, placing the Treaty 
of Utrecht into the perspective of the Wars of Religion and modifying the 
opinion that Westphalia was the end of this period. Both exhibitions started 
the show with a portrait of Martin Luther and ended with announcements of 
the peace in 1713/14 and an allegorical painting on the treaties of Utrecht and 
Rastatt. The difference between the two venues was the geographical focus 
(the Low Countries vs the Upper Rhine region) and the selection of objects, 
but the structure of the two was basically the same. Madrid showed a shorter 
time span (starting around 1660) and a geographical focus on Southern Europe, 
although the North Sea coasts and Rhine/Danube basin were not neglected. A 
painting of the Battle of Oudenaarde in Flanders even served as the logo of 
the Spanish exhibition.12 The Madrid venue focused on the war in Spain but 
placed it in the perspective of the pan-European conflict, adjusting the com-
mon view in Spain to see the War of the Spanish Succession primarily as a civil 
war. Their colleagues in Baden opted for more or less the same period, but 
paid much more attention to the aspect of the Swiss mercenaries that served 
both sides during the war. The new director of the Historisches Museum, Carol 
Nater Cartier, who took over from Barbara Welter in the spring of 2013, added 
a gender element, the role of women in the creation of policy at the courts. 
Although the Swiss venue did not start with the Reformation, the emphasis on 
religious conflict was as strong as in Utrecht and Rastatt. Iconic was a statue of 
Louis XIV trampling Heresy, a loan from the Palace of Versailles.13
The historical content of the selection was that of authentic artefacts. In 
all venues documents, paintings, sculptures, prints, medals etc. from the time 
12    The Battle of Oudenaarde by Joseph van Bredel, oil on canvas (1716), MOU City Hall, 
Oudenaarde, inv. nr. 01261, see: In Vredesnaam, ed. De Bruin & Brinkman, 144.
13    Louis XIV trampling Heresy, marble statue by Thomas Gobert, Musée National des 
Châteaux de Versailles et de Trianon, inv. nr. MV 8679. See De Bruin and Brinkman 
(ed.), 116.
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itself told the story. Central were original treaty documents with seals and 
signatures from the national archives of Austria, Spain and the Netherlands. 
In the Utrecht venue we showed the original Dutch-French treaty of 11 April 
1713. To emphasise the point that the Peace of Utrecht was not a single treaty 
we displayed this document together with printed versions of other bilateral 
treaties concluded in Utrecht, as well as printed editions of the treaties of 
Baden and Rastatt. We also showed a (contemporary) Dutch translation of the 
French text.
It was a long search for authentic objects; working through catalogues, 
books, articles, on-line databases, old-fashioned card-index boxes, and endless 
talks with colleagues at home and abroad. The aim was to find authentic arte-
facts to tell the story of war and peace. Most obvious were the abovementioned 
key documents, as well as portraits of protagonists (such as Louis XIV, Queen 
Anne, Prince Eugene of Savoy and the main negotiators in Utrecht). Pictures of 
events during the long period covered by the storyline of the exhibitions, from 
the tyranny of Alba to fireworks celebrating the peace of 1713 were welcome 
finds in the search. A challenge was to find a painting of the negotiations or the 
signing, similar to those of Münster and Nijmegen. For Utrecht, however, we 
only found engravings. A request for a loan of a painted group portrait of nego-
tiators in Baden from the collection of the Château de Versailles was refused 
because of its fragility. In a private collection in Hamburg we found an allegory 
on the treaties of Utrecht and Rastatt. It was a modello for a large painting by 
the Napolitan artist Paolo di Matteis, of which only a fragment has survived. 
The painting shows a self-portrait of di Matteis working on the allegorical mar-
riage of Habsburg and Flanders surrounded by traditional symbols of peace 
and references to the results of the treaties, e.g. the Vesuvius for the transfer 
of Naples to Austria.14 The painting was shown at all four venues. During the 
exhibition it was bought by the Centraal Museum Utrecht from the collector.
As in the 1948 and 1998 exhibitions on the Treaty of Westphalia, the num-
ber of objects representing war outnumbered those representing peace. For 
the 2013–2015 exhibition the most striking war-related element was a selec-
tion from a private collection of battlefield archaeology related to the Battle of 
Blenheim in 1704. The owner, a contractor in the Bavarian village of Blindheim 
(Blenheim), who permanently loans objects to Blenheim Palace and Schloss 
Höchstädt, generously offered a few hundred objects (bullets, weapons and 
even human remains) for the venues in Utrecht, Rastatt and Baden. For the vis-
itors the Blenheim scenery, together with an animation of the battle, was one 
14    Liesbeth M. Helmus, ‘Allegories on Peace: Nijmegen, Ryswick and Utrecht-Rastatt,’ in In 
Vredesnaam, ed. De Bruin & Brinkman, 94–96.
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of the elements in the exhibition that most impressed them. The Blindheim 
collection was one of the elements shown in most or all venues. Some objects, 
for example the portraits of Prince Eugene of Savoy and Marshal Villars, who 
fought as commanders against each other, but who made peace in Rastatt and 
in Baden as envoys for their sovereigns, served to illustrate both warfare and 
the peace negotiations.
In Madrid the picture of a battle (Oudenaarde 1708) served as the icon of 
the exhibition on banners, posters, leaflets and the catalogue, while Utrecht 
used a fragment of the allegorical painting by Paolo di Matteis, Rastatt a photo 
of the Residential Palace and Baden an engraving made on the occasion of the 
negotiations in 1714.
The artefacts representing war and peace came from eighty-six collec-
tions from eight different countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). It was a wide 
range of collections, including those from famous institutions like the British 
Museum, the Prado, the Château de Versailles, the Bibliothèque Nationale or 
the Alte Pinakotek. However, local museums and private collectors, such as the 
contractor in Blindheim, also offered their contributions to the exhibition. A 
small selection travelled along all four venues, a larger number was shown on 
two or three venues and some only by one of the participants. The differences 
in selection had to do with the focus, costs of transport, and the availability 
of objects. Works on paper or textiles, for example, can be shown only for a 
limited period for conservation reasons. Despite these differences the exhibi-
tions on the four venues all told the story of the Treaty of Utrecht as the end of 
a large European conflict.
 Research as a Base for an Exhibition
The team preparing the international historical exhibition strove vigorously for 
a content based on recent academic research. In that sense, the project resem-
bled the commemoration of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1998. The Münster 
and Osnabrück shows in particular were rich in objects and information fed by 
the work of many scholars and counselled by a ‘Wissenschaftlicher Beirat’.15 
The research was published in a three volume catalogue.16 In the exhibition 
15    De Bruin and Jordan, 82–86.
16    Klaus Bußmann & Heinz Schilling (ed.), 1648, Krieg und Frieden in Europa/1648, War 
and Peace in Europe 3 vol. (Münster-Osnabrück: Veranstaltungsgesellschaft 350 Jahre 
Westfälischer Friede mbH, 1998).
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a large number of artefacts was shown, 1260 of which were described in the 
 catalogue. It was all impressive, maybe overwhelming for the common visitor. 
For the 1713 commemoration we wanted to avoid this. It was our aim to make 
an exhibition that derived its content from recent research, but presented in an 
understandable and easy way. We wanted to filter the information, so to speak. 
Alexander Jordan, Bernardo García and I served as intermediaries between the 
specialists in the field and the exhibition teams. We attended conferences and 
spoke intensely with the participants. David Onnekink in particular was an 
important partner in this respect.
Most authors of the exhibition catalogue were recruited from the confer-
ences on peace in early modern Europe held in Osnabrück, Madrid and Utrecht 
between 2008 and 2013. Maarten Brinkman and I edited the catalogue, which 
was published in Dutch, German and English, serving the Utrecht, Rastatt 
and Baden venues.17 This catalogue was much smaller than the Münster-
Osnabrück one previously mentioned: only 190 pages, containing nine essays 
and 95 descriptions of artefacts, a selection of the objects shown at the venues. 
The separate catalogue (in Spanish only), issued by the Fundación Carlos de 
Amberes and edited by Bernardo García, also benefited from the conference 
series. This publication had the same outline: essays by specialists and descrip-
tions of the artefacts, in this case all 78.18
The curators of the exhibition adapted the information further with their 
educational colleagues. It was their task to tell the story of the peace to specific 
target groups. This was a new stage in translating knowledge. While the cura-
tors had used the results of academic research to develop a comprehensible 
exhibition concept, this concept now had to be tailored to specific groups such 
as school children, elderly visitors etc. Also, the educational staff developed 
products like an audio guide or games for the general audience. They checked 
and adapted the texts and animations for the visitors, e.g. the target groups. 
A European Negotiation Game was developed especially for the exhibition. 
Guided by a game master, visitors could act like participants at the negotia-
tion table. This table was a world map, which roughly represented the situ-
ation of 1712. The players had to fulfil their assignment with cards, dices and 
pawns. Families as well as staff members of the history department of the 
Rijksmuseum played this game with great enthusiasm. By doing so they pro-
cessed the knowledge acquired during the exhibition visit. Their conversations 
17    In Vredesnaam, ed. De Bruin & Brinkman.
18    Bernardo García (ed.), En Nombre de la Paz. La Guerra de Sucsesión Española y los Tratodos 
de Madrid, Utrecht, Rastatt y Baden 1713–1715 (Madrid: Fundación Carlos de Amberes, 
2013).
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with the game masters also contributed to digest the impression the exhibition 
made, sometimes in quite an emotional way. The way artefacts were presented 
proved important for bringing across the message to the audience. An attrac-
tive design makes the message stronger, but it should not be too dominant. 
Curators need to find a balance between aesthetics and content. For ‘Peace 
Was Made Here,’ the Utrecht and Baden venues hired professionals from 
respectively Amsterdam and Zurich. Rastatt and Madrid made the presenta-
tion in-house, although Rastatt used elements of the Utrecht presentation, 
as did Baden. The designs were very much appreciated. The designers of the 
Utrecht venue, De Vrijer & Van Dongen, were even awarded a silver medal by 
the European Design Awards in Cologne, on 24 May 2014.19
Despite the popularization of the topic, essential new conclusions from the 
research front were incorporated: the questioning of the Treaty of Westphalia 
as the end of religious warfare with a stronger emphasis on the confessional 
element in the politics of Louis XIV and his adversaries, the impact of war on 
society, the role of the financial sector and the culture of peace conferences in 
early modern Europe. To demonstrate these conclusions, the curators selected 
appealing objects such as the sculpture of Louis XIV trampling Heresy, skulls 
from the Blenheim battlefield and a money carriage used at the Amsterdam 
stock exchange from the Dutch Royal Collections. These artefacts stand for 
the continuity in religious warfare, the atrocities of war and the financing of 
warfare. The labels given to these objects, the descriptions in the catalogue, 
the related essays in the same catalogue, the audio guide, the children’s pro-
gram; all these elements served to translate the results of academic research 
to the various target groups. From questionnaires and reactions of visitors to 
the game master, guards and curators it was evident that visitors understood 
and appreciated the new insights. A relatively unknown episode in history had 
been brought to the attention of professional historians, policy makers and the 
general public.
During the conference of which this volume is the book of proceedings, the 
international experts could reflect on the exhibition. The final session took 
place in the Centraal Museum and after an introduction the participants vis-
ited the exhibition. Such an interaction also took place with students. David 
Onnekink and I gave a BA/thesis course on the War of the Spanish Succession 
and the Treaty of Utrecht at the History Department of Utrecht University for 
three years entitled ‘World War 0.1’. One of the tasks given to students was to 
develop an exhibition concept on a subject related to the theme of the course, 
19    ‘De Vrijer van Dongen,’ Centraal Museum, Utrecht. http://www.devrijervandongen.nl, 
accessed 26 April 2015.
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for example Queen Anne’s War, the role of the Duke of Marlborough, the court 
of Philip V or religious propaganda. The participants of the third year (2013–
2014) could visit the exhibition in the Centraal Museum a few weeks before 
its dismantling at the end of September 2013. The students could match their 
ideas about transferring academic knowledge to an exhibition with what they 
saw in the museum.
 The Exhibition as a European Cooperation Project
From the start it was evident that the commemoration project had to be a 
European event. The initiative was taken by Utrecht, but foreign contacts were 
made at an early stage. In keeping with the cultural capital bid, connections 
with Brussels and the cultural capitals during the preparatory period were self-
evident, but connections were also made with Malta, the EU Member State 
co-organizing the event in 2018. Utrecht had already developed common proj-
ects with Maltese counterparts from 2006 onwards. On the academic research 
front the international conference series and the contacts connected to these 
have just been mentioned.
For the curators of the historical exhibition a European dimension was 
intended from the start, not only in content, but also in organization, even 
in the choice of venues. Museums in Rastatt and Baden were contacted at 
an early stage since the treaties of Rastatt and Baden of 1714 are so closely 
connected to the Treaty of Utrecht in the realm of historiography. Both the 
Wehrgeschichtliches Museum Rastatt and the Historisches Museum Baden 
responded enthusiastically to the Utrecht request to join the project. The 
Rastatt Museum was later joined by Staatliche Schlösser und Gärten Baden-
Württemberg (SSG). Talks with French and British museums eventually did 
not result in cooperation, but via the conference line the preparation group 
came into contact with the Fundación Carlos de Amberes in Madrid. The foun-
dation has as its mission the fostering of cultural historical ties between Spain 
and the former Spanish Netherlands. According to its website ‘the Foundation 
cooperates via all sorts of cultural, political and scientific initiatives with those 
countries—Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg and northern France—in 
the adventure of building a common space: a united Europe.’20 In view of this, 
an exhibition on the Treaty of Utrecht fitted in with the core of its mission. 
So, the Fundación entered the project in the Summer of 2011. Since one of the 
20    ‘The Objectives of the Foundation,’ Fondacion Carlos de Amberes. http://www. fcamberes 
.org/paginas/en/en_stc_pre.htm, accessed 12 April 2012.
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separate treaties constituting the complex that formed the Treaty of Utrecht 
was signed in Madrid, the concept for the exhibition cooperation was that the 
cities of peace in 1713–1715 were to be the venues of the commemorations three 
hundred years later.
Shortly after the Fundación joined the cooperation, we applied for a Euro-
pean grant. The program Culture 2007 of the European Commission offered 
the possibility of a substantial financial support for the exhibition. Unfor-
tunately the Swiss partner could not be a beneficiary since Switzerland was 
excluded from the program, not being an EU Member State, associate or can-
didate Member State, nor being part of the European Economic Area.21 Never-
theless Baden remained a full partner in the project. For the application, this 
was all rather complicated. It had to be stated that the Swiss partner would not 
benefit from the grant, but on the other hand we made clear that Baden was 
the final stage of the exhibition tour. This was solved by planning the Baden 
commemoration after the end of the grant period. This period was set for July 
2012 till June 2014 and the signing of the Treaty of Baden was 7 September 1714 
making the opening of the tercentennial exhibition 7 September 2014.
Essential to the application was the meaning of the Treaty of Utrecht for 
European history as a crucial moment in the development between a conti-
nent torn apart by religious conflict and the pursuit of hegemony, to a system 
of balance between great powers. Three hundred years later the cities hosting 
negotiations in 1712–1715 were the venues of the commemoration exhibition. 
In the application the link between past and present was made clear with a 
historical role for the exhibitions and catalogues and the transfer to the present 
through educational programs. The application was awarded with 87 points 
out of 100 (with a threshold for granting at 76 points). The grant was 200,000 
euros on a total budget of 1.2 million (including salaries and overhead costs). 
The EU funded part of the project started in July 2012 and ended two years later. 
During the period the realization of three exhibition venues (Utrecht, Madrid 
and Rastatt) took place as well as two conferences (Madrid and Utrecht).22
Writing the application and the final report was complicated and time con-
suming. Complicated forms had to be filled out in order to meet the finan-
cial and legal rules of the EU. In the final report emphasis was placed on the 
21    In the new program Culture 2014–2020 the rules have been changed; Switzerland is now 
included.
22    For the proceedings of Madrid conference (2012) see: Vísperas de Succesión. Europa y la 
Monarquía de Carlos II, ed. Bernardo J. García García and A. Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño 
(Madrid: Fundación Carlos de Amberes, 2015). This volume is the book of proceedings for 
the Utrecht conference of April 2013.
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 financial figures, showing that the project management was sound. However, 
we also demonstrated, through the number of visitors, reactions and press 
reviews, that we had succeeded in bringing across the meaning of the Peace of 
Utrecht as a milestone in European history. This indeed has been the accom-
plishment of the commemoration project: to have placed Utrecht in line with 
the great peace treaties, between Westphalia and Vienna. In the report we 
emphasized the importance of new academic research translated to a general 
audience of museum visitors, readers and event participants.
Apart from the international connection, the exhibition project also 
had a local embedding. The shows in the Centraal Museum Utrecht and in 
the Wehrgeschichtliches Museum Rastatt were related to other museums in 
town. In Utrecht this happened under the umbrella of the ‘Stichting Vrede van 
Utrecht’. The Utrecht Archive showed the impact of the negotiations on local 
society, the National Museum on Religious Art and History Catharijneconvent 
worked with the topic of tolerance in early modern history, the Dutch Railway 
Museum displayed the role of trains in warfare and the University Museum 
showed the dilemmas of justice and reconciliation after conflicts (Yugoslavia, 
Uganda).23 The Rastatt exhibition was related to a common presentation 
at the local museum and the local archive on war and peace in the Upper 
Rhine Region.
 Reactions from Press and Visitors
In the application to the EU the importance of good communication and a 
sound promotional plan was emphasized. It was stated that the exhibition as 
well as the education and participation program could be considered as com-
munication tools: to communicate the abomination of war, the importance 
of the Treaties, and of dialogue and diplomacy in general for a peaceful and 
tolerant Europe. The ‘Peace Was Made Here’ project provided a unique oppor-
tunity to have older and younger target groups interacting: it combined a topic 
which had the natural attention of the elderly, with the use of digital media 
which appealed to the younger target groups. In the ‘Studio,’ interaction was 
stimulated and elderly became more familiar with digital media. An inter-
national symposium discussing the experiences with participation based on 
the ‘Studio’ concept, was held in Utrecht on 23 September 2014. The sympo-
sium was organized by the Centraal Museum and presided over by director 
Edwin Jacobs.
23    9 jaar Stichting Vrede van Utrecht, 70–79.
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The ‘Peace Was Made Here’ project and its message were disseminated by 
press releases, press conferences, interviews, presentations, flyers, posters, 
advertisements on radio, TV, magazines and newspapers etc. In these mes-
sages the topicality of a historical subject and the thrill of authentic objects 
were emphasized. The media picked up on it eagerly. None of the four venues 
could complain of a lack of media attention. Local, national and international 
journalists came to the exhibitions and interviewed the curators. The national 
eight o’clock news in the Netherlands and Germany filmed in the exhibitions 
and interviewed the curators. There was even a film crew from Canada at the 
Utrecht venue. The result was broadcast from 25 August 2014.24 The atten-
tion of the media was also wide in Spain. Already at an early stage the foreign 
media were informed, through an international press conference in Utrecht 
in September 2012. The articles in the press and other media were mostly very 
positive. 
In Utrecht, Rastatt and Baden the exhibitions could benefit from the com-
munication and promotion activities for the tercentennial in the three cities. 
The ‘Stichting Vrede van Utrecht’ and the cities of Rastatt and Baden promoted 
the commemoration for months, from April to September 2013, from March 
to July 2014 and from September 2015 to January 2015 respectively. The three 
museums closely cooperated with the local tourist offices and other museums 
in town. The closest link was that between the Wehrgeschchtliches Museum 
and the Staatliche Schlösser und Gärten Baden-Württemberg (SSG). The 
Castle Foundation was in charge of the communication for both the exhibi-
tion ‘Frieden in Europa’ and the scenery in the Palace.
Crucial events were the openings of the exhibitions. The first was on 11 April 
2013 in Utrecht with the already mentioned ceremony attended by Dutch 
Foreign Minister Timmermans and the French Ambassador Ménat, as well 
as a commemorative concert in Utrecht Cathedral in the presence of Queen 
Beatrix of the Netherlands (three weeks before her abdication). The opening 
of the Madrid venue with the ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence and 
a row of European ambassadors attracted wide press attention. The third 
inauguration took place in Rastatt on 6 March 2014 with the prime minister 
of Baden-Württemberg and Prince Bernhard of Baden, member of the grand 
ducal dynasty that built the Palace of Rastatt. This event also drew wide media 
attention. Local, regional and national media paid attention to ‘Frieden für 
Europa’. From the opposite banks of the Rhine Les Dernières Nouvelles d’Alsace 
paid attention to the tercentennial in Rastatt. Furthermore, the local newspa-
pers in Rastatt wrote about the exhibitions in Utrecht and Madrid.
24    Les Sceaux d’Utrecht, produced by Mozus Productions, Moncton, N-B.
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The communication resulted in rising visitor numbers. In Utrecht more 
than 53,000 people visited the exhibition, in Rastatt WGM welcomed 15,000, 
SSG also 15,000 for the peace location in the Palace and 10,000 people attended 
the ‘Schlosserlebnistag’. The exhibition in the city museum drew 4,000 visi-
tors. A few hundred of visitors attended the lecture program. The exhibition 
in Madrid attracted almost 8,000 visitors while the museum in Baden counted 
over 5,000. The Madrid and Baden numbers seem to be disappointing, but 
these two partners are small institutions. For the Historisches Museum ‘Baden 
ist Frieden verhandeln’ even resulted in an all-time high record of visitors.
 Conclusion
Maybe I was a bit ironical about the peace message in the tercentennial of the 
Treaty of Utrecht. Some elements, such as the claim of the ‘Utrecht Principles’ 
to be derived from the treaty, were indeed rather far-fetched. However, a com-
memoration of an event hitherto unknown outside the circle of professional 
historians would never have been possible without the broad support that was 
generated by the political interest in the subject. 1713 was simply not as well-
known as 1648 to justify an elaborate and costly historical commemoration. 
Local, regional and national authorities facilitated the preparations and the 
realization of the project and the EU- grant even lifted it to an international 
level. This support gave us the time to prepare an exhibition that translated 
the results of recent research to a wider audience. The link with the academic 
research front was a series of conferences, one of which was ‘Performances of 
Peace’. Curators of the exhibition participated and transferred the knowledge to 
concepts and contents of the museum shows. The story was told with authentic 
objects from dozens of collections in eight European countries. Closest to the 
realm of research were the catalogues with descriptions of objects and essays 
by participants of the conferences. The exhibitions with texts, labels and ani-
mations made the information highly accessible to the visitors and the con-
frontation with the authentic objects gave them the thrill of experiencing the 
past. The skulls and bullets from the battlefield of Blenheim and the seals and 
signatures on the treaty documents made the early Eighteenth century visible. 
Reactions from the visitors and reviews in the media confirmed our opinion 
that we had conveyed the story to the public. This worked in The Netherlands, 
Spain, Germany and Switzerland. The tercentennial of the Treaty of Utrecht 
was thus a successful performance of peace at four different national stages.
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